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Abstract
This thesis focuses primarily on the work of the Valencian 
poet, Ausias March (1398 - 1459), who was revered by the first two 
generations of Petrarquistas- in Golden Age Spain, and in particular 
by Juan Boscan and Garcilaso de la Vega. It has long been contended 
that the introduction of Ficinian Neoplatonism in Spain by Boscan’s 
translation of II Cortegiano, and Garcilaso*s assimilation of Bembo's 
Petrarchism, represents a radical shift in sensibility, unprecedented 
in the Iberian peninsula. The object of this thesis is to demonstrate
that because Ausias March is a Lullian poet who manifests an evangelical- 
Platonic sensibility, and is not a "troubadour attarde" as Amedee Pag’es 
thought, the introduction of the Italianate fashion by Boscan and 
Garcilaso is not a radical departure from their earlier allegiance, but
a development.
The poetry of Ausias March is remarkable for its
introspection. Consequently, the interpretation of his work must 
begin with an analysis of his use of the theory of imagination, which
he inherited through the literary influence of the Chartrians and
Victorines of the twelfth century, and,in particular, from Hughes de
Saint Victor. The importance of introspection and imagination naturally
entails the question of the extremes of melancholy, as it is understood
in the mediaeval tradition of Aristotle’s Problem XXX, i. After a 
survey of the role of melancholy imagination in Ausias March’s poetry, 
the function of these two closely related concepts is analysed in Ficino’s 
Commentarium in Convivium , Hebreo’s Dialoghi, Bembo’s Gli Asolani, and 
Castiglione’s 11 Cortegiano. This enables one to determine that the 
Florentine theory of love is not insulated from passion, as many literary
critics imply. The dialectical relation of natural reason to Augustinian
right reason evinces the extremes of imagination and melancholy, as either
lunacy or divine rapture. These elements of Florentine Neoplatonism
reveal a deep concern for the difficult relation of the body to the 
soul, and, ultimately, a conscious search for ascesis.
These elements, which are common to Ausias March and the
Florentine Neoplatonists, are an expression of the Augustinian doctrine
of Charity. The common factor between Ausias March and the Florentines 
is the pseudo-Dionysian - Erigenian concept of beauty. The latter is
fundamental to what M. D. Chenu has defined as the secular evangelical
current in Europe. It is a sensibility based on a consciousness of the
all-pervasive presence of grace in nature, which is articulated in the 
symbolic mentality of Christian Platonists. This aspect of Ausias March1s 
work is central to Chapter V. In order to avoid creating the impression 
that this interpretation of Ausias March’s poetry is anachronical this 
chapter studies the significance of an important segment of this poet’s 
imagery. This serves to contrast Ausias March’s use of the pseudo­
Dionysian - Erigenian concept of beauty and his consequent handling of 
the concepts of melancholy and imagination to that used by Andreas 
Capellanus. Finally, this analysis illustrates Ausias March’s
predominantly symbolic mentality, as well as his exceptional use of 
medical theory which distinguishes him from the vast majority of Spanish 
cancionero poets, and emphasizes his many points of affinity with the
Florentine Neoplatonists.
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Abstract
This thesis focuses primarily on the work of the Valencian 
poet, Ausias March (1398 - 1459), who was revered by the first two 
generations of Petrarquistas in Golden Age Spain, and in particular
by Juan Boscan and Garcilaso de la Vega. It has long been contended
z
that the introduction of Ficinian Neoplatonism in Spain by Boscan’s 
translation of II Cortegiano, and Garcilaso's assimilation of Bembo’s 
Petrarchism, represents a radical shift in sensibility, unprecedented
in the Iberian peninsula. The object of this thesis is to demonstrate 
that because Ausias March is a Lullian poet who manifests an evangelical- 
Platonic sensibility, and is not a "troubadour attarde" as Amedee Pag*es 
thought, the introduction of the Italianate fashion by Boscan and
Garcilaso is not a radical departure from their earlier allegiance, but
a development.
The poetry of Ausias March is remarkable for its 
introspection. Consequently, the interpretation of his work must 
begin with an analysis of his use of the theory of imagination, which
he inherited through the literary influence of the Chartrians and
Victorines of the twelfth, century, and,in particular, from Hughes de
Saint Victor. The importance of introspection and imagination naturally 
entails the question of the extremes of melancholy, as it Is understood 
in the mediaeval tradition of AristotleTs Problem XXX, i. After a 
survey of the role of melancholy imagination in Ausias March’s poetry, 
the function of these two closely related concepts is analysed in Ficino’s 
Commentarium in Convivium , Hebreo’s Dialoghi, Bembo’s Gli Asolani, and 
Castiglione’s II Cortegiano. This enables one to determine that the 
Florentine theory of love is not insulated from passion, as many literary 
critics imply. The dialectical relation of natural reason to Augustinian 
right reason evinces the extremes of imagination and melancholy, as either 
lunacy or divine rapture. These elements of Florentine Neoplatonism
reveal a deep concern for the difficult relation of the body to the 
soul, and, ultimately, a conscious search for ascesis.
These elements, which are common to Ausias March and the
Florentine Neoplatonists, are an expression of the Augustinian doctrine 
of Charity. The common factor between Ausias March and the Florentines 
is the pseudo-Dionysian - Erigenian concept of beauty. The latter is 
fundamental to what M. D. Chenu has defined as the secular evangelical
current in Europe. It is a sensibility based on a consciousness of the 
all-pervasive presence of grace in nature, which is articulated in the 
symbolic mentality of Christian Platonists. This aspect of Ausias March’s 
work is central to Chapter V. In order to avoid creating the impression 
that this interpretation of Ausias March’s poetry is anachronical this 
chapter studies the significance of an important segment of this poet’s 
imagery. This serves to contrast Ausias March’s use of the pseudo­
Dionysian - Erigenian concept of beauty and his consequent handling of 
the concepts of melancholy and imagination to that used by Andreas 
Capellanus. Finally, this analysis illustrates Ausias March’s 
predominantly symbolic mentality, as well as his exceptional use of 
medical theory which distinguishes him from the vast majority of Spanish 
cancionero poets, and emphasizes his many points of affinity with the
Florentine Neoplatonists.
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FOREWORD
Some questions may arise in the mind of the reader
concerning the order and style of this work. As a thesis it is 
intended for those already quite familiar with Ausiasmarquian 
scholarship. It is the demonstration of a hypothesis on literary 
history. As such, the style and order are determined by a sustained 
effort of logical argumentation (par un& Zogique serre&) within 
the intended purpose. The style is often harsh, but, I hope, clear 
in its austerity.
My object was to demonstrate that, because Ausias March, 
as a Lullian poet, manifests an evangelical Platonic sensibility in 
his usage of the rhetorical theory of imagination according to 
Victorine-Chartrian canons, the introduction of the Platonico-
Petrarchan sensibility in Golden Age Spain by his- admirers, Juan 
Boscan and Garcilaso de la Vega, did not represent a radical shift
in sensibility, but a development. In order to demonstrate this 
hypothesis, I had to shew that: a) Ausias March’s poetry was 
based on a certain conception of Imagination, and what implications 
this had; b) that this conception also affects M. Ficino, and 
then, his followers whose works were the vehicles of the Italianate 
sensibility in Spain. Premiss a required that I evince the presence 
of the Victorine-Chartrian theory of imagination in Ausias March, 
and only subsequently that I illustrate the dynamics of this theory 
in the significance of his imagery. Premiss b required that I shew 
that imagination played an important role in the thought of the
Florentine Neoplatonists, and that I demonstrate that their theory
of love does not presuppose a divorce from passion and instinct.
The logical development of these themes was thus determined by 
reference to the concept of imagination and its correlative,
melancholy.
Hence, Chapter 1 presents the hypothesis and background 
information. Chapter II re-assesses the biographical interpretation 
of Ausias March. Chapter III is an analysis of the Chartrian- 
Victorine rhetorical theory of imagination and its function in 
Ausias March’s poetry. Chapter IV surveys the evangelical background 
of the Florentines and their usage of imagination, and is de facto 
the conclusion. In order to avoid the accusation of anachronism, 
and because many hispanists following O.H. Green associate ’’courtly 
love” with Platonism and Christian immorality, Chapter V substantiates 
my thesis. It analyses the implications of imagination in Andreas 
Capellanus, and how Ausias March diverges from this ’’courtly love” 
in his use of imagery. Chapter VI concludes with a final re-assessment
In a book many things would differ, especially in the 
format; and this would affect the style. For instance, the background 
would be expanded considerably. Chapter II would have to repeat 
the biography of Ausias March, before presenting contrary arguments. 
Chapter III would also integrate much of the background information 
that I have put in referencial notes, and probably be split in two.
Chapter V would also be split into at least two chapters, and precede
the present Chapter IV, which would be a second part of the book,
and split into four chapters. This would entail considerable
expansion at the expense of the thesis’ concision.
Four more points may need clarification. First the
frightening bulk of the thesis is illusory. It actually consists
of some four hundred pages, one quarter of which are translations 
of the Latin texts quoted. Hence, this thesis is not as long as it
may seem. Appendix I might have been a chapter, however, it only
elucidates a point which is a foregone conclusion in the premiss
that Ausias March is a Lullian poet, hence, it is accessory and 
not vital to the thesis. Appendix II represents a preliminary work,
which I had to do in order to understand the function of Ausias
March’s imagery. As a reference work it is a convenient catalogue, 
which I do not accept as a thesis, for, although it might be 
considered so in certain places, it does not uphold a proposition,
that is, it has no thesis. I have only included it here for the 
reader’s convenience and curiosity. Finally, the footnote system 
that I follow in each chapter, is used to substantiate and clarify 
points made in the text, especially concerning the interpretation
of difficult verses. These notes contain discussions and additional
references, hence I did not use the PMLA style of thesis footnotes
which would have led to an endless maze of brackets. In accordance
with the regulations of this university consistency was my guide.
I uniformly used a bibliographical note style in the footnotes, 
which has the advantage of being clear.
1CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The literature of the fifteenth century portrays a period of
extreme social crisis and reorientation in Europe. It is not only
the period of humanist renewal, but also the culmination of the feu- 
1dal disintegration begun in the twelfth century. Perhaps more than
in the two preceding centuries writers felt the need to re-assess
social values. This change in sensitivity can be seen in certain 
2authors by the return to philosophical poetry. Hence, an important 
section of fifteenth-century poetry is directly affected by the 
’’scientific" knowledge of that period, and adapts itself to the 
changing circumstances, within the medium of the courtly lyric, either
by re-working old themes or seeking new alternatives. In the context 
of the study of Spanish literature, aspects of this problem seem to 
have become lost or confused by the critics’ tendency to examine the 
culture of the Spanish peninsula as a unit. The particularities of 
regional cultural evolutions are overlooked. Perhaps in order to 
avoid complexities, it has been the custom of literary historians to 
stress "Spain’s Cultural ’Belatedness’". Although there is an 
element of truth in this concept, particularly applicable to Castile, 
one should note that this unilateral interpretation not only over­
looks individual spontaneity, but also creates anachronisms.
Whereas it may be true that fifteenth-century Castile under- 
4went a belated "troubadour-revival", such an evaluation is hazard­
ous in the Catalan context. Although very close political and cul­
tural bonds unite Castile and Catalonia today, one must bear in mind
that prior to the reign of Isabel and Ferdinand the extent of the
subsequent cultural annexation of Catalonia could not be foreseen.
2Kings the insularity of Castile was in sharp contrast with the Euro­
pean expansionism of Catalonia. In his magistral study of that period
Amedee Pages has pointed out that through the marriage of Joan I el 
5Humanists and Violante de Bar French poetry came to play an impor­
tant role in the intellectual development of fifteenth-century 
Catalonia. In spite of its noteworthy exactitude Pages’ study, La 
poesie franqaise en Catalogne, has one serious defect. In accordance
with the criticism prevalent at the time at which this book was
written, Pages interprets the works of Oton de Granson, Guillaume de
Machaut and Alain Chartier as a direct prolongation of the ’’courtly
love tradition’’ of the Provencal troubadours, which he opposes to the 
£
Italianate love tradition and the incipient Petrarchism. Yet, in 
the fourteenth-century French literary modes were breaking away from 
the previous courtly love tradition. The influence of a nascent 
humanism re-oriented poetry towards a greater introspection, and away 
from the notion of poetry as a means of social entertainment only.
It is primarily philosophical poetry. D. Porion defines this new 
direction of courtly poetry as the expression of a more personal
experience:
Le lyrisme est d’abord entraine vers un enrichissement des images 
sensibles, puis vers une reevaluation de 1’amour en fonction de la 
vie concrete, vers un approfondissement de la vie interieure dans la 
tristesse, enfin vers une sagesse eclairee par une culture morale 
plus humaniste mais toujours orientee vers Dieu.?
Among the various contributions to the theory of courtly love devel­
oped by these poets, introspection, heightened by the anguish of 
rejection and solitude, is by far the most important. The popularity
of La Belle Dame Sans Merci and the cultivation of the theme of
g
’’tristesse” in fifteenth-century Catalan literature are definite
Indeed, in the hundred years prior to the accession of the Catholic
evidence of the impact of French poetry on that culture. This
orientation of the theory of courtly love led to the study and culti­
vation of the medical and philosophical notions of melancholy, which
9are fundamental to the development of Florentine Neoplatonism,
The medical literature concerning melancholy is part of the uninter­
rupted, if temporarily submerged, bond that makes the Florentines the 
heirs of the Chartrian tradition.As it became more philosophical 
the courtly lyric was a natural medium for the development of the 
theory of melancholy.
The evolution of courtly literature towards the description
of the lover’s “interior life” is paralleled by a development in the
nature and significance of imagery. In this context one must note
that the increased importance of Imagination in the image-making
process, oriented poetic theory towards a kind of “Platonism". It is
in the use and significance of this imagery that the double nature of
melancholy can be found. Although this problem seems to have been
overlooked, within the limits of the study of courtly love poetry,
11the discussion of the problem of melancholy in the Middle Ages 
focused primarily on Aristotle's Problem XXX, I. The latter repre­
sents: “a point in history when Platonism and Aristotelianism inter-
12penetrate and balance one another". After the near eclipse of
Chartrian Platonism in the thirteenth century, caused by the intro- 
13duction of the Aristotelian corpus in thirteenth-century Europe,
14it was, among other sources, largely through medical and hermetic 
texts concerned with the problem of melancholy that Platonism survived 
through the fourteenth century before regaining its vitality at the 
end of the fifteenth in Florence.Although I shall return below
to the problem of melancholy in the development of courtly love
16theory, it is important to point out here that the contribution of 
the French poets is to be found mainly in their usage of imagery,
3
4one-sided; although it may sometimes seem to repeat the traditional 
motifs of the troubadours, it brings new vitality and significance.
Just as courtly love should not be viewed as a single and unchanging 
formula,I? so must the imagery of courtly love be allowed semasiolog- 
ical variance. In a study on the function of mediaeval imagery 
Douglas Kelly has explicitly described this problem:
The play of meaning and sentiment on the literal level elicits a more 
penetrating and refined understanding of the ideas the Images articu­
late, whether as metonymy or allegory. This allows for variation 
from one text or situation to another, in accordance with semantic 
adaptation, authorial intention and understanding, and consequently 
choice of Images - in short with authorial finesse. And it flies in 
the face of the oft-heard but superficial allegation that courtly 
poetry is monotonous and monolithic.18
An author’s usage of imagery is not merely ornamental, it has an 
intrinsic significance of its own, that either complements or tran­
scends the didactic or discursive sections of a literary text. It is
in fact the section that best reveals "authorial intention’! “
An image can serve either as a mere rhetorical ornament, or
as an instrument used to convey a particular meaning. The Chartrian 
philosophers, such as Alain de Lille, exploited the latter potential 
of the image, as a means of directing the attention of the reader 
beyond the formal presentation of the image as a symbol. The princi­
pal function of the image was to reveal an internal spiritual truth 
that lay bound in the poetic metaphor:
... in the shallow exterior of literature the poetic lyre sounds a 
false note, but within speaks to its hearers of the mystery of loftier 
understanding, so that, the waste of outer falsity cast aside, the 
reader finds, in secret within, the sweeter kernel of truth.19
20This is the essence of the "mentalite symbolique" that pervades the 
literary production of mediaeval Platonists. As the significance of 
the imagery moves towards the description of the interior life of the 
individual, the "authorial intention" shifts away from the external
rather than in the didactic part of their poetry. This imagery is not
descriptions of courtship. The kind of evolution in the "authorial 
intention" and sensitivity to which I am referring has been succinctly 
summed up in French literature by Jean Frappier:
On ne confond pas le ton de Gace Brule et celui du Chatelain de Couci 
quand ilsdisent leur tristesse et leur joie, les alternances de leur 
doute et de leur espoir. Plus tard chez un Guillaume de Machaut, il 
arrive que 1’expression de 1’amour revete une ampleur quasi cosmique 
et suggere les harmonies du microcosme et du macrocosme. Au XV e 
siecle un Charles d’Orleans renovera le langage de 1’amour courtois 
en l1introduisant dans l’intimite de son espace interieur et en fai- 
sant d’un allegorisme traditionnel une mythologie mentale instrument 
d’analyse au surplus.21
It is this kind of evolution of individual sensitivity towards the 
problem of love that leads to a growing importance of the symbolic 
nature of imagery, and causes a return to the "mentalite symbolique" 
of the twelfth century, thereby preparing the way for the introduction 
of sixteenth-century Platonism.
The influence of the French poets of Guillaume de Machaut’s
generation therefore indicates that there was the possibility for a
change of sensitivity in Catalonia, that was divorced from the
"troubadour revival" of fifteenth-century Castile, although it might
be formally mimetic. In the case of the Valencian poet, Ausias 
22 23March (1398-1459) critics are generally divided in their approach.
24Some consider that he is possibly the last of the troubadours while 
25others see in him a harbinger of Renaissance Platonism. In either 
26case these judgements seem to me to be based on an anachronism.
The study of his poetry since the fundamental work of Amedee Pages, 
Auzias March et ses predecesseurs has generally been based on the
possible influence of St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, which
both A. Pag'fes and J. Torras i Bages firmly believe Ausias March knew, 
27to the point of being "un disciple" of St. Thomas. The salient 
feature of the interpretation of the poetry of Ausias March in most
5
previous studies has been to focus the investigation almost
6exclusively on the ’’discursive” sections of each poem. The study of 
the meaning of the imagery has been for the most part omitted from
these works. The few studies that have dealt with Ausias March’s
28imagery have been limited to the problems of source and influence;
this basically furthers A. Pages’ approach to Ausias March which uses
the source of this imagery to define Ausias March’s production as 
29"troubadouresque. ’’ Conversely, those interpretations that have
tried to bring into relief Ausias March’s ’’Platonism" have focused
their attention mainly on those poems in which the discursive section
is inordinately reduced in favour of a lyrical usage of imagery, such
as in Poem XVIII, of which M. Menendez-Pelayo makes an extensive 
30case. Yet, in spite of efforts to "Platonize” Ausias March criticism 
has been generally in favour of the discursive approach.
Certain recent studies, still largely based on a renewed
approach to the discursive section of Ausias March’s work, such as 
31P. Ramirez i Molas, La poesia d’Ausias March, who denies the Thomist
influence and replaces it with a predominantly Lullian influence,
32and Constanzo di Girolamo who, through an analysis of the semantic
use of troubadouresque terminology, demonstrates how Ausias March
breaks with standard troubadour tradition, have given the discursive
interpretation of Ausias March a new orientation. However, eminent 
33critics, such as Lola Badia, have pointed out that like their pre­
decessors these critics do little to enlighten the reader’s under­
standing of the meaning of Ausias March’s poetry. I would contend 
that much of the significance of this poetry lies in a correct inter­
pretation of Ausias March’s imagery. In order to facilitate an 
approach and understanding of this vast facet of Ausias March’s work,
I found it necessary to establish a concordance of images and prov­
erbs (Appendix JJ), in which I have added various additional sources
drawn from folklore, courtly poetry, religious prose, and the
Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes overlooked by Pages and Bohigas. This 
catalogue is meant to guide the reader through the sources, frequency 
and instances of usage of the various images in Ausias March’s reper­
toire. It is obviously impossible for me to make full use of this
catalogue in this thesis. I have consequently limited my research to 
what I felt were the most significant themes of Ausias March’s poetry, 
all of which have a direct bearing on his subsequent influence in 
Spanish literature. These are his religious attitude and his 
manipulation of the themes of melancholy and love. This choice is 
determined by the following considerations.
One of the most remarkable aspects in the study of the works
of Ausias March is undoubtedly that, owing to the union of Castile
and Aragon, his importance does not rest principally on his influence
on the fifteenth and sixteenth-century Catalan poets of the 
x 36’’Decadencia’’, but above all on the first two generations of 
35’’Petrarquistas” in Golden Age Spain. The consequences of this 
particular situation are diverse, and even contradictory. Yet, they 
should be borne in mind in the assessment of Ausias March’s poetry. 
The point that always remains to answer is the reason why this 
fifteenth-century Catalan poet seemed so important to the major 
Castilian poets of the sixteenth century. The fundamental, and 
immediately obvious, aspect of this phenomenon is that Ausias March’s 
work represents a vital nexus in the merging of the two cultures of 
Aragon and Castile, precisely at the moment when the latter entered
into the mainstream of the European Renaissance of the sixteenth
36century. From this essential point the spectrum of implications
broadens out to its particular cultural manifestations. Just as the 
”dolce stil nuovo" and Petrarchism became an inherent part of the
7
37
continued to be a source of inspiration for European poets of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, so Is the work of Ausias March
an integral part of the development of this intellectual current in 
38Golden Age Spain. The contradiction in this matter seems to lie
in that he is also considered to be one of the principal representa- 
39tives of the Spanish ’’cancioneril" tradition.
Much of the confusion in these concepts seems to arise out of
the usual confrontation of courtly love - Renaissance Platonic love, 
or in other words, Aristotelianisra-Platonism. The study of the dis­
cursive aspects of Ausias March’s poetry has done much to incline 
critics to consider him as an Aristotelian, and, hence, as a courtly 
poet. In this context the main problem is that of the evolution, 
and transition, of the courtly love sensibility to Neoplatonic love 
theory. 0. H. Green has attempted to resolve this problem by
stressing the continuity of ’’cancionero” attitudes in such Golden 
40Age poets as Quevedo. Yet, this is only a partial solution to a
problem which largely reflects an ongoing controversy in sixteenth- 
41century Europe, concerning the nature of love, and which may well
be based on false premisses concerning Green’s definition of courtly 
42love. The ambiguity of the latter term is such that some critics 
43would dismiss it altogether. This state of affairs does little 
to enlighten the problem of the transition. A recent work on Juan 
Boscan perpetuates the notion of a total opposition between courtly
love and Neoplatonic love. The difficulty in accepting such a posi­
tion is accentuated by the fact that Boscan was greatly influenced
44by Ausias March; his sensibility was shaped by this influence, the 
45suggestion that he broke from it, literally overnight, is suspect.
development of Italian Renaissance Neoplatonic love theory, and
The terms used by this critic reveal the difficulty of understanding
9such a transition:
... it is without question that the recognition of Boscan's greatness 
could rest solely on his miraculous ability to make the radical shift 
from the Aristotelian world of love as a physical orexis to the 
Platonic universe of love as a spiritual condition.^6 (the underlining 
is mine)
The ’'miracle” deserves an explanation. The poetry of Ausias March 
did make use of certain themes present in mediaeval Platonism, and, 
in my opinion, manipulated elements of standard medical, astrological,
and hermetic texts, known to the West from Arabic sources since the
eleventh century. These various sources find their expression both 
in the imagery, and a scholastic language reflecting the usual post­
thirteenth century influence of the Nichomachean Ethics. The combina­
tion of these elements used to express very subtle notions of love’s 
melancholy, and thereby furthering the influence of his French pre­
decessors, makes of Ausias March a mediaeval poet whose sensitivity 
foreshadows that of the Italianate current in Spain.
As the above paragraph has tried to suggest the problem of 
the transition in Spain, from the tradition of the courtly lyric to 
a Neoplatonic Renaissance sensitivity, rests principally on a poor 
definition of terms. In order to bring the various problems in 
Ausias March's poetry into perspective, one has to examine the 
relation that exists between mediaeval Aristotelianism and Platonism,
and their subsequent relation to Renaissance Platonism. In addition
to this the notion of the predominance of St. Thomas Aquinas as "the 
it 47encyclopedia of the Middle Ages , will have to be reassessed in 
the light of modern scholarship. Moreover, owing to the current 
debate over the reality of courtly love, I will attempt to come to 
terms with some aspects of its meaning in order to focus on its 
relation to the Italianate Neoplatonic current. The point of 
departure for both of these discussions is the study of the basic
10
theory of Imagination that lies behind Ausias March1s imagery. This 
theory of imagination is the pivot for Ausias March’s ’’Platonism”, 
found largely in the imagery, and his ’’Aristotelianism”, expressed 
in the discursive passages, both of which contribute to the expression 
of the poet’s melancholy.
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siecle sont intellectuellement et institutionellement des theo­
logians et non des philosophes. (Chenu, p. 139). The intro­
duction of Aristotle brings about the secularization of philos­
ophy, in which Augustinian-Platonic themes remain the keystone 
of theology (Chenu, pp. 116-117); both of these currents play 
an important role in the development of secular vernacular 
literature. (On the introduction of philosophy in vernacular 
poetry see Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, as well as, Richard 
McKeon, "Poetry and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century," Modern 
Philology XLIII (1945-1946), pp. 217-234.) My concern in this 
thesis will, therefore, be primarily with vernacular and secular 
sources, although I will inevitably have to turn to Latin 
theological sources.
Among the many other currents of Mediaeval Platonism, the 
twelfth century introduces the Erigenist-Dionysian, as well as 
that of the Victorines, and is affected by the introduction of 
the Greek Fathers, continued by Franciscan evangelism through 
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and hermetic texts, that lead us by the Lullian influence to the 
role played by Nicholas Cusanus in the "Christian Platonism" of 
the Florentines (see, Ernst Cassirer, The Individual and the 
Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. M. Domandi, New York: 
Harper Row, 1963).
As Wetherbee (Platonism and Poetry, p. 70) points out:
"Though the subject remains virtually unexplored, the influence 
of medical writings was clearly considerable. They inspired 
much original scientific investigation, and they must surely 
have contributed immeasurably to that awareness of the complexity 
of human nature which is so strikingly displayed in twelfth- 
century poetry. They provide a. physiological counterpart, for 
example, to the moral-philosophical concern for the kinds and 
degrees of love..." (underlining is mine). I believe that the 
secular developments can be traced in the evolution of the notion 
of melancholy, as studied by Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl.
See Chapter V: Melancholy: Mirror of Courtly Love.
Jean Frappier, who points out the variations of courtly love 
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courtoises dans les litteratures d’oc et d’oil au XIIe siecle" 
in Amour Courtois et Table Ronde, Geneve: Droz, 1973, pp. 1-32, 
further develops this concept in his extensive survey of the 
problem: "Sur un proces fait a 1’amour courtois" (Ibid., pp.
61-96). He defines courtly love as a matter of evolving sensi­
bility: "On n’interprete pas Jaufre Rudel ou Bernard de 
Ventadorn en dissertant sur Guillaume de Machaut, sur Chaucer ou 
sur Charles d’Orleans, comme si du XIIe siecle a la fin du Moyen 
Age il s’agissait toujours du meme "amour courtois" (p. 93); 
furthermore, "En fait, assez tot, 1’essence de la fine amor s’est 
alteree et le secret de sa poesie s’est peut-etre irremediable- 
ment perdu. A une reaction d’esprit devot contre des sublimites 
qui pouvaient paraitre en fin de compte relever simplement d’un 
hedonisme mondain ne tarda guere a se meler un souhait tres
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morale. Des croisements se produisent aussi entre le fine amour 
et des elements venus d’ailleurs que du domaine provengal. Ainsi 
naquirent des varietes dont chacune est a elle seule un certain 
’’amour courtois” (p. 94). One of the logical conclusions of 
this often restrictive, and therefore, inadequate definition is 
that the majority of social evolutions of love and courtship in 
the Western world could then be considered manifestations of 
’’courtly love.”
18 Douglas Kelly, Medieval Imagination: Rhetoric and the 
Poetry of Courtly Love, Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 
1978, p. 231.
19 Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans. D. M. Moffat, 
Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1972 (reprint of Yale Studies in 
English, 1902), p. 40.
20 M. D. Chenu, La theologie, pp. 159-209.
21 Jean Frappier, Amour courtois et table ronde, pp. 95-96.
22 The graphic rendition of the name "Ausias” has been the 
subject of some controversy ever since the first editions of 
Ausias March’s works. The controversy can be found summed up 
in A. Pag^s, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 56-58. The 
latter inclined to the spelling “Auzias*. Following the research 
of R. Aramon i Serra, Pere Bohigas (ed. Ausias March, Poesies 
vol. I, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952, pp. 9-11, note 1) and GermAn 
Colon ("El nom de fonts del poeta Ausias March," Boletin de la 
Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura XLVI num. 1, 1970, pp. 161­
224, believe that the correct spelling is "Ausias." Finally, M. 
de Riquer, ("Ausias March," Historia de la literatura catalana 
vol. II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, pp. 471-472, note 1), and 
Rafael Ferreres (ed. Ausias March, Obra poetica completa vol. I, 
pp. 16-21) suggest that "Ausias" is the best spelling. Other 
possible variations are listed in these works. For my part, of 
these three main spellings, I would be inclined to follow the 
orthography "Ausias," both because the arguments of Riquer and 
Ferreres seem to be the soundest, and in matters such as this, 
which are the subject of endless academic quibbling, simplicity 
is undoubtedly the best guide. Apart from this slight disagree­
ment with Bohigas, his edition seems to me to be in many respects 
the soundest, therefore, all quotations of Ausias March in this 
thesis will proceed from this edition, unless otherwise indicated.
23 Ausias March's date of birth is a matter of some uncertainty. 
It is based mainly on the first documented dates concerning 
Ausias March. Critics generally suppose that at the moment of 
his emancipation in 1409 he must have been at least twelve years 
old. This places his birth somewhere about 1397 (see A. Pag^s, 
Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 56; Bohigas, Poesies vol.
I, p. 14; Riquer, "Ausias March," p. 472; R. Ferreres, Obra 
poetica completa vol. I, pp. 21-22; as well as, F. Marti Grajales, 
Ensayo de un diccionario biogrifico y; bibliografico de los poetas 
que florecieron en le Reino de Valencia, Madrid: Revista de 
Archives, Bibliotecas y Museos, 1927, p. 286, and Luis Fullana,
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Boletln de la Sociedad Castellonense de Cultura, t. XVIX, 1936, 
pp. 136-137. The latter work is of great interest since it 
reviews the various theories on the birth of Ausias March by 
Gregorio Silvestre and A. Paz y Melia. This scholar has written 
"Noticias para la vida de Ausias March," Revista de Archivos y 
Museos vol. V, 1901, pp. 371-372 which presents interesting 
arguments for placing the date of birth in 1381.
24 A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 233 ("en un 
mot c’est un troubadour attarde"), and more recently R. Ferreres, 
Qbra poetica completa vol. I, pp. 45-48. In the case of the 
latter It should be remarked that his reasoning is faulty. He 
merely repeats the obsolete point of view of Pages, and then 
supports it with the authority of Pierre Le Gentil (La poesie 
lyrique espagnole et portuguaise a_ la fin du moyen age vols. I­
II, Rennes: Plihon, 1949-1952). In this work it is obvious 
that Le Gentil does not seem to have a first hand knowledge of 
Ausias March; each reference, such as that on page 460, explicitly 
relies on Pages interpretation. (The same is true of Rene Nelli, 
L’Erotique des troubadours, pp. 273-274). Moreover, Ferreres 
states that: "Hasta la plena incorporation de la poesia espanola 
al renacimiento es evidente y poderosa la influencia provenzal
y aun cuando triunfa el Renacimiento no se pierde completamente.
El Cancionero de Baena, entre otras, ofrece gran cantidad de 
ejemplos. Si esto ocurria con los poetas Castellanos a los que 
no les unia ni historia, ni lengua, ni tradici6n literaria, hay 
que pensar lo que fue para la poesia catalana y valenciana tan 
vinculada a la lirica provenzal" (p. 46). This argument is 
obviously based on the pre-supposed evaluation of Castilian 
poetry in the fourteenth century, or the generation prior to 
Ausias March. It overlooks what Frappier calls the Northern 
French influence, and the evolution from the troubadours to 
Ausias March (see notes 17 and 18). Moreover, the problem of 
the continued influence of Provenqo-Catalan poetics affects all 
of Europe (see for instance, Roger Boase, The Origin and Meaning 
of Courtly Love, p. 8). That certain, generally lesser, poets 
continued to cultivate the Provenqal lyric forms in Europe as 
a whole, is not to be questioned, however, before applying a 
general definition, each poet’s work must be carefully considered. 
Constanzo di Girolamo ("Ausias March and the Troubadour Poetic 
Code," Catalan Studies in Memory of Josephine de Boer, eds.
Joseph Gulsoy and Josep M. Sola-Sole, Barcelona: Hispam, 1977, 
pp. 223-237), has amply demonstrated Ausias March’s complete 
semantic departure from Provenqal poetic theory. For a more 
temperate view of Pages’ theory, see A. Rubio y Lluch’s review: 
"Amedee Pages - Auzias March et ses predecesseurs," Anuari de 
l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans IV 1911-1912, pp. 729-738. It is 
the source of M. de Riquer’s more balanced judgement on this 
matter in "Ausias March," Historia de la literatura catalana II, 
p. 514.
25 M. Menendez-Pelayo has done the most to point out Ausias
March’s supposed Platonic roots, and by implication, although 
not always explicitly, he presents Ausias March as a harbinger 
in: "De las vicisitudes de la filosofia plattfnica en Espaha,"
Obras completas t. 9, Madrid: Victoriano Suarez, 1918, p. 89,
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Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, pp. 223-233. Others consider 
him to be a precursor: J. Rubi6 y Ors, Ausias March y su £poca, 
Barcelona: J. Subirana, 1882, pp. 32-40; A. Rubid y Lluch, El 
Renacimiento clasico en la literatura catalana, Barcelona: J. J. 
Roviralta, 1889, pp. 34-36, and J. Rubio i Balaguer, De l’Edat 
Mitjana al Renaixement, Barcelona: Ayma, 1948, pp. 40, 44-49, 
150-151. M. de Riquer ("Els poetes petrarquistes de Catalunya," 
Commentaris critics sobre classics Catalans, Barcelona: La 
Revista, 1935, p. 9) suggests that Ausias March's use of the 
hendecasyllabic verse was compatible with the scansion of the 
Italian Renaissance hendecasyllable. In a more recent work Jose 
Alcina Clota ("Raices Helenicas," Homenaje a Ausias March, 
Barcelona: Instituto Nacional de Ensenanza Media "Ausias March",
1959, pp. 15-22) further elaborates on Ausias March’s Platonism, 
although his arguments are not very convincing.
26 J. Huizinga, "The Problem of the Renaissance," Men and Ideas, 
pp. 260-261: "By marking someone as a precursor one lifts him 
out of the framework of his time, within which he should be under­
stood, and in so doing one distorts history." The same judgement 
is applicable in the inverse direction, see Frappier as quoted
in note 17.
27 This phrase is found in A. Pages, Auzias March et ses prede­
cesseurs, p. 388, and warranted by the study of J. Torras i 
Bages, "El poeta Ausias March," La Tradicio Catalana, Barcelona: 
Selecta, 1966 (original 1892), pp. 321-348.
28 These articles on the source and influence of Ausias March’s 
imagery, also discuss Ausias March’s usage of the latter in a 
very limited way: R. Leveroni, "Les images marines en la poesia 
d’Ausies March," B.H.S. XXVII, 1951, pp. 152-166; Miquel Dol£, 
"Ausias March, poeta mediterrani," Revista de Filolog/a Valenciana 
VI, 1963, pp. 33-54; and Wendy Rolf, "Conflict and Choice: The 
Sea Storm in the Poems of Ausias March," H.R, (39), 1971, pp. 69­
75. By far the most enlightening of these is that of R. Leveroni, 
who emphasizes Ausias March’s original use of sea imagery as 
compared to the troubadours, however she loses herself in a 
comparison with contemporary poetry that adds little to the 
reader’s knowledge. W. Rolf’s study furthers that of Bohigas, 
"Metafisica y ret6rica en la obra de Ausias March," Revista 
Valenciana de Filologia VI, 1963, pp. 3-25, which traces the 
evolution of marine imagery in Ausias March. I believe that this 
is based on a radical misunderstanding of the symbolic value of 
Ausias March’s imagery; see Chapter V of this thesis. A very 
recent interpretation of Ausias March’s usage of the "maldit" 
tradition: Marie-Claire Zimmerman, "Les metamorphoses du maldit 
chez Ausias March," Iberica I: Cahiers Iberiques et Ibero- 
americains de l’Universite de Paris, Sorbonne, 1977, pp. 333-347, 
makes an extensive and enlightening comparison of Ausias March’s 
handling of "maldit" imagery, but unfortunately loses herself
in redundant structuralist jargon.
29 A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 233.
30 M. Menendez-Pelayo, Historia de las ideas esteticas II, p. 224.
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textual, conologia, elements filoSofics (Ph.D.), Basle:
University Publication, 1970, pp. 313-387.
32 See note 22.
33 Lola Badia, "Llegir a Ausias March,” Serra d*Or, gener 1980: 
’’Em sembla, en resum, que es lfcit d’afirmar que les deficencies 
que presents la divulgacio de l’obra de March.... no es sind* el 
reflex de 1’estat actual dels estudis generals sobra la poesia 
del valenci^ i que no podem queixar-nos massa del merest biblio­
graf ic ni dels esforjos dels critics. El resultat, per6, es que 
ara com ara no llegirem Ausias March sense patir" (p. 44).
34 For his influence on Catalan poets see in particular, A.
Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 393-407, and P. 
Bohigas (ed.) Poesies vol. I, pp. 132-149.
35 As P. Bohigas has said: "el testimoni mes eloquent de la 
pervivencia d’Ausias March en els segles XVI i XVIII ens el dona 
la literatura castellana;" on this subject see Poesies I, pp. 
149-156 (quote, p. 149), and A. Pages, Auzias March et ses prede­
cesseurs, pp. 403-422. Further contributions to the study of 
Auzias March1s influence on Golden Age poetry can be found in:
Jose Maria de Cossio, "De Ausias March y Bartolome Argensola," 
R.F.E. XIX, 1932, pp. 187-188; R. Lapesa, La trayectoria poetica 
de Garcilaso, Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1948; Kathleen 
McNerney, The Influence of Ausias March on Castilian Golden Age 
Poetry (Ph.D. thesis), New Mexico: Albuquerque, May 1977, 128 
pages (a catalogue based on a small part of Pages1 research, only 
looks at four poets, includes many translations of Ausias March); 
J. G. Fucilla, "Two Generations of Petrarchism and Petrarchists 
in Spain," Modern Philology XXVII, 1930, esp. pp. 277-279; by
the same author, Estudios sobre el petrarquismo en Espana, Madrid: 
Revista de Filologia Espafiola (Anejo LXXII), 1960, pp. XIII-26;
A. Comas, "Cuatro influencias de la literatura catalana medieval 
sobre la castellana de la edad media y del renacimiento," Ensayos 
sobre literatura catalana, Bareelona: Taber, 1968, pp. 30-40;
M. de Riquer,.T,influencia de Ausias March en la lirica castellana
de la Edad de Oro," Revista Nacional de Educacion I, 1941, pp. 49­
74; also by the same author, Traducciones castellanas de Ausias 
March en la Edad de Oro, Barcelona: Instituto Espanol de 
Estudios Mediterraneos, 1946, pp. IX-XLI; Juan Manuel de Rozas, 
"Petrarca y Ausias March en los sonetos-prologos amorosos del 
Siglo de Oro," Homenaje _a Diez Taboada, Estudios de Filologia 
Espanola, 1952, pp. 57-75; A. M. Withers, The Sources of the 
Poetry of Gutierre de Cetina, Philadelphia: Westbrook, 1923, pp. 
47-82; A. M. Withers, "Further Influences of Ausias March on 
Gutierre de Cetina," M.L.N., 1936, pp. 373-379; J. P. Wickershaw 
Crawford, "Notes on the Sonnets In the Spanish Cancionero General 
de 1554," Romanic Review VII, 1916, pp. 328-337; most recently, 
Rafiel Ferreres, "Ausias March en algunos poetas del Siglo de Oro," 
Estudios sobre literatura y arte: Dedicados al Profesor Emilio 
Orozco Dfaz vol. I, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1979, pp. 
469-483, an interesting contribution which sets back the influence 
of Ausias March prior to Boscan.
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36 This phrase is expedient. The transition was, perhaps more 
than anything else, the product of economic stability. All over 
Europe the distinction between "the Middle Ages” and ’’the 
Renaissance" is never too clear (Huizinga, Men and Ideas, p. 260). 
The concept of the Renaissance is mainly one of restauratio to 
the Golden Age. Therefore, one of the fundamental problems is 
the number of renaissances preceding the flourishing of the period 
known to us as the Renaissance. The whole concept of the restau­
ratio to the Golden Age suggests that the development of the 
Renaissance is intimately related to that of the evangelical 
movement within the Church (see Chenu, La theologie, pp. 252-273). 
Owing to this problem, one can see in the Renaissance the culmina­
tion of late mediaeval culture: "The Renaissance cannot be under­
stood as a pure contrast to medieval culture, not even as a 
frontier territory between medieval and modern times" (Huizinga, 
Ibid., p. 286). Hence, after the social turmoil of the latter 
half of the fifteenth century, Spain catches up to the social 
fashions of sixteenth-century Europe; in this context intellectual 
novelties also come to bear their influence.
37 On this point see John Charles Nelson, Renaissance Theory of 
Love, New York: Columbia, 1958, pp. 15-54 which traces the prose 
commentaries on Dante and Petrarch in the Florentine circle;
Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, New York: 
Octagon Books, 1968, pp. 1-56. Of particular Interest in this 
process is the role played by Ramon Lull in the re-orientation of 
this sensibility. Although I will deal with part of this problem 
in the fourth chapter of this thesis, it should suffice to point 
out Lull’s influence on Giordano Bruno (Nelson, p. 4); see also 
Chapter III, note 109.
38 In any discussion on this subject Ausias March cannot be over­
looked, as is evident in M. Menendez-Pelayo, "De las vicisitudes 
de la filosofia platdnica en Espana" (see note 25). His role 
cannot be clearly understood, however, as long as his relation to 
fifteenth-century courtly poetry is not clarified.
39 The main responsibility for this lies in 0. H. Green’s
"Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros," P.M.L.A. LXIV, .1949 , 
pp. 247-301. In this article Green makes extensive reference to 
Ausias March in order to support his point. This use of Ausias 
March is tendentious and its validity is greatly undermined by 
the research of C. di Girolamo (see note 24). My first objection 
to Green is that, as the opening lines of this introduction 
suggest, Ausias March is not necessarily representative of the 
Spanish, that is, "Castilian," cancionero tradition. The second 
basic objection has been formulated by the late R. 0. Jones in 
"Bembo, Gil Polo, Garcilaso: Three Accounts of Love," Revue de 
litterature comparee vol. 40, 1966, pp. 526-540: "... with its
insistence that courtly love is essentially amor de lonh, "have 
and have not." This one sided interpretation (true perhaps of 
some poets but certainly not all) is now being abandoned — just 
when Professor Green propagates it afresh among Hispanists in 
his Spain and the Western Tradition, vol. I (Madison, 1963)"
(p. 535). Furthermore, it is interesting to note in this context 
that R. Lapesa, La trayectoria poetica de Garcilaso, is always 
careful to distinguish between cancioneros and Ausias March:
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"varios corrientes que confluyen en la poesia de Boscan y 
Garcilaso: clasicismo, petrarquismo, formas italianas, herencia 
de cancionero e influjo de Ausias March, se ofrecen imperfectada- 
mente amalgadas en la obra del barcelones... ’’ (p. 20).
40 0. H. Green, El amor cortes en Quevedo, Zaragoza: Libreria 
General, 1955.
41 See J. C. Nelson’s review of the various Italian love 
treatises, and the fashionable controversy surrounding the nature 
of love, Renaissance Theory of Love, pp. 67-162. After Ficino’s 
treatment of this matter in the In Convivium Platonis sive de 
Amore, the subject became a fashion, which never had the profound 
meaning of the original philosophical treatise, it became an 
artificial literary genre. Hence, in his conclusion Nelson points 
out, in reference to Castiglione’s II libro del cortegiano: ’’The 
ideal itself becomes merely a topic for polite conversation, and 
one wonders whether it means more to its proponents than to the 
scoffers, such as Signor Morello" (p. 261).
42 See note 37; Green’s definition is greatly influenced by the 
theories of Alexander J. Denomy (summed up in The Heresy of 
Courtly Love, New York: The Declau X. McMullen Co., 1947) which 
are reviewed by Theodore Silverstein, "Andreas, Plato and the 
Arabs," Modern Philology XLVII, 1949-1950, pp. 117-126, as well 
as, Peter Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of the European 
Love-Lyric vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon, 1968, p. 6.
43 See F.-X. Newman (ed.) The Meaning of Courtly Love, Albany: 
State University of New York, 1968, as well as Jean Frappier’s 
response in Amour Courtois et Table Ronde, pp. 61-96, and in the 
same volume, "Amour Courtois" pp. 33-41; see also notes 17 and 21.
44 "La influencia de Ausias March, muy intensa, fue puesta de 
relieve por Menendez y Pelayo, que hizo notar la estrecha afinidad 
espiritual entre los dos poetas, superior a la de Boscan con 
Petrarca, y reuni6 buen numero de ejemplos con debitos indudables. 
Sus conclusiones fueron corroboradas y ampliadas por Amedee Pages." 
(R. Lapesa, La trayectoria poetica de Garcilaso, p. 46.)
45 I do not wish to suggest that Ausias March’s poetic sensitivity 
was "renacentista," nor that it should be confused with the 
Italianate sensitivity, but rather that through his handling of 
cosmic and harmonic theories of melancholy, which went somewhat 
beyond the standard concept of amor hereos, his sensitivity pre­
pared the way for the entrance of Italianate currents. Hence, I 
tacitly object to the words of R. 0. Jones who sees the entrance
of the Italianate fashion as something radically unknown to Spain: 
"This encounter took place in 1526 when Andrea Navagero, poet and 
classical scholar, was present, as Venetian ambassador, at Charles 
V’s triumphal entry into Granada. Navagero’s great prestige as a 
man of letters doubtless made his encouragement the more persua­
sive. Garcilaso, in his enthusiasm for the new literary experi­
ence which Italy afforded, was led to reject earlier Spanish 
literature root and branch... The change of feeling was relatively 
recent and sudden" (A Literary History of Spain, The Golden Age: 
Prose and Poetry, London: Ernest Benn, 1971, pp. 28-29). As
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Lapesa points out (La trayectoria de Garcilaso, p. 26) Garcilaso 
continued to cultivate Spanish metres for some time after 1528.
The implications of Jones’ assumption is not merely one of metres, 
but one of poetic sensitivity. I would not object to Jones’ 
general theory had he not interpreted Garcilaso’s phrase, ’’apenas 
ha nadie escrito en nuestra lengua sino lo que se pudiera muy bien 
escusar” (in A Literary History, p. 29) as referring to all Spanish 
literature, but rather, as I believe it was intended, to Castilian, 
remembering that Ausias March was then accessible only in Catalan.
I feel somewhat supported in my contention by the research of 
Patrick Gallagher, The Life and Works of Garci Sanchez de Badajoz, 
London: Tamesis, 1968, which represents a more comprehensive 
study of late cancionero poetry, which unfortunately differs 
vastly from the kind of criticism that surrounds the study of 
Ausias March. As Nicholas Round has correctly pointed out in his 
review-article of Gallagher, "Garci-Sanchez de Badajoz and the 
Revaluation of Cancionero Poetry," F.M.L.S. VI, 1970, pp. 178-187, 
"Loosely, we might call them "Platonists" — a reminder that 
humanistic Neoplatonism, when it reached Spain, was to find a 
public already familiar with its basic doctrines of the nature 
of reality" (p. 181).
46 David H. Darst, Juan Boscan, Boston: Twayne, 1978, p. 68.
47 M.W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and 
Mediaeval Thought, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1927, p. 227.
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CHAPTER II: NOTES ON THE BIOGRAPHY OF AUSIAS MARCH.
When evidence concerning the intimate aspects of the life
of an author is lacking, critics must inevitably base their 
reconstruction of his biography on conjectures. Frequently the 
latter are founded on references to second-hand judgements made
over one century after the passing of the author in question. This
adds to the complex problem that a biography is always an
interpretation that focuses on certain facets of the individual’s 
personality. In instances where first-hand source material is
lacking that reconstruction is consciously, or unconsciously, 
determined by the approach and method taken by the critic, who is 
also affected by prejudices and beliefs of his age. Thus, no 
matter how well-intentioned and rigorous a critic may wish to be, 
a biography is always the subjective analysis of the life of the 
author concerned. It is the interpretation of documentation 
adjusted to the critical perspective of the researcher, especially 
when he feels obliged to weave a character sketch on the basis of 
purely external pieces of information, such as legal documents. It 
is subordinated to the justification of a literary theory.
It seems to me that the description made of the life of 
Ausias March by Amedee Pages, and subsequently by Luis Fullana and 
their followers, is just such a case.^ The preliminary work done 
by Pages necessarily corresponds to his fundamental thesis that 
Ausias March is "un troubadour attarde". It is from this context 
that Pages found it natural to stress the seemingly feudal aspects 
of Ausias March’s life, since feudality underlies the "courtly"
mentality. Undoubtedly, Ausias March was in many aspects of the
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administration of his estates a lord, with feudal rights and
privileges, and Pages’ painstaking research evinces this point.
Should one approach the poetry of Ausias March only in this light 
inconsistencies would quickly become obvious. Hence, it is 
unsettling to note that many aspects of Ausias March’s historical 
circumstance, as well as his literary production, mark a departure
from the Catalan feudal tradition, as does, for instance, his use 
of Catalan and not Provenqal as a poetic language. Recently,
modern critics have been inclined to draw attention to the fact
that Ausias March seems to present a way out of the existing molds 
3of tradition, if not an alternative. Consequently I would suggest, 
for socio-economic reasons which I will expose below, that the 
life of Ausias March presents certain anomalies that do not 
entirely correspond to the feudal circumstance presented by A. Pages 
and L. Fullana, and that furthermore certain points of interpretation 
stressed by various critics, and not necessarily Pages, are 
unwarranted and do not allow one to sustain the kind of portrait 
commonly drawn of Ausias March and his work. It is not my purpose 
to present a biography of Ausias March. What documentation is 
available for this purpose has already been collected by the 
aforementioned critics, and I have no intention of duplicating their 
research. My intention is to present a slightly more balanced point 
of view. To this end I will try to clarify five points which have 
drawn the attention of most readers of Ausias March, and which have 
often been accepted as facts, although they are not substantiated. 
This exercise is not simply frivolous since these five points 
directly affect the interpretation of this poet’s work.
The method used by Pages deserves attention. Like most
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French nineteenth and early twentieth-century historical critics, 
Pages’ work has a definitely positivist aura about it, worthy of 
the tradition of Auguste Comte and Ernest Renan. Its admirable
philological rigour is undermined by a tendency to interpret the 
life of Ausias March in implicitly naturalist terms. Thus, in 
Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, Pages subordinates the work of
the Valencian poet to that of his forebearers, and thereby places 
it within the ’’courtly tradition.” The determinist bias of this 
interpretation is patent In the concluding paragraph of the 
genealogy of the March family:
Issu d’une famille de chevaliers, comptant parmi ses parents 
collateraux des ecclesiastiques ou des guerriers soumis a une 
discipline monacale, fils, neveu et cousin de poetes soucieux de 
moralisation, Auzias March ne pouvait que difficilement se 
soustraire a toutes ses influences, et il serait etrange que de 
tels exemples et une heredite aussi multiple n* aient pas laisse 
quelques vestiges dans 1’esprit et dans 1’oeuvre d’un ecrivain, 
en qui toutes les forces vives de la race devaient s’epanouir 
comme dans son dernier rameau.^ (underlining is mine)
The twin concepts of heredity and race are the governing factors 
of Pages’ thesis. The critic who chooses to accept Pages’ 
interpretation must acquiesce to this premiss of Pages’ work. This 
procedure can only raise questions, even though it does not seem to 
have done so. In the first place, any claim to the weight of so 
many predecessors in Ausias March’s life is substantially altered 
when one notes that in 1948 Pages revised the genealogy of the 
Marchs, leaving only one poet in direct filiation to Ausias March, 
and the others may never have had any contact with the Valencian 
poet. This however, is entirely speculative and it is best to set 
aside the hardly credible notion of race and heredity. Furthermore, 
one might accept the Pages’ claim that Ausias March was affected 
by the literary works and the cultural tradition of his relatives,
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if the eminent French critic had substantiated this by identifying
traces of their poetry in that of their successor. The two possible
instances referred to by Pages are so general that they do not
5 .validate his approach. That one should therefore approach the 
poetry of Ausias March primarily as the work of an individual, and 
only after this as pertaining to a broader literary tradition, is 
even more evident when the chronology of his life is taken into
consideration.
Ausias March was born in 1397 or 1398, long after the 
marriage of his father, Pere March the fifth, to his second wife, 
Leonor de Ripoll in 1379. His father, who died in 1413, was the 
descendant of Catalan bourgeois who had served the crown as royal 
notaries, councillors and treasurers. The first of these, Pere 
March the first, was originally from Barcelona, and had been granted 
an estate in Gandia for his services to the king in 1249, ten years 
after the reconquest of Valencia. From then on the March family 
is divided into two main branches; one remains in Catalonia, and 
the other in Valencia. Now, although Ausias March’s cousin, Pere 
March the third, was knighted in 1323, his own grandfather, Jacme 
March the second was only knighted in 1360, and is the first March 
to be knighted in the Valencian branch of the Ausias’ family. Thus, 
the nobility of Ausias March’s family only dates from some forty 
years prior to his birth. Jacme March the second inherited the
Catalan estates of the March family at the Castle of Arampunya when 
that branch died out in 1354, and his second son, Pere March the 
fifth was then given the Valencian estates. Ausias March’s uncle, 
the elder brother of Pere March, Jacme March the third, inherited 
the Castle of Arampunya from his father. In all this the first
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point to note is that Ausias March’s family does not form part of ' 
the ancient aristocracy that formed the real feudal nobility, but 
rather it belongs to the well-to-do bourgeoisie recently integrated 
into the ranks of the lower nobility. Contrary to Pages’ emphasis 
on the nobility of the March family, it would be more exact to say 
that it is representative of the Valencian landed gentry that
financed the mercantile Mediterranean expansionism of the Aragonese 
kings culminating in the work of Alfonso the Magnanimous.?
The next point is that, as I noted above, Pere March the
fifth died in 1413, shortly after the emancipation of Ausias March,
g
which occurred in 1409, that is, at the age of twelve. If as
Pages would have it, Ausias March began to write poetry in 1430,
that is>some seventeen years after Pere March’s death, it is
doubtful that Ausias March might have been affected by his father’s 
9teachings. Prom this perspective it must also be noted that
between 1413 and 1430, many intervening incidents, not least of 
which is his participation in the Italian campaigns of Alfonso the 
Magnanimous, where he undoubtedly met poets such as Jordi de San 
Jordi and Andreu Febrer, would have put him in a totally different 
intellectual atmosphere from that of his predecessors. Another 
point to be considered is that although he inherited the rich 
library of Pere March the fifth, which must have served to develop 
his intellectual abilities, Ausias March may hardly have known his 
father. Pere March was about seventy-five years old when he died, 
and until his resignation in the first months of 1412, he had been 
since 1395 Attorney General and Bailiff for the Duke of Gandia, 
responsible for all the cities and castles owned by the latter.
This position must have required the frequent absence of Pere from 
his home. For these reasons, one can only treat Pages’ presupposition
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that Ausias March was affected by the literary tradition of his
father, with extreme caution, although one must also be wary not
to reject it outright either. As the work of an individual the 
poetry of Ausias March cannot be interpreted as being subordinate 
to that of his forebearersJ he was undoubtedly aware of previous
traditions, but also of his contemporaries. These contribute to
shape his own literary reactions which do not necessarily adhere to
a single tradition.
After his participation in the campaigns of Alfonso V which 
took him to Corsica, Sardinia, Naples and the Isles of Djerba,
Chergui and Kerkennah in the Gulf of Gabes facing the Tunisian cities 
of Sfax and Gabes, Ausias March returned to Valencia in 1425, 
having been appointed the king’s grand falconer. This obliged him
to reside in Valencia while his mother continued to care for his
estates. In 1429 he returned to Gandia and Beniarjo after the 
passing of his mother, and ceased to be directly employed by the 
king. From then on Ausias March seems to have retired from public 
life, living principally at his estate in Beniarjo, as well as in 
Gandla and Valencia, with possible occasional voyages to Naples.
His life in the remaining twenty-nine years is known to us only 
through a series of legal documents concerning interminable lawsuits
and his two marriages. From the first of these in 1437 to Isabel 
Martorell I Monpalau, the sister of Johannot Martorell, one of the 
authors of Tirant lo Blanc, Ausias March inherited more property in 
Rafol de Jalon when Isabel died in 1439, childless. In 1443 he 
re-married to Juana Escorna y Castella, with whom he moved to 
Valencia in 1450 where he passed away in 1458, with no legitimate 
descent. Juana Escorna had preceded him in 1454. The heirs of
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Ausias March then consisted mainly of his four illegitimate
children, three sons and one daughter, begotten from concubines
and slaves. Various critics, such as Pages, have made a very 
elaborate case of this aspect of Ausias March’s life, partially 
in order to demonstrate the lust that would seem to complement the
tortured love that animates his poetry, but mainly to accentuate
the credibility of the notion that Ausias March had a seigniorial
mentality. Pages sees in this a confirmation of his thesis: "Ce
sont ces amours irregulieres, les faiblesses d’un grand seigneur
que nous revele le chapitre secret de la biographie d’Auzias 
12March.” For whoever has read Pages these true confessions are
a key to the portrait of Ausias March the belated troubadour who
is constantly represented as a "seigneur justicier ou justiciable...
Tres attache a ses prerogatives, il les exerce avec le sentiment 
13le plus vif de son importance." This takes Pages directly to
the equivocal notion that: "le poete ne fait qu’exposer sa maniere 
14de vivre." More than a way of life, as X hope to shew in
successive chapters, Ausias March reveals a theory of love. These 
accidents of Ausias March’s life should not prejudice our evaluation 
of his poetry, especially since they are not referred to in his
work. One should remember that the problem of illegitimate children
was not exclusive to the nobility; it was a fairly common factor of
the Middle Ages. One need only think of the life of Petrarch and
how his work avoids factual references to Laura’s marriage and to 
15his two illegitimate children and their mother. It is evident 
that these aspects of Ausias March’s intimate life do not necessarily 
affect the content of his poetry. Indirectly, these things do 
reflect an aspect of Ausias March’s character, but one which is
evident in his poetry without reference to these external details.
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Consequently, the extra-marital activities of Ausias March 
have little bearing on the so-called seigniorial mentality of the 
Valencian poet. Once more it is necessary to return to Pages1 
inclination to represent Ausias March as a feudal lord. There is
no doubt that Ausias March, who lived in the first half of the
fifteenth century did live in a feudal juridical system, and that
he was affected by this circumstance. Furthermore, Ausias March
was a proud man, who defended his rights and privileges, but pride
is not a particularity of the nobility. It is misleading to
represent Ausias March as a knight of the Middle Ages living in 
feudal conditions such as those of the twelfth-century troubadours.
The circumstance is radically altered by the change of the economic
system. As I mentioned above, Ausias March and his family are 
representatives of the landed gentry that had recently been granted 
titles of nobility, and as such, they manifest a very conservative 
mentality. The point of differentiation between them and the old
aristocracy, which Pages seems to overlook, is that the socio-economic
system on which their wealth and status rests, and which, therefore,
conditions their values, is radically different from the purely
agrarian warring feudal aristocracy, which they imitate. That which
really affects the sensibility of Ausias March is,not so much the
external trappings of his social condition, as the pressures and
interrelations of social economy which both maintain and modify his
position. This forms his real circumstance. As he states in one
of his poems, Ausias March is a Valencian: "La velledat en
valencians mal prova, / e no se com yo faga obra nova" (CXII,
16w. 9-10). It is, then, to the Valencian context that he belongs,
and that the critic must understand in order to come to a just
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evaluation of his poetry. Unlike the Castilian socio-economic 
system of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, which is feudal 
and agrarian, the Valencian system is mercantile, although not quite
in the same manner as the Italian city-states with which it competes.
The rural agriculture system of Valencia is complemented by an
important industrial base. As early as the beginning of the
fourteenth century the dukes of Gandia had fomented the development
of the textile industry, which grew throughout Valencia. With the
textile industry there also came a different religious sensibility,
characteristic of Franciscan secularization, such as one finds in 
17Ausias March.
Ausias March does not seem to have been directly involved 
18in the non-agrarian industry of his region; however, he forms 
part of a very productive commercial agrarian class which plays an 
important role in the development of the bourgeois mentality of
Valencia. In the administration of his estates Ausias March was
among the first men in Spain to establish a sugar mill, and
therefore, to promote the industrial production of sugar and its 
commercialization. To this aspect of his life must be added his 
participation in the building of a vast irrigation canal, still
19known today as the "canal dels Marcs", and the building of a bridge. 
This kind of activity is largely reponsible for the prosperity of
Valencia, which enabled the full introduction of the Renaissance
in the second half of the fifteenth-century. In order to understand
this development one must turn to the study of Francesc Eximenis’
20economic theory by Jose A. Maravall. In this work the latter 
shews how the Franciscan writer adopts the modes of his spirituality 
to the urban pre-capitalist mentality of Valencia, in the generation 
prior to Ausias March. The important point that Maravall makes is
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that the Renaissance sensibility in Valencia was not brought about
by the small industrial bourgeoisie, but by a traditionalist 
leisurely class which fomented work and prosperity:
Tales juicios sobre el trabajo y la ociosidad, como ha bien puesto 
en claro Anderson, constituyen una manifestacidn de un espiritu 
tradicional y responden a la mentalidad de una sociedad de base 
agraria. Asl* se explica que, contra lo que parece desprenderse de 
lo estimado por ciertos escritores espaKoles del presente, la 
sociedad dinamica, que inicia el gran despegue capitalista en las 
sociedades europeas del Renacimiento, no fuera creacion de pequefios 
artesanos y trabajadores mecanicos, sino de los "ociosos honorables” 
que caracterizo Max Weber.21
Without being a merchant or a banker, like the Medici and other
prominent Italian families, Ausias March is one of these traditionalist 
’’honourably leisured’’ individuals. Yet, unlike his Italian counterparts 
Ausias March is not a fully integrated member of the urban gentry, as 
documents attest his residence alternates between the country and
the city. This situation represents what Max Weber describes as a
transference of status connections:
The cutting of status connections with the rural nobility was 
carried out in relatively pure form only in the civic corporations 
of Nothem Europe. In the South, chiefly in Italy, the reverse 
occurs when, with the mounting power of the cities, rural nobles 
took up urban residence.22
With the growing prosperity and power of Valencia in the fifteenth 
century, it is only natural that one should find Ausias March, who 
is a rural noble, drawn to the city.
Jose A. Maravall’s point of view, referred to in the above 
quotation, is somewhat extreme. If the Renaissance did not arise
from the industrial class, their presence was nonetheless an 
important catalyst. The situation is far more complex than a mere 
opposition between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy. It was 
the constant dialectical exchange between the two productive classes 
in Valencia that brought about the necessary changes. Thus, one
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finds in Ausias March’s poetry explicit mention of his contempt
for the merchant class, such as his criticism of knights who take
part in mercantile activities: "los cavaliers per mercaders
s’espachen" (CIV, v. 220), and when he vents his indignation at
the lady who has jilted him, by accusing her of having sold her
body to a "merchant”: "ha mercader liura-*s vostre cors vill" (XLII,
v. 11).- It would be incorrect to interpret these verses as simply
reflecting the author’s contempt for the merchant class; they are 
23of a topical nature in Spanish poetry. Behind their face-value 
lies the more important expression of the rivalry and tension that 
existed between the new nobility and the upcoming merchant class,
and the passive competition which their presence in an urban context
entailed. Hence, although Ausias March’s fortune stemmed mainly
from the agricultural productivity of his estates, one notes that
he spent about one half of his adult life in the urban atmosphere
of Gandia and Valencia. Furthermore, these apparent criticisms of
the merchant class belie Ausias March’s familiarity with the urban
middle class, which is obvious in his poetic exchanges with young
24 25citizens of Valencia, such as, Bernat Fenollar, and Joan Moreno, 
who serves as witness to Ausias March’s first will.^
Consequently, without needing to say that Ausias March was 
a merchant, which would be inexact, one can legitimately forward 
the idea that his work is the product of an individual living in 
an urbanizing, not to use Maravall’s terminology "pre-capitalist", 
society. Moreover, it does not seem misleading to suggest that as 
a member of the pre-mercantile landed gentry, recently integrated 
into the ranks of the petty nobility, Ausias March partakes of the
secular sensibility characteristic of the traditionalist, wealthy
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"ociosos honorables", who are closely associated with the urbanization 
of Valencia, and as such, represent a mentality which is radically 
distinct from that of the purely feudal nobility. Hence, just as
the agrarian-based mercantile economy of Valencia is representative
of an alternative to the purely feudal structure, so does the work
of Ausias March present "a way out of the existing molds of 
27tradition", and can be said to be the cultural expression of that 
society.
Amedee Pages’ depiction of Ausias March as a feudal lord 
is further undermined by the recent claims made by certain critics
that Ausias March might have been of Jewish origin. This speculation
is based, as usual, on the family name "March", in which Americo 
28Castro has seen a Jewish origin. The "converso" background of
Ausias March could also be demonstrated by a study of his religious
attitude, which would have more substance than a mere theory based 
29on a name. However, such a study has not been made. Therefore,
here too caution must be exercised when one considers how much a
mere suspicion can be overstretched, and that furthermore, even if
one has evidence of Jewishness based on religious attitudes, it
must be noted that such attitudes may not be caused by "Jewishness",
but by the education and values of the middle class to which many 
30"conversos" belong. As J. N. Hillgarth indicates concerning the 
extent of the Jewish population according to the census of 1290:
A prudent conclusion would seem to be that the numbers of the 
Jewish population were very much smaller than recent estimates 
have suggested. They probably did not number more than 2 or 3 
percent of the population of the Crown of Aragon and formed a 
smaller proportion still of that of Castile-Leon. Their importance 
was due not to their numbers but to their wealth and industry and 
especially to the fact that they possessed in their Hebrew-Arabic 
learning a culture and a tradition superior to that of the Christians 
among whom they lived.31
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In view of the small proportion of the population represented by- 
Jews in the Crown of Aragon, it is difficult to see in Ausias 
March a "converso” without more specific and relevant evidence. 
Moreover, the Jewishness of Ausias March would have to go back at
least to Pere March the first, that is some one hundred and
seventy-five years before he began to write. His father and 
grandfather were also good Christians and their links with the 
Jewish culture would have been tenuous. Hence, Ausias March can
hardly be said to have partaken of a separate culture and tradition.
What contact he may have had with the Jewish culture would have 
been made through the various communities present in urban centres
such as Girona, and of necessity it would have been indirect. The
importance of this aspect of Ausias March1s biography is that those
points of hetrodox sensibility which could be construed to indicate
some affinity with the "conversos ”, and which I will discuss in
Appendix I, are common to the secular middle class sensibility in 
32Western Europe, as studied in the work of M. D. Chenu. Without
denying the possibility, however remote, of a Jewish ancestry in
the March family, a solid case cannot be made simply on the basis 
of a suspicion. Unless it is further substantiated, Ausias March’s 
possible Jewishness has to be considered accidental to his 
sensibility. It has no bearing on his poetry, and certainly to
this date it has not contributed to a better understanding of his
verses. What does concern the particular sensibility of Ausias 
March is his participation in a mercantile urbanizing society,
without having to be of Jewish descent.
Another major point that has called the attention of the
critics, and affected their interpretation of Ausias March’s poetry
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is that he was appointed tax-collector by the Prince of Viana 
when the latter took possession of the Duchy of Gandia. A 
sixteenth-century chronicler, Jeronimo Zurita, writing a century 
after the death of Ausias March, says of the Prince of Viana and 
the Valencian poet:
entre todos los mas senalados varones que hubo en Espana en su 
tiempo fue por el mas estimado y preferido de su amistad y pervanqa 
Ausias March, caballero de singular ingenio y doctrina, en gran 
espiritu y artificio. en todo lo que compuso, con mucha gravedad 
en lengua limosina.
This statement, which seems to echo the marques de Santillana’s
praise of Ausias March in his Prohemio to Pedro, constable of
Portugal, does not give any source for Zurita’s information, and
furthermore it commits the error of placing Ausias March in the 
34all too general context of Spain. Strictly on the basis of
Zurita's claim, and Luis Fullana*s impressionistic elaboration of
this statement, various well-intentioned critics have propagated
the idea that Ausias March and the Prince of Viana were closely 
35associated. Indeed, the existence of such a relation would 
favour Amedee Pages* thesis that Ausias March was a Thomist poet, 
and an assiduous reader of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, the 
content of which pervades the discursive elements of his poetry, 
for the Prince of Viana was profoundly interested in Aristotle,
and especially in the Nicomachean Ethics which he translated from
36Latin in 1457. However, Zurita’s statement may be only a 
conjecture based on this possible point of affinity. Indeed, it 
is entirely to Pages’ credit that such a relation is mere 
speculation on the part of critics: "il n’est pas certain que
le jeune due et son vassal aient eu a cette epoque de veritable
37relations....’* Although such an intellectual exchange between
35
Ausias March and the Prince of Viana might have been historically 
plausible, the lack of any kind of serious documentation, or 
contemporary references to a meeting or epistolary exchange between
the two, coupled with the additional problem that the Prince does
not seem to have travelled to, or resided in, his duchy, reduces 
this aspect of Ausias March’s biography to mere speculation. It 
is best left aside and not used as the basis of any theory
concerning his work.
Of greater interest among the events of Ausias March’s life 
that have excited the curiosity of critics in the last two decades 
is a letter which refers to Ausias March, written by Maria of Castile, 
Alfonso the Magnanimous* wife^who governed the Crown of Aragon in 
his absence. This letter was discovered by Jordi Rubio i Balaguer
in 1960. It refers to an incident related to the life of Ausias
March which has led various eminent critics, such as Rubio i Balaguer,
Martin de Riquer and Rafael Ferreres, to suggest that the Valencian 
38poet was guilty of paederasty. The entire incident described in
the letter of Marfa of Castile revolves around a lad of twelve or
thirteen, Johanet Carnicer, who had run away from his apprenticeship 
to the queen’s secretary, Pere Lobet, in order to join some boys 
who worked for the king’s new grand falconer, Ausias March. The 
letter which is dated June 27, 1425, states that the lad had been 
placed in the care of P. Lobet, in order "to learn and to profit”, 
but that he has fled from his master and is now "on the path of
damnation":
es li fugit e es se’n anat aqui ab Mossen Ausies March. E per tai 
com es gran carrech del dit nostre secretari que aquell tenia en 
comanda per aprendre e profitar, e ara en via de perdicid, vds 
pregam e manam que tota vegada que per part del pare del dit fadri 
la present vos sera presentada e’n secret requerit, faqats tornar 
e restituir lo dit fadri al dit son pare.39
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The key phrase here is not the ”en via de perdicio" but "tenia en 
comanda", which refers to the responsibility of the secretary. It 
seems to me that the formula "en via de perdicio" does not necessarily, 
and definitely not in this case, refer to Ausias March’s possible
inclination to sodomy. Incidences of sodomy under the reign of
/ 40the very pious Maria of Castile were dealt with very harshly.
In the face of evidence of her intransigence on these matters, if
Maria had really suspected that Ausias March was a paederast one
can only wonder why she had one lad removed and not all the others,
and why she took no further action against Ausias March. Furthermore,
only two years before, Marfa had shown great confidence in Ausias
March when she requested his assistance to arrange the marriage of
Na Vilaraguda and Mossen Berenguer de Vilaragut, which she considered 
41to be a very delicate matter. Although it is true that in the 
two intervening years, during which Ausias March was with Alfonso
in Naples and North Africa, Maria may have discovered that he was
a sodomite; there is nothing that can substantiate that
speculation. It is best to turn to the intelligent opinion of Joan 
42Ferrater on this matter. His theory is that as an apprentice 
Carnicer broke his bondage to P. Lobet, and this placed him in 
"via de perdicio", and that the incident has no sexual implications, 
it is simply a case of a lad fleeing the drudgery of learning, for 
the joys of hunting. I would add that this placed Lobet, who was 
entrusted to care for the lad, in an embarrassing position, and 
that it was undoubtedly also a source of shame and hurt pride for
Carnicer’s father. For these reasons Maria ordered the bailiff to 
act with the utmost discretion ("en secret"). Again, this rather
sensational contribution towards the life and character of Ausias
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March adds nothing to our understanding of his work.
A further point that has interested the biographers of
Ausias March is the question of his relationship to his deaf and
dumb sister, Peyrona, who was entrusted to his care. As Rafael
Ferreres has shewn? Ausias March does not seem to have fulfilled 
43his duties towards his sister with complete integrity. The point 
that interests me is not the practical aspect of Peyrona’s fate, 
which is not referred to in the poems of Ausias March, but the
interpretation that critics such as Ferreres and Fullana have
imposed on the verse ”D’un ventre trist exir m’ha fet natura"
44(LVIIX, v. 29). These‘critics construe that this is a reference 
to the sad childhood of Ausias March caused by the birth of Peyrona:
Nada sabemos de la infancia de nuestro poeta, tan solo si, porque 
el lo declara, que no debia haber alegria en su casa quiza por la 
condicidn sordomuda de su hermana Peirona,... Asif declara el 
poeta: ’’D’un ventre trist exir m’ha fet natura.”45
There could be no more patent distortion of the intention of Ausias 
March’s poetry than this kind of extra-literary imposition on the 
text. Taken in its context this verse has nothing to do with 
Peyrona or the childhood of Ausias March? it concerns his
predestination to love:
Ma voluntat 
cascuna fa 
ma voluntat 
son poder fa,
D’un ventre trist 
per vos amar 
no ss£ als fats 
en fer que vos
It is evident from verses 30 and
ab la raho no luyta, 
lo mes de son poder: 
pus d’amar no pot fer, 
e ma raho la’n cuyta. 
exir m’a fet natura, 
fon lo meu naximent; 
com no «ls fon de present 
d’amar aguesseu cura
(LVIII, w. 25-32)
31 in the second half of this
stanza that verse 29 refers to predestination. As such, these 
verses refer to a much more important facet of Ausias March’s poetry
38
than one might surmise from Ferreres* interpretation. As Pere
Bohigas has indicated,verse 29 proceeds from Job’s damnation of
his birth: "Pereat dies in quo natus sum, et nox in qua dictum
est: Conceptus homo.... Quia non conclusit ostia ventris, qui
portavit me, nec abstulit mala ab oculis meis’* (Job XII: 3 and 10).
The point made by Ausias March in these verses cannot be clearly
understood unless the significance of "trist" is. This sorrowful
love is a predestined condition which the poet accepts, in another
poem he refers to it as his ill-starred heart: "cor malastruch"
(XI, v. 2). "Tristeza" is here, as in all other poems of Ausias
March, synonymous with his poetic melancholy, which he inherits
from the tradition of the French fourteenth-century poets such as,
A 6Guillaume de Machaut, Oton de Granson and Alain Chartier. Hence,
verse 29 is a reference to his melancholy temperament to which he 
47claims to have been predestined by birth. The repercussions of
this statement are very important, for if Ausias March associates
melancholy with a predestined condition, he evidently had to have
some knowledge of microcosmic and iatromathematical theory, such 
48as they are found in Ramon Lull and Arnau de Vilanova. Biographical 
criticism that attempts to explain his poetry by making use of
various indefinite facets of what is known to us of Ausias March’s
life, overlooks the actual significance of his verses. The
relevance of Peyrona’s role in the origin of the poet’s melancholy 
is very marginal, and statements such as that of Rafael Ferreres
quoted above are of an unreliable speculative nature. Taken in 
context Ausias March uses the imagery of verse 29 to describe the 
melancholy orientation of his love; like Job’s love of God, it is 
pure and constant. Thus, the previous verses state that this love
is guided by reason (verses 25-28), and that as such it is not a
39
frenetic passion. Long before Marsilio Ficino articulated his 
49Platonic theory of Love, Albert the Great in the De animalibus
(libri XXVI) had pointed out that melancholy individuals: "have 
50firm convictions and well regulated passions", and Johannes 
Hispalensis also remarked that pure love was a trait of the
51melancholy lover, because honesty in love proceeds from Saturn.
It is in this tradition that Ausias March writes. Verse 29 is
consequently in perfect harmony with the rest of Poem LVIII; its
imagery, which evokes the life of Job, merely serves to reinforce 
March’s claim to a chaste and unwavering love to which he is 
predestined.
Traditional criticism of the poetry of Ausias March is
based on a certain interpretation of his life which is subordinated
to romantic notions of feudalism, as well as to the misleading 
theories of race and heredity. As I have tried to shew above, many 
of the ideas concerning Ausias March raised by this kind of 
biographical criticism do not contribute to our understanding of 
the poet’s work; they only serve to support a misleading theory 
conceived in the light of the concept of "courtly love," which is 
itself a questionable premiss. In order to understand the poetry
of Ausias March, one cannot rely on unsubstantiated speculation
about certain possible facets of his life; it is necessary to turn 
to the internal evidence of his work. Significance lies in the 
imagery which illustrates a theory of love, and which can reveal 
in what literary tradition Ausias March is writing.
As verse 29 of Poem LVIII, discussed above, indicates, the 
basis for Ausias March’s theory of love is his melancholy complexion.
In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance melancholy was considered to
40
be a physiological and psychological problem, largely affected by
the theory of perception which was understood to be a medical 
52question affecting the role of the vital spirits. Subjacent to
the microcosmic medical theories which this involved, was the
question of the nature of the object perceived, that is, its
relation as a form or idea to universals. Melancholy was, therefore,
closely associated with Imagination understood to be not only a
vain raving, fancy, or the mental creation of situations and
circumstances, but principally as the faculty of forming universal 
images of objects sensed, as well as of creating images of objects
not apprehended sensorially. These different kinds of imagination 
were closely related to the varieties of the possible range of 
melancholies which could take the individual from lunacy to genius. 
Thus, Mila y Fontanals has said of Ausias March: ”se nota que 
havia estudiat la ciencia medicinal, cosa poch usada per cavaliers 
ni poetas”. Although Mila y Fontanals does not develop this very 
perspicacious remark, one has to note that this approach does not 
take one to the poetry of the troubadours, but to the concept of 
imagination as it is found in twelfth-century Chartrian poetics, 
and which is the basis of the theories of melancholy that play an 
important role in the development of the Renaissance theory of love. 
It iSjthenjto this aspect of Ausias March’s poetry that I will turn 
in order to understand the relation that exists between Ausias
March and the theory of love introduced in Italy by the admirers 
of the Valencian poet: Juan Boscan and Garcilaso de la Vega.
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CHAPTER III: THE RHETORICAL BACKGROUND IN AUSIAS MARCH'S IMAGINATION
There exists a very close relation between the notion that
the mediaeval poet has of imagination and his use of imagery. Both 
of these concepts determine the way in which he understands his poet­
ical experience and gives expression to it. In his poetry Ausias 
March continues to be faithful to the traditional forms and genres of 
the troubadours. A. Pages has extensively documented this point, as 
well as Ausias March's familiarity with the Leys d’Amor.^ It is 
logical, therefore, that one should turn to the rhetorical theory of 
the mediaeval "artes poeticae" in order to shed some light on Ausias 
March’s theory of the image and the concurrent use of the Imagination, 
without incurring the possibility of seeming to set Ausias March out­
side his chronological limits.
In Ausias March’s poetry the image generally dominates the
poetical structure, that is, it has precedence within the logic of
the poem over the discursive exposition, or "descriptio". The
’’descriptio” is a complement to the image, in which the poet attempts
to clarify the significance of the metaphor as it applies to his 
2circumstance. There is consequently a correlation between the two, 
but it is not necessarily explicit. The very short Poem XXIX can 
serve as a model for the analysis of Ausias March’s procedure. The 
first four verses of this poem introduce the image of a bull who 
flees, vanquished by his foe, before returning to destroy him:
Si com lo taur 
quant es sobrat 
ne torna may 
per destruir
se'n va fuyt pel desert
per son semblant qui»l forqa,
fins ha cobrada forqa
aquell qui«l ha desert, (XXIX, w. 1-4).
This image which is drawn from a bestiary (see Appendix II J: 2) has ethi­
cal connotations concerning the poet’s relation to the lady. The
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remaining four verses establish a correlation between this "arche- 
3
typal" image, drawn from the basic mediaeval topoi, and the lover1s 
shyness before the overwhelming beauty of the lady. He must overcome 
this awe before returning to enjoy the lady’s company. The topical 
nature of this image does not establish a direct parallel with the 
lover’s situation as exposed in the ’’descriptio”. The lover’s '’de­
light” contrasts with the destruction of the foe, because the metaphor 
implies a "luctamen Veneris":
tot enaxdf «m 
car vostre gest 
no tornare 
la gran pahor
cove lunyar de vds, 
mon esforq ha confus; 
fins del tot haja fus 
qui«m toll ser delitos (5-8).
There is an awkward association of the foe as being both the lady’s 
"gest" (v. 6) and the poet’s fear (v. 8). The "pahor" is the foe that 
must be destroyed, but not the "gest" that gave rise to this fear; a 
direct parallel would establish the "gest" as the enemy. The image 
therefore establishes a general referential context of conflict and 
fear which must be overcome with time. This procedure is quite 
straightforward: the first four verses introduce the image and its 
frame of reference, which the "descriptio" in the last four verses 
clarifies and adjusts to the poet’s experience. This procedure is 
typically mediaeval and corresponds to the rhetoric of composition as 
described by Matthieu de Vendome in the Ars versificatoria:
in poeticae facultatis exercitatio praecedit imaginatio sensus, sequi- 
tur sermo interpres intellectus, deinde ordinatio in qualitate tracta- 
tus; prior est sententiae conceptio, sequitur verborum excogitatio, 
subjungitur qualitas scilicet materiae, sive tractatus dispositio.4
Vendome therefore presents the creative process of the image as 
preceding the intellectual utterance and rhetorical disposition.
Kelly succinctly summarizes this process: "Imagination, verbalization, 
stylization and disposition: this is composition in the Middle Ages.’’^
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Matthieu de Vendome’s description of poetical rhetoric quoted 
above points out that imagination is the source of all poetry, "imag­
ination precedes the senses". The definition of imagination in the 
Middle Ages derived principally from Boethius* De Consolatione 
Philosophiae in which it was considered as a means of perception and 
apprehension of forms divorced from matter. It was therefore 
considered to be a limited spiritual sense, not to be confused with 
intelligence which was divine cognition:
Xpsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, 
aliter intelligentia contuetur. Sensus enim figuram in subiecta 
materia constitutam, imaginatio vero solam sine materia iudicat figuram. 
Ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam quae singularibus 
inest universali consideratione perpendit. Intelligentiae vero celsior 
oculus exsistit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum ipsam illam 
simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur.6
The intelligence perceives the Divine Form or Idea, whereas the imag­
ination has cognition of the form of particulars, that is, the ideas 
as they are reflected in matter. However, in this epistemological 
conception of imagination, the relation which It has to matter not 
only limits its function but accentuates the duality of its nature.
It partakes not only of the spirit, but also of the flesh. In order 
that it be of value to man it must be controlled by reason.? This 
aspect of the theory of imagination was rooted in the Aristotelian
tradition of scholasticism. In Book III of the De Anima Aristotle
distinguished imagination from either sensorial perception or discur-
g
sive thinking in order to stress its ambiguous nature, as being 
9indistinguishably true or false when considered by itself. Aristotle 
therefore considered imagination to be a movement produced by sensation:
But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be 
moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be 
impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percip­
ient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since 
movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is 
necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement
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must be (1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing apart from sensa­
tion (b) incapable of existing except when we perceive, (2) such that 
in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may present 
various phenomena both active and passive, and (3) such that it may 
be either true or false.10
Thus imagination is for Aristotle ”a movement resulting from an actual
11 12 exercise of a power of sense”, that particular sense being sight.
In general this mechanical interpretation of imagination was inherited 
by St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary to William of Moerbeke’s
version of Aristotle’s De Anima. Aquinas continued to stress the
13 1 Arelativism of imagination, as well as its relation to the senses. 
However, one should note that his commentary did concede to the 
’’spiritual” aspects of imagination:
667. Whether this movement also presupposes some potency other than 
the exterior senses, is a question which Aristotle leaves unanswered. 
Since, however, diverse acts imply diverse potencies, and diverse 
movements connote diverse receivers of movement (for the moving thing 
moves something other than itself), it seems necessary to posit an 
imaginative potency distinct from exterior senses.15
In his discussion on the relation between light and imagination (668) 
Aquinas, goes beyond Aristotle by stressing that sight is the most 
spiritual of the senses.jn spite of these tentative concessions
this theory of imagination remained too mechanical, and even Dante,
who normally follows Aristotle and Aquinas, broke away from it in
order to develop the sight and imagination relationship even further 
17towards its potential metaphysical implications.
Both before and after Dante, the theory of imagination in
the realm of poetic theory was mainly influenced by Chartrian and
Victorine currents. For the Chartrian poets, imagination meant a
reflection of cosmic order, as it was reflected in the world. Their
theory of imagination was greatly influenced by ’’philosophical
speculation going back from the twelfth century poets to Plato’s 
18Timaeus”. Characteristically, they established the priority of
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the imagination on the basis of an entirely Platonic epistemology.
The Chartrian poets, such as Alain de Lille and Bernardus Silvestris,
considered imagination to be the intellection of archetypes. In the
De Planetu Naturae Alain de Lille describes imagination, which he 
understands as the perception of an "imago”, that Is, as the intellec­
tion of an archetype:
When she saw that I had returned to myself, she depicted for my mental 
perception the image of a real voice, and by this brought into actual 
being words which had been, so to speak, archetypes ideally precon­
ceived. 19
The emphasis in the Chartrian theory is laid primarily on what Boethius 
saw as the function of intellection, and the image is considered to be 
"the visible correlative to the permanent archetype". The imagina­
tion as the image forming process is therefore conceived of in a very
Platonic manner, as an illumination from without animating objects 
21perceived. Rhetoricians such as Geoffroy de Vinsauf and Matthieu
de Vendome were greatly influenced by this aspect of Chartrian thought,
as can be seen in the above quotation (4)' imagination is given a role
which transcends limitations placed upon it by its relation to the 
22senses.
These concepts of imagination, as propounded by the theoreti­
cians of poetry, were mainly a matter of rhetoric. It would be mis­
leading to gloss this subject so as to leave the impression that 
imagination might have been given priority over reason. The rhetori­
cians’ concept of this theory was broad; it corresponded to the
requirements of a theory of poetic creation, which saw the poet’s 
23creative activity as being similar to God’s creative activity, and 
24as such it was successful. In practice, however, it was considered 
to be a secondary form of cognition. Hughes de Saint Victor defines 
imagination as "sensuous memory made up of traces of corporeal
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objects entering in the mind; it possesses in itself nothing certain 
25as a source of knowledge”. Hughes* notion of "sensuous memory"
needs some clarification. He uses the words "sensus" and "sensualitas"
in a fashion particular to his own Neoplatonic philosophical system,
to denote the relation between the body and the spirit. "Sensualitas"
is an intermediary movement which operates through the use of the
imagination. Hughes de Saint Victor’s system is similar to that of
Plotinus in as much as it portrays the relation of man to the One, as
a continuous movement of God moving down to man and man moving up 
26towards God, that is in Christian terminology, a continuous inter- 
27action of contemplation and revelation. In the De Unione Corporis
et Spiritus Hughes establishes a microcosmic relation when discussing
the function of the elements, and develops the concept that the 
28relation of the body to the spirit is as that of man to God, and 
contemplation to revelation. Like contemplation "sensualitas" is 
the movement whereby imagination informs reason of "the physical 
universe as the reflection of thought — the thought of God”. By 
"sensualitas" the spirit moves towards the body, and the "sensus" 
moves towards the spirit. Therefore, imagination in its highest
function informs reason of the Divine; it is the handmaid of reason:
Imagination is not yet reason in her most exalted mood; but for this 
mystic, imagination, subordinated to reason, is at least a power 
which makes possible the interpretation of a rational universe.30
This interpretation is conditioned by the intermediary and dual nature
of imagination. It is a deceptive relation; if through a flaw of
perception the spirit moves excessively towards corporeality imagina- 
31tion can mislead reason, which leads to a loss of discretion. How­
ever, imagination remains the perception of an ideal, which may be
either true or false. The latter consideration is primarily the
concern of the moralist.
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The fundamentally numinous character of the concept of
imagination, both in its nature and its function, as defined by the 
rhetoricians of the twelfth century overlooks the problem of its 
degree of exactitude in favour of its inherent ideality. Imagination 
is the means by which the poet conceives of an ideal, which he consid­
ers to be a superior reality. In mediaeval poetry imagination conse­
quently has an ethical dimension, which precedes moral judgements.
It is a means of measuring the distance that separates man from his 
ideal; it forces man to reflect on the state of his soul. D. Kelly 
has identified this particular aspect of the use of imagination:
Froissart and Gower conclude the Joli buisson de ionece and the 
Confessio amantis by looking into a mirror and finding his own face. 
Thus they realize what separates them from the ideal in their 
Imagination. The distance is what much late medieval literature 
is about.32
The failure to meet that ideal then entails moral consideration as to
the value of the particular "Imagination”of the ideal, as is the case
of much fifteenth-century courtly poetry. Imagination is, therefore,
that which is imitated in poetic imagery as the basis for a theoretical 
33model to be used for moral and didactic exposition.
In the case of Ausias March’s poetry the imagery, as seen
above in the discussion of Poem XXIX, is based on a theoretically
ideal model against which the poet-lover measures his own predicament;
he is reflected in the image. The source of this imagery is amply
documented in Appendix II to demonstrate that it draws principally 
34from the common stock of courtly images. Nevertheless, the signifi­
cance of this imagery cannot be understood strictly on the basis of
its origin. It is necessary to take into account that the love
experience described by Ausias March is essentially sorrowful, owing 
35to the poet’s moral failure to achieve this ideal. The frequent 
inaccessibility of the courtly ideal brings its values into crisis in
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the poetry of Ausias March. The various references to the ’’imagina­
tion” in this poetry clearly reflect this crisis. A survey of the 
uses of "imaginar" in the vocabulary of Ausias March should demonstrate 
the significance and role that imagination has in his work.
In the use of certain cognates Ausias March uses alternate
forms of the verb "imaginar” simply as a mental representation,
generally of a metonomical or allegorical figure, such as in XCIII,
90; CXII, 125; CXVII, 200; CXXVII, 200; CXXVII, 104; CXXVIII, 210.
In these cases the use of "imagination" is derivative since the figure
called to mind is already integrated into the imagery. There is,
however, a richer usage of "imagination" in its rhetorical function
which has profound philosophical implications, in the forms of
"imaginar" as a noun, and secondarily as an infinitive.
The references to imagination in Ausias March's poems naturally 
37vary in usage over the many years in which he wrote these poems.
In general, one can say that in the group of poems whose theme is the
38rejection of amorous life, represented by the later, or "moral" poems, 
references to imagination are indirect. In these poems imagination 
assumes a passive function. It is referred to as a secondary cogni­
tive function, whose role in the poet’s amorous evolution is evaluated
39for its moral contents. The final work, Poem CXXVIII, verse 244,
refers to the function of imagination only to point out that it has
a dual cognitive value, which is neither necessarily good nor bad.
This evaluation made in hindsight follows the mainstream of scholastic
definitions, as discussed above:
Car lo delit e la dolor
que porten pe(r) l(o)s senys forans
e imaginacions grans
d’on mal e be se’n consegueix, (CXXVIII, w. 242-245).
This kind of reference is purely discursive; it is part of a terminology
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used to explain the basic mechanisms of "innamoramento"; hence, the 
concept of the image-building function of imagination is overlooked. 
It is used similarly in Poem CXX, verse 86. The poem’s context based
on the renunciation of love views all functions that contributed to
the "giovenile errore" negatively. The imagination is here referred 
to as being closely associated to the memory; it is the "sensuous 
memory" of the present: "0, tu^recort, no»t recorts be algii, / e del 
present perda 1 ’ imaginarf* (CXX, w. 85-86).
The process involved in the rejection of love, however, can 
cause the duality of imagination to assume a more important role. In 
Poem CXXX imagination continues to be a point of reference for the 
moral evaluation of love. The ambivalent character of imagination as 
a cognitive function allows Ausias March to dwell at length on the 
opposition of the spiritual ideal of love and its limitations caused 
by the relation that it has to the senses in order to be perceived, 
and this leads to the moral evaluation of love. The poet describes 
a situation in which he wishes to love, but not to see his love
reciprocated. Reciprocation would violate the purity of his love. 
Although he loves the lady any reciprocation of his love would lead 
to physical love:
Sens mon voler yo no»n parteix la pensa 
per un desig que no*m par amor sia, 
car no cobeig la su*amor fos mia, 
ans ve a temps que-m plau me fes offensa; 
car per s»amor la mia se’n obliga 
e mi no plau de tai preu fer-li paga
(CXIX, w. 21-26).
40The source of this love is the "gest”, which is intimately related 
to the movement of the imagination. The problem of the "gest" is a
key to the understanding of Ausias March’s poetry, which has been 
glossed over by many critics following A. Pages’ approach. P. Bohigas 
reduces the significance of the "gest" to a mere physical movement;
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he defines the ”gest” in the following words: "Alio que enamora el 
poeta es el posat de la dama, la seva gracia". Similarly, A. Pages 
defines the "gest" as a "graceful movement of the lady". However, in 
order to make some concessions to the essentially spiritual nature of 
the "gest", which cannot be overlooked, Pages remarks that as all 
movements it has its source in the soul, which scholastics considered 
to be the body’s motor, and, as such it is at best an expression of
the soul:
En revanche, si ces caracteres sont susceptibles, suivant lui, de 
frapper 1’attention du vulgaire, il en est un qui n’est sensible 
qu’aux gens "subtils" et auquel Auzias March attache la plus grande 
importance. C’est le geste, lo gest, que Montemayor, dont il faut 
toujours se defier, confond avec le visage et traduit inexactement 
par l’espagnol "rostro". Le geste, comme tout mouvement, a son 
principe, suivant les scolastiques, dans l’ame dont il est comme 
1’expression. Voila pourquoi il loue le maintien, la demarche, le 
port impeccable de sa dame. Il va meme jusqu’a dire que c’est tout 
ce qu’il aime en elle.^2
A few years later Pages redefined the term in the strictly limited
physical sense implied in the above: "Gest, ’expression du corps ou 
43 ’du visage, geste, allure, air, mine’". Although it is literally 
imprecise I cannot help but feel that Montemayor’s translation is 
more rigorous. Montemayor was greatly influenced by Italian Neopla­
tonism1, his interpretation of "gest" as "rostro" indicates that he 
felt it was a reflection of the lady’s soul. This is confirmed by the 
relation that imagination has to "gest", in the medieval Neoplatonic 
current of the Chartrians and Victorines, as well as, Poem CXVI, 
verse 121, "Lo gest dels ulls", and the Petrarchan verses 49-50 in 
Poem LXVII (Appendix II ), which seem to echo Jordi de Sant Jordi*s
imitation of Sonnet 5 ("Quando io movo i sospiri a chiamar voi") in 
44"Jus sus lo front". Even if one should accept that the "gest" is 
45"a graceful movement", its spiritual nature needs to be clarified.
In this poem the spiritual nature of the "gest" is explicit because
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it is intimately related to the imagination; it is what the imagina­
tion perceives. The ’’gest” is not the movement of the lady as such, 
but the spirit of the lady perceived, first in the imagination, which, 
as discussed previously, is the movement of the spirit (or soul) down 
to the object parallelled by an upward movement of the senses that 
perceive the lady as a physical object, from which, in turn, the 
subject’s spirit recognizes the ’’form" (the physical object’s spirit), 
which animates the body, and it is only then that the ’’gest” is also 
the movement of that body. All this takes place in the act of the 
highest spiritual sense, sight. ’’Gest" is, therefore, a term used to
denote the perception, or reflection, of the lady’s spirit, that is, 
a 6it is an imagination of the lady as an "archetypal” idea. As Hughes 
. 47de Saint Victor had pointed out, there is the danger that the sub­
ject’s spirit might become excessively enamoured of the imagination, 
and thereby incline too much to the flesh. The duality of the object 
perceived increases the possibility of this risk. Hence, in his first 
reference to the imagination in Poem CXIX, verse 18, Ausias March plays
on this theme:
Mas que sera 
e fastig port 
Tant es 1’escalf 
que no sent res 
1’imaginar 
si com la mar 
qu-en s-amargor
que reffret e qu-enflame 
qu-ensemps horn se’n alte?
que pel gest m’enamora,
del fret que-1 toch me porta, 
l’amarch dol^ assabora, 
los rius la obehexen 
lur dol^or convertexen
(CXIX, w. 13-20).
These verses, which begin with an elegant riddle, expound the function 
of imagination in the process of "innamoramento”. The riddle gives us 
the basic clues of the duality which we must find in the solution: 
that which "cools” and "ignites" (verse 13), is also that which brings 
"sorrow" and "joy" ("fastig" and "alt"). The "gest", which is brought
on by the most spiritual sense, sight, makes the poet "ardent" (verse
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15), while touch, the most physical sense, is forgotten (verse 16).
The images of fire, and illumination of reason (verse 17) at the 
sight of the lady’s "gest”, consequently dominate the coldness of the 
physical object perceived. The imagination is, therefore, that which
brings both joy and sorrow; for this reason Ausias March believes
that it tastes of bitter and sweet (verse 18). The physical object
as corporeal matter, or flesh, is bitter, but the spirit of the lady
is sweet. The ensuing image of the sea and the rivers further
exemplifies the sense of these verses. Just as the rivers flow to
the sea, so does the subject’s spirit move towards the object in
order to perceive its form, as the subject’s spirit approaches that 
48object excessively so it diminishes in spirituality and becomes 
baser, so do the rivers lose purity^ as they come to the sea they are 
muddied and become more saline until they are lost in the sea. The 
image is a metaphor for the Neoplatonic concept of emanation and its 
progressive degradation.
In the remainder of this poem Ausias March continues to 
develop this subject, as well as the intricate relation of the "gest" 
to the imagination. The skill of the poet in these verses lies in 
his ability to play on the confusion created by the spirit’s movement 
in the perception of the "gest", that is, to play with the ambivalence 
of imagination in relation to the dual nature of the lady. Hence, 
in stanza IV, verses 31-32, Ausias March states that when he imagines 
the cause of his love, he is unable to perceive either the cause 
itself, or where it lies: "Quant ymagin d*aquest-amor la causa, / 
no la perceb e menys hon te son siti" (w. 31-32). Owing to the 
fact that he is enraptured in the movement of the imagination between 
the senses and the spirit he can perceive neither the "gest", the 
lady’s spirit ("la causa") nor her body ("son siti"). He is describing
59
the conflict of the senses and the spirit, as the one moves toward the
other. The remaining verses in this stanza describe the confusion
that arises, out of this ambivalent cognitive faculty, imagination.
This confusion is furthered in the last reference to imagination in 
this poem in stanza VI, verse 52. In this section Ausias March 
exploits the confusion caused by imagination by inverting the usual 
function of imagination. He describes the delight of the lowest 
senses in the lady’s ’’gest", as they rise to meet the subject’s 
spirit:
Lo toch, per si, 
quant pren delit, 
pel gest, que tai 
que tot mi-nsemps
molt no s’i adelita; 
I’imaginar lo*y porta 
pensament me reporta 
per ella tota*m cita
(CXIX, w. 51-54).
Although the sense of touch in itself takes no delight in the spiritual
vision of the "gest", the upward movement of the imagination that
raises it to the spirit leads it to appreciate the "gest". However,
this same movement that brings the vision of the "gest" which delights
the sense of touch also causes the spirit to incline to sensuality,
and this leads to the poet’s amorous confusion. Ausias March explains
the ambivalence of this process in verses 79-80: "No es en earn, e
la earn mi enclina: / entra per l’ull e«n lo tot d’ella fina."
This is caused by the proximity of the body to the spirit. However,
although the body is inherently ugly, since it is only base matter,
it is redeemed by the beauty of the spirit or "gest”, which is the
source of this love: "Amor pel gest cors leig amar me mana" (CXIX,
49v. 87). The imagination which is intimately related to the "gest" 
is the source of idealism for Ausias March’s love; it enables him to 
perceive an inaccessible ideal, even on the psychological level of 
the "innamoramento" which he describes in Poem CXIX. The moral point 
of view in these later poems does not condemn the ideal "per se", but
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the ambivalent nature of the means of cognition man has of it, and 
the fall of man’s spirit which it entails.
This particular aspect of the problem of love pervades the 
poems of the middle and late period of Ausias March’s production.
In these, his consciousness of the contradictory function of imagina­
tion and its power over reason becomes constantly more acute, as we 
have seen it defined in Poem CXIX. Ausias March’s love, which delves 
into the ideal perceived in his imagination, is determined by the 
ineffable nature of this goal which can find no one to match its 
standards. In this period of productivity, the fall of the spirit 
and its inclination to the flesh, or matter, becomes a stark reality 
for Ausias March. The value of love is jeopardized, because it is 
increasingly considered to be the usurpation by the senses, or the 
flesh, of the apparent domain of the spirit. In his desire to achieve
the ideal created by imagination sorrow, which is conceived of as a 
51 'lack of discretion, consequently comes to become a dominant factor
in the thematic background of these poems. Love is, therefore,
presented as a corporeal experience, because the fall of the spirit
compels the lover to sensual love. Poem CXV repudiates that love
which has led the poet to sensuality, and in the final stanzas the
role of imagination is alluded to. The poem’s first stanza introduces
the problem of the impossibility of Ausias March’s ideal love to be 
52reciprocated : "la mi*amor un altr»a si no*n tira" (CXV, v. 9).
As in Poem CXIX, imagination is a source of "coldness" and "ardour"
53for the lover, that is, of love, "amar", or its repudiation "ahirar" :
No passa res 
que no-m escalph 
tots los mijans 
en ahirar 
Cascu d’aquests 
no se jutjar
que d’ella ymagine,
o que tot no*m refrede; 
de mi apart o vede, 
o amar si pens fine, 
te causa*n mi que*s tinga; 
en mi qual se retinga
(CXV, w. 85-90).
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The poet is caught in the contradictory movement of imagination, reason
rejects this love ("ahirar"), yet the senses are enamoured by the
image of the lady ("amar"). Hence, he feels both attraction and
revulsion for the lady. As verse 90 indicates this contradictory
situation stems from a confusion of the poet’s judgement. Owing to
the idealizing nature of imagination the senses have usurped the
function of the spirit, this usurpation is a source of conflict,
referred to in verse 89, the ’’ahirar” has its cause (’’causa”) in the
spirit or reason, and the love ("amar") in the senses; because the
spirit has had to lower itself excessively and, therefore, has lost 
54in spirituality, there is no possible middle point, verse 87. That 
this love is sensual, and either does not partake in spirituality or 
forces the spirit to lower itself against its will, is obvious from 
what the poet says in stanza XI:
No »s pot be dir 
lo que yo sent, 
d’aqo«m delit 
en l’esperit,
amor de home propi 
car per la earn es tota; 
com no»n pas una gota 
e si»u fa, com repropi
(CXV, w. 101-104).
Reason is therefore powerless before this imagination dominated by 
the senses that usurp the function of the spirit. Ausias March then 
describes the disillusionment which he feels at the perversion of his
ideal. It is a deceit over which he has no control. In stanza X the
conflict of "Ira” and "Amor" represents the defeat of reason by the 
senses, and the lack of power that the lover has when he is captivated 
by the "sensual memory" of the lady:
L’imaginar 
sind aquest 
te.m lo cor pres 
per allogar 
fent mudament 
qu* en suor vinch 
ladonchs Amor 
ans son poder 
no passa molt 
e venq Amor,
altre be no«m esmenta,
qu» e sentit per aquesta;
molt poca part ne resta 
Ira quant se presenta; 
tan gran en ma persona, 
quant Ira«n mi comenqa;
no pot fer que la venqa, 
del tot li abandona;
que lur poder s’eguala 
entrant-me sens escala
(CXV, w. 91-100).
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As the spirit, or reason, lowers itself, the senses ’'Amor” lose their 
power (verse 98), but as the senses rise to meet the spirit their 
power also increases (verse 99), and overwhelms reason. The judgement 
that Ausias makes of imagination is negative. He is concerned with 
the deceitful nature of imagination, which has brought him sorrow.
As explained above, sorrow proceeds from the knowledge, or desire, of 
virtue which is frustrated by the individual’s lack of will to tran­
scend sensuality. This poem is, therefore, a bitter condemnation of 
imagination which has enticed the poet to love a lady, who was per­
ceived as a spiritual entity. Ausias March feels that he is unable 
to love spiritually; however, his reason is so falsely delighted by 
the imagination (w. 96-100)^^ that he is unable to reject the 
deceitful ideal perceived in imagination. The ’’tornada’’ of this 
poem sums up this situation, that the ideal of Love, perceived decep­
tively by imagination, can only bring the poet sorrow: ’’Amor, Amor, 
yo he pres ferma tema: / que vostre be porta dolor extrema” (CXV, 
w. 121-122).
The creation of this ideal, which is considered to be deceit­
ful in the later poems, can be traced to the early poems. The inter­
vening poems of the middle period, preceding the ’’Cants de Mort”, do 
not refer to imagination with an explicitly moral intention. In these 
poems imagination is only referred to as the faculty of mental figura­
tion, and only twice is it associated to what the poet considers to be 
the ideal of Love. Poem LXXXIX begins with an image of a mystic 
nature^? ( Appendix II), by which the poet indicates that he is seek­
ing the lady’s love, not her physical possession, as verses 50-53 
indicate :
mon gran voler 
de vostre cors 
qu« encontra mi 
La voluntat
me porta*n aquest zel;
no tern lo pus prim pel
res fes ne*m fos altiu.
vull que pas tota» n mi
(LXXXIX, w. 50-53).
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Consequently the ideal set forth by the imagination is that the poet 
be granted the love of the lady, that his love be recognized and 
returned, spiritually but not physically. His delight is to imagine
that state of beatitude, which is essentially a spiritual communion:
Si »1 penssament 
d1imaginar 
sens aquell tot, 
si no »s tot sa,
lunyava hun sol punt
haver vostre voler,
no pusch delit haver;
tost pora sser defunt
(LXXXIX, w. 14-16).
This parallels the ’’mystic” imagery that introduces this theme:
’’Cervo ferit no desija la font / aytant com yo esser a vos present”
(LXXXIX, w. 1-2). In this desire for a love which is not physical
the imagination leads the poet into perceiving the lady ideally. The 
veracity of that ideal is imagined, but not tested. In Poem LXXXVII
the illusory character of that ideal is explained. Once again Ausias
March expounds problems arising from the duality of man and the 
ambivalence of imagination. This time, however, the scope of the 
imagination is broadened to explain that what Ausias March seeks in
the imagination is Love in its
No conech horn 
coneg. Amor 
yo son aquell 
d’imaginar en ell, 
Desig me fa 
dormint tant fort 
assats a mi 
que pur. amor 
Mon delit es 
e romanch trist
most ideal form:
qui sens amar persona, 
e per deu lo confesse; 
que per negun temps cesse 
e res no»m dona, 
en la speranqa jaure, 
que rah6 no «m desperta; 
es caussa descuberta 
no pot en dona caure. 
vida contemplativa, 
devaliant en 1’activa
(LXXXVII, w. 261-270)
An important point to notice in these verses is that Ausias March is
not in love with Love as such, but in love with Love through a person
(w. 261-262), that Is, he is in love with the spiritual essence which 
he perceives in that person (vv. 263-264), by means of imagination.
The contradiction which is the object of these verses lies in the fact
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that the perception Ausias March has of Love cannot be achieved in 
reality, or the practice of love, as verse 264 states. The imagina­
tion being an imperfect means of cognition, it cannot without the 
assistance of reason transcend the limits of the senses. Although 
Ausias March does desire pure love (w. 265 and 268) his imagination 
is not guided by reason, and in practice it becomes sensual love. 
Hence, Ausias March aspires to a "contemplative” life, as seen above 
in Poem CXIX, which reveals to him the ideal of a virtuous love which
he desires. Nevertheless, the lack of a strong will, which is the 
result of the absence of reason, causes the lover to fall into
sensuality and sorrow. The latter is the realization of the distance
that separates him from the ineffable ideal which he perceives only
in imagination.
Imagination, which has the basic function of allowing the poet 
to perceive an ineffable ideal that he cannot match in the sensory 
world, causes him to sorrow. The knowledge he has of this ideal makes 
the poet superior to the average man. Imagination, therefore, also 
serves to isolate the poet, or lover, from the community of mankind. 
Variations on this aspect of imagination can be found in three 
relatively early poems of Ausias March, XIII, XXXVI, and LXVI. In 
the latter poem sorrow arising from imagination becomes associated 
with the fear of death which serves as an expression of the poet’s 
isolation. This poem, written after a period during which Ausias 
March claims not to have been in love, represents a moment in which 
the poet relapses into his search for pure love, and the subsequent 
apprehensions he feels towards his new love. In the first stanza
Ausias March claims that he has been compelled to love against his 
will, and then implores Love to grant him a pure love:
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0 ver» Amor I 
puys m’as plagat, 
aquell enguent 
los pacients 
No sia sols
tu invoch e reclam:
vulles-m’abandonar
que sol medecinar
que per tu mal passam. 
yo en ta desfavor!
(LXVI, w. 9-13).
As the last verse points out, Ausias March fears isolation, that is, 
that he will be the only true lover not to find reciprocation in 
"ver*Amor”, true or pure love. The medical references in verses 11 
and 12 set the tone for some of the ensuing imagery. In stanza IV 
Ausias March compares his situation to that of a sick man (see Ap­
pendix 13) who is certain to live because he knows the normal symptoms 
of his illness, but comes to fear that he will die when a new ill 
befalls him. This fear of death is brought on by imagination (verse 
28):
Sf co«l malalt 
per alguns mals 
si algun mal 
en por de mort 
ne pren a me, 
lo mal d’Amor, 
e per mal nou, 
per no sser tai
de viure te fermanqa 
que familiars te, 
d’altr*accident li ve,
1’imaginar lo lanqa 
que»m era ja no res 
vivint sobre aquell, 
a morir vinch per ell, 
e com molt major es
(LXVI, w. 25-32).
As verses 29-32 indicate, imagination has thrown Ausias March into a
renewed consciousness of sorrow; it has renewed his love. The fear
that Ausias March expresses in the subsequent stanzas is summed up in
verses 31 and 32, "lo mal d’Amor" is the product of the imagination;
thus, Love brings a mortal wound: "esser menys d’ulls, ans del
colp, molt hi val, / mas al ferit mort sola»s guariment" (verses
39-40). The imagination renews the poet’s sorrow and leads him to
acknowledge the distance that separates him from his perception of
the ideal. This experience of the distance, which in rhetorical terms 
59is known as the "laetus horror", has an existential dimension. It
is an affirmation of the limitations of the flesh which can only be
66
transcended in death, which Ausias March conceives as the release 
from the ’’dark prison” of the body: ’’Torn a no-res yo «t suplich, 
lo meu esser, / car mes me val que tostemps l’escur career" (CV, 
w. 197-198).
The "laetus horror” felt by Ausias March at the contemplation 
of the distance that separates him from the ideal perceived in the 
lady gives way to an increased consciousness of death as a release 
from sentient life. The imagination is consequently a source of 
alienation. Poems XIII and XXXVI explicitly refer to imagination in 
this context. Poem XXXVI addresses both death and the lady, in 
stanzas I and IV respectively. Ausias March introduces the theme of 
this poem with an apostrophe to death on whom he calls to free him
from the sorrow he feels. Stanza II develops this theme by requesting
death, which is the only thing
Ma dolor gran 
sind per mal 
per altr» affany 
e sia tant 
torbant mon seny 
ladonchs remey 
altra dolor 
o prech la mort
that can surpass the poet’s sorrow
no pot esser perida 
qu» en quantitat la passe; 
no crech mon cor se lasse 
que« m don pena *nfinida, 
fins que dolor no senta: 
yo pens aconseguesqua; 
me plau sia fresqua, 
que morir me consenta
(XXXVI, w. 9-16).
These verses are essentially a hyperbolic praise of the lady. What
Ausias March is saying in highly rhetorical language is that his vision
of the lady’s beauty is such that the sorrow he experiences, the
’’laetus horror" caused by imagination, could only be surpassed by
death. The fresh sorrow referred to in verse 15 is a renewed "laetus 
61horror", which, although impossible as verses 9 to 12 stipulate, 
would increase the state of anguish that the poet feels, and end his 
present sorrow. As Bohigas interprets these verses, this new sorrow 
can only be found in death. In the third stanza Ausias March traces
this anguish directly to the imagination, and addresses the lady in
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order to beseech her to renew his
L’imaginar 
altra dolor, 
a donar plor 
ffuig de les gents, 
Deman de vos 
ago deman 
e no es poch; 
gran part del mal
pure love, beyond all contradictions
per null temps no m’esmenta
e que apert no sia
perdent tot*alegria;
no*m plau que algu*m senta.
que de mi* us vullau dolrre;
que lleument pusch atenyer,
ab que no*m vullau fenyer,
vds me poreu dissolre
(XXXVI, w. 17-24).
Ausias March seeks to renew his confidence in the possibility of
achieving the ideal which the imagination presents to him. The 
imagination presents the image which provokes the "laetus horror” 
(verses 17-18), and leads the poet to acknowledge his sorrow, that is, 
his incapacity to fulfill that desire. This alienates him from man­
kind who has no conception of this ideal (verse 20). This situation
will lead to the subsequent moral and religious poems in which Ausias 
62March describes the moral decadence of his age. However, in his 
request to the lady Ausias March begs her to reciprocate his pure 
love, and fulfill the requirements of his ideal, that is, to renew 
his faith in the possibility of achieving the ideal, by not feigning 
pure love (verse 23). The problem of finding a being capable of 
truly reciprocating that love was the subject of Poem LXXXVII
discussed above.
Poem XIII also examines the problem of alienation resulting
from the knowledge of the existence of an ideal imparted by imagina­
tion. Ausias March expands the scope of this alienation by explicitly 
contrasting his imagination to that of the average man. This is the
source of Ausias March1s contention that his knowledge of Love is 
63exclusive. His ideal is so much beyond the reach of the living, 
that is, the average person who does not aspire to Ausias March’s 
ideal, that his love makes him seem to be a dead man among the quick:
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Cascu requer 
per 50 no »m plau 
D'imaginar 
si com d’om mort,
e vol a son semblant;
la pratica dels vius.
mon estat son esquius;
de mi prenen espant
(XIII, w. 9-12).
In his later moral poems Ausias March specifically refers to the 
64"pratica dels vius" (verse 10) as the rites of lustful love; his
aspiration to a virtuous love sets fear in men’s hearts, as does the 
65vision of a dead man (verse 12). That which Ausias March seeks in 
the imagination is infinite: "car 50 que vull no sera may finat"
(v. 15). In this early poem Ausias March fears that death would 
deprive him of the vision of this imagination. This tormenting 
situation has its origin in the impossibility of finding a living 
woman to reciprocate Ausias March’s love. Consequently, the fourth 
stanza deals with the problem of death, which would deprive the lover
of his imagination and, at the same time, impede any possibility of
attaining pure love:
E si la mort 
- ffer mi absent 
no li graesch 
lo meu cors nuu, 
de perdre pus 
los meus desigs 
e si»m cove 
seran donats
no «m dugues tai offensa 
d’una tan plasent vista -, 
que de tera no vista 
qui de plaer no pensa 
que lo ymaginar
no poder-se complir; 
mon derrer jorn finir, 
termens a ben amar
(XIII, w. 25-32).
Death, which would lead to the burial of the poet’s body, would 
deprive him of the pleasure he draws from the sight of the lady 
(verse 26), and hence, of the imagination he has of her spirit (see
Poem CXIX above). The greatest loss, therefore, would be the very 
66source of his pure love, which is the imagination (verse 29). This 
also marks the end of "ben amar" (verse 32), which is beyond the love
of the living (verse 10 above). Yet, all that Ausias March seeks is 
that the lady acknowledge this love. However, the only test which
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the poet has to certify that the lady fulfills this condition and
shows mercy, is in death, by becoming a martyr of Love:
que d’esta mort 
penedint-vos 
mor l’ignoscent
vos ha plagut plorar,
com per poqua merce
e per amar-vos martre
(XIII, w. 36-38).
In these poems the imagination is the source of an inaccessible love, 
which as in the above verses, creates a ’’religio amoris" (verse 38), 
and is a source of sorrow for the poet that brings about alienation 
and a consciousness of death. These various poetic themes are used 
rhetorically to magnify the value of the poet's imagination: the 
greater the effect of the "laetus horror" produced on the lover by 
the perception of the imagination, the greater the latter is. Indirectly, 
the manipulation of these elements becomes a consistent praise of the 
lady as Ausias March wishes the reader to perceive her through his 
suffering, as in the laudatory verses of Poem XXXVI, 9-16.
In the early poems the formation of Ausias March1s conscious­
ness of death and the inaccessibility of pure love depends largely on 
the role which imagination plays in the deceitful maintenance of hope. 
Indeed, as in the Roman de la Rose, one of the commandments of Love
is that the lover should always have present in his mind, the memory 
67of the beloved, that is, the imagination which is sensuous memory.
This induces the poet into renewing his belief in the possibility of
an ideal love, as in Poem XXXVI, verse 15 above. Poem I uses this
concept extensively. The introductory image which draws on the
Boethian theme of the adversity of Fortune in the memory of happiness 
68(Appendix II ) refers to the participation of the imagination. The 
significance of this poem is greatly increased when one realizes that 
Ausias March deliberately introduces the problem of the deceitfulness 
of imagination, as opposed to that of mere memory:
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Ax£ com cell 
e son delit 
ne pren a mi, 
1’imaginar, 
sentint estar
qui*n lo somni*s delita 
de foil pensament ve, 
que *1 temps passat me te 
qu<> altre be no*y habita, 
en aguayt ma dolor
(I, w. 1-5).
The imagination of past times, as a mental figuration of the Golden
Age, not as a cognitive faculty, which plays an important role in 
69Ausias March’s poetry, is the source of much of Ausias March’s 
idealization of love. The imagination in this early poem is the 
perception of an ideal past based on pure love, as all references to
imagination in this poetry. Although the ideal bears a negative moral
connotation, it is nevertheless an ideal characterized by its very 
ineffability. As verse 9-10 of this poem indicate, Ausias March 
refers to an ideal which is irremediably lost: ’’Del temps present 
no*m trobe amador, / mas del passat, qu* es no-res e finit" (I, w. 
9-10). This is obviously related to Ausias March’s image of past 
lovers, as virtuous lovers, in Poem XIII, verses 5-8. This conception 
of the past has an inner actuality for the poet by the very nature of 
its idealism: ’’Temps de *venir en negun be*m pot caure; / aquell 
passat en mi es lo millor” (I, w. 7-8), (underlining is mine). By 
this ideal which is irretrievable the poet finds himself constantly 
facing the ’’laetus horror” which characterizes his sorrow. The 
imagery in this poem is consequently inverted in order to represent 
the ideal which is impossible to attain. Ausias March’s use of the 
image of the condemned prisoner in stanza II provides a key for 
understanding the duality of this ideal and the ’’laetus horror”:
sf com aquell 
he de lonch temps 
e creure»l fan 
e *1 fan morir
qui es jutgat a mort
la sab e s’aconorta,
que li sera estorta
sens un punt de recort
(I, w. 13-16).
The image of hope denied to the lover, who is a ’’prisoner of love"
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( Appendix XI ) , acquires its full significance in this poem when it 
is recalled that it is originally found in the Guillaume de Lorris 
section of the Roman de la Rose^; Ausias March is frequently supposed 
to have known the whole work^:
Mout est Esperance courtoise:
El ne laira ja une toise
Nul vaillant ome jusqu’au chief,
Ne por perill ne por meschief.
Nes au larron que l’en viaut pendre
Fait ele ades merci atendre (w. 2631-2636).
If hope is to sustain the lover in the Roman de la Rose, this is not 
the case in Ausias March’s Poem I. The courtly ideal proposed by 
Guillaume de Lorris has an opposite value within the limits of the 
Valencian poet’s experience. The hope of retrieving the past is 
deceitful; by having recourse to the imagery of the Roman de la Rose 
Ausias March refers to a courtly ideal which is inaccessible. The
subsequent imagery of Poem I describes situations in which the deceit 
of hope only leads to a greater consciousness of the ’’laetus horror”, 
the distance that separates the individual from the ideal perceived 
and sought. The ’’imaginar" recalls the ideal which sparks hope, and, 
therefore, pleasure. This causes the poet to aspire to a virtuous
love which is denied by his actual circumstance, and leads to sorrow,
which as we have seen above is the consciousness of the individual’s
failure to attain virtue:
Ff^ra millor 
que no mesclar 
entre»quells mals, 
com del passat 
Las I Mon delit 
doble’s l’affany
These verses return to the theme
ma dolor sofferir 
pocha part de plaher 
qui »m giten de saber 
plaher me cove *xir. 
dolor se converteix; 
apres d’un poc repos,
(I, w. 25-30).
of the failure to realize this
imagination, and the poet’s constant relapse into the belief of the
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possibility of attaining this ideal, as seen in Poem LXVI, verses 25­
32 and LXXXVI, verses 265, which is the fruit of a vision brought
about by imagination. It is a false hope that beguiles the poet and 
causes him to shun the "practice of the living” (Poem XIII, verse 10). 
The interpretation of imagination in this poem is negative. It 
logically can be considered to be a reflection of the definition of 
imagination as an imperfect means of cognition, which as verse 27 
above suggests is destructive when not accompanied by the control of
reason.
Yet, in the remaining two poems which refer to imagination,
Poems IX and XXVII, the function of the imagination continues to be
ambivalent. It is eventually a source of sorrow, but it is also the 
immediate source of the poet’s aspiration to the highest kind of 
virtuous love. Poem IX refers to imagination three times, in stanzas
IV and V. In all three instances imagination is the only faculty that
allows the lover to perceive Love. The poet describes the state of 
folly into which he has been driven now that he finds himself aban­
doned by Love who has become weary of his unusual constancy. This 
allegorical representation in the first stanza is a masque of the 
lover’s timidity. The lover’s fear of revealing his love, and the 
unreciprocated nature of this love are the main subjects of this
poem. One could infer a moral purpose in this poem by similarities
with the process described in Poem CXV, verses 85-100, discussed 
above*, however, this is a subject developed in Ausias March’s later 
poetry. The tone of this poem is set by the reference to Pyramus
and Thisbe, who proved the truth of their love in death:
Cell qui no sent 
yo li perdo 
Piramus volch 
e per senblant
que pot fer molt amar,
si de mi s va trufan;
morir passat d’un bran, 
mort Tisbe volch passar
(IX, w. 13-16).
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The image of ideal lovers (Appendix XI ) whose love was proven by­
death is paralleled by Ausias March’s own conception of ideal love 
which can only be warranted by death, as in Poem XXXVI, discussed 
previously. Love has taken away the lover’s rational faculties:
"que»1 seny tinch pres l’arbitre y la raho" (IX, v. 7); this impedes 
him from being able to communicate his love to the lady. Beyond 
reason, however, he is sustained in love by the rapture of imagination 
which Love cannot take away from him:
Stant a part 
ymaginant 
d’executar 
puys lo primer 
1’imaginar 
tan larguament
e sol, yo m’enpeguesch, 
go que deuria fer; 
no dech haver esper, 
assaig no enseguesch;
Amor me vol reprendre, 
ab vergonya»m refrena
(IX, w. 25-30).
In this stanza imagination has a passive and subservient function to 
the problem of revealing love. As seen previously in the discussion 
of Poem CXIX, the contemplation of the lady’s perfection operates 
within the Imagination, which allows the lover to perceive the ideal. 
In verse 26 above it is the contemplation of action that would bring 
about the ideal, but which timidity or shame ("vergonya") prevents 
him from putting into practice (verse 27). Within the faculty of 
Imagination his love is born, that is, the contemplation of the lady’s 
spirit, or pure love, which Love threatens to take away from him
(verse 29). In stanza V Ausias March describes the conflict between
contemplation and the practice of love, or, by extension the conflict 
of the spirit and the flesh that torments him. It is his belief in 
the reality of the perception of the imagination that drives Ausias 
March to claim that he would die in order to prove the veracity of his 
love, like Pyramus and Thisbe:
Los fets d’Amor yo no pusch ben entendre; 
de grans contrasts m»opinio es plena;
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hor*a*n lo jorn 
peasant en go 
Si altra veu 
per dar senyal 
suplich la mort 
e si no«m val,
que no sent ulla pena; 
que vinch a l’arma rendre.
I1imaginar m’i porta, 
que yo sia cregut, 
qu»en tai cas me ajut; 
ma veritat jau morta
(IX, w. 33-40).
As verses 35 and 36 indicate, in this great conflict between contem­
plative and active life, there is an hour in which the lover is free
73from all sorrow and feels indifferent to death. This indifference
to death and sorrow is characteristic of the rapture of contemplation 
Indeed, verse 37, indicates that this contemplative state is brought 
about by imagination. Hence, the imagination again gives Ausias 
March access to the ineffable ideal of love; the deceit of this mode 
of cognition is evident in the "tornada":
Lir entre carts, 
de mos delits 
no»y he toquat, 
e per tornar
fins a veure la porta 
sobirans son vengut; 
ans me’n torn com a mut, 
ja trob la via torta
(IX, w. 41-44).
The lover’s imagination has led him into a one-way, no-exit, situa­
tion; now that he has seen the lady he cannot turn away (verse 44). 
His reason is now captured by Love (verse 7 above); it has become 
excessively enamoured of imagination, which, as Hughes de Saint
Victor remarked, leads to man’s individual fall. The great "finesse" 
74of this poem lies in the poet’s ability to play on the highly 
ambivalent nature of imagination.
Poem XXVII also develops around the theme of the lover’s 
shyness, and the conflict between contemplative and active life. The 
first stanza presents the problematic situation. The imagination of 
Love found in the contemplation overcomes the sorrow of the poet, 
however, since it subdues reason it causes a new sorrow, because love 
cannot be revealed to the lady without destroying the ideal perceived
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This entails a conflict for the lover concerning whether he should 
reveal his love or not. These problems are summed up in the first
eight verses:
Sobresdolor 
1’enteniment 
aytant es dolq 
e mon affany,
No trob remey, 
que mon voler 
ne*n sol un loch 
sin6 *n morir
m’a tolt 1’imaginar; 
no*s dol ni«s pot esbatre: 
que »1 ha calgut abatre, 
plorant?no»s pot mostrar. 
car ma dolor es tanta, 
en parts ne tinch partit, 
lo’m trobe ahunit 
e viure que«s decanta
(XXVII, w. 1-8).
As in Poem IX the problem of the lover’s shyness is intimately related 
to that of the loss of his rational faculty. Reason has become 
excessively enamoured of imagination*, it has lowered itself (’’abatre”, 
verse 3), and has fallen to the power of the senses, verses 1 to 2.
The sorrow that arises out of this situation is portrayed as a choice 
between living and dying, verse 8. This represents the constant 
fluctuation of the will between revealing or not the poet’s love, 
verses 5 to 8. The choice, which is affected by reason’s excessive 
attraction to the imagination, is one between contemplative or active 
life, as discussed above in Poem LXXXVII, verses 261-270. The imagina 
tion’s power over reason causes the lover’s will to lose the necessary 
guidance, verse 6, and to fluctuate constantly, verse 7, between 
contemplative and active life. The sorrow, verse 5, which arises from 
this state can therefore be said to be the product of the lover’s 
fear to face the distance that separates him from the ideal perceived 
in his imagination. The "tomada" articulates this notion:
Plena de seny, 
vida y dolor 
lo meu desig 
quant me recort
no »s pot ben soferir 
sens pendr* algun espay; 
se converteix en glay 
que res vos haja dir
(XXVII, w. 41-44).
The fear of revealing the lover’s feeling is tantamount to the fear of
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destroying the contemplative ideal of imagination. It is therefore
the fear of facing the failure of this ideal in active life. The poet
is caught between the desire of having his love reciprocated and the 
fear that by reciprocation it will either be destroyed, or at best, 
rejected by the lady. In either case It is important to note that 
the constant factor is that the imagination has given the lover access 
to an ineffable ideal which cannot be put into practice without 
destroying it. The desire to believe in any such possibility is 
entirely dependent in these early poems on the fall of reason. Imagina­
tion then becomes a state of rapture that gives the lover access to a
higher ideal against which he must measure himself once this ideal is
put into practice. However, the very fact that it entails the loss 
of reason inevitably sets the imagination in an ambivalent context, 
and this allows for subsequent moral judgement.
In all of the above references to Ausias March’s use of the
theory of imagination it is evident that the spiritual vision of the 
"form” of the lady is considered to be quasi-divine. Yet, in all these
cases the ideal is rendered inaccessible due to an inherent flaw in
reason which causes its inclination to the flesh. Hughes de Saint
Victor refers to this movement as the excessive enamourment of reason
to the imagination. The perception of this ideal is obviously taken 
in context, and as stanza IV of Poem IX, it involves the problem of 
"imagining" actions that are fitting to the ideal circumstance; 
hence, the "imagining" of an ideal world within which the object moves. 
This context seems to be the idealization of a certain literary
tradition, implicit in the references to Pyramus and Thisbe. This
larger context of the imagination as related to the problem of love
in the poetry of Ausias March will be the object of a subsequent chapter 
75in this thesis. In its original sense the imagination as an ideal
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individually perceived is not condemned in itself. It Is the imagina­
tion as a movement of the sensuous memory leading to the perversion 
of reason and free will, as in Poem IX, verse 7, that is open to moral 
reproof.
This is the very point which I consider to be the hinge of 
all problems present in Ausias March’s poetry, whether it be moral, 
religious or erotic. The classification of the types of love in
three parts, which is really used to define the degree of the movement
of reason away from the spirit, is a subsequent evolution of this
problem, excessively noted by prior critics. It represents the
discursive solution to the representation of an essentially metaphysical 
poetic problem which has its roots in the rhetorical theory inherited
from the Chartrians and Victorines, and especially, in the case of
Ausias March, from the De Unione Corporis et Spiritus of Hughes of 
Saint Victor, a point which will be substantiated in chapter V.
This naturally implies that there is present in the works of Ausias 
March, the influence of a mediaeval Neoplatonic current which affects 
both his interpretation of love and his religious sensitivity. The
latter will be the subject of chapter V. There remains in this
section to clarify the notion of Ausias March’s experience of the
perception of the individual ideal. As I pointed out above the
previous examples of Ausias March’s references to imagination are
all concerned with its ambivalent nature. The description of the
original experience emphasizing its capacity to cause "laetus horror",
and, hence, consciousness of the positive aspects of the imagination,
7 6its rise to the spirit, is overlooked. This, I believe, can be 
found in Ausias March’s usage of the word "fantasia", phantasy, which 
although basically synonymous to imagination, had in the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries certain important secondary implications.
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The problem of a distinction between phantasy and imagination 
is a hoary one that goes back to Aristotle’s criticism of Plato, and 
is determined by the solution given by Proclus,?? which explicitly 
separated the two terms and affected subsequent definitions. Imagina­
tion and phantasy are both imperfect means of cognition, and, as the
78texts previously quoted point out, they are frequently inter­
changeable. The difference is a matter of degree based on the notion
7of an association of imagination to reason and phantasy to intellect. 
Proclus’ explanation of the difference placed phantasy in an even more 
ambivalent position than imagination by associating it to truth found
in fiction or dreams, hence divorcing it, more than imagination, from
the senses, and equally accentuating its unreliability. For Proclus
it is ’’the last echo... of the intellect, and is not improperly 
80called passive intellect". Furthermore, it is associated to Platonic 
reminiscence in which "the images of a former ideal existence are in 
phantasy and can be recalled". Hence, through its relation to the 
intellect phantasy is considered to be an ambivalent form of non­
sensuous memory, which could lead to a superior truth but also to
great deceit, if it is considered to be a concrete representation of
sensuous objects. A further determinant factor in this distinction
is the Stoic definition of phantasy. It accentuated the relation of
phantasy to dreams and stressed its unreliable nature by associating
it to the unreality of the vision and the physiological condition of 
82the subject. The Stoics consequently associated it to melancholy :
Thousands who are insane or melancholy have what are really phantasies 
in the sense that they have sources in external reality; yet, since 
there is no true correspondence between the phenomenon and the impres­
sion, these are to be called "phantasms".83
The consequences of these two basic views of phantasy on the later 
Middle Ages can best be gleaned from the work of Albert the Great for
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whom: "Phantasia implied the loftier functions, the greater freedom,
84but at the same time the greater liability to error.”
These concepts pervade the literary tradition of pre­
Renaissance Europe. Indeed, one needs only to compare Dante’s 
85various references to ’’1’alta fantasia" in the Divina Commedia to
Chaucer’s almost antonymous usage of the same word as "derke 
86fantasye" in the "Franklin’s Tale", where it is related to the 
87"maladye of hereos", in order to consider the varied fortunes of 
this term. In courtly literature the moral consequences of the 
negative interpretation of phantasy, as a vain imagination, is a 
predominant aspect of the moralists’ view on love, as can be seen in 
the highly influential De planetu naturae. Alain de Lille’s Nature
describes the deceit into which mankind has fallen since the rebellion
of the senses. W. Wetherbee’s interpretation of the De planetu
88 89 naturae clearly identifies this deceit with the "maze of phantasia"
90whose duplicity has brought "shadows of sorrow" as described in the
two parts of Genius’ speech. In the fourteenth-century French authors, 
91such as Jehan Le Bel, found it necessary to differentiate between
imagination and phantasy; to the latter Le Bel naturally attributed
the faculty of inventing valid or invalid images. Hence, this aspect
of phantasy is considered to be a source of sorrow, or "tristitia".
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries "tristitia" became synonymous 
92with melancholy. An important factor in determining the relation
between phantasy and melancholy in the Middle Ages was undoubtedly
the former’s association to sleep and dreams, as found in Proclus and
the Stoics. This led to the association of phantasy to sloth in the
Christian tradition, and sloth was equally considered to be an attribute 
93of the lesser kind of melancholy. However, although this seems to
have been the predominant interpretation of phantasy in the courtly
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.i 94treatises that considered love to be an "inmoderata cogitatione”, 
one cannot overlook the equally important aspect of phantasy as a 
lofty intellectual faculty, which is also present in the courtly 
tradition. It gained importance in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, and shaped the Florentine sensibility.
The various possible implications of phantasy are greater than 
those of imagination. This does not seem to have been ignored by 
Ausias March. The three references he makes to phantasy tend to 
associate this faculty to its loftier contemplative function. However, 
the implication in the two later poems suggests a relation to lesser 
melancholy and, as such, to idle phantasy. This is clearly a posterior 
moral judgement. These three references are found in Poems XVIII, CI 
and CXVII. It is only in the first of these that Ausias March 
explicitly extols phantasy’s intellectual benefits-; in the others 
this judgement is tempered.
Poem CXVII is an extensive moral poem dealing with the various 
kinds of love and the poet’s incapacity to maintain his love pure, 
owing to the weakness of the will and the problem of man’s dual nature. 
The reference to phantasy in these verses is accessory; it comes as 
an interjection:
Si«n gran exces 
tot lo compost 
car segons es 
axi ses parts 
tirant, fluixant, 
volent l’onest,
- ago segons 
a temps volent
This description is followed by
per son desig l’om puja
ses potences te preses,
e a qui es amable,
de amor les carrega,
creixent, minvant, fent cambis,
apres tot lo contrari
se porta»n fantasia - ;
com hom, com brut, com angel
(CXVII, w. 161-168)
elemental imagery describing this
95process in the ensuing stanza ( Appendix II ). The reference to 
phantasy is used to denote the mutability of the kinds of affection
to which man is inclined by his dual nature. As verses 167-168 imply,
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phantasy is a source of this instability. This is a reference to 
the breadth of possibilities inherent in the notion of phantasy, as
in Jehan Le Bel it is an indiscriminate source of valid or invalid
images. Ausias March is basically repeating a standard notion con­
cerning the ambivalence of phantasy as a means of cognition, and only 
as such can it be associated with deceit in a general condemnation
of love.
Unlike Poem CXVII, Poems XVIII and CI, are love poems; there
is a good rhetorical reason for Ausias March not to formulate a
condemnation of phantasy in these poems, especially in XVIII where
it is the source of a fulfilling experience of love. Poem CI, which 
96seems to be a later poem, associates phantasy to the spiritual
aspects of the lover’s contemplation of the lady, that is, to her
’’seny” and "gest”. This poem develops mainly around the theme of the
power of the "gest", and by so doing, Ausias March is able to praise
the lady, as he frequently does when referring to the imagination.
The effects of the perception of the lady’s ’’gest" serve to praise
her. Ausias March introduces the subject of this poem with a medical
image of possible troubadour origin ( Appendix II ), which alternates
with a Petrarchan image in the second stanza, describing the effects
of the "gest". In these verses, the "gest" as a spiritual emanation 
97is perceived in the eyes of the lady by the imagination and renders 
the lover powerless:
Yo viu uns ulls 
de dar dolor 
yo, smaginant, 
qu* en mon castell 
yo viu un gest 
d’un feble cos, 
qu* un horn armat 
sens rompre’m pel
haver tan gran potenca 
e prometre plaher; 
viu sus mi tai poder 
era sclau de remenqa: 
e sentf una veu 
e cuydara jurar 
yo *1 fera congoxar: 
yo »m so retut per seu
(CI, w. 9-16).
In the first four verses of this stanza the theory of imagination,
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introduced by vision, is clearly set out, and the last four verses 
repeat the same concept with another, but similar, metaphor in which 
the notion of ’’gest", as related to the imagination, is elaborated 
upon. Characteristically the function of the imagination entails a 
conflict between the senses and reason^:
Mos ulls d’aqo han feta la bugada 
e tot mos senys s’i s6n volguts mesclar; 
yo pena*n pas, mas no*y puch contrastar
(CI, w. 25-27).
From this point onwards the poet is caught in his usual dilemma, 
discursively presented in Poem CXVII, v. 168, of being unable to 
choose between contemplation and action. The "gest" of the lady 
keeps him in contemplation, "Lo vostre gest tots mos actes afrena" 
(verse 45). It is in this context that phantasy is introduced:
Dormint, vetlant, 
en contemplar 
e quant mes trob, 
pel pensament,
yo tinch la fantasia 
qui am, qui es, que val, 
lavors me va pus mal, 
qui»m met en gran follia
(CI, w. 33-36).
Ausias March’s conception of phantasy in the first two verses above 
follows the standard definition of this faculty. The two words, 
"dormint, vetlant" (verse 33), which mean, sleeping, lying awake or 
day-dreaming, give us a perfect description of phantasy as associated 
to dreams and sleep, hence to sloth, and therefore, to melancholy, or 
"amor hereos". As one can see in verse 36 the "inmoderata cogitatione 
caused by phantasy (verse 33) leads the lover into folly, "gran follia 
(verse 36). This folly is the product of the opposition between the 
contemplation of the "gest" which restrains the lover and his 
boundless love (will or desire) as explained in verses 45 and 46.
This is a conflict between action and contemplation. The irony is 
that the "gest" which causes the contemplation also sparks the "voler"
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Lo vostre gest 
he mon voler 
1’ivern cremant, 
aquells perills
tots mos actes afrena, 
res no’1 pot enfrenar; 
l’estiu sens escalfar, 
me daran mala strena
(CI, w. 45-48).
■ 99Contrary to Bohigas1 judicious opinion, verse 47 is a topical de­
scription of the unstable medical condition of the melancholy lover.
The poetic unity of the text is maintained by a return to the medical 
imagery used at the beginning. The concept of phantasy presented in 
these verses is particularly ambiguous. It has a very close relation 
to imagination as a contemplative faculty (verse 34), and therefore, 
of keeping the poet’s love on a spiritual level, yet it is also 
’’idle fantasy" which leads to the physiological unbalance characteristic 
of "amor hereos", in which the lover suffers the extremes of Love’s 
folly. .
In Poem XVIII phantasy is presented as a purely spiritual
faculty. The context in which it Is mentioned is solely concerned
with the description of the intellectual bliss found in the perception
of the lady’s beauty. This poem is generally referred to as one of 
101the most "Platonic" poems of Ausias March’s production. It describes
the rise of the visual, and therefore, sensual, perception to the
spirit (verses 5 to 8 below). All references to the "enamourment",
or fall, of reason are deleted. Love is here strictly intellectual
and blissful. Phantasy is considered a means to revealed knowledge,
102that is to true wisdom. Although it is only mentioned once it is 
the introductory verb which dominates every section of this poem. 
Everything referred to is perceived in phantasy. The first stanza 
provides the reader with all the thematic elements subsequently 
developed:
Ffantasiant, 
los grans secrets 
e mon jorn clar
Amor a mi descobre 
c» als pus suptils amaga, 
als homens es nit fosqua,
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e visch de 50 
Tant en Amor 
que par del tot 
car mos desigs 
sino en tai
que persones no tasten. 
l’esperit meu contempla, 
fora del cors s’aparte, 
no son trobats en home, 
que la earn punt no*l torbe
(XVIII, w. 1-8).
The first fundamental problem in the above verses is that of deter
mining the subject of the verb. Out of phantasy, that is, fancy,
Love might be deceiving the poet. On the basis of previous references
to the imagination and to phantasy, in which the subject always per­
forms the action I am inclined to believe that "Ffantasiant" is
103performed by the narrator. Phantasizing on love entails three 
basic themes, that of revelation (verse 2), through illumination 
(verse 3), which is conceived of as a spiritual contemplation (verse 
5), and leads to a quasi-mystic implication of the ascension of the 
spirit through a divorce from the flesh (verses 7-8).
Ausias March presents the subsequent images in reference to 
these three themes in mystic terms adequate to the contemplative life 
which he is describing. Phantasy has in these verses the quality of 
a mystic rapture which is described through an imagery of light. It 
portrays the divine revelation of Love, and the spirit’s ascent to 
the spiritual vision by separation from sensuality:
Sf com los sants, 
la lum del mon 
e menyspreants 
puys major part 
tot enaxi 
aquells desigs 
prenint aquells
As verse 31 tells us Ausias March’s
sentints la lum divina,
conegueren per ficta,
la gloria mundana,
de gloria sentien,
tinch en menyspreu e fastig
qui complits, Amor minva,
que del esperit mouen,
(XVIII, w. 25-31).
love is inspired by desires that
proceed from the spirit. Verses subsequent to this passage better 
define the source of these spiritual desires by elaborating on the 
divine illumination alluded to in verses 25 and 26. The light imagery
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introduces an extensive contrast between it and the darkness and
chaos which characterizes this world and the soul’s life in it. The
divine light illuminates the spirit as it is informed by the sense
perception, and Ausias March uses the concept of illumination to 
104expound a basic theory of the clear spirit, which is inherent to 
the illuminative function of phantasy. As passive intellect, phantasy 
recalls the images of the soul’s former existence; saintly illumina­
tion is the Christian Platonic equivalent of this concept. Through
this illumination the spirit, unsullied by the flesh, rises above its 
earthly bonds and enjoys a purely intellectual contemplation of the
divine mysteries. The fifth stanza summarizes this process:
Si com sant Pau 
del cors perque 
car es lo cors 
e tant com viu 
axi Amor 
e no*y acull 
e per go sent 
sf que ma earn
Deu li sostrague l’arma
v£s divinals misteris,
del esperit lo carjjre
ab ell es en tenebres,
l’esperit meu arrapa
la maculada pensa,
lo delit qui no-s canssa, 
la ver- amor no «m torba
(XVIII, w. 33-40).
There is implied in the reference to St. Paul’s conversion (see Ap­
pendix II), which involves illumination, notions which are normally
105associated with that of the Pauline mirror. Phantasy here, as in 
all this poem,is conceived to be the illumination of the clear spirit, 
which in its movement informs the rational soul. Hence, Ausias March 
refers to the entombment of the spirit in the body, the soul’s 
descent into chaos, the "descensus ad inferos" in verses 35 and 36. 
Love, through phantasy, liberates the spirit from its captivity and 
purifies its perception (verse 38). Again, this process is under­
stood to be a mystic rapture (verse 37). Consistent with the implica­
tions of mediaeval Christian Neoplatonism the revealed knowledge 
gained in phantasy is presented as a divine folly: "e quant ho die, 
de mos dits me desmenten, / dant aparer que coses folles parle"
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(verses 55 and 56). Characteristically, the clear spirit is maintained 
106so, by the constant action of the will which keeps the surface of 
the mirror polished so that it will best reflect divine secrets. The 
’'tornada" of this poem, therefore, ends by referring to the important
action of the will:
Lir entre carts, 
en go que null 
go fay Amor, 
sos grans tresors;
lo meu voler se tempra 
amador sap lo tempre; 
a qui plau que yo senta 
sols a mi* Is manifesta
(XVIII, w. 57-60).
As in the case of references to the Imagination, these verses imply
a certain flattery of the lady's beauty since she is perceived in the
light of phantasy which is vision illuminated by Love. However, an
important point in this "tornada" is that Ausias March makes it clear
that in this phantasy his will is tempered. He is therefore describing
himself as a well-tempered lover. Leo Spitzer has noted that the word
"tempered" frequently implies a reference to the notion of world 
107harmony. In his various uses of this word Ausias March frequently
108alludes to the temper of the microcosm, a concept with which he is 
quite familiar^O^; "Per menor mon l’om per tots se nomena" (CXII, 
verse 375). In subsequent problems references to the lover's temper 
are governed by the theory of the four humours and the difficulty of 
maintaining them in balance.In this case, where the lover’s 
temper is perfectly harmonious, phantasy is associated to a state of 
plenitude in which the lover’s soul reaches a condition of cosmic 
harmony; this is in total agreement with the mystic rapture that 
accompanies the clear spirit’s vision.
When referring to the concept of the clear spirit in Poem 
XVIII I am describing a kind of epistemology generally associated with
Neoplatonists, such as Hughes de Saint Victor. There is, consequently,
87
the implication that Ausias March seems to have been aware of certain
Neoplatonic theories, of which he made use in his poetry. In this 
case, as in others, it is hazardous to attribute to a poet the traits 
of a particular philosophical school, and, therefore, to interpret 
his work strictly in terms of this model. In this poem, as in all 
others, Ausias March describes a variation of his particular experience 
The language and imagery with which he chooses to characterize these 
experiences is subject to his eclecticism. One can observe, strictly 
in the limited scope of the last three poems, the vast differences 
in the poet’s evaluation of his experience. In Poem XVIII folly is 
considered to be a virtue; at the opposite extreme, in Poem CI folly 
has a deceptive quality, and it is perceived as a source of error.
Two basic interpretations of phantasy are thus opposed to one another 
in the poetry of Ausias March. Poem XVIII, presented an interpreta­
tion of the lover’s experience in terms of the concept of the clear 
spirit in which the will keeps the lover’s soul from the obscuring 
effects of the flesh. In this situation phantasy is considered to be 
a beneficial and spiritual faculty. This is opposed to the concept 
of phantasy as "idle phantasy" or "derke fantasye", as it is found
in Poems CI and CXVII. In these instances Ausias March associates 
. Illphantasy with the concept of "dark" or "puddled" spirit, that is, 
to the will’s fall and reason’s inclination to the flesh. Evidently, 
the distance that separates the two uses of this term suggests a 
transformation in the poet’s experience of phantasy. Yet, the two 
interpretations of phantasy are not juxtaposed. One can note, however, 
that the essence of Ausias March’s poetry lies in this opposition.
He is primarily concerned with the experience of love as it is found 
in the clear spirit, and its progressive puddling through the 
instability of the will; to this he adds the problem of the
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physiological mutability of the lover’s condition. Hence, in Poem 
CXVII one finds a shift of emphasis from a certain definition of the
nature of phantasy to the effects of the will; this, however, is 
perceived in the previous stanzas (see verses 141-144 in footnote
109) to be related to the temper of the humours. The double under­
standing of phantasy, and of man’s spirit, indicates that Ausias 
March’s concern was not so much for Love, as for melancholy and its 
effect on the latter. His poetry represents an effort to maintain 
the clear spirit; variations in this experience are affected by 
melancholy and its interpretation in mediaeval Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian terminology.
In his interpretation of imagination and phantasy Ausias
March adapts concepts that are considered to be inherent in the 
mediaeval Platonism of Chartres and Saint Victor. These form part
of their influence on literature. As most mediaeval Christian
Platonists, Ausias March is not so much concerned with the problem
of the spirit's ascent to the divine vision, as with that of recovering 
112from the immersion of the spirit in matter, the ’’descensus ad
inferos”, as can be observed in verse 35, Poem XVIII, and verse 198,
Poem CV, quoted above. Consequently, a large part of his poetry is 
113concerned with the problem of the duality of man, and the function 
of the will in maintaining the freedom of the spirit. Both the 
religious and erotic experiences are affected by this consciousness 
of the "descensus ad inferos”, and the individual’s need to surpass
the dualist conflict. The common denominator in both kinds of
experience is the "laetus horror" perceived in phantasy or imagination. 
Phantasy, which I use to refer to both phantasy and imagination,
114consequently becomes "a particular way of relating to the world", 
which acts as a norm by which the poet judges his worldly experience
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and the distance that separates him from the ideal perceived. The 
experience is therefore both joyful in its perception (Poem XVIII) 
and sorrowful in the consciousness of its inaccessibility. It is not 
surprising that Ausias March should interpret this personal experience 
as melancholy. The quality of the phantasy associated with Ausias 
March’s love is affected by an external literary factor, referred to 
in my interpretation of Poem IX. Phantasy in love as a form of action 
is shaped by a literary tradition through which Ausias March judges 
his circumstance. The melancholy is therefore subject to the 
adequacy of a literary tradition in which Ausias March is working.
Imagination and phantasy are subjacent to three closely 
related concepts in the poetry of Ausias March that affect the 
comprehension of his work, Neoplatonism, melancholy, and courtly love. 
The first poses a particular problem inasmuch as the critique has 
tended to oppose Aristotelianism and Platonism in general terms and 
obscured the origins of Florentine Neoplatonism and its relation to 
mediaeval Neoplatonic currents. The second, melancholy, is affected 
by these currents, and plays an important role in fifteenth-century 
courtly love, as found in Ausias March.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III
Auzias March, Les obres d’Auzias March vol. I, ed. A. Pages, 
Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1912, pp. 159-160; and 
also, in general Auzias March et ses predecesseurs.
On this point see A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, 
p. 252. He states: "L’image, comparaison ou.metaphore, ne fait 
pas corps avec l’idee, elle la precede et la prepare, etc.”. On 
this point Pages is partially correct. However, throughout this 
thesis I hope to demonstrate that in many instances it is Pages’ 
failure to understand Ausias March’s ’’mentalite symbolique”, and 
therefore, the significance of the imagery, that enables him to 
see all of Ausias March’s poetry as disjointed. It is on the 
problem of the relation of the image’s significance to the rest 
of the poem that I principally disagree with Pages. Contrary to 
what some modern critics believe, his interpretation of the poetry 
through the scholastic language used by Ausias March is for the 
most part exact, however, it is only one very limited level of 
the text. A complete understanding of Ausias March’s poetry can 
be arrived at when one realizes that the function of the "descrip­
tio." is complementary to the image, which reveals the authorial 
intention subjacent to the discursive sections.
On the usage of "topoi” as "archetypes”, see E. R. Curtius, 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. W. R. Trask, 
Princeton: University Press, 1973, p. 101; it is also loosely 
used in this sense by D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1978, pp. 32-33.
Matthieu de Vendome, "Ars versificatoria", ed. E. Faral, Les 
Arts poetiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siecle, Paris: Champion, 1962, 
p. 180. "In the exercise of the poetic faculty a mental image of 
the perception comes first; utterance, which expounds the meaning 
follows; and finally, arrangement ensues in the nature of the 
treatment. The first is the conception of the meaning, next is 
the invention of words, and finally we have the nature of the 
subject matter or the disposition of the treatment". From Ernest 
Gallo, trans. "Matthew of Vendome: Introductory Treatise on the 
Art of Poetry," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 
no. 118, 1974, p. 84; also found in D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, 
p. 32.
D. Kelly, op, cit., p. 32.
Boethius, "The Consolation of Philosophy", in Tractates,
De Consolatione Philosophise, ed. and trans. S. J. Tester, London: 
Heinemann, 1973, p. 410: "For sense examines the shape set in the 
underlying matter, imagination the shape alone without matter; 
while reason surpasses this too, and examines with a universal 
consideration the specific form itself, which is present in single 
individuals. But the eye of intelligence is set higher still, for
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passing beyond the process of going round the one whole it looks 
with the pure sight of the mind at the simple Form itself”.
Within the limits of all the variations possible it is 
basically this twelfth-century definition of Imagination that lies 
behind much of the theorizing on the definition of love in the 
courtly love treatises written in the scholastic tradition. This 
leads to the elaborate discussions on Reason, as in the Roman de 
la Rose. Hence, Andreas Capellanus* definition of love: "Amor 
est passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et inmoderata 
cogitatione formae alterius sexus, ob quam aliquis super omnia 
cupit alterius potiri amplexibus et omnia de utriusque voluntate 
in ipsius amoris praecepta compleri” (underlining is mine). (De 
Amore, ed. E. Trojel, Munchen: Eidos, 1964, p. 3), defines love 
as an illness necessary for generation, and focuses primarily on 
the ’’visio’*, "formae", that is, "imagination", uncontrolled by 
Reason. The Roman de la Rose repeats this definition: "Amour, 
se bien sui apensee, / C’est maladie de pensee / Entre deus 
persones annexe, / Franches entre eus, de divers sexe, / Venant 
aus gens par ardeur nee / De vision desordonde, / Pour acoler et 
pour baisier, / Pour aus charnelment aaiser" (w. 4377-4388). 
(Guillaume de Lorris et Jean de Meun, Le Roman de la Rose II, ed. 
Ernest Langlois, Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1914). Again the moral 
intention of the author, possibly for humourous intentions as in 
the De Amore, focuses on concupiscence born from "disorderly 
vision" ("vision desordonee", see above, underlining mine), which 
is the uncontrolled imagination that does not have the guidance 
of reason. I am confirmed to this interpretation by the introduc­
tion to D. W. Robertson’s "The Subject of the ’De Amore’ of Andreas 
Capellanus," Modern Philology, 50, 1952-1953, pp. 145-161, in which 
he surveys the sources of Capellanus’ definition. One of the most 
popular definitions is that of Ailred de Rievaulx, in which the 
word "vision" is explicitly replaced by "image forming", that is, 
imagination. Furthermore, Ailred subsequently describes the 
"animo captivatur", as does Hughes de Saint Victor (see notes 26 
and 31 in this thesis): "Verum amicitae carnalis exordium ab 
affectione procedit, quae instar meretricis divaricat pedes suos 
omni transeunti, sequens aures et oculos suos per varia fornicantes 
per quorum aditus usque ad ipsam mentem pulchrorum corporum, vel 
rerum voluptuosarum inferuntur imagenes: quibus ad libitum frui, 
putat esse beatum; sed sine socio frui, minus aestimat, esse 
jucundum. Tunc motu, nutu, verbis, obsequiis, animus ab animo 
captivatur, et accenditur unus ab altero, et conflatur in unum: 
ut inito foedere miserabili, quidquid sceleris, quidquid sacrilegi 
est, alter agat et patiatur pro altero; nihilque hac amicitia 
dulcius arbitrantur, nihil judicant justius: idem velle, et idem 
nolle, sibi existimantes amicitiae legibus imperari" (underlining 
mine). ("De spirituali amicitia”, P. L. CXCV, p. 665; also quoted 
by D. W. Robertson, op. cit., p. 151). Such passages, which are 
evidently the source of Capellanus’ definition, demonstrate fairly 
clearly that behind the moral dissertations of these authors there 
lies the twelfth-century rhetorical theory of imagination that 
proceeds mainly from the’Chartrian and Victorine Schools.
"For imagination is different from either perceiving or dis­
cursive thinking, though it is not found without sensation, or
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judgement without it” (Book III, 3), Aristotle, De Anima ed. 
J. A. Smith, The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1931, p. 427b.
"But what we imagine is sometimes false though our contem­
poraneous judgement about it Is true," De Anima (Book III, 3), 
pp. 428a-428b; "... this movement must be... such that it may be
either true or false," £e Anima (Book III, 3), p. 428b.
10 De
11 De
12 "As
 Anima, p. 428b.
 Anima. p. 429a.
(imagination) has been formed from ^£05 (light), 
not possible to see without light," De Anima. p
the name 
because it is
429a.
"#659, And this leads him to the conclusion that imagination 
is a certain movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing. 
It cannot exist without sensation, nor in insentient beings. If 
there is any movement caused by actual sensation, it must resemble 
sensation, and imagining is the only activity of this kind. Hence 
it must be the movement in question. And, being such, it can give 
occasion to the imagining subject for a variety of actions and 
passions. And it can be either true or false..." Aristotle,
De Anima in the Version of William of Moerbeke and The Commentary 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. K. Foster and Silvester Humphries, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959, pp. 396-397.
"#666 ... if the foregoing remarks are true of nothing but 
the imagination, and are certainly true of it, then imagination 
must be the movement proceeding from actuated senses." Commentary 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 398.
15 Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 398.
"#668 ... He says, then, that because sight is the principal 
sense, being more spiritual (as we have seen already), and knowing 
a wider range of objects than any other, therefore imagination, 
which arises from actual sensation, gets its name from light." 
Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 399. It should be noted that 
in this passage, which must be compared to the original quoted 
in note 12, as well as, in sections 417-418, St. Thomas expands 
considerably on both the original and the Moerbeke version, in 
order to introduce the concept of the light’s and the imagination’s 
spirituality.
It is generally considered that Dante, much as Aquinas, 
represents the great synthesis if mediaeval thought. On the sub­
ject of imagination, however, his own synthesis draws strongly 
on the Neoplatonic currents which were influential in mediaeval 
poetic theory. Therefore, in his study of imagination, M. W. Bundy
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points out: ’’The student of Dante, the great mediaeval synthesis, 
naturally turns to the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, the encyclopedia 
of the Middle Ages, and it is true that there is much in the views 
just examined that aids in explaining Dante’s utterances concerning 
the imagination; but in many ways he is closer to Augustine and 
the Neoplatonists. Like Aquinas, it is true, he is an Aristote­
lian, glorifying the master of those who know; but like Augustine 
and Synesius, and often after them Hugo and Richard, he has a 
more profound interest in a theory of vision, in notions to be 
derived from Plato and Plotinus of the qualities of perfect insight 
into spiritual realities”. M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagina­
tion in Classical and Mediaeval Thought, p. 225. In his exposi­
tion of the theory of imagination in Dante, Bundy demonstrates 
the development of its Neoplatonic inclinations from the vision of 
Beatrice in the Vita Nuova to the Divina Commedia.
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D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 32. R. W. Southern’s 
strong reservations about the concept of the existence of the 
’’School of Chartres” as a philosophical school of thought 
(Medieval Humanism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970, pp. 61-85), 
should be pointed out for the sake of exactitude. These reserva­
tions do not, however, invalidate the existence of a ’’Platonic” 
influence present in the works of its various members. For a more 
complete exposition of the Chartrian influence see W. P. Wetherbee, 
Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century.
Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans. D. M. Moffat, 
Hamden: Archon Books, 1972 (reprint of Yale Studies in English, 
v. 36, 1902), pp. 23-24.
D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, pp. 30-31.
Geoffroy de Vinsauf specifically refers to the source of 
poetry as the mental archetypes perceived in a ’’Pauline mirror":
"Si quis habet fundare domum, non currit ad actum / Impetuosa 
manus: intrinseca linea cordis / Praemetitur opus, seriemque 
subordine certo / Interior praescribit homo, totamque figurat /
Ante manus cordis quam corporis; et status ejus / Est prius 
archetypus quam sensibilis. Ipsa poesis / Spectet in hoc speculo 
quae lex sit danda poetis." "Poetria nova” vv. 43-49 in Les Arts 
poetiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siecle, p. 198. (Trans. If anyone 
has to establish a house, let not an impetuous hand rush to the 
act: an internal thread of the heart measures out the task before­
hand, and from within man prescribes the order in rigid sequence, 
and the hand of the heart forms the whole house, before the hand 
of the body, and its form is archetypal before it is tangible.
Let the art of poetry look in this mirror, which is the law that 
must be given to the poets.) The opposition between the hand 
of the heart and the hand of the body, is obviously a variation 
on the Augustinian "eye of the mind" and the "eye of the flesh", 
("that light of honesty and beauty... which the eye of the flesh 
cannot ken, it being only by the inner man discerned," St. 
Augustine, Confessions vol. I, trans. W. Watts, ed. W. H. D.
Rouse, London: Heinemann, 1968, p. 327). In Geoffroi de Vinsauf’s 
metaphor the plan for the building of "the house" must first be
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perceived by the inner eye. The metaphor of "the house” proceeds 
from St. John 14, 2: ”In domo Patris mei, mansiones multae sunt” 
(Biblia Sacra Latina; Vulgate, London: Bagster, 1970). The 
"Father’s House" is the source of divine archetypes and forms the 
model which is found in the mirror. The latter is the inner 
mirror of the soul, which was the standard Mediaeval and Renaissance 
interpretation of I Corinthians, XIII, 12: "Videmus nunc per 
speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem” (Biblia Sacra 
Latina). This passage was not generally understood to mean 
"through a glasse" (King James Bible) but rather as in the Tyndale 
Bible "Now we see in a glasse even in a darke speakynge; but then 
we shall see face to face". Hence the world was a reflection of 
the "thought of God" (see note 29 below), perceived by the "inner 
eye", and this was obviously a confusion of the Plotinian concept 
of the Animate and the Pauline mirror (see also notes 104 and 105). 
The vision of the House of God was therefore reflected in the 
soul’s eye, and it was this vision that should guide the craft 
of the poet. John Donne, in the Easter Sermon of 1628, used both 
metaphors, in a manner very similar to Geoffroi de Vinsauf: "For 
our sight of God, our Theatre, the place where we sit and see him, 
is the whole world, the whole house and frame of nature, and our 
medium, or glasse, is.the Booke of Creatures, and our light by 
which we see him, Is the light of Naturall reason... The whole 
frame of the world is the Theatre, and every creature of the 
stage, the medium, the glasse in which we may see God" (underlining 
mine). (Gordon Worth O’Brien, Renaissance Poetics and the Problem 
of Power, Chicago: Institute of Elizabethan Studies, 1956, pp.
2-3.) This metaphor is also a basic point of departure for the 
elaboration of Marsilio Ficino’s theory of love in the Commentarium 
Marsili Ficini Florentini in Convivium Platonis de Amore (Marsile 
Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon, ed. et trad. Raymond 
Marcel, Paris: Societe d’Edition, "Les Belles Lettres," 1956, 
pp. 187-188; see also page 147, in Chapter IV of this thesis).
W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 146-151.
D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 44: "The similarity 
between the artist’s craft and God’s creation is a medieval common­
place that appears in Hughes de St. Victor, Bernardus Silvestris, 
Alain de Lille, Geoffroy de Vinsauf”. On this point see also note 
24.
There is a reference to this in the prologue of the Cancionero 
de Baena: "la qual qienqia (poetry) e avisaqidn e dotrina que 
della depende e es avida e recibida e alcangada por gracia infusa 
del senor Dios" (Jose Maria Azaceta, ed. Cancionero de Juan 
Alfonso de Baena vol I, Madrid: Consejo Superior, 1966, p. 14). 
Charles F. Fraker has studied this problem: ("La poesia es una 
gracia infusa de Dios," Studies on the Cancionero de Baena,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1966, pp. 63-90). His 
research is largely based on a comparison with late Provenqal texts, 
such as the Leys d’Amor. He believes that the source of this 
poetic theory lies in the current of Franciscan and Joachimite 
spirituality, popular among "conversos" hostile to scholasticism.
The poetic theory indeed has great affinity with the general 
evangelical current, but it is not necessarily a product of it.
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Fraker concludes that: ’’The whole situation is in a way a
paradigm of the very special genius of our enriqueno poets in
general... The theory of poetic grace, a curious amalgam of
Spiritual theology and Provencal poetics, is in a way a brilliant 
idea-, but its emergence would have been practically inconceivable 
if its inventors had really known and understood the later Pro­
vencal tradition" (pp. 89-90). . The logic of this study relies 
excessively on the "myth of the Thomist phalanx" (H. A. Oberman, 
"Fourteenth-century Religious Thought," Speculum LIII, 1978, p.
82), which tends to confuse scholasticism too readily with 
Aristotelianism and Thomism. Much hazardous speculation, in this 
otherwise very enlightening article, might have been prevented if 
Fraker had considered the influence of twelfth-century Latin 
rhetorics on medieval poetic theory. Furthermore, this is a 
typical embroilment resulting from excessive reliance on the 
dubious notion of courtly love as a continuation of the Provencal 
tradition. Surely, the influence to be sought in this aspect of 
Baena’s prologue is more likely to be that of the Northern French 
tradition. This concept is part of an ongoing sensibility, in 
which Franciscan spirituality is a posterior manifestation, and 
Jewishness accidental. (See notes 21, 105, and M. D. Chenu,
La theologie, esp. "Le Reveil Evangelique," pp. 252-273, as well 
as Chapter IV of this thesis.)
Hughes of St. Victor, Didascalicon, trans. Jerome Taylor,
New York: Columbia University, 1961, p. 66.
Hughes de Saint Victor ("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus,"
Patrologiae Latinae CLXXVII, pp. 285-294) presents this relation 
by means of the Biblical image of Moses* ascension on Mount Sinai, 
which proceeds from Dionysius the Aeropagite, Mystical Theology,
I (Dionysius the Aeropagite, The Mystical Theology and the
Celestial Hierarchies, London: Unwin and Sons, 1949, p. ll);Hughes statf
"Ascendit Moyses in montem, et Deus descendit in montem. Nisi
ergo Moyses ascendisset et Deus descendisset, non convenissent
in unum. Magna sunt in his omnibus sacramenta. Ascendit corpus
et descendit spiritus. Ascendit spiritus et descendit Deus. Quo
ascendit corpus, superius est corpore. Quo descendit spiritus,
inferius est spiritu. Rursum quo ascendit spiritus superius
spiritu: et quo descendit Deo, inferius Deo. Corpus sensu
ascendit, spiritus sensualite descendit. Item spiritus ascendit
contemplatione, Deus descendit revelatione. Theophania est
in revelatione, intelligentia in contemplatione, imaginatio
in sensualite, in sensu instrumentum sensualitatis, et origo
imaginationis" (P.L. CLXXVII, p. 285). (Underlining is mine,
and translates: "The flesh (body) ascends and the spirit
descends. The spirit ascends and God descends. Where the flesh
ascends it is higher than flesh; where the spirit descends it is
lower than spirit, and when God descends he is lower than God.
The flesh ascends through the senses, and the spirit descends in 
a way perceptible by the senses, the spirit ascends in contempla­
tion, and God descends in revelation"). The notion that when God 
moves down he becomes less than God, and, similarly, that the 
spirit should become less spirit reveals the essentially 
"emanationist" tendency underlying this aspect of the theory of 
imagination. Similarly, Ausias March frequently refers to the rise of
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the senses and the fall of the spirit, this process is succinctly 
described in Poem LXXXVII (inter alia), verses 91-90: ”Les 
voluntats se mostren per les obres, / d’on se veu clar com 
nostr*arma*s baxa / e-1 nostre cors en alt munta sa raxa, / 
perque»n delit ell e 1’arma sdn pobres. / L’arma pel cors a 
son delit s’enclina / lexant lo seu, sa natura*5lunya; / lo 
cors en alt a delitar met punya, / no coneix be sa natura 
mesquina. / La earn volar vol e l’arma s’aterra, / perque algd, 
si toca^ no s’aferra." The negative and moral aspect of these 
verses is the result of a loss of discretion (see note 31). The 
relation of this aspect of Hughes de Saint Victor’s thought to 
that of Plotinus would seem to lie in Plotinus’ theistic mysticism 
(see A. H. Armstrong, The Cambridge History of Later Greek and 
Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge: University Press, 1970, p. 
263), and the concept of the duality of intelligible matter in the 
two moments of ’’timeless generation,” in which Intellect proceeds 
from the One, and then returns to the One to be informed (Ibid., 
p. 241). The terminology used by Plotinus is Aristotelian; this 
accentuates the sense of duality in the concepts of Movement and 
Otherness which give rise to Intelligible Matter, and depend on 
the light of the One to come to them in order to return: ’’For 
Otherness there exists always, which produces intelligible matter; 
for this is the principle of matter, this and primary Movement.
For this reason Movement, too, was called Otherness, because Move­
ment and Otherness sprang forth together. The Movement and Other­
ness which came from the First are undefined, and need the First 
to define them; and they are defined when they turn to it. But 
before the turning, matter, too, was undefined and the Other and 
not yet good,, but unilluminated from the First. For if light 
comes from the First, then that which receives the light, before 
it receives it has everlastingly no light; but it has light as 
other than itself, since light comes to it from something else." 
(Plotinus, Enneads vol. II, ed. A. H. Armstrong, London: William 
Heinemann, 1966, p. 117) (underlining is mine). Although Plotinus 
and Hughes de Saint Victor’s systems differ in complexity their 
common denominator lies in the double movement of the Intellect 
(desiring) to the One (desired), and the One to the Intellect.
The difficult problem of the relation between the two systems is 
borne out in the evolution of the concept of the Animate, which 
in scholastic philosophy and medicine became virtually synonymous 
to the term "spirit” (see note 104, and Gordon Worth O’Brien, 
Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of Power, pp. 1-40), and is 
closely associated with concept of the "Pauline mirror" (note 21). 
In the concept of the spirit as animate the latter has an 
epistemological function similar to the illumination described by 
Hughes de Saint Victor (see also note 31). The term animate is 
paraphrased in Armstrong’s edition of the Enneads, I will refer 
to the more explicit translation of Stephen Mackenna, as revised 
by C. B. Page, since I will make references to the animate as 
follows: "And how do we possess the Divinity? In that the 
Divinity is poised upon the Intellectual-Principle and Authentic- 
Existence; and We come third in order after these two, for the We 
is constituted by a union of the supreme, the undivided Soul - 
we read - and the Soul which is divided among (living) bodies.
For, note, we inevitably think of the Soul, though one and 
undivided in the All, as present to bodies in division: in so far 
as any bodies are Animates, the Soul has given itself to each of
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the separate material masses; or rather it appears to be present 
in the bodies by the fact that it shines into them; it makes them 
living beings not by merging into body but by shining forth, 
without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself like 
one face caught by many mirrors. The first of these images is 
(the faculty of) Sense-Perception seated in the Couplement; and 
from this downwards all the successive images are to be recognized 
as phases of the Soul in lessening succession from one another, 
until the series ends in the faculties of generation and growth 
and of all production of offspring... #9. The Soul, then, in us, 
will in its nature stand apart from all that can cause any of the 
evils which man does or suffers; for all such evil, as we have 
seen, belongs only to the Animate, the Couplement” (Enneads I, i, 
8-9). (Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. S. MacKenna, second ed. 
revised C. B. Page, London: Faber and Faber, 1956, pp. 26-27).
The concept of the animate is therefore an intellective principle 
intermediate between the soul and matter, in this Plotinus is 
repeating Plato's doctrine of the emanations of the lower soul 
(see, Armstrong, Enneads vol. I, pp. 110-111, note 3; and, Plato, 
Timaeus and Critias, trans. Desmond Lee, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1971, pp. 46-47). This principle implies the theory of the "Anima 
mundi", or as it is formulated above, "undivided Soul". It was 
perpetuated through the Middle Ages in medical theory, and in 
microcosmic theories of world harmony. Consequently, Aquinas 
was largely opposed to the concept, because of the Averroist 
implications of the "world soul" (Summa Theologica question LXXVI, 
article 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920, pp. 22-28), and also 
opposed microcosmic notions (see note 107), unlike the Chartrians 
and Hughes de Saint Victor (see note 27 also). The somewhat 
ambiguous reaction of St. Thomas to microcosmic theories is not 
only consistent with the consequences which this notion has in 
heretic writers such as Amaury de Bene (see note 109), but also 
forms part of his reaction against Averroist monopsychism (Summa 
Theologica Ia, 76, 2; edition quoted above, pp. 30-31 in 
particular). This problem is also the object of some discussion 
in A. 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 1936, p. 81: "Returning to the author of the Summa
Theologica, his position with respect to the principles of 
plenitude and continuity may now be summed up. He employs both 
freely as premisses, we have seen, whenever they serve his 
purpose; but he evades their consequences by means of subtle but 
spurious or irrelevant distinctions when they are at the point 
of leading him into the heresy of admitting the complete 
correspondence between the realms of the possible and the actual 
with the cosmic determinism which this implies*. The proximity 
of Hughes de Saint Victor's epistemology to the theory of the 
animate is self-evident, as are its repercussions in poetic 
rhetoric previously referred to. As I will explain Ausias March, 
as a poet, not only shows knowledge of Hughes de Saint Victor, 
but makes extensive use of medical and microcosmic theories, 
that imply reference to the animate, though not necessarily to 
the "anima mundi”.
To define this relationship Hughes de Saint Victor, before 
elaborating on the microcosmic relation, uses the image of Jacob's 
ladder, which also acts as a gradualist metaphor of the chain of
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being: ’’Vide scalam Jacobi, in terra stabat, et summitas ejus
coelos tangebat. Terra corpus, coelum Deus. Ascendunt animi 
contemplatione ab infimis ad summa. A corpore ad spiritum, 
mediante sensu et sensualite. A spiritu ad Deum, mediante 
contemplatione et revelatione" ("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus" 
P.L. CLXXVII, p. 285). (Trans.: See Jacob’s ladder, it rested 
on earth, and the top of it reached the heavens. The earth is 
the flesh, the heavens, God. Our minds ascend in contemplation 
from the depths to the most high. From flesh to spirit, through 
the mediation of the senses and sensory perception; from spirit 
to God through the mediation of contemplation and revelation.)
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See note 26: "Ascendit corpus et descendit spiritus.
Ascendit spiritus et descendit Deus".
M. W. Bundy, p. 202.
M. W. Bundy, p. 201.
This, I believe is one of the most important points towards 
the understanding of Ausias March’s poetry, which has been over­
looked by critics who follow an almost exclusively Thomist inter­
pretation of his work, as the one and only key to his work. Xt 
affects an image which is central to his work (see Chapter V). 
Hughes de Saint Victor explains that imaginations are made when 
the form of things enters into the eyes of the beholder through 
the seven "tunics" and the "humours", the other senses introduce 
the forms by hidden canals unto the "phantasticam cellam". These 
"imaginations" are corporeal and are common to both animals and 
men. In men, however, they are spiritualized by reason, and reach, 
"the very substance of the rational soul" (Quae quidem imaginatio 
in brutis animalibus phantasticam cellam non transcendit; in 
rationalibus autem usque ad rationalem progreditur, ubi ipsam 
incorporearn animae substantiam contingit, et excitat discretionem" 
("De Unione Corporis et Spiritus," P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288). The 
imagination, however, is like a shadow which wraps itself around 
reason. If these imaginations are merely contemplated in order 
to gather knowledge for the Intellect, then they are easily 
shaken off. However, if reason becomes excessively enamoured of 
these imaginations, then they cling to it like a second skin or 
garment that cannot be taken off without causing great pain. The 
central point concerning the role of the imagination in love, is 
the contentious issue raised by Andreas Capellanus in his defini­
tion, "ex visione et inmoderata cogitatione", which provides the 
source of the "irony" in the De Amore and related treatises (see 
note 7). This role is affected by the gradualist concept inherent 
to this theory (see note 27, and D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in 
Perspective: The Hierarchy of Love in Andreas Capellanus," 
Traditio XXIV, 1968, pp. 119-148). Due to the fact that both the 
image and the concept of Hughes de Saint Victor’s theory play a 
very important role in Ausias March's poetry, I believe it is 
opportune to provide the reader with both a copy and translation 
of the passage concerned. From the passage quoted previously 
(Quae quidem...) the text continues: "Ergo imaginatio nihil aliud 
est quam similitudo corporis, per sensus quidem corporeos ex
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corporum contactu concepta extrinsecus, atque per eosdem sensus 
introrsum ad partem puriorem corporei spiritus reducta, eique 
impressa. Haec autem in rationalibus purior fit, ubi ad rationalem 
et incorpoream animae substantiam contingendam defecatur; tamen 
illic quoque extra substantiam illius manens, quia similitudo 
corporis est et fundatur in corpore. Rationalis autem substantia 
corporea lux est; imaginatio vero, inquantum corporis imago est, 
umbra est. Et idcirco postquam imaginatio usque ad rationem 
ascendit, quasi umbra in lucem veniens, et luci superveniens, 
inquantum ad earn venit, manifestatur, et circumscribitur inquantum 
illi supervenit, obnubilat earn, et obumbrat, et involvit, et 
contegit. Et siquidem ratio ipsa sola contemplatione earn susce- 
perit quasi vestimentum, ei est ipsa imaginatio extra earn, et 
circa earn quo facile exui et spoliari possit. Si ver etiam delec- 
tatione illi adhaeserit, quasi pellis ei fit ipsa imaginatio, ita 
ut non sine dolore exui possit, cui cum amore inhaesit. Hinc est 
quod animae corporibus exutae, corporalibus adhuc passionibus 
teneri possunt, quia videlicet a corruptione corporalium affec- 
tionum nondum mundatae sunt. Habet namque et ipse spiritus quandam 
in sua natura mutabilitatem, secundum quam corpori vivificando 
appropinquat, in qua ilia spiritualis et incorporea substantia 
nonnihil suae puritatis deponit, et quasi quamdam grossiori pro- 
prietate corpori assumendo occurrit. Quae quidam coaptatio, si 
secundum solam naturam fit, mutationem habet, corruptionem non 
habet. Si autem vitiosa est, in hoc ipso puriorem naturam 
corrumpit, quod earn ad consortium ignobilioris terminos naturae 
transire compellit. Et hoc vitium quanto altius animae in corpore 
manenti inhaeserit, tanto difficilius a corpore discendentem 
deserit: non tollitur passio, etiam cum tollitur causa passionis” 
(P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288). (Translation: Indeed this imagination 
does not transcend the chamber of phantasy in wild animals, but in 
those with rational minds it proceeds to the rational part of the 
mind where it touches that very incorporeal substance of the 
anima (soul, or mind), and arouses reason (discernment or discre­
tion). Therefore, the imagination is nothing other than a likeness 
of the body, conceived through the corporeal senses externally 
from the contact of bodies, and brought back within through those 
same senses to the purer part of the corporeal spirit, and 
impressed upon it. The imagination, therefore, becomes purified 
in those with rational minds, when It is cleansed with a view to 
attaining the rational and incorporeal substance of the anima; 
remaining, however, also outside its substance, because the like­
ness of the body is based on the body. But rational substance is 
corporeal light; indeed, imagination, inasmuch as it is the image 
of the body, is a shadow. And therefore, when imagination has 
ascended to reason like a shadow coming into light, and coming 
upon light suddenly when it reaches it, it is made manifest and 
is therefore circumscribed; sometimes when it comes upon it, it 
veils reason, obscures it, envelopes it and hides it. And if 
indeed, reason herself, by contemplation alone puts it on, as 
though it were a vestment, then imagination is outside reason 
and around it, so that it may be easily cast off and stripped.
If indeed through delight, imagination still clings to reason, 
the imagination herself becomes like a skin on it to which reason 
clings with love, in such a way that it cannot be cast off without 
grief or pain. It is for this reason that souls cast off from 
bodies can be held by corporeal passions, because clearly they 
have not yet been affected by the corruption of corporeal love.
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For the spirit itself has in its nature mutability, according to 
which it comes near to the quickening of the body and in which 
that spiritual and incorporeal substance places something of its 
purity, and as it were, counteracts the body’s being usurped by 
a baser quality. This combination, if it comes about naturally, 
has variation, and not corruption. But if it is corrupted, it 
destroys its purer nature in the very thing which compels its 
nature to pass on to a partnership with a nature more obscure in 
its boundaries. And the deeper this vice of the soul shall have 
become rooted in the living body, the more painfully it will leave 
the body as it dies, and passion is not suffered, even when the 
cause of passion is tolerated”.) This description of ’’corporeal 
imagination" places emphasis on the negative aspects of the 
imagination, and is characteristic of the moralist’s interpreta­
tion of the "inmoderata cogitatione". Although Ausias March’s 
love includes a consciousness of this aspect of imagination, the 
poetic theory which is also part of his craft, enables him to 
manipulate the opposite aspects of the concept of imagination, 
which one can term as, "the illumination" and "the clouding".
D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, pp. 36-37.
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"... non pas 1’imitation proprement dite d’un acte ou d’une 
personne, qu’on prend comme modele concret, vecu, mais celui de 
la reproduction d’un modele theorique, ideal, entrevu dans sa 
pensee, qu’on se propose soi-meme de realiser. Le modele qu’on 
veut copier ou reproduire n’existe pas au concret: il n’a pas 
de realite que dans 1’esprit qui le conqoit et 1’effort de 
1 * imitateur tend a le realiser concretement, comme un artiste 
tache d’executer 1’ideal entrevu," Jean de Ghellinck, "Imitari, 
imitatio," A.L.M.A. (Bulletin du Cange) XV, 1940-1941, p. 151; 
also quoted in D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 44.
Many of the topical images found in Ausias March have been 
traced from troubadour sources, as catalogued by N. Scarano, 
"Fonti Provenzale e Italiane della Lirica Petrarchesca," Studj 
di Filologia Romanza vol. 8, 1899, pp. 250-360.
In his latter poems Ausias March clearly defines the sorrow, 
"dolor" which plays an important part in all his poetry. In Poem 
CXXVII, verses 325-333, Ausias March explains that "sorrow" is 
the realization of the failure of the will seeking virtue to 
assert itself, that is, it is the personal impotence to act 
virtuously, even though the desire to do so is present in the 
individual: "Ells han proposit de fer be, / mas no han l’abit,
go per que / s’ateny delit. / Los bons han lur cami complit / 
havent lur intent conseguit / e s6n contents; / los malvats son 
cas«impotents / d’esmenar lurs defalliments / d’on han dolor." 
"Dolor" or "sorrow" is, therefore, the desire to act virtuously 
which is denied because of the lack of a strong will; it is the 
realization of a moral condition. As in Poem CXXVIII, verses 
219-220, it is a lack of discretion: "hon no es discrecio / 
regeix la sola passio." This problem, especially as it is 
qualified in Poem CXXVII, entails in this poetry the problem of 
predestination, which is closely related to the evangelistic and 
Platonic current present in Ausias March’s poetry (see note 109,
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and Appendix I).
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As di Girolamo has demonstrated in ’’Ausias March and the 
Troubadour Poetic Code” (Chap. I, note 24), although Ausias March 
sporadically uses what seems to be troubadour vocabulary, "he 
breaks with the courtly tradition" (p. 236). Naturally, this 
conflicts with 0. H. Green’s definition of courtly love which 
relies on Ausias March’s work to demonstrate its validity 
("Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros“« Chap. 1, note 39). In the 
works of Ausias March and his French predecessors, such as Oton 
de Granson and Alain Chartier, although the terminology of the 
courtly tradition is apparently maintained, its significance is 
altered in order to reflect the internal disarray of the poet’s 
spiritual life. By so doing, Ausias March may be seen to rejoin 
the first or second generation of troubadours such as Marcabru 
(A. Jeanroy, La poesie lyrique des troubadours II, Paris: Didier, 
1934, pp. 13-60; R. Nelli, L’Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: 
Privat, 1963, pp. 105-158, and p. 273), yet he departs from the 
essentially ludic character of the troubadour courtly love. From 
Ausias March’s point of view, he deviates away from the troubadour 
tradition, for whereas he seeks spiritual ascesis in love, he 
considers that the troubadours revel in sensuality: "D*aquest 
voler los trobadors escriuen, / e, per aquest, dolor mortal 
los toca; / la racional part de l’arma no »ls broca; / del sensual 
aquests apetits viuen" (LXXXVII, w. 41-44).
A. Pages, in Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 106-107, 
considers that Ausias March wrote all his poetry between 1430 and 
1459. This presupposes that he began to write poetry around the 
age of 32, after his return from the Italian campaigns of Alfonso 
the Magnanimous in 1420 and 1424 and his final settling in Gandia 
in 1428. R. Ferreres, Ausias March: Obra poetica completa I, p.
30, complies with Pages* general theory, although he suggests that 
Ausias March began to write poetry around 1428. Martin de Riquer, 
basing his theory on the absence of Ausias March*s name in the 
Canqoner Vega-Aquilo, suggests that Ausias March did not write 
poetry before 1426 (Historia de la literatura catalana II, p. 487).
Bohigas shies away from this problem. P. Ramirez.i Molas, rejects
Pages* suggestion as absurd, and accepts Riquer’s interpretation 
(La poesia d’Ausias March, p. 199). Without further definite 
evidence the problem of when Ausias March began to write poetry 
Is one of Byzantine speculation subject to the preconceptions of 
critics. Riquer*s deduction seems to me to be thus far the most 
perceptive. From an objective point of view, this also leaves me 
somewhat uneasy, because of its rigid exclusivity. All of the 
above theories are based on the questionable presupposition that 
Ausias March wrote poetry only once he had retired to his estates 
and had sufficient leisure to feel inspired. This does more to 
reveal the academic nature of criticism on Ausias March, than 
enlighten the reader, and culminates in Ferreres comparison of 
Ausias March to Hans Holbein’s "Erasmus" (p. 30); for these critics 
only the poet, quill in hand and clouded brow, is worthy of the 
Muses’ inspiration. In the Italian campaigns Ausias March was 
possibly in contact with some of the best Catalan poets of that 
period, such as Andreu Febrer and Jordi de Sant Jordi, the possible 
influence of the latter Is not to be dismissed (see Appendix II). 
Poetry was a courtly pastime which was cultivated even on the
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battlefield, one of the best examples is the "Debat entre Honor 
et Delit" written by Ausias March’s.uncle, Jacme March, in June 
1365 during the siege of Morvedre opposing Pere el Cerxmonios and 
Pedro el Cruel (A. Pages, ed., La "Vesi6 de Bernat de So" et le 
"Debat entre Honor et Delit": Poernes provenqo-catalans du XIVe 
siecle, suivis du "Sirventes" de Joan de Castelnou, Toulouse:
Privat, 1945). Moreover, parts of Jordi de Sant Jordi’s own 
poetry seem to have been written during the Italian campaigns 
of Alfonso the Magnanimous (M. de Riquer, ed., Jordi de Sant 
Jordi, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1955, pp. 16-17). It is 
therefore not entirely impossible that Ausias March may well have 
written poetry prior to 1426. That his name does not appear in 
the Canqoner Veg£-Aquilo definitely demonstrates that he was not 
known as a poet prior to 1426, but not necessarily that he did 
not write poetry. Furthermore, Pages suggests that: "De la 
premiere de ses chansons a la quatorzieme il s’ecoule un intervalle 
de cinq ans. Il met onze autres annees a ecrire les soixante dix 
chansons qui suivent" (Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 107). 
Although this statement may not necessarily be exact it indicates 
that Ausias March’s poetry was written over a very long span of 
time, a point that is obvious to every reader. Poem VI, "Molt he 
tardat en descobrir ma falta" implies that there has been a previous 
erotico-poetical experience which Ausias March now retracts.
Hence the dating of the beginnings of Ausias March’s poetical 
production should be placed anywhere between 1420 and 1430, until 
better evidence demonstrates conclusively a specific date at which 
Ausias March began to write poetry.
38 The problem of the chronology of Ausias March’s poems is as 
ambiguous as that discussed in note 37. Realizing the inconsis­
tencies in the manuscript order of the poems, early editors, such 
as Baltasar de Romani, divided them into four groups: "C&ntica de 
Amor," "Cantica Moral," "CAntica de Muerte," "Cantica Spiritual" 
(see A. Pages ed., Les Obres d’Auzias March vol. I, p. 58). It 
was generally accepted that the last three groups belonged to a 
later period, since they correspond mainly to the theme of the 
rejection of love. A. Pages in: "Etude sur la chronologie des 
poesies d’Auzias March," Romania XXXVI, 1907, pp. 203-223; and 
Les Obres, pp. 161-181, established a chronology on the basis of 
manuscripts F and N which proceed from two distinct families, and 
which correspond to each other in the order in which the works are 
presented. Furthermore, Pages relied on historical references 
found in the poems, of which only one was then erroneous (see, A. 
Pages, "Sur un vers d’Auzias March et un passage du Curial et 
Guelfa," Romania LXI, 1935, pp. 85-90; and by the same author, "La 
’Table de Prusse’ et 1’ordre teutonique dans l’ancienne littera- 
ture catalane," Romania LXII, 1936, pp. 242-245). Bohigas feels 
that the best chronology is provided by manuscripts F, N, G^, B,
K, D, and turns to the historical references in support of his 
arguments, in general he follows Pages’ chronology (P. Bohigas, 
ed. Ausias March: Poesies I, pp. 166-175), although he cautions 
against an overly rigid acceptance of this chronology (p. 175).
M. de Riquer, in view of the relative merits of Pages’ classifica­
tion classifies Ausias March’s poems into groups according to their 
"cycles", the latter are determined by the "senhals" found at the 
end of each poem, furthermore Riquer adopts the classification of 
B. Romani (Historia de la literatura II, pp. 507-540). Riquer*s
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classification, based on differentiating traits in each cycle, 
has been extensively criticized by P. Ramirez i Molas (La poesia 
d’Ausias March, pp. 206-209), who rejects Riquer*s method because 
it does not arrive at sufficiently precise conclusions. Ramirez 
i Molas has attempted to establish a chronology on the basis of 
the kinds of rhymes used in Ausias March's poetry, within the 
various cycles and groups previously used by M. de Riquer. P. 
Ramirez i Molas* method, which seems not to have been accepted 
by most critics, is an interesting approach; unfortunately, it 
presents two major drawbacks. First, it relies heavily on M. de 
Riquer*s theory of the cycles (see La poesia d*Ausias March, pp. 
209-219); second, strictly as a matter of methodology which pre­
supposes "la sinceritat del poeta’* (Ibid., p. 195), the establishing 
of a chronology on the basis of certain rhymes, has a certain 
unsatisfactory positivist simplicity. Enlightening as it is M. 
de Riquer*s classification has some weaknesses. It allows 
excessive importance to the problem of the lady, when the actual 
subject of these poems is the poet himself; this reveals an intent 
on the part of the critic to see in Ausias March a "cantor de 
Teresa", in the stilnuovisti manner. This is warranted neither 
by the text nor the tradition in which Ausias March seems to be 
writing, although there may be points of affinity. Further objec­
tion can then be raised that if, as critics seem to agree, Ausias 
March and his generation in Catalonia are influenced by the French 
poets of Guillaume de Machaut*s tradition, then the problem of 
the lady would be extraneous. As I will demonstrate in Chapter V, 
"Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love", because of the Impor­
tance of the theory of imagination, not only could two senyals 
refer to one lady, but one senyal could refer to as many ladies 
as the poet chose to love (see D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, pp. 
180-181). Hence, in the differentiations observed by Riquer 
between the two main cycles, it is dangerous to suggest that each 
refers to a different lady. Hypothetically, there is the extreme 
possibility that each poem could refer to a different lady, or at 
least, to a different perception of each one by the poet. In each 
case the reader is faced by a different reaction on the part of 
the poet to the vision of the lady adjusted to his imagination. 
Caution should be exercised in any attempt to establish a chronol­
ogy of Ausias March’s poetry. This is especially true as regards 
apparently rigorous pseudo-scientific methods which presuppose 
mechanical behaviourist tendencies in a poet of Ausias March’s 
genius. This defines Ramirez i Molas’ criteria, as he states him­
self: "... el poeta que rima els seus versos treballa gairebe
sempre per un mecanisme d’associacid d’imatges fonetiques. Una 
de les lleis inexorables d’aquest mecanisme es la de 1’habit..."
(La poesia d*Ausias March, p. 213). According to this kind of 
criteria one could, conceivably, establish a more exact' chronology 
by tracing the development of the poet’s imagery, and frequency 
of usage, as found in Appendix II. I feel, however, that the 
results might be equally dubious, since the critic cannot control 
the individual poet’s freedom of creativity. Consequently, I 
believe that Pages’ approach, and in general, his results, 
tempered by Bohigas’ just caution, still represent the most 
reliable ordering of Ausias March’s poems. M. de Riquer*s division 
of the love poems into cycles has produced interesting results, 
reinforced by^Ramfrez i Molas’ research, and these should also be 
taken into account in the interpretation of Ausias March’s work.
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In all cases a reasonable degree of reserve and flexibility should 
be observed, the lack of an exact chronology should not affect our 
understanding of Ausias March’s poetry.
After X had written this note, Joan Ferrater published, Les 
poesies d’Ausias March: Introduceio i_ text revisat per Joan 
Ferrater, Barcelona: Edicions Quaderns Crema, 1979. The entire 
introduction claims to be a study towards the establishment of a 
’’new” chronology. The rest represents a "new edition” of his 
poetry. Ferrater’s chronology is a defense of Pages’ work comple­
mented by the aportations of Ramirez i Molas, and it is therefore 
meant to represent the most up to date work on Ausias March.
Ferrater does not present any arguments in favour of Ramirez i 
Molas’ chronology, although he recognizes that it is accepted by 
no one but himself (p. lv). His defense of Pages is based on an 
apparent collation of texts and the notion that Ausias March began 
to write in 1425 at a rate of 284 verses a year (p. xliii). This 
leads him to divide Ausias March’s poetry into a dozen cycles 
representing the same amount of periods of composition. To go 
into all the reasonings of Ferrater is impossible here, and I will 
limit myself to a few pertinent comments, which may sound impertinent 
to the author and his followers. In essence, although I agree 
with Ferrater in his recognition of the superiority of Pages, as 
I have said above, I do not agree with his theory of divisions, 
and find his presentation and method, rather, his lack of method, 
absolutely objectionable.
Joan Ferrater is an eminent critic of modern literature. As 
a professor of comparative literature he is very familiar with the 
latest critical methods of modern literature, and as is often the 
case with modern critics, ventures into the field of mediaeval 
studies simply reveal the superficiality of modern pseudo-scien­
tific methods, and a total lack of the most elemental erudition.
This gives Ferrater’s chronology an air of ease and general 
scientific rigor, which is a poor “facade" for his shameless 
exploitation of the unwary reader’s gullibility, and a sinister 
abuse of his reputation as a critic. In spite of its pretensions 
of "Wissenschaft", it is a scurrilous display of lack of philolo­
gical scholarship, the arrogance of which deserves to be condemned 
in the strongest possible terms.
On the very first page of his Introduction Ferrater informs 
the reader that he is preparing this edition because he understands 
Ausias March from cover to cover: "es perque je em penso que els 
he entes de cap a cap” (p. xv). Such a prodigious blessing of 
"ciencia infusa", unclaimed by anyone to date, enables him to 
imply at the end of his introduction that his work is "too learned 
for a public of imbeciles" but that he feels obliged to present 
his new findings on Ausias March for the benefit of a cultivated ,
public. The air of modesty with which this is said smacks of 
Tartuffian glibness: "Algu es va empescar de dir que aquest 
prbleg era massa savi per al public d’imbecils que el qui ho va dir es de 
via pensar que per forqa havia de ser el de l’esmentada col-leccio, 
i es del tot just, doncs, que jo recuperi per al public fet de 
bona gent, curiosa i si pot ser cultivada, a qui destino tot el 
que publico unes pagines que contenen prou noticies for^a intere- 
sants..." (p. lv). Indeed, I am glad to be among the "imbeciles" 
who may have found nothing new, of worth, in his "interesting" 
work. It is only glibness that can substantiate Ferrater’s 
chronology. In the first place, a chronology is not a matter of
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hypothetical speculation. Without the painstaking examination of 
each poem, a chronology cannot be said to be valid. In other 
words, Ferrater1s entire work is based on an unsubstantiated 
construction, and as such it is absolutely vacuous, and his argu­
ments are poor rhetoric. In short, Ferrater begins with what 
should be a conclusion. His method is even less sensitive than 
Ramirez i Molas1, it is purely mechanical: ”La versemblanqa. que 
les seccions que hem obtingut mitjanqant l’aplicacid mecanica dels 
nostres criteris (predominantment externs, ho repeteixo...)11 (p. 
xxxviii) and ”Els resultat obtingut amb l’execucio mecanica de la 
nostra projeccid fonamentada al seu torn en una hipotesi cronolo- 
gica" (p. xliv). Th6sc external criteria ara an artificial imposi­
tion on the text, a corruption of the reading. Whatever external 
criteria Ferrater may use, and these are never very clear, he is 
building castles in the air. He avoids confronting the text by 
claiming that such a task would be too demanding: "No podem 
entrar en l’examen frontal de la successi6 de les poesies, com a 
elements funcionals de les seccions a que pertanyen, des del punt 
de vista del contingut, ja que aixo equivaldria, quasi a comentar- 
les exhaustivament totes" (p. xxxviii). Let us come to the point} 
I sincerely doubt that Ferrater is capable of such a commentary, 
and I will demonstrate this claim immediately. He vaguely prom­
ises to grace the world with a proper study, some day: "Ja en 
parlarem un altre dia" (p. liii). The kind of specious rhetoric 
to which he has recourse is patent, when after thirty-one pages 
of vain ramblings he admits that his claims lack foundation: "a 
penes podem dir que hagim transcendit pel seu mitja el pla de la 
conjectura i passat a establir-nos en el de la documentaci6 his- 
torica. La plausabilitat de la nostra hipotesi es, ho podem 
admetre, extrema, pero la hipotesi no ens ha donat efectivament 
cap fet" (p. xlvi). Ferrater proceeds backwards by attempting to 
seek historical justification for his lack of evidence; this is 
inacceptable. He may tell us of the extreme plausability of his 
hypothesis, on the basis of his own authority, but the critical 
mind should never accept demagogy. The lack of facts, but the 
suggestion of an extreme plausability, demands an excessive faith 
in the critic’s superior wisdom, which I, for one, am not graced 
with. In order to adduce "facts" in support of his "Invention^ 
Ferrater presents a "historical" interpretation of Poem 46 which 
he claims cannot be read otherwise: "no podem sino llegir com a 
(prestament) escrita per algu que es disposa a fer un viatge per 
mar en direccio oest-nord-oest" (p. xlvi). One is surprised to 
find that Ferrater's revealed knowledge is also very limited, as 
one can read in my interpretation of this poem in Chapter V of 
this thesis, the actual significance of this poem is medical. 
Ferrater’s dogmatism crumbles easily. Moreover, since this is one 
of the rare instances in which he confronts the text one can 
rightly wonder what his commentary would be like. Indeed, even 
in his peripheral references to the text one can legitimately 
question whether he has read sufficient studies on Ausias March. 
For instance, on page xxviii he states that Poem 72 is written 
in praise of Alfonso the Magnanimous, a theory formulated by Pages 
in 1901, which he revoked in 1907 (Romania XXXVI, pp. 210-211) 
and explained that it was in fact written in praise of Christ.
This has been accepted by all contemporary critics, except of 
course, Ferrater, who gives no reason for returning to Pages’ 
early error. Furthermore, Ferrater’s edition has no footnotes,
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nor does his introduction, every statement he makes is undocumented 
As such, Ferrater does not justify his editorial criteria, it is 
a gratuituous act of re-punctuation. A serious edition of Ausias 
March should present a completely annotated text, if possible with­
out punctuation leaving such things to the discretion of the reader 
since Ausias March probably did not know the rules of punctuation.
Much more could be said, but I think that Ferrater’s poor 
excuse for scholarship speaks for itself. It is characteristic 
of the shoddiest kinds of academic work done principally in the 
field of hispanism. Of the two recent editions Rafael Ferreres’, 
for all its drawbacks, has sufficient modesty and learning to 
elicit the respect, if not the agreement, of this reader. It is 
not a travesti of scholarship like Ferrater’s work. The most 
regrettable aspect of Ferrater’s work is that, in view of his 
reputation as a critic, the reach of his influence as a reader 
on various journals and editorial houses, it is to be feared that 
his work will be met with favourable reviews by those who do not 
wish to be considered ’’imbeciles”. This will undoubtedly perpet­
uate his dubious approach to literature, and foster the prolifera­
tion of a "modern” approach to mediaeval texts devoid of a sound 
preparation which may be too tasking.
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P. Ramirez i Molas (La poesia drAusias March, pp. 109-118) 
considers that Poem CXXVIII is not by Ausias March. His theory 
has not been met with much success among most critics. The argu­
ments for this theory are based mainly on the suggestion that 
Ausias March may not necessarily have read a version of St. 
Bernard’s Contemptus mundi, as Pages had thought in his reading of 
verses 41-48 in Poem XXVI (see Commentaire des poesies d’Auzias 
March, Paris: Honore Champion, 1925, pp. 39-40), since these 
verses are also found in the Flors del Gay Saber, w. 5054-5071, 
and El Torcimany ("Torcimany" de Luis de Averqo: Tratado ret&rico 
grammatical i diccionaro de rimas. Siglos XIV-XV vol. I, ed. Jose 
M. Casas Homs, Barcelona: Consejos Superior de Investigaciones 
Cientificas, 1956, p. 125), and on the metric irregularity. The 
subsequent arguments of P. Ramirez i Molas suggest, but do not 
establish, that the poem is actually by Pere Vilasalo, a priest- 
scribe who copied the works of Ausias March. His arguments do not 
transcend personal opinion. On the basis of the arguments of 
Pages, Bohigas and Riquer, as well as on that of the use made of 
images and proverbs in poem CXXVIII, which on the whole correspond 
to that found in the 127 other poems of Ausias March, I am inclined 
to believe in the latter’s authorship.
The problem of the "gest”, although it is discussed here at 
some length, will be dealt with again in Chapter V: "Melancholy: 
The Mirror of Courtly Love."
Bohigas, Poesies V, p. 95; he goes on to explain: "en canvi, 
no se sent inflamat pel toch. D’acord amb aquests versos i amb 
els w. 81-90, que els expliquen, la dama cantada acf per Ausias 
March no era bella en el sentit propi d’aquesta paraula; la passio 
del poeta no era pas desvetllada per la bellesa d’aquella, sino 
pel seu gest" (p. 95). In the introduction to Poesies, vol. I, 
p. 55, Bohigas defines the gest as the object of spiritual contem­
plation, "sols ocasionalment troba la joia de la contemplacio de
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l’harmoniosa bellesa d’un cos, un gest i un intellecte superior 
infonent-los noblesa...," . ’’Ausias March canta uns ulls amb poder 
de dar dolor e prometre plaher i el gest i la veu d’un feble cos 
que l’han.fet esclau: "Dormint, vetlant, yo tinch la fantasia / 
en contemplar qui am, qui es, que val” (CI, w. 33-34). The 
role of phantasy-imagination, which form parts of discussion found 
in this section of the thesis, is the essential source of my dis­
agreement with Bohigas’ definition of "gest”, as is evident in the 
text. Part of the confusion which surrounds the definition of 
the "gest" seems to arise out of Ausias March’s usage of the theory 
of the imagination, and the interpretation he makes concerning its 
validity. The examples I give indicate the "interior" significance 
which the "gest" has in his poems. However, the ambiguity of this 
term can easily be understood in its relation to "amor hereos", 
where imagination is frequently conceived of strictly as a source 
of concupiscence. Hence, in Latin "gestus" has the meaning of 
"bearing", such as in the Latin translation of Avicenna’s Cannon 
of Medicine (quoted from John Livingston Lowes, "The Loveres 
Maladye of Hereos" Modern Philology XI, 1913-1914, p. 513): "Haec 
aegritudo est solicitudo melancholies similis melancholiae, in 
quo homo sibi iam induxit incitationem seu applicationem cogita- 
tionis suae continuam super pulchritudine ipsius quarundam formarum 
et gestuum seu morum quae insuntei." As the latter half of this 
sentence states "amor hereos" is a vehement, or immoderate, cogita­
tion "on the beauty of certain forms of being and gestures and 
character, which are in it". Hence, "gest" as used by Ausias March, 
if indeed Pages’ and Bohigas’ interpretation is intended to reflect 
its mediaeval latin significance, is related to the perception of 
the soul (form). Ausias March’s poetical usage of this concept is 
characteristically broader than that of the philosopher. (See 
also note 87 on "amor hereos".)
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A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 212-213.
A. Pages, Commentaire des poesies d’Auzias March, p. 35.
See notes 40 and 41 above.
In his edition-translation of the complete poems of Ausias 
March, R. Ferreres accepts the definition proposed by Pages 
(Ausias March: Poesia Completa I, p. 212). Yet, in spite of 
his own criticism of Montemayor’s translation of "gesto" by "rostro", 
echoing that of Pages, Ferreres himself finds it impossible to elude 
the semantic implication, and translates "gesto" by "rostro", as 
in Poem CI, verses 13 and 45, inter alia. These inconsistencies 
demonstrate the difficulty which many critics experience in under­
standing the essentially Neoplatonic theory of imagination which 
underlies the notion of "gest" (see also note 49), and pervades 
Ausias March's erotic though.
In its extreme implications, "gest" understood as the vision 
of the form of the lady, reduces the perception that the lover 
has of her to the most idealized traits, as a universal aspiration. 
As Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love " will 
discuss, she is both reduced and heightened to the embodiment of
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Sapientia. She becomes a "mental archetype”, as prescribed by 
mediaeval rhetorical theory.
47
48
49
See note 31.
As Hughes de Saint Victor explains on the perception of the 
imagination that "when the spirit descends it is lower than spirit; 
and when God descends He is lower than God" ("De Unione Corporis 
et Spiritus", p. 285). See note 26.
The perception and the definition of the "gest" as understood 
by Pages and Bohigas, has led to a certain amount of misinterpre­
tation in the poetry of Ausias March, and, in particular, in 
stanza IX of Poem CXIX: "Axi com es bella una persona / tota 
ensemps, e no en parts jutjada, / e no *s veu be perqu*es tai 
estimada, / puix no ha res qu«als bells natura dona / -en als 
esta que»1 cors li acompanya, / go es lo gest qu*en tai cas 
l’ull engana-; / Amor pel gest cors leig amar me mana, / 
tant qu»en mi veig sperienga stranya: / si*l pens en parts, 
la pensa d’ell aparte, / e quant la veig o toch, sens alt, 
no*m farte" (w. 81-90). Verse 85 has been the subject of a 
little inconsistency and misinterpretation. R. Ferreres translates 
verses 85 and 86 as: "pues no tiene nada de lo que a los bellos 
da natura, en otros esta en el cuerpo que les acompana, estA en 
la actitud que en tai caso la vista engana". It seems to me that 
this interpretation, coupled by the translation of "gest" by 
"actitud", deforms the sense of text. In verse 85 "li" is, as 
always, a dative singular pronoun. I would therefore interpret 
this passage as either: "it is in something else which accompanies 
the body", or preferably, "it is in something else which is 
accompanied by the body"; since the basic concept in Aristotelian 
scholasticism is that the soul is the motor of the body, the body 
accompanies it, or it accompanies the body. The indefinite "it" 
refers to what is not well perceived ("no*s veu be"), which is 
why the person is loved ("perqu*es tai estimada"), and that is 
the "gest". In Catalan my translation would be "que al cors que 
li acompanya", the beauty is in something else than the body which 
accompanies it; it is in the "gest" which reveals the soul which 
is accompanied by the body; the sense is then "it is in something 
other than the body which accompanies it". This is parallelled by 
the definition of beauty given in CXVI, verses 121-126 concerning 
the "gest": "Lo gest dels ulls e de aquells la forma / fet han 
en mi passio molt estranya / per l’apetit que tot per earn se 
guanya / ab altre molt que d’opinio»s forma; / e d’aquest es lo 
tot d’ella l’objecte>/ no sols lo cors, mas tota ensemps presa". 
Here, as in CXIX, v. 82, the object of beauty is defined as:
"tota ensemps e no en part jutjada". This is not a reference to 
the Stoic concept of beauty as the harmonious association of the 
various external parts (see Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le 
Banquet de Platon, introduction de Raymond Marcel, p. 77), but to 
the Neoplatonic doctrine of the body as a reflection of the soul. 
"Tota ensemps" refers to the union of the body and the soul.
Hence beauty perceived by Ausias March in the imagination is not 
merely corporeal symmetry, he is drawn to the body by his percep­
tion of the soul imprisoned therein.
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In the thematic classification of Ausias March’s poems this 
would refer to.the "Cants Morals"; like the religious poems, they 
seem to correspond to a period of rejection of love. (See notes 
37 and 38.)
51 See note 35.
52 See below in this chapter the discussion of imagination in 
Poem LXXXVII.
"Ira can mean a whole gamut of unpleasant emotions ranging 
from anger to resentment and despair, while the absence of happi­
ness leaves the field open to a fairly wide variety of types of 
feeling — chagrin, sorrow (violent or resigned), hopelessness, 
and so on," (D. R. Sutherland, "The Love Meditation in Courtly 
Literature," Studies in Medieval French Presented to A. Ewert, 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1961, p. 74). In his interpretation of Ausias 
March, Pages limits the significance of this term to "anger":
"Cette irascibilite n’est d’ailleurs qu’une consequence de 1’amour, 
de 1*inclination primitive. La colere, dit-il, tire sa puissance 
de 1’amour...’’ (Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 294). 
Similarly, he interprets "odi" as "l’aversion ou la fuite" (Ibid., 
p. 296). The relation which these terms have with the movement 
of the imagination implies that their usage is meant to denote the 
movement of reason away from the object of enamourment, which is 
exploited by the poet as a moral source of sorrow (see note 35).
As such, this concept is related to the Chartrian definition of 
irascibilitas as "the power to reject unwanted things" (see, D. C. 
Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary Theory in Bernard 
Silvester’s Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Aeneid, Ph.D. thesis, 
Chicago: Illinois, 1967, p. 38).
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See notes 26 and 48.
See note 31.
This is inherent to Hughes de Saint Victor’s description of 
the movement of reason. See note 31.
Rafael Ferreres has challenged the notion that this image 
proceeds from Psalm XLII (Obra poetica completa II, pp. 8-9, and 
"Ausias March en algunos poetas del siglo de oro," Estudios sobre 
literatura arte: Dedicados al Profesor Emilio Orozco Dfaz, vol. 
I, Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1979, p. 472). He suggests 
that it may also proceed from the Galician tradition. His objec­
tion is very perceptive,’ however, as I hope to demonstrate in the 
text, the usage of this image in Poem LXXXIX still implies a high 
degree of mystic symbolism. •
There seems to be some discrepancy between Pages’ interpreta­
tion of these verses and that of Bohigas. Pages sees in verses 
50 to 53 of Poem LXXXIX, an expression of the poet’s victory over 
the physical attraction he could feel towards the lady: ”11 ne
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craint pas de subir 1’influence de la beaute physique de sa dame" 
(Commentaire, p. 97). Bohigas sees in these same verses an 
allusion to the concupiscent desires of the lady: "Semblen clara 
allusio a l’amor vulgar que el poeta podia esperar de la dama 
incapaq d’elevar-se a les altures d’un amor mes pur i durador" 
(Poesies III, p. 168). Bohigas’ interpretation is somewhat 
obscured by the fact that he surmises an aspect of the lovers’ 
relation which is not explicit in the text. The problem in these 
verses is not the lady’s concupiscence, but the poet’s own inclina 
tion to the flesh. Hence it seems to me that in this instance 
Pages’ interpretation is correct.
The expression "laetus horror" is used by D. Kelly (Medieval 
Imagination, p. 37) in a discussion on the principle of imposition 
in the Roman de la rose and Troilus: "... The reader is aware of 
the distance separating him from his own perfection. He is a more 
or less faithful imago of the perfect self visible in the mirror 
of his soul. Whatever the idealized context the author has chosen 
one finds direction to life and meaning by consideration of the 
goal as perfection. Imagination as Memory is thus linked to 
Prudence; and Prudence as we read in the Anticlaudianus, is the 
sole agent able to approach God and consider His perfection, his 
"diuinam psichen" at least in a mirror. That mirror can only 
show things as Prudentius does. The prudent inspector will thus 
experience a laetus horror, an awful and exhuberant horror before 
the abyss of separation. The expression laetus horror is borrowed 
by the Vir from Statius to express the love he conceives for the 
Mulier in the Epistolae duorum amantium. That love too has its 
diversity, its slippings into disarray and self-alienation, the 
flights of the soul into diversa..."» It is with this sense in 
mind that I am using the term "laetus horror”, and the reference 
to its "existential" implications, as they would have been known 
to a medieval author.
This aspect of Ausias March’s works naturally raises some 
problems in relation to the traditional vision of Ausias March 
as a Catholic poet strongly inspired by Thomist scholasticism.
P. Bohigas, following J. Rubio i Ors, denies any possibility of 
existentialist experience in Ausias March. Rubio i Ors states: 
"Sin embargo, fuerza es convenir, y en esto se distingue nuestro 
poeta de los modernos erdticos escepticos, que esos arranques de 
desesperacidn son como los involuntarios gritos que hace exhalar 
al enfermo la vehemencia del dolor, y que se encuentran, como 
rumores perdidos, en la atmosfera de resignacion en que procura 
anegarse, acordandose siempre que es cristiana su alma, enamorada 
de otra igualmente cristiana, y que el amor que le profesa ha de 
sobrevivir a su cuerpo y a los deleites, como a las tristezas de 
este mundo...". (Ausias March £ su epoca, p. 53). This argument 
is taken up by Bohigas (Poesies I, pp. 114-115, note 3):
"L’angoixa d’Ausias March es moral. Emprant aquesta paraula, no 
ens referim, doncs, de cap manera a l’angoixa metafxsica dels 
existencialistes. Ausias March, doctrinariament, es trobava al 
pol oposat." In the broad use of the term "existential", Ausias 
March’s problem is not the Sartrian opposition of existence and 
"esse", but it is metaphysical. The moral anguish in Ausias 
March, as a problem inherent in the "laetus horror", is rooted in
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that of the metaphysical recovery of the soul from the "descensus 
ad inferos”, in an essentially Neoplatonic harmonic vision of 
the universe as the macrocosm in which the moral flaws of the 
microcosm are a perversion of this harmony. These problems are 
the concern of chapter IV of this thesis which deals with the 
mediaeval tradition of Neoplatonism which Ausias March inherited. 
This, moreover, is compatible with the current of fifteenth- 
century scepticism in Catalonia (see M. de Riquer, "Poemes 
Esceptics," Commentaris critics sobre classics Catalans, pp. 18­
29; and Antoni Canals' prologue to "De Provid&ncia," pp. 85-88, 
in M. de Riquer (ed.), Antoni Canals: Sci.pid e Anibal, Barcelona: 
Barcino, 1935). Canals also relates the problem of love to 
scepticism in the prologue to "De Arra de Anima" (Ibid., pp. 121­
125). The "laetus horror" which has existentialist implications 
is closely related to that of Ausias March's religious position, 
which is the subject of Appendix I: "The Orthodoxy of Ausias 
March."
P. Bohigas’ interpretation of this stanza is formally identical 
to mine, but, unfortunately, he does not seem to have realized 
that the unity of this poem lies in its development of a praise 
of the lady, through the manipulation of the implications of the 
theory of Imagination. He therefore interprets verses 11-12 as:
"Cap altre afany, si no es el de la mort, no pot superar el dolor 
del poeta," and verses 15-16: "El poeta demana o un dolor "fresc," 
mes viu que el que sent, o la mort..." (Poesies II, p. 124). A 
slightly more complex aspect of this problem in the interpretation 
of these verses and related to my thesis on the "laetus horror", 
leads me to suggest very cautiously, that I would be inclined to 
identify this "altra dolor ... que sia fresqua" with a renewal of 
the initial vision of the ideal, prior to the poet's conscious­
ness of the distance that separates him from it. This would 
explain why as verses 17-18 suggest, Imagination cannot provide 
the same "laetus horror" again, and, moreover, this remains within 
what I consider to be the hyperbolic frame of reference of these 
verses.
62 See Poem CIV.
See Poem XVIII, w. 1-2; also, the discussion of XVIII 
below; LXXI, vv. 1-2; LXXII I, w. 1-4; LXXVII, w. 325-330; 
LXXXVII, w. 1-4; CII, w. 36-40.
64 See in Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love," 
the discussion of Poem LXXV.
In his use of this metaphor Ausias March relies on a highly 
developed mediaeval tradition of the quick and the dead, in which 
the dead set fear in the hearts of the quick, and preach virtue, 
of which they have a retrospective knowledge. This theme, which 
is found in the Cinq poemes des trois morts et des trois vifs 
(ed. S. Glixelli, Paris: Champion, 1914), has been extensively 
studied by A. Tenenti, La vie et la mort au XVe siecle, Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1952; and by the same author, Il senso della morte 
e 1’amore della vita nel Rinascimento, Torino: Einaudi, 1957.
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In Spain it has been surveyed by Florence Whyte, The Dance of 
Death in Spain and Catalonia, Baltimore: Waverly, 1931.
66 Verses 25-30 have been the object of some contention.
Pages sees these verses as a "construction embarrassee et obscure”, 
and his interpretation of them is: "Je ne sais aucun gre (a la 
Mort), si elle ne couvre point de terre mon corps nu. Dans sa 
joie celui-ci ne pense qu’a abandonner toute image de 1’impossi­
bility ou je suis de satisfaire mes desirs... L’idee est celle- 
ci: si la mort ne me privait pas du plaisir de vous voir, je ne 
lui saurais aucun gre de ne point me faire disparaitre de cette 
terre ou mes desirs restent sans satisfaction..." (Commentaire, 
p. 20)-. According to Bohigas: "El sentit es ben clar: si la 
mort no causes al poeta el mal de privar-lo de la visio plaent de 
la persona amada, aquell no li agrairia que no cobris (vista), ja 
de terra el seu cos. Al poeta no li resta altre plaer que imagi­
nar uns desigs que no es poden complir" (Poesies II, p. 49). P. 
Ramirez i Molas generally agrees with Bohigas, although he 
suggests that verse 30 is not subordinated to "imagination" in 
verse 29, but to verses 31-32, and that the verse should actually 
be read as "los meus desigs no podent-se complir" and interprets 
the passage as "no pot perdre altre plaer que el de 1’imaginar, 
per tai com el plaer dels desigs li es defSs i fora del seu 
abast" (La poesia d*Ausias March, pp. 29-30). R. Ferreres in his 
translation of verses 27-30, in spite of having access to all 
three of the above interpretations, according to his bibliography, 
still manages to take his readers out on a Tolkeinian trip of 
his own, in which the vital concept of imagination disappears 
altogether: "no le agradezco que no cubra de tierra mi cuerpo 
desnudo, pues no piensa en el placer que pierde, sino que mis 
deseos no se podran cumplir..." (Ausias March: Qbra Poetica 
Completa I, p. 179). My interpretation of these verses is based 
on the fact that a close inspection of Ausias March’s poetry 
reveals that in general every "cobla" acts as a unit of thought 
in which the first two verses introduce a thought which is 
developed in the ensuing verses. Verses 25-26 introduce the 
thought that death would offend the poet by depriving him of the 
vision of the beloved. This interpretation is inclined to favour 
those of Bohigas and Ramirez i Molas. The concepts implied by 
the sight which would be lost, are developed in the ensuing verses 
by the explicit reference to imagination (verse 29), which com­
bines both sight and sensual memory, thereby bridging the intro­
duction of "body" and "delight". In verses 27-30, the poet does 
not thank Death for covering his naked body with earth. The body 
thinks that there is no greater displeasure, than that of losing 
the imagination (sight and sensual memory). Verse 30 should be 
interpreted as does Ramirez i Molas. The difficulty in these 
verses lies primarily in understanding the ambivalent nature of 
imagination. It involves the spiritualization of the flesh, and 
the fall of reason, and therefore, makes the movement from "con­
templacio" to "desigs" in these few verses understandable. (See 
also the discussion of this matter: in Chapter V: "Melancholy:
The Mirror of Courtly Love.")
67 "Douz Pensers vient a chief de piece, / Qui l’ire e la dolor 
despi^ce, / E a l’amant en son venir / Fait de la joie sovenir /
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Que Esperance li promet; / E apres au devant li met / Les iauz 
rianz, le nes traitiz, / Qui n’est trop granz ne trop petiz, /
E la bouchetd coloree, / Don l’aleine est si savoree; / Si li 
plaist mout quant il li membre / De la biaute de chascun membre. / 
Encor vait cil solaz doblant / Quant d’un ris ou d’un bel 
semblant / Li membre ou d’une bele chiere / Que fait li a s'amie 
chiere. / Douz Pensers ensi assoage / La dolor d’amor e la rage” 
(w. 2649-2666), Roman de la rose II, ed. E. Langlois, Paris: 
Firmin-Didot, 1920, p. 135. As this quotation indicates hope is 
maintained by the imagination, which in this instance is debased 
to being simply ’’sensuous memory".
M. S. Boethius, The Theological Tractates and The Consolation 
of Philosophy, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester, 
London: Heinemann, 1973, p. 191, "Consolation II, iv, prose:
"But it is just that which torments me, for in all the adversities 
of fortune, the most unhappy kind of misfortune is to have known 
happiness."
69 On the development of the theme 
March, see Chapter V: "Melancholy:
of the Golden Age in Ausias 
The Mirror of Courtly Love."
For a summary of the controversy surrounding the problem of 
the relation of the two parts of the Roman de la rose, see Charles 
Dahlberg, trans., G. de Lorris and J. de Meun, The Romance of the 
Rose, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 2-4.
71 A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 280; 
Commentaire, p. 69.
72 Op. cit., ed. E. Langlois, tome II, p. 134.
I follow Bohigas’ interpretation of verse 36; however, for 
the purpose of this discussion one should note that verses 35-36 
in Poem IX cause some problems of interpretation. Pag&s, 
Commentaire, p. 14, says of verse 35: "Il y a une heure par jour 
ou je n’eprouve aucune peine a, etc...." Bohigas interprets 
verses 35-36 as "Hi ha moments del dia que no te cap pena de 
pensar que esta a punt de morir (l’arma rendre)" (Poesies II, p. 
37). Although this interpretation conveys the general idea, it 
seems to me that the object of verse 36 is missed by the transla­
tion "that he is on the point of dying". Ausias March seems to 
be implying much more in verse 36: "pensant en go que vinch a 
l’arma rendre". Bohigas’ version only implies "pensant que vinch 
a rendre l’arma". Ausias March is actually saying: "thinking 
of that for which I come to give up my soul". There is a "double 
entente" in these verses, the spiritual vision is a rapture, but 
it may also be a reflection on the false "religio amoris" which 
steals his soul, that is, to which he gives up his soul. The 
reference in verse 34 would indicate a conflict of spirit and 
flesh, "de grans contrasts m*opinio es plena", which warrants 
my interpretation. Also, the sense of the "tornada" (see text) 
heightens the viability of this interpretation.
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D. Kelly defines "courtly love" literature as the product of 
"finesse" which lies behind the rhetoric of "courtly love";
"Fin1amors as used in the Middle Ages and courtly love in modern 
parlance are not always synonymous. The difference lies in the 
divergent connotations of the adjectives courtly and fin. Courtly 
love commonly suggests arts of love, rules and directives prescrib­
ing specific conduct and fixing sentiment within an exact mold.
It is held to be essentially deductive, functioning as an elaborate 
etiquette covering every conceivable circumstance and action. That 
which is fin evinces finesse. Finesse characterizes "la puissance 
intuitive" as one critic puts it, "la faculte de saisir confusement 
la realite profonde des objets concrets", that is, the essential 
and indicative elements of experience" (Medieval Imagination, p.
20; see also p. 235).
75 See Chapter V: "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love."
76 See notes 26 and 31.
77 M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and 
Mediaeval Thought, pp. 140-141.
See in particular the reference in note 31; the implications 
of "fantasia" naturally incline it to "inmoderata cogitatione", 
as in note 7. Also see, St. Thomas’ elimination of the problem, 
Bundy, p. 217.
"the common contrast was between imagination and reason, 
phantasy and intellect" (Bundy, p. 180). These relations pose a 
great problem which cannot be overlooked, but which I can only 
glean over in this thesis. Phantasy is constantly seen as either 
quasi-divine, or as totally deceitful and evil. These two kinds 
of Phantasy were a constant source of contention in the Middle 
Ages, and generally, it can be said to have been viewed negatively 
by most mediaeval theologians. In this respect, it shares the 
fate of melancholy with which it is intimately associated. In 
literature, as I shall try to point out below it had more fortune, 
however, its implications can only be determined by the context in 
which it is presented. In this very brief expose of the problem 
I am mainly interested in presenting the ambivalent implications 
of this term, and its relation to intuition which is important for 
the understanding of Poem XVIII. I am, therefore, presenting 
mainly the positive aspects of phantasy and their possible negative 
effects which seem to have been the standard mediaeval interpreta­
tion of this concept.
80 Bundy, p. 139.
81 Ibid.
Here, as elsewhere, phantasy shares the fate of melancholy.
The Stoics considered melancholy to be a form of madness. Phantasy 
is then related to insanity, however, as in the case of melancholy,
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"furor" was an occasional gift of the Stoic Wise Man. Hence just 
as there are two types of melancholy, so are there two types of 
phantasy (see Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 43-44).
Bundy, p. 89. Bundy here paraphrases an extensive and more 
complex passage found in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta vol. II, ed. 
J. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1903, reprinted in Stuttgart: Teubner 
Verlag, 1964. The passage,which comes from Aetii Placita, is in 
Greek. Owing to my manifest and regrettable ignorance of Greek,
I am forced to rely on Bundy's text.
84 M. W. Bundy, p. 266.
Dante's references to "fantasia" are mainly found in the 
Paradiso. The only one outside this context is found in a general 
reference to imagination (Purgatorio, Canto XVII, 25; Dante 
Alighieri, The Divine Comedy I-III, ed. and trans., C. S. Singleton, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973). In all other 
references in the Paradiso it is associated with the highest 
intellectual faculties of man* it assists him in the perception 
of the divine, especially in the final canto, verse 142: "A l'alta 
fantasia qui maned possa; / ma gia volgeva il mio disio e '1 
velle, / si come rota ch’igualmente e mossa, / l’amor che move il 
sole e 1'altre stelle" (The Divine Comedy, Canto XXXIII, w. 142­
145, p. 380).
"Hire friendes sawe hir sorwe gan to slake, / Ande preyde 
hire on knees, for Goddes sake, / To come and romen hire in 
companye, / Away to dryve hire derke fantasye" (Op. cit., w. 
841-844) (Geoffroy Chaucer, The Works, ed. F. N. Robinson (second 
edition), Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961, p. 136). In this 
context the "derke fantasye" refers to the melancholy state into 
which Dorigen swoons during Averagus' absence. The description 
of Dorigen's actions are exactly those of a melancholy figure: 
"Another tyme ther wolde she sitte and thynke, / And cast her eyen 
downward fro the brinke" (Op. cit., w. 856-857; Ibid., p. 137).
On this point see Saturn and Melancholy, p. 405, for the icono­
graphy of Malinconia.
And in his geere for al the worlde he ferde, / Not only like 
the loveris maladye / Of Hereos, but rather lyk manye, /
Engendered of humour raalencolik, Biforen, in his celle fantastik" 
(The Works of Geoffroy Chaucer, "The Knight's Tale," w. 1372­
1376, p. 30). The "maladye of hereos" is generally considered to 
be melancholy love with a concupiscent intention. This subject 
has been extensively studied by John Livingston Lowes, "The Loveres 
Maladye of Hereos," Modern Philology XI, 1913-1914, pp. 491-546.
The definition given by Arnau de Vilanova identifies it with the 
excessive meditation characteristic of melancholics: "Amor ... 
qui dicitur heroicus est vehemens et assidua cogitatio supra rem 
desideratam cum confidentia obtinendi delectabile apprehensum ex 
ea" (Livingston Lowes, p. 541), from Tractatus de amore qui 
heroycus nominatur. The title and significance of this work seems 
to have escaped Spanish critics, as can be seen in the introduction
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to Arnau de Vilanova, Qbres Catalanes, vol. II: Escrits Medics, 
proleg de Joaquin Carreras i Artau, Barcelona: Barcino, 1947.
In the catalogue to Vilanova’s work Carreras i Artau lists: "De 
amore qui heroicus (eroticus?) nominatur" (p. 34). Arnau de 
Vilanova’s definition does not record melancholy love "amor 
hereos" as a totally negative activity, it is an ardent meditation 
on an object with the confidence of obtaining a delightful 
apprehension or understanding of it; this does not necessarily 
imply a concupiscent intention. Arnau de Vilanova’s attitude in 
this matter corresponds to his more advanced conception of 
melancholy, when compared to that of many of his contemporaries, 
and preludes the position taken by Marsilio Ficino (see Saturn and 
Melancholy, pp. 263-266). The general notion of "amor hereos" as 
a concupiscent, and therefore, perverted phantasy can be perceived 
in the definition of the Portuguese, Velascus, in his Philonium 
(1418), quoted in Livingston Lowes (pp. 505-506): "Est autem hereos 
amor inordinatus et irrationabilis quern aliquis habet erga aliquam 
mulierem non propter bonum finem. Est ergo hereos amor cum solli- 
citudine immensa propter amorem mulieris" ... "Causa hereos est 
corruptio imaginatione falsa representantis virtuti rationabili 
et opinativae. Nam imaginatio magna domina est: et imperat aliis 
virtutibus...." This definition explicitly refers to the destruc­
tive function of imagination, as in Chaucer it is a melancholy 
engendered in first of the three cells of the brain, the cell of 
phantasy, which,as in Hughes de Saint Victor, is the seat of the 
imaginative faculty (see note 31). This is closely associated 
with Andreas Capellanus’ definition of love as an "inmoderata 
cogitatione" (notes 7, 31). In the second part of the first 
Appendix to The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love (pp. 131-132), 
Roger Boase sums up the research of J. Livingston Lowes on "amor 
hereos" and "amor ishq", and correctly points out that this con­
cept was known in fifteenth-century Castile. Moreover, he quotes 
the late fifteenth-century writer Francisco Lopez de Villalobos, 
who associates "amor hereos" with the troubadours: "Amor hereos 
segun nuestros autores / en una corrupts imaginacion / por quien 
algun hombre se aquexa de amores, / y en este qu’es hito de los 
trovadores..." (from El sumario de la medecina con un tratado de 
las pestfferas bubas, Salamanca, 1498, ed. Maria Teresa de 
Herrera, Cuadernos de Historia de la Medicina Espanola monograf£a 
25, Salamanca, 1973, p. 38), and also refers to Alfonso de 
Madrigal. On the basis of these references Boase associates "amor 
hereos" with "courtly love”. This seems to me to be a hazardous 
and possibly equivocal definition. Ausias March who is also 
familiar with the theory of "amor hereos”, also rejects the love 
of the troubadours, in his rejection of sensual love: "D’aquest 
voler los trobadors escriuen, / e, per aquest, dolor mortal 
los toca; / la racional part de l’arma no *ls broca; / del sensual 
aquest apetits viuen" (LXXXVII, w. 41-44). Villalobos’ rejection 
of troubadour love on the basis of "hereos" is written some fifty 
years after Ausias March, and seems to refer to a similar under­
standing of troubadour love as essentially sensual. This condem­
nation of "amor hereos", as related to courtly love of the 
troubadours, cannot be considered to have the value of a testimony, 
since it is a broad condemnation of an indefinite previous genera­
tion. The real danger of associating "amor hereos" with "courtly 
love" lies in the ambiguous nature of both terms. "Amor hereos", 
because it is closely related to melancholy, follows the uneven
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development of this concept, and should not, therefore, be
conceived of as a blanket definition, even if that may be the
impression left by Livingston Lowes’ article. Similarly,
’’courtly love”, which has its own evolution (Chap. I, note 17), cannot 
be conceived of as a monolithic term. One can see the consequences 
of this approach in D. W. Robertson’s very exacting interpretation 
"The Concept of Courtly Love as an Impediment to the Understanding 
of Medieval Texts," in The Meaning of Courtly Love, ed. F. X.
Newman, p. 17, in which the "amor hereos" of Arcite, quoted at 
the beginning of this note, is considered to be something absolutely 
distinct from the definition of courtly love. In Ausias March’s 
circumstances it is quite probable that his attitude to melancholy 
may have been closer to that of his compatriot Arnau de Vilanova, 
than to Velascus’. That which makes his work so interesting is 
that it represents an ambivalent attitude to melancholy, possibly 
owing to the religious climate of Catalonia-Valencia, and the 
definite influence of Ramon Llull, which is so affined to Vilanova's 
(see note 109).
W. Wetherbee, "The Function of Poetry in the De planctu 
naturae of Alain de Lille," Traditio XXV, 1969, pp. 87-125, and 
Platonism and Poetry, pp. 188-211.
89 Platonism and Poetry, p. 206.
90 Alain de Lille, The Complaint of Nature, trans., D. M. 
Moffat, p. 94.
91 D. Kelly, Medieval Imagination, p. 97.
92 R. S. Kinsman, The Darker Vision of the Renaissance, pp. 14­
15. ...  . .. .
Ibid.; R. S. Kinsman’s arguments are based on the research of 
S. Wenzel, "The Seven Deadly Sins: Some Problems of Research," 
Speculum XLIII, 1968, pp. 1-22. The latter provides some 
enlightening information on the relation between Ira, acedia, 
and tristitia (see note 53 of this chapter) for the basis of 
Scholastic classification: "Cassian had distributed a large 
number of vices among the three Platonic parts of the soul, and 
in the eight century had given the following relation, in which 
the capital vices are considered as springing from the three parts 
if these are corrupted:
concupiscentia: gastrimaquia, fornication, philargyria
ira: tristitia, acedia
ratio: superbia, cenodoxia.
This simple model appears in later works, even in vernacular 
treatises..." (p. 5). This model drawn by Wenzel from Alcuin's 
"De animae ratione" (P.L. CI, p. 640ff), explains why Ausias 
March refers to "irascibilitas" and its fall (p. 20 of this text, 
and note 53 above), he is led into "tristitia" and perhaps 
"acedia", which is defined by the treatise "Quoniam ut ait sapiens" 
(Brit. Mus., Ms. Harley 3823, fol. 65v., quoted by Wenzel, p. 8): 
"Iuxta terram autem que est elementum infimum nascitur accidia et
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avaritia. Accidia quia melan grece terra vel nigrum latine. 
Unde melancholici qui magus sunt accidiosi." In this definition 
melancholy persons are given to sloth.
94
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See note 7.
This elemental imagery is directly related to melancholy, as 
it is in other cases which I will describe in Chapter V, and can 
be seen in notes 108 and 110. The reference to phantasy in verse 
167 and the instability which it causes are implicitly related to 
the mutability of the elements in stanza XXII; an explanation for 
this can be found in note 100 in a medical description common to 
both Ficino and Ausias March. The ensuing stanza XXIII then 
clarifies these references to the instability of the elements in 
the lover by exposing it in terms of the theory of the elementatum. 
The elements are not found in the body in their simple form, but 
always mixed in combinations with their opposites, in which one 
trait predominates (see Richard McKeon, “Medicine and Philosophy 
in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: The Problem of Elements,”
The Thomist XXIV, 1961, p. 236; and Theodore Silverstein, 
"Elementatum: Its Appearance Among Twelfth-Century Cosmogonists,"
Medieval Studies XVI, 1954, pp. 156-162). The reference to the 
elementata furthers the concept of the body as a composite, as 
found in verse 162; as Ausias March states of the elements: “ans 
es compost d’un altre son contrari” (verse 178). This refers to 
a medical version of the conflict of contemplation and action, 
between the elements of the lover’s body. Phantasy in verse 167 
is therefore the source of contemplation which engenders melancholy 
instability. The term elementatum was introduced by Guillaume de 
Conches from medical texts, in particular from the Pantegni of 
Galen translated by Constantine the African (see Silverstein, pp. 
157-158). This shows a fair knowledge of medical theory on the 
part of Ausias March, which should, however, be taken in perspec­
tive. Silverstein notes that the term probably came to Guillaume 
de Conches by way of John of Spain and Dominicus Gundissalinus in 
the Latin version of Avicenna’s Fons Vitae. These twelfth-century 
sources are the common background of Ramon Lull’s philosophy.
Lull made of the elementatum one of the cornerstones of his 
thought; it is found inter alia in the Arbre de Ciencia, under 
"De 1’arbre elemental": "Per les branques entenem los quatre 
elements simples, go es a saber, lo foe, l’aer, l’aigua e la 
terra, qui son substancies de les coses elementades en elles 
sustentades, e elles son insensibles e incorompables en quant son 
simples" ... "Per lo fruit entenem los elementats, aixi com la 
pera e la poma, e l’home e 1 leo, e 1 peix e l’aucell e l’aur e 
1’argent" (Ramon Llull, Qbres esencials vol. I, Barcelona: Selecta, 
1957, p. 557a). In this case Lull is undoubtedly one of Ausias 
March’s main sources, which reflects Ausias March’s perfect adequacy 
to a current of Neoplatonism in his era. In this sense he is 
neither a precursor, nor a belated follower of a by-gone tradition.
96 Pages, who follows the manuscript chronology (see Les Qbres 
d*Auzias March I, pp. 164-165), accepts in the case of CI the 
chronology presented in D (see Commentaire, p. 110), and there­
fore, believes that it is a later poem. Bohigas follows a similar
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method and arrives at the same conclusion, Poesies I, p. 175. 
Riquer, Historia de la literatura II, p. 491, believes that it 
may belong to an earlier cycle. Ramirez i Molas, La poesia 
d’Ausias March, p. 217, also considers that it is a youthful 
product. On the basis of the internal evidence, that is, the way 
in which Ausias March conceives of phantasy and its effects, I am 
in complete agreement with Pages. .
See notes 41 and 49.
Pages misinterprets these verses. Seemingly this can only be 
because he overlooks the function of imagination, for he states: 
"Et tons les sens (de ma dame) ont voulu s’y meler. C’est par 
tous ses sens qu’elle a agi sur lui" (Commentaire, p. 113).
Bohigas (Poesies IV, p. 82) considers that verse 47 represents 
an "Oposicio entre la fredor de l’amada, que tanmateix, encen el 
poeta, i 1’ardor d’aquest, que no aconsegueix d’escalfar la dama."
The traditional notion of the unstable physical attributes of 
the melancholy lover can be seen in John Livingston Lowes* examina­
tion of Chaucer’s description of Arcite ("The Loveres Maladye of 
Hereos," pp. 525-526). The medical description of the melancholy 
person as unstable originates in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problem 
XXX, i, in the description of the black bile which can be either 
very hot or very cold: "But to revert to our former discussion, 
that such melancholic humour is already mixed in nature; for it 
is a mixture of hot and cold; for nature consists of these two 
elements. So black bile becomes both very hot and very cold. For 
the same thing can be naturally affected by both these conditions, 
as for instance water which is cold, but if it is sufficiently 
heated so as to reach boiling point it is hotter than the flame 
itself, and stone and steel when heated in the flame become hotter 
than the coal, though by nature they are cold" (Aristotle,
Problems II: Books XXII-XXXVII, trans. W. S. Hett and H. Rackham, 
London: Heinemann, 1965, p. 161). Marsilio Ficino, in his medical 
explanation of melancholia’s effect on the wit of individuals, 
repeats these concepts: "Bilis enim atra ferri instar, quando 
multum ad frigus intenditur, friget ad summum, quando contra ad 
calidum valde declinat, calet ad summum" (Marsilio Ficino, Opera 
Omnia vol. I, intro. P. 0. Kristeller, Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 
1962, reprint of Basilea: Henric Petrina, 1576, p. 498; this 
passage is also found in Saturn and Melancholy, p. 31). Further 
in this text after explaining the theory of opposites in the 
atra bilis, Ficino refers to the "great power which melancholy 
has towards either extreme, stable by a certain unity and of a 
fixed nature" ("trans, of: "Tantam ad utrunque extremum melancho­
lia uim habet, unitate quadara stabilis, atque naturae" Opera Omnia, 
p. 498) thereby echoing the concept of the mean used by Aristotle 
to solve the problem of the melancholy instability. As Klibansky, 
Panofsky and Saxl point out: "only the Aristotelian concept of 
the "mean" made it possible to conceive an effective equilibrium 
between the poles of this antithesis," Saturn and Melancholy, p.
40). This concept of the opposites also forms part of the 
Petrarchan tradition of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,
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such as it is found in Petrarch’s sonnet 48; first stanza: "Se 
mai foco per foco non si spense / ne fiume fu giamai secco per 
pioggia, / ma sempre l'un per l’altro simil poggia / et spesso 
l’un contrario l’altro accense" (Petrarch’s Lyric Poems, ed. and 
trans. R. M. Durling, Cambridge: Harvard, 1976, p. 115). The 
fifteenth-century Petrarchan tradition in Catalonia prior to 
Ausias March is represented by Jordi de Sant Jordi’s "Canqo 
d’opposits," (number 15 in Jordi de Sant Jordi, ed. M. de Riquer, 
Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1955, pp. 173-177)’, it is an 
example of the more "preciosiSta" current of Petrarchism typical 
of the fifteenth-century imitators of Petrarch, prior to the 
Florentine revitalization which gave back to Petrarchism its 
content. Ausias March, like Petrarch, uses these concepts based 
on the theory of melancholy as a means of psychological introspec­
tion, which in the Valencian poet reaches what seems to me to be a 
greater level of complexity through the manipulation of the 
physiological implications. Hence in many images of hot and cold 
Ausias March describes his own physiological and psychological 
instability (Appendix II under: "Heat-Cold (Medical) G:l:c, and 
Hot-Cold (non medical) 1:1), for example: "Cascun*amor vol temps 
sens calt ne fret: / yo crem d’ivern, e d’estiu tremoli" (LXXXIV, 
w. 23-24). This image, which comes from Bernat de Ventadorn, is 
used in the same way as that found in Poem CI, which is at the 
origin of this discussion. The heat and cold are the physiological 
extremes of melancholy love experienced by Ausias March. As Pages 
has frequently noted, Ausias March seeks the Aristotelian mean in 
love: "Car la virtut en lo mig loch se met / e los estrems per
vicis abandons" (XXX, w. 31-32), (see also A. Pages, Auzias March 
et ses predecesseurs, p. 375). In his physiological interpreta­
tion of melancholy Ausias March consequently echoes the theory of 
the mean, as did Ficino: "A temps he cor d’acer, de earn, e de 
fust" (CXIV, v. 87). As in Problem XXX, i_, Ausias March is 
describing his melancholy as being extremely unstable, cold as 
steel, temperate as the means (the flesh is "elementata" it par­
takes of hot and cold), and combustible as wood, that is, hot.
The significance of this verse has not been previously noted by 
critics; it establishes a physiological parallel with the discur­
sive division of the three kinds of love based on the Nicomachean 
Ethics.
See note 30, Chapter I.
As many twelfth-century Platonists, Hughes de Saint Victor 
has a sapiential view of the Incarnation, that is, he conceives 
of the Incarnation as the restauratio of man to his original 
communion with Divine Wisdom (see Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, 
pp. 54-55, and M. D. Chenu, La Theologie au XIIe siecle, page 205, 
pp. 225-227: "les implications platoniciennes d’un Hughes de 
Saint Victor l’ameneraient a concevoir nature et grSce comme des 
participations de la vie divine plutot que comme des formes dis- 
tinctes," p. 225). This entails a certain concept that true 
Wisdom is beheld in man’s mind, as can be noticed in the first 
book of the Didascalicon, Hughes de Saint Victor says of man:
"But his immortal mind, illuminated by Wisdom, beholds its own 
principle and recognizes how unfitting it is for it to seek any­
thing outside itself when what it is in itself can be enough for
121
it" (Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon, trans. Jerome Taylor, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 46). As one 
can note in this statement true wisdom comes through "illumina­
tion "j it is revealed knowledge.
103 The use of a present participle has enabled Spanish translators 
and editors to gloss over this problem. Arthur Terry, in his 
translation (Ausias March, Selected Poems, trans. A. Terry, 
Edinburgh: University Press, 1976), correctly identifies the 
action as pertaining to the narrator, by translating "Ffantasiant" 
as "in my imaginings". A certain degree of inexactitude results 
from the equation of phantasy with imagination, this, however, is 
permissible in the general limitations intended in this transla­
tion.
104 Phantasy, as it is conceived of in these verses, especially 
in verses 25-40, is evidently a passive intellection of "univer- 
sals"; it is "l’alta fantasia" of Dante. Ausias March, who is 
evidently aware of, and follows, the epistemology of Hughes de 
Saint Victor, clearly perceives the movement of the spirit as a 
go-between of the body and the soul of the individual, as can be 
noted in verses 33-40 (see notes 26 and 31). In a reference such 
as this one, the spirit has a dialectical function similar to that 
of the Plotinian animate (see note 26). G. Worth O’Brien points 
out that the concept of "spirit" was understood by the Scholastics 
as a "tertium quid" between the body and the soul; furthermore, 
the Galenic concept of the "spirit" accentuated its microcosmic 
relation, and hence: "when Ficino undertook to expound the 
nature of the "third something" in man, he substituted "spirit" 
for Animate..." (see Renaissance Poetics and the Problem of 
Power, p. 26). This is obvious in Ficino’s statement: "Tria 
profecto in nobis esse videntur, anima, spiritus atque corpus. 
Anima et corpus natura longe inter se diversa spiritu medio 
copulantur qui vapor quidam est tenuissimus et perlucidus per 
cordis calorem ex subtilissima parte sanguinis genitus. Inde per 
omnia membra diffusus anime vires accipit, et transfundit in 
corpus. Accidem item per organa sensuum corporum externorum 
imagines, que in anima propterea figi non possunt, quia incorporea 
substantia, que corporibus prestantior est, formari ab illis per 
imaginum susceptionem non potest. Sed anima ubique spiritui 
presens imagines corporum in eo tamquam in speculo relucentes 
facile inspicit perque illas corpora iudicat. Atque hec cognitio 
sensus a Platonis dicitur.... Huiusmodi conceptionem imagina- 
tionem phantasticamque vocamus" (Commentaire sur le Banquet de 
Platon, ed. Raymond Marcel, p. 207; see also Raymond Marcel, 
Marsile Ficin, Paris: Societe d’Edition ’Les Belles Lettres,* 
1958, pp. 407 and 668, as well as Chapter IV of this thesis).
The relation of this to Hughes de Saint Victor’s description of 
imagination and his use of "sensualitas" is self-evident (see 
notes 26 and 31). The fundamental concept of the clear spirit 
is, therefore, that of the spirit which finds itself illuminated 
by Divine grace, that is, informed of the Divine mysteries (Ibid., 
pp. 39-40). A problem arises here, inasmuch as this refers to 
what St. Augustine considers to be "recta ratio": "with the 
sight of the soul we see in the eternal truth from which all 
temporal things have been made, the form according to which we
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effect something, in ourselves or in our bodies with a true and 
right reason; and it is from the same.source that we possess a 
true knowledge of things... (Ibid., p. 19, from De Trinitate,
IX, 7). Ausias March is evidently very much aware of this 
definition of the concept of "recta ratio". In Poem CV one finds 
a reference to this: "ab hull de earn he fet los teus judicis:
/ vulles dar lum a la vista de l’arma" (w. 95-96). Here Ausias 
March opposes natural reason to "recta ratio", that is, to wisdom 
granted to the spirit, which purifies and clears it by illumina­
tion. Although Ausias March never refers to the term "recta 
ratio", he uses a very close approximation: "en pur« amor 
1Tespirit meu conferme / e»n aquell punt resta ma raho clara" 
(LXXXVII, w. 213-214). In pure love, Ausias March voices the 
same concept as "recta ratio" when referring to "clear reason 
that is "clear spirit". David W. Clark, in "William of Ockham on 
Right Reason," Speculum XLVII, 1973, pp. 13-36, demonstrates that 
the term "recta ratio" in later mediaeval scholasticism came to 
be conceived of as "right reasoning". William of Ockham uses it 
in two ways. The first is: "the correct knowledge about one’s 
obligation" (Ibid., p. 15), it is moral knowledge. The other 
significance he attributes to "recta ratio" pertains to the 
Nominalist School’s approach to the problem of predestination and 
the moral autonomy of the individual, "recta ratio" is then: 
"Rather than moral knowledge or propositions, the functional 
meaning of recta ratio signifies a non-complex act of judgement 
which asserts an obligation by assenting to normative proposi­
tions" (Ibid., p. 17). A recent article on Ausias March (Mark 
Johnson, "Scholastic Background as a Literary Tradition in Ausias 
March," Romance Notes XIX. 1979, pp. 1-5) uses the general 
introduction of Clark’s article to suggest that Ausias March uses 
the concept of "recta ratio" like all Schoolmen, strictly to 
define "right reasoning" "as practical knowledge that enables 
morally correct behaviour". The conclusion of this article is 
that: "It is paradoxical that in his approach he applied the 
traditional concept of right reason — a construct intended for 
the definition of morally proper behaviour — to the implicitly 
immoral conduct of courtly love" (Ibid., p. 5). The real paradox 
is in the superficiality of the critic. That Ausias March made 
use of scholastic logic is not to be denied, but whether every 
syllogism involving reason becomes an example of "recta ratio" is 
another matter. The arguments used in this article are inherently 
misleading, if not fallacious, and the woolly reference to 
"courtly love" only adds to this misunderstanding. The problem 
of Ausias March is basically that he has to rely on "natural 
reason" (the eye of flesh) which is misleading because it draws 
him to the flesh. In pure love, when Ausias March is granted 
"recta ratio", that is, "raho clara" (LXXXVII, v. 214) then he 
perceives truly, "with the eye of the soul": "del espirit es 
sa preso pus ampla, / e ses virtuts e potences exampla, / si que 
no veu tras paret mas per rexa" (LXXXVII, w. 196-198). As I 
have repeatedly described, Ausias March is a poet, and he is 
primarily influenced by poetic theory, which, indirectly, is 
affected by later Scholasticism, but has its roots in Chartrian 
and Victorine philosophy. Reason fails because it is enamoured 
of the imagination, as Hughes de Saint Victor describes it (see 
notes 26 and 31). Reason in this context is that of discursive 
reason, the eye of flesh. "Recta ratio" which is associated with
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the soul’s illumination of Wisdom, faith, could not fall since it 
is not strictly limited to logic. Hence in the limits of what is 
traditionally accepted as "courtly love", in the Roman de la rose, 
Reason, although she is "fille de Dieu" (v. 5816), and therefore, 
enables men to participate in divinity, is always secondary to 
faith, and consequently to the will: "A sa maniere, Jean de Meun 
indique qu’ici-bas, si la volonte n’adhere pas aux verites eta- 
blies par la raison, celle-ci reste sterile. Il ne suffit pas 
de savoir, il faut croire et aimer" (P. Badel, "Raison, Fille de 
Dieu" et le rationalisme de Jean de Meun," Melanges a Jean 
Frappier, t. 1, Geneve: Droz, 1970, p. 49). This literary theme 
is frequent in most courtly literature, and it is intimately 
associated with that of raising the soul out of its immersion in 
chaos. To perceive with "recta ratio" is to do so through the 
eye of the soul, that is, in clear spirit. Since Ausias March 
never uses the term "recta ratio," but refers to the Augustinian 
concept In which it is not merely "right reasoning" in a discur­
sive manner, but aided by Divine illumination, speculation such as 
that of Mark Johnson, is unwarranted, it can only refer to a 
standard syllogistic procedure, and rather than enlighten the 
reading of Ausias March it spreads confusion by placing it in the 
context of "courtly love" as an invariably immoral behaviour.
See notes 21 and 104. "The Pauline mirror is a variation on 
the Plotinian concept of the Animate. It is the mirror of man’s 
soul in which divine illumination is reflected, and therefore, it 
is the mirror of recta ratio. "It cannot be searched by discur­
sive reason; we are, on the contrary, the passive recipients of 
whatever light this mirror sheds upon our minds. The mirror of 
right reason is hence the Deity, so that, in the awkward imagery 
of this epistemology, we look upon the glass of the Lord in the 
darkened mirror of our mind; but whatever truth that we apprehend 
in this exercise comes not from our attempts to disperse the dark­
ness from the light (right reason) which shines through the glass 
of understanding in spite of its darkness" (Renaissance Poetics 
and the Problem of Power, p. 20).
106 See note 149 on the Roman de la rose, and Renaissance Poetics 
and the Problem of Power, p. 29: "The will, then, is the key to 
efficacious mirror-polishing."
107 Leo Spitzer, Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony, 
ed. A. Granville Hatcher, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963 
(see Chapter III, pp. 64-80); for example: "The history of the 
disappearance of the one field (world harmony — well-tempered­
ness) is simply the history of modern civilization..." (p. 75).
It is interesting to note that Leo Spitzer refers extensively to 
Ausias March in support of his theory (see pages 89 and 91-92, 
Ibid.). He is, to my knowledge, the only critic to have paid 
proper attention to this vital aspect of the work of Ausias March. 
Francisco Rico, in his survey of microcosmic theories in Spain,
El pequeno mundo del hombre, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, character­
istically omits any reference to Ausias March. This seems to me 
to be a consequence of the interpretation of the Valencian poet’s 
work as Thomist. As it is well known St. Thomas was generally
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opposed to microcosmic theories of world harmony (see note .
26."-aboixe,-. and Spitzer, pp. 73-74). As Rudolf Allers
"Microcosmus," Traditio II, 1944, p. 385, points out: "When St. 
Thomas repeats after Aristotle that the soul is ’’somehow" all 
things he is careful to make a distinction. The soul is actually 
what it actually knows; and all other things it is but potentially. 
The anima quoddammodo omnia lends itself, accordingly, to a micro- 
cosmistic interpretation only in a metaphorical sense. In fact 
when St. Thomas speaks of this, he does not refer to the notion 
of the mundus parvus.
For example: "axi* Amor suptil y enfinit tempra / la fini- 
tat de la del cors y aviva: / en cert cas mor nostr* amor 
sensitiva / e 1’espirit junt amb ell se destempra" (LXXXVII, w. 
315-318); and, "Dins lo cors d’om les humors se discorden; / de 
temps en temps llur poder se transmuda:/en un sols jorn
regna malenconia, / n* aquell mateix colera, sanch e fleuma" 
(XCIV, w. 17-20); see note 100.
Menendez-Pelayo states, in the Historia de las ideas esteticas 
vol. II, Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, p. 2271 ”el 
llamado platonismo de Ausias March muy rara vez invade los terminos 
ont6logicos." To the contrary, I believe that Ausias March’s 
intimate knowledge of microcosmic theories associates his work 
with a particular aspect of Neoplatonic thought in which the 
onthology plays an important, if discreet, role. His knowledge 
of Ramon Lull, as studied by P. Ramirez i Molas (La poesia, pp. 
313-369), is supported and furthered by the present study of 
Ausias March’s manipulation of microcosmic theory. R. Pring-Mill 
has pointedly remarked that Lull’s thought is eclectic, it combines 
a primarily Neoplatonic onthology with an Aristotelian psychology; 
this trait is generally common to mediaeval Christian philosophers: 
"Cal dir tanmateix, que per cristia que fos el simbolisme de la 
doctrina, com analisi dels processos psicologics no contenia res 
que fos incompatible amb el neoplatonisme filosofic i la psico- 
fisiologia aristotelica de gairebe tots els sistemes de pensament 
de 1’epoca..." (El microcosmos lul lia, Palma de Mallorca: Moll, 
1962, p. 129). As many of his predecessors, the twelfth-century 
philosophers, Lull relies extensively on Augustinian hylemorphism 
(see Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siecle, p. 117; and Pring- 
Mill, op. cit., p. 126). Lull consequently uses and recognizes 
two basic ontologies, one Aristotelian and Thomist, and the 
other Neoplatonic-Augustinian: "... com s’han d’ajuntar la seva 
anima i el seu cos? Ramon Llull reconeix dues maneres generals 
de fer-ho: ’dien alcuns’ (per exemple: els tomistes) ’que anima 
es forma del cors pus que l’enforma, lo soste e l’aduu a la fi 
per que es’ (XXI: 14). Pero ell, encara que sense negar mai 
aquesta primera manera de veure llur unio, preferiex veure-la 
d’una altra manera, la qual era un desenvolupament de l’hilomor- 
fisme augustinia (amb la seva unio durant la vida de dos essers 
complets, cas (un dotat de forma i de materia): ’Altres dien que 
lo cors ha forma de la anima, e que de la sua forma essencial e de 
la essencial forma de la anima es composta la forma de l’home, en 
axf" passada en terq nombre de forma de anima e de cors’ (XXI:
14)" (Pring-Mill, op. cit., p. 164 and p. 165). Clearly the latter 
refers to the "tertium quid", which I have discussed above as
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Animate or clear spirit (see notes 26, 31, 104 and 105). In the 
use of a combination of the two ontologies Lull writes under the 
influence of John Scotus Erigena (see Frances Yates, ’’Ramon Lull 
and John Scotus Erigena,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes vol. 23, London: University of London, 1960, pp. 1­
44), after the discredit of Erigena’s teachings caused by the 
Almaurician heresy (see Yates, op. cit., p. 35; and M. D. Chenu,
La theologie, p. 317) which preached the doctrine of the "divinity 
of man”. This doctrine was carried on by Amaury de Bene’s disciples 
who were known as the "beginnis,” and is found repeated in Arnau 
de Vilanova’s "Lliqo de Narbona" (Qbres catalanes, vol. I:
Escrits Religiosos, Barcelona:Barcino, 1947, p. 143): "de huna 
materia a de huna ma foren abdos engendrats en l’ajustament de la 
divinitat ab natura humana." Lull is, therefore, safeguarding 
himself from the accusation of heterodoxy by referring to two 
ontologies which in the Chrisian context are rendered compatible 
by the doctrines of the Fall and man as "imago dei". In the wake 
of Lull’s influence it is not surprising to find Ausias March 
using an Aristotelian psychology, drawn mainly from the Nicomachean 
Ethics, and an implicitly Neoplatonic onthology tempered with 
Aristotelian elements. Unlike Pages and his successors, who 
interpret the work of Ausias March as Aristotelian Scholasticism,
I would suggest a greater allowance for eclecticism in view of 
Lull’s acknowledged influence.
In Poem CXVII, for instance, one finds a description of the 
lover’s temper: "s£ com en l’om un*humor predomina, / que no 
es hu que per egual les haja, / e ve per temps que*s cambia*1 
domini, / axf Amor pratica en nosatres" (CXVII, w. 141-144); 
see also note 108.
The terms "dark" and "puddled" spirit are used by George 
Chapman and Shakespeare to refer to the spirit’s inclination to 
matter (see G. Worth O’Brien, Renaissance Poetics and the Problem 
of Power, pp. 38-39). Ausias March does not use these terms, but 
their significance is implicit in his work, as I explain in the 
text.
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Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 7.
A. Pages has made an extensive case of this point, inter 
alia: Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 289, 340.
R. D. Laing, The Politics of Experience, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1967, p. 27.
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CHAPTER IV: PHILOSOPHICAL CURRENTS AFFECTING THE INTERPRETATION OF 
AUSIAS MARCH.
The first concern of this chapter is a partially artificial
construction. As I pointed out in the introduction, there is a
tendency among many literary critics to perpetuate the notion of the
Middle Ages as Aristotelian and the Renaissance as Platonic, and
therefore, diametrically opposed. A reductionist approach such as
this oney frequently conceives of mediaeval scholastic philosophy as
being strictly Aristotelian. It uses the work of St. Thomas Aquinas
as its main representative, which it interprets as being purely 
1Aristotelian. This is the fruit of a desire to see in the Renaissance
a complete rejection of the Middle Ages. It has led various critics 
to stress the originality of certain authors at the expense of the
continuity out of which the work and ideas of these authors arose.
Fortunately, certain recent works have contributed to the general
discredit of the traditional vision of the Middle Ages as monolithically 
2 .Aristotelian and Thomist. As W. J. Bouwsma has suggested, the
opposition between Plato and Aristotle was not a major concern of the
Renaissance humanists, ’’more seriously, when compared with the humanists
of the Renaissance Plato and Aristotle seem more to resemble than to 
3
differ from each other”. Like the term "courtly love", this concept
is a term of convenience which can become an impediment to the proper 
4understanding of the text, if one relies excessively on such
generalities. Yet one cannot elude confronting them, since they are 
ingrained in our critical vocabulary. This is of utmost concern in 
the case of the criticism of Ausias March in which problems are almost
inextricably compounded by the intimate association of the terms 
"courtly love" and "Aristotelianism", which critics such as A. Pages,
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Torras i Bages, and P. Bohigas use to support the notion of the
orthodox Catholicism of Ausias March in the light of possible Thomist
references.
The premiss of the logic of these critics is therefore suspect. 
Any understanding of the passage from the sensibility present in the 
works of Ausias March to a Florentine Neoplatonic sensibility based on 
the aforementioned reasoning is also impeachable. Consequently, in 
order to arrive at a reasonable understanding of this development 
certain fundamental questions must be answered. Undoubtedly, the first 
point should be to clarify the relation that exists between the works 
of Plato and Aristotle this, however, would constitute not only an 
endless thesis, but a futile exercise since neither was clearly known 
to the Scholastics. It is therefore far more important to understand 
how this relation was understood in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,
g
in the light of the continuity of the Platonic tradition.
The point of departure for this study is undoubtedly Petrarchism. 
The Italianate sensibility introduced into sixteenth-century Castile is 
the renewed Petrarchism of Pietro Bembo,? which is an attempt to infuse 
a new philosophical content and purpose into what had become a vacuous 
rhetorical formulation of the standard Petrarchan topoi. This content 
is in large part affected by the development of Florentine Neoplatonism, 
as it evolved out of the writings of Marsilio Ficino and his circle, 
with the particular importance of the influence of the Commentarium
g
Marsilii Ficini Florentini in Convivium Platonis, de Amore. The
numerous commentaries on the works of Petrarch and Dante, done in the
light of Florentine Platonic theory, witness the intimate relation
that exists between philosophical Petrarchism and the development of 
9
Ficino’s Platonism. The Commentarium of Ficino is considered by many
to be the source of the new sensibility which Boscan discovered and
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articulated in his translation of Baldassare Castiglione’s Libro del 
Cortegiano.^Q This work echoed Bembo’s own manipulation of the 
Florentine theory of love which he described in Gli Asolani. These 
works, together with Leone Hebraeus' Dialoghi d’Amore, comprise the 
theoretical background for Renaissance Italianate love theory, as it 
was to be assimilated in sixteenth-century Spain, and everywhere in
Europe. As Pages would have it, with Ausias March:
Nous sommes au terme des variations auxquelles donna lieu, au Moyen 
Age, la theorie de l’amitie vertueuse d’Aristote conque comme 1’ideal 
de 1’amour entre deux personnes de sexe different. A partir de la 
decouverte de Platon, avec Marsile Ficin et les platonisants de l’Italie, 
ce sentiment entrera dans une phase nouvelleA^
Yet, some time after this statement Pages also remarks: "... la
distinction bien connue des trois amours, et notamment, la theorie de 
1’amour honnete correspondant assez exactement a celle que Baldassare 
Castiglione avait exposee dans son Cortegiano". The extent to which 
the novel aspect of the Florentine sensibility may have been over­
stretched, strictly in comparison to the theory of love in Ausias March, 
is open to suspicion. It is therefore with the source and meaning of 
this content, that is, with the implications of this sensibility, as
uttered by Marsilio Ficino, in the light of humanist Platonism 
13initiated theoretically by Petrarch, that one must come to terms, 
if an understanding of the poetic evolution is to be reached.
Any attempt to oppose the Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages to
the Platonism of the Renaissance encounters strong resistance when one
considers the maze of problems that surround the introduction of the 
14Aristotelian Corpus in thirteenth-century Europe. The novelty of 
Aristotelianism could not, and did not, entirely surmount the pre-eminence 
of St. Augustine’s Latin Platonism, which is so fundamental that it 
remains: "le bien commun des theologiens".Rather, the new
Aristotelianism had to merge with the Dionysian and Erigenian currents
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which predominate in all philosophical and theological thought till
the end of the thirteenth century, and remain the central inspiration
in the secular current, in spite of the vicissitudes of Aristotelian 
16Scholasticism. The predominance of the Dionysian-Erigenian current
with strong Augustinian implications is perceptible in the works of
the Franciscan Ramon Lull, who a century later was to play an
important role in the development of Renaissance Platonisms, as is
evident in the work of Raimundo Sabunde,^? Nicholas de Cusa, and Pico
della Mirandola^; not to mention Giordano Bruno.st. Thomas Aquinas’
own adaptation of Aristotle relied extensively on St. Augustine’s
theory of the soul, and the hierarchy of the pseudo-Dionysius the 
20Areopagite. However, in order to understand the difference and
opposition between Plato and Aristotle, one has to remember that the 
21scepticism which was already latent in Europe, was reinforced by the
introduction of Averroes’ commentary on Aristotle, which was the object 
22of Albert the Great’s and St. Thomas’ refutals. It is around this
problem that a distinction, however inaccurate, developed between
Platonism and Aristotelianism. St. Augustine, following the Christian
dogma of immortality, had taught that the soul is one, individual, and 
23distinct from the body, even when it acts as the motor of the body.
By the end of the twelfth century it had become evident to the
Chartrians that neither Plato nor Aristotle was actually reconciliable
with the Christian dogma;either taken to their ultimate consequences 
25led to fundamentally heretical positions. The main point of divergence 
between the two was considered to rest on their interpretations of the 
nature and function of the soul. M. D. Chenu, relying on the definitions 
of E. Brehier, gives a clear summary of this problem:
Platon presente ici de vraies valeurs spirituelles contre Aristote: 
’’Aristote a pour ainsi dire raye l’ame de son image de l’univers; les
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moteurs des cieux sont des intelligences; l’ame n'apparait que dans 
les corps sublunaires, a titre de forme du corps, notion tout 
intellectuelle d’un physiologiste qui cherche le principe des fonctions 
corporelles; l’ame comme siege de la destinee, a disparu” (E. Brehier, 
Histoire de la philosophie I, 2, Paris, 1948, p. 458). Chez les 
platoniciens au contraire, partisans de 1’unite substantielle du 
cosmos et de la sympathie de ses parties, les ames ont une fonction 
cosmique, elles ont une destinee, jouant dans le detail du gouvernement 
des choses le meme role que l’ame du monde dans 1*ensemble; l’ame est 
l’intermediaire entre le monde intelligible et le monde sensible. De 
fait les Peres avaient fait une critique assez severe de la definition 
aristotelicienne de l’ame. Le Ps.-Gregoire de Nysse (Nemesius) est le 
pivot de cette resistance en plein moyen-age: cette definition est un 
danger mortel pour la substantiality de l’ame, et done pour son 
immortalite (”De natura hominis,” P.G. 40, p. 560). L’entree de Denys, 
dont la Hierarchic ne fait pas place a l’Ame du monde, menagera 
avantageusement ces valeurs platoniciennes de la continuity cosmique 
des ames; en les adoptant, saint Thomas rompra avec 1’architecture du 
cosmos d’Aristote.26
Hence, there is a continuity of the Neoplatonic current in Saint Thomas
Aquinas’ assimilation of the Aristotelian Corpus. Yet, even after
Aquinas* adjustment of the Aristotelian Corpus to the Christian dogma,
there continued to be an important strain of Augustinian and Neoplatonic
thought that maintained itself in opposition to Aquinas* Aristotelian 
27scholasticism. The scholastic system originated in Boethius’ attempt
at syncretism, which acknowledged the superiority of Aristotelian logic 
28and method, but maintained a Platonic metaphysical system. It is 
therefore not surprising to find, especially after the introduction of 
the Aristotelian Corpus, Christian theologians and philosophers who 
maintain a dual ontology, which, while giving priority to the Augustinian 
and Platonic definition of the soul, also accepts the Aristotelian
definition in its broader re-formulation of St. Thomas. As I have
. 29pointed out in the case of Ramon Lull, and is evident in the works 
of St. Bonaventure, one finds philosophers using scholastic Aristotelian
vocabulary and logic, as defined by Boethius, in order to develop an 
. . 30Augustinian Neoplatonic metaphysics. It is therefore quite erroneous 
to associate automatically the use of a certain logical means of exposition 
with a particular kind of sensibility, as critics have done in the case
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of Ausias March.
Florentine Neoplatonism is greatly indebted to the humanism of
Francesco Petrarch; it is considered to be the culmination of his aims.
The common practice is to divide Petrarch’s works into two groups, the 
31vernacular poems and the Latin humanist works. Yet although the
32latter is philological and the former an erotic ’’giovenile errore”,
they are cast by the same man and reflect his sensibility. A comparison
attempting to distinguish excessively between the two is equivocal,
since both parts represent one man’s approach to two distinct problems,
and the sensibility remains the same. Petrarch’s rejection of his
’’youthful error”, concerns his experience of earthly love, which his 
33sensibility could only lead him to reject. The common concern of
both parts of Petrarch’s works is evident in his apocryphal dialogue 
with St. Augustine, the De Contemptu Mundi, Colloquiorum Liber, Quern 
Secretum Suum Inscripsit. In the first of three dialogues Petrarch 
describes what he considers to be his "disease", the "strange fluctuations", 
and "inward discord" which he feels:
Ex quo fit, ut tarn salutare propositum nimia mobilitate fatiscat,
oriturque ilia intestina discordia, de qua multa iam diximus, illasque 
animae sibi irascentis anxietas, dum horret sordes suas Ipsa nec diluit, 
vias tortuosas cognoscit, nec deserit impendensque periculum metuit, 
nec declinat.34
In these few lines of the Secretum Petrarch describes not merely his
own inward conflict, but that which had become the central intellectual
problem of his age, and seemed to be related to the introduction of the
Aristotelian Corpus: scepticism. Throughout his discussion of this
subject Petrarch, whose humanism rejects the arid formulations of 
35scholasticism, does not seem to be aware of St. Thomas’ and Albert 
36the Great’s commentaries against Averroes. He is aware, however, of 
the dangers stemming from the popularity of the Aristotelian Corpus, 
and in particular, of the materialism implicit in the Nicomachean
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37Ethics.
The problem of the immortality of the soul, and the problems
arising from the•study of Aristotle, are the subject of Petrarch’s 
38treatise De Suiipsius et Multorum Ignorantia (1367). The basis for
the extensive expose of Petrarch’s Augustinian position on this matter
is a defense and praise of Plato. In this context, his condemnation
of the ’’Aristotelians" is never exactly directed at Aristotle, but
against the Averroist interpretation of his work, which was influential
in Paduan medicine, of which his interlocutor seems to have been a 
40representative. The solution presented by Petrarch to problems
caused by the notion of the mortality of the soul, is drawn from St.
Augustine’s statements on the compatibility of Neoplatonism and 
41Christianity. Although Petrarch claimed to possess sixteen works of 
42Plato, his knowledge of Greek was insufficient, and therefore he had
to rely on commentaries, praises of the Fathers and their successors,
43and Latin Neoplatonists, to substantiate his claim about the superiority
of Plato. This corresponds very much to the way in which Petrarch
conceived the role to be played by Plato. His reproaches against
Aristotle rested in the nefarious effects of his writings on the 
44Christian community. Plato was a means to substantiate the revelation 
of Christ, and as such, although superior to Aristotle, Plato remains 
subordinate to Christ. The basis for this hierarchical understanding 
of wisdom is explicitly described in Petrarch’s defense of Platonic 
epistemology and its relation to Christianity:
"Quibus enim, inquit, oculis animi intueri potuit Plato fabricam illam 
tanti operis qua construi a deo atque edificari mundura facit?" Potest 
utcumque haec interrogatio tolerari, nisi quod iam querendo responsum 
est, quibus haec oculis videt Plato nempe animi, quibus invisibilia 
cernuntur, et quibus ipse, ut philosophus fretus acerrimus atque 
clarissimus, multa vidit; quamvis ad hanc visionem nostri propius 
accesserint, non visu quidem sed lumine clariore.^5
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In this reference to the better light of the "nostri”, Petrarch harks 
back to the Christian philosophers and Fathers who "bettered" Plato. 
The statement concerning the superiority of the Christian successors 
of Plato is reminiscent of Bernard de Chartres’ famous saying that the
moderns are dwarves on the shoulders of the ancients. 46 His admiration
for Plato, in this text, rests on the vision of a cosmic God, as found 
47in Chalcidius’ commentary of the Timaeus, and is directed to the
assertion of his faith in the immortality of the soul and the Providence
of Christ. The text represents Petrarch’s reaction to an Averroist
materialist philosophy which scoffs at Christ and the redemptive 
48message, and is an example of his use of the secular wisdom of Plato 
to express a "philosophia Christi". Plato is the pagan philosopher 
who perceived the divine mysteries most clearly: "In divinis altius 
ascendit Plato ac Platonic!, quamquam neuter pervenire potuerit quo 
tendebat. Sed ut dixi, propius venit Plato." As Raymond Marcel has 
pointed out in his research, this attitude is indicative of Petrarch’s
return to the philosophical currents of the Chartrian and Victorine 
Schools,50 and acts as a link between these and Florentine Neoplatonism. 
However, the Christocentric nature of Petrarch’s defense of Plato is 
indicative of a sensibility which, as is evident in the former
quotation, depends on a vision of the world perceived by the eyes of
the soul. In this context, Petrarch remains faithful to the teachings
of St. Augustine; the De Suiipse et Multorum Ignorantia, which is
addressed to a secular reader, advocates the need for the cultivation 
51of interior faith in a lay circumstance. This seems to me to be a
manifestation of Petrarch’s own inclination to an erudite form of the 
52secular evangelical currents which developed out of the Chartrian
and Victorine Schools, and are an inherent part of the Christian
Platonic tradition
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The evangelical movement, which begins in the twelfth century,
is a highly complex social phenomenon which is in great part a result 
53of the crisis of feudalism and the excessive growth of the Church’s 
54temporal power. The twelfth century witnesses the rise of the cities 
and the independent evolution of a large secular society. Intimately
associated with the rise of the cities is that of the universities,
and consequently, the growth of the study of the arts, as opposed to 
55the study of formal theology. In order to respond to the changing
values which this social evolution represents, the Church Instituted
a series of canonic reforms among the various orders on which its
temporal power rested. The problem which it faced was that of
preserving the feudal structure which is the basis of its institutions, 
while attempting to adjust to the spiritual needs of a growing urban 
laity. There arose out of this situation a division within the various
religious orders affecting their approach to the sacramental practice
of religion. The more traditional members of the Church maintained the
fundamentally feudal forms of the ’’vita monastica”, whereas many
advocated the return of the evangelical message of the Early Church to 
56the world, that is, ’’vita apostolica”. The latter represents the 
beginning of an effort by the Church to return to what it believed to 
be the original Evangelical message of the Early Church devoid of its 
temporal power and restrictions. Undoubtedly, renewed interest in the 
theology of the Greek Fathers played an important role in this development, 
as one notes in the writings of Joachim de Flore, and his influence,
57with that of John Scotus Erigena, on the newly founded Minor Orders,
incorporated into the Church within the first decade of the thirteenth 
58century. However, before being strictly limited to a return to the 
study of the Bible and its message, as the foundation of all theology:
La ’’vita apostolica” est la lumiere interieure qui suscite, avec de
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nouveaux "etats de vie", une conscience nouvelle des implantations de 
la grace dans le sol de la nature.^9
In his exhortation to the emulation of Plato, this is clearly what 
Petrarch refers to when he states: "quibus haec oculis videt Plato 
nempe animi, quibus invisibilia cernuntur
The "vita apostolica" and its posterior evangelical evolutions 
are, therefore, a spontaneous manifestation of inner Christian
sensibility, to which the Church, as an institution, responded
inadequately. One of the fundamental sources for the inspiration of
this movement, from within the cloisters of the Church, is the work
of "the twelfth-century St. Augustine". Hughes de Saint Victor, whose
thought brings together the various Neoplatonic currents of St.
Augustine, the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and John Scotus Erigena
As I indicated in the previous chapter the mystical character of
Hughes de Saint Victor1s thought rests on "a vision of the universe as 
61a reflection of the thought...of God". This is consistent with the
Neoplatonic influence in the evangelical movement: "les implications
platoniciennes d’un Hughes de Saint Victor l’ameneraient a concevoir
nature et grace comme des participations de la vie divine plutot que 
62comme des formes distinctes". This mystical sensibility, which is
so characteristic of much of the evangelical movement, and its
expression in Hughes de Saint Victor is intimately related to the 
63writings of the pseudo-Dionysius, whom Hughes frequently echoes.
The focal point of this vision is the pseudo-Dionysius’ formulation of
the theory of the symbol which had a profound influence in art and
literature,in both the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.por the 
66pseudo-Dionysius, as St. Augustine before him, the Creation is a
reflection of God’s attributes, which cannot be distinct from His 
67substance since God is incorruptible, and therefore, the hierarchy
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of the Creation in its parts represents, however imperfectly, the 
68ideas in God from which they proceed. Hence, the universe is
symbolic:
... the wisdom of the venerable theolegists, which has power to lead 
us to the heights, reverently descends to the level of the unharmonious 
dissimilitudes, not allowing our irrational nature to remain attached 
to those unseemly images, but arousing the upward-turning part of the 
soul, and stimulating it through the ugliness of images; since it would 
seem neither right nor true, even to those who cling to earthly things 
that such low forms should resemble those supercelestial and divine 
contemplations. Moreover it must be borne in mind that no single 
existing thing is entirely deprived of participation in the Beautiful, 
for, as the true Word says, all things are very beautiful.
Holy contemplations can therefore be derived from all things, 
and the above-named incongruous similitudes can be fashioned from 
material things to symbolize that which is intelligible and intellectual, 
since the intellectual has in another manner what has been attributed 
differently to the perceptible.69
The world, is^ then^ not only good but beautiful. In this light it is 
natural to find that the "vita apostolica" places great emphasis on 
the contemplative experience, but never participating of the images,
in order to stimulate the interior life. It is this desire to find
the inner-significance of the Evangelical word that incited Hughes de 
Saint Victor to initiate a return to Biblical studies, as opposed to
the speculative theology of the great Summas, which gained in importance 
after the twelfth century. Hughes de Saint Victor's initial impetus
70was perpetuated among Franciscans by the Breviloquium of St. Bonaventure.
Neoplatonic theory is therefore closely associated with a
transcendental end. In Petrarch’s defense of Plato in the De Suiipse
et Multorum Ignorantia the actual intended purpose is to demonstrate
the immortality of the soul from a rational position founded on the 
authority of the ancients, at least equal if not superior to that of
Aristotle; Platonism is again used to a transcendental end, which is
considered contradictory to Aristotle's teachings.It is not
surprising, therefore, to find the Timaeus frequently referred to in 
72Petrarch’s treatise; it was considered by the Chartrians to be a
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demonstration of the Creation as "the expression of the goodness of 
73the creator”. Hence, Petrarch’s Platonism was closely associated
with the sensibility of the evangelical movement, which was strongly 
74affected by twelfth-century Platonisms that served to articulate the
75Augustinian theory of illumination.
The Italy of the Humanist Renaissance which inherited Petrarch’s 
original Platonism, prepared the way for, and rendered possible, the
presumed re-discovery of Plato’s corpus through Ficino’s translations,
76is above all a middle-class society imitating the feudal forms of an
agrarian mediaeval aristocracy. It is in its values, as in the kind
of economy on which its power is founded,?? a profoundly bourgeois
society in the context of fifteenth-century social structure. The
patrons of Marsilio Ficino, the Medici family, were prominent bankers
who became princes; their economic power caused their virtually
hereditary "election” as leaders of the Florentine Republic. The
values of the Medicis were, therefore, those of an educated secular
society which frequently confronted the Church’s temporal power. Its
religious concerns, then,reflect those of the secular society, and it
is with this in mind that Cosme de Medici chose and educated Marsilio 
78Ficino to translate and comment the Dialogues of Plato. Lorenzo de
Medici merely furthered his family’s concerns in his mentorship of
Ficino. The religious inclination of this educated bourgeoisie is
a development of the evangelical current inherent in the "vita apostolica" 
79which is so closely related to the rise of the laity. The frequent 
opposition between the Church and the republics in Italy naturally 
favoured the evangelical intent to cultivate interior spirituality.
This is evident in the work, and life, of Marsilio Ficino, which abounds 
with references that life should be led in the imitation of Christ,
and therefore, interprets Plato’s opus in its subservient relation to
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the teachings of Christ. He too, elaborates a ’’philosophia Christi”
80through the dialectic of Plato, as is evident in his letter to
Lorenzo recalling the virtues of Cosme:
And truth itself moves the heart ("animum”) more effectively than that 
which either bears the semblance of truth or is untrue altogether. For 
this reason the imitation of the Socratic way of life leads more people 
more surely to virtue than the moral philosophy of Aristotle. And 
Christ alone by His example has been of greater profit to more people 
in leading them towards a noble and holy life than all the orators and 
philosophers with their words.81
This quotation, which is highly reminiscent of Petrarch’s remarks on 
82the value of Aristotle’s Ethics, urges the reader to imitate the
life of Christ, that is, to take up ’’the Socratic way of life”, which 
83for Ficino is the contemplative life. As in the evangelical current,
the philosophy propounded by Ficino places faith in the centre of the
individual’s daily activities. It is, therefore, not surprising that
Ficino found himself closely associated with the reforms of Savonarola, 
84for whom he had the greatest admiration. Indeed, this other side of 
Ficino, frequently forgotten by literary critics, is most important 
for the evaluation of the inherent significance and posterior 
repercussion of the Commentarium in Convivium Platonis, de Amore. It 
enlightens and broadens our perspective.
As Petrarch before him, Ficino turns to the authority of Plato
in order to demonstrate the veracity of the Christian dogma on the 
85soul’s immortality, and hence he necessarily follows Bessarion in 
8 6his attempt to conciliate Aristotle and Plato. In the works of
Ficino this is constantly referred to as his opposition to the 
8 7’’peripatetics”, that is, the Averroists and their interpretation of
Aristotle. In order to refute the latter Ficino, on the advice of St.
88Antonine, relies on the Summa contra gentiles of Aquinas. The latter
is read by Ficino in a Neoplatonic light, and serves to complement the
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teachings of St. Augustine and the pseudo-Dionysius, which form the 
89basis of Ficinian thought. Hence, although Ficino has direct access
to the text of Plato, Proclus and Plotinus, vast discrepancies can be
found between his Christian-Dionysian interpretation of the Greek 
90work, and Plato’s intended meaning. Ficino’s thought, eloquently 
novel as it may seem to the reader, is consequently firmly rooted in
the Christian-Platonic tradition. One should bear in mind that for
all the freshness of the form of the Platonic dialogue:
encore aujourd’hui ceux qui font de Ficin un novateur auraient interet 
a chercher patiemment ce qu’il a emprunte a saint Thomas et a St.
Augustin, car il n’est pas douteux qu’il a vu dans ces deux maitres 
de la pensee chretienne les meilleurs intermediaires pour reconcilier 
Aristote et Platon.91
Indeed, the sources manipulated by Ficino reveal his profound debt to
the Christian Neoplatonists that precede him, and in particular to the
twelfth-century philosophers of the Chartrian and Victorine Schools,
intimately associated with the evangelical movement. The repugnance
felt by Petrarch towards scholasticism is not entirely shared by Ficino,
92for whom this forms a most essential part of his academic training.
Ficino himself was conscious of his debt to his predecessors. In his
letter to Martin Penninger, "Responsio Petenti Platonicam Instructionem 
93et Librorum Numerum" : Ficino acknowledges his debt towards those
whom he considers to be his predecessors, Greek, Arabic and Latin.
As Raymond Klibansky has remarked, many of these theologians whom
Ficino considers to be Platonists, "would not be considered Platonists 
94at all if judged by the standards of modern scholarship". In this 
letter Ficino omits specific references to the Chartrians, but establishes 
an inevitable continuity in his final reference to Nicholas de Cusa.
However this omission may have come about, Ficino, who refers to most
prominent theologians of the Middle Ages, also mentions two of the 
95foremost Chartrians, William of Conches and John of Salisbury.
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Throughout his writings it is evident, nonetheless, that his debt
towards the Chartrians is not limited to these authors. He also makes
mention of some of the more extreme developments of the Chartrian
current in the evangelical movement, such as Gilbert de la Porree,
David de Dinant, and Amaury de Bene, all of whom were accused of 
96heresy. The common denominator as regards this facet of Ficino’s 
thought is that the Chartrians and their followers all relied
extensively on the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite,
as the basis to formulate a theory of the dignity of man, and the
reflection of God in the Creation. This point is fundamental for
understanding the position of Ficino in his interpretation of Plato.
Plato is the textual source, but he is interpreted in the light of
the pseudo-Dionysius, who remains for Ficino the ’’culmen” of 
. 97Platonism. Hence, both his Platonism, and the evangelism on which
it is based and should not be divorced from, form a continuity that
sheds light on the relation that exists between Ramon Lull, Nicholas 
98de Cusa and Ficino.
Part I: The Theory of Love: Melancholy in Ficino’s Commentarium 
in Convivium.
The Commentarium in Convivium Platonis, de Amore was written
in 1468, with no major subsequent alteration which might have been
99caused by a spiritual crisis, as A. della Torre originally supposed.
It is written after a relatively less productive period in the life of 
Ficino during which he undertook the translation of Dante’s De Monarchia,
between 1467-1468. He also seems to have taken a keen interest in the
commentary of the Divina Commedia written by his friend and teacher, 
Cristoforo Landino.^-^^ It is particularly important for the comprehension 
of the significance of the Commentarium in Convivium to realize that
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it is written immediately after this period during which Ficino
manifests great interest in the writings of Dante. For Ficino,
Dante’s Divina Commedia is a storehouse of Platonic symbols and
concepts,and his reading of Dante is conditioned by this perspective. 
This is in large part a result of his acceptance of the Mediaeval and
Renaissance notion that Virgil was a Platonist, supplemented by his
knowledge of the fact that Dante was imitating Virgil. Landino, in
his commentary on the Divina Commedia relied extensively on the usage 
102of the rhetorical concept of ’’integumentum”, which was originally
particular to the Chartrian interpretation of classical works, especially 
103the pagan classics such as Virgil, as in the Commentary of the First 
104Six Books of the Aeneid ascribed to Bernardus Silvestris. Hence,
for Ficino, Dante in particular, and his mentor Virgil, are Neoplatonic 
’’poetic philosophers”:
Dante Alighieri per patria celeste, per abitatione florentino, di 
stirpe angelico, in professione philosopho poetico, benche non parlassi 
in lingua greca con quel sacro padre de’ philosophi, interprete della 
verita, Platone, niente di meno in ispirito parlo in modo con lui, che 
di molte sententie Platonice adorno e libri suoi... Questo ordine 
Platonic© prima segui Virgilio. Questo segui Dante, col vaso di 
Virgilio beendo alia Platoniche fonti....
The Commentarium in Convivium, whose chronological proximity to the 
translation of the De Monarchia is obvious, is thus written in the wake 
of this interpretation of Dante. It is, therefore, quite plausible to 
consider that the conception of love formulated by Ficino has great 
affinity with Dante’s concept, as in the Divina Commedia where it is 
associated to a Christian Neoplatonic theory of imagination. This 
affinity to Dante is possibly greater than one might expect in a
commentary on Plato, should one maintain neat definitions of the
Divina Commedia as a poetic exposition of Aquinas’ "purely" Aristotelian 
Summa Theologica.
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A main point of departure towards the understanding of the
Commentarium in Convivium is its contribution to the concept of the 
107dignity of man. Although this concept is not entirely novel, the
Commentarium has the merit to utter a fundamental, if limited,
consciousness of it, in what purports to be a secular piece of 
108literature. This concept in Ficino’s thought only reaches its 
109plenitude in the less popular Theologia Platonica. In both the
Commentarium and the Theologia this concept is intimately related to 
the focal problem of the soul’s immortality,since only an immortal 
soul could be god-like, thereby allowing for some dignity in human 
nature. Furthermore, this is consequently a fundamental problem in
the conciliation of Plato and Aristotle, on which the subsequent 
problem of the power of human, or natural, reason also rests. The 
subjacent presupposition of Ficino’s construct is the issue of faith 
and scepticism. It would be exceedingly erroneous to assume that 
Ficino’s proclaimed belief in the dignity of man left him blind to 
the reality of his Christian earthly existence. Ficino, who like
Petrarch, saw in St. Augustine his master, has left us at least one
definite equivalent of the Confessions, or Secretum, in his letter to
Michael Mercato, entitled "Dialogus inter Deum et animam Theologicus
Here, Ficino tells the reader of his own doubts: ”Hec igitur, atque
similia, quum sedulo cogitarem, coepi quandoque lugere animo. Utpote 
111qui et rationi iam diffiderem, et nondum revelationi confiderem?
The crux of Ficino’s situation is the difficulty of bridging the gap
between reason and revelation. It is consequently natural that Ficino, 
ll9who dedicates an entire treatise to the illumination of St. Paul,
finds the solution in the evangelical and Augustinian concept of 
113illumination which resolves the fundamental problems incurred in 
114the ’’descensus ad inferos" evident in the dual nature of man. In
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the Commentarium in Convivium, which is intended to be ”une philosophic
de 1’amour qui transposait en quelque sorte l’Ethigue d’Aristote en
faisant du Souverain Bien le centre de gravite de la creation toute 
115entiere", the theory of illumination becomes inextricably associated 
with the concept of the "divine furore", which is the fruit of Ficino’s 
medical background, and draws extensively on Aristotle’s Problem XXX,
_i. The theory of illumination, or "furore", is an aspect of the concept 
of melancholy that is central to the Commentarium in Convivium, and
which Ficino subsequently develops in the De Vita Triplici, the second 
book of which, "De vita producenda", answers and furthers Arnau de
Vilanova’s own theories of the De retardanda senectute.The
importance of the theory of melancholy in the Commentarium in Convivium
seems to have been overlooked by literary critics, as well as by 
117Klibansky, Saxl and Panofsky, who, in their Saturn and Melancholy,
have limited their study to the De Vita Triplici and the Epistolarium.
When approaching the text of the Commentarium in Convivium, it is,
therefore, essential that one bear in mind the eclectic nature of 
Ficino’s dissertation, which comments on Plato, but diverges from his 
text in order to expound Dionysian and Thomist theories, and frequently, 
medical principles resting on the theory of "amor hereos"3
As it can be inferred from what I have said until now, the 
"dignitate hominis" in Ficino’s thought is subject to the action of 
divine grace in relation to the individual will which is affected by 
the dual state of human existence. The transcendental reality which
determines our comprehension of the true nature of man, that is, the
divine origin of his soul which is considered to be his real nature,
is cognizable strictly by his intellect, for "only the intellect enters 
119into a real relationship with its objects". The "Summum Bonum",
which Ficino equates with "Beauty", becomes central to the object and
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the manner in which one apprehends it in this world, as I have
indicated previously (quotation 115 above). This simply repeats the
essential theophanic conception of the world of the pseudo-Dionysius.
It echoes again the concept of the vision of the world as a reflection 
120of the thought of God, as articulated by Hughes de Saint Victor. 
Consequently, it is only natural that problems of vision and perception 
are the most frequently discussed topics of the Commentarium; they are 
directed, however, towards a particular consciousness of Beauty.
Beauty, as it is perceived by the sense of vision pertaining to 
the eyes, is primarily a reflection of light. Real Beauty is not this 
reflection, but the source of this light. There results from this 
basic premiss that although corporeal bodies may appear to be beautiful 
they only serve to draw us to the real Beauty, which is God, or the 
inherent Goodness. This aspect of Ficinian thought is explicable only
in reference to the Augustinian elaboration of the Pauline concept of
121 122 the soul as a mirror, and the Plotinian theory of the '’animate". 
These concepts are found in conflation with the awareness of the 
participation of the "Summum Bonum" in the objects perceived. As I 
have previously explained this is an inherent part of the pseudo- 
Dionysius’ notion of the relationship that exists between the Beautiful 
and the Good, which Ficino repeats:
Neque ab re theologi veteres bonitatem in centro, pulchritudinem in 
circulo posuerunt. Bonitatem quidem in centro uno, in circulis autem 
quatuor pulchritudinem. Centrum unum omnium deus est, circuli quatuor 
circa deum, mens, anima, natura, materia.^^3
This hierarchic description of the interpenetration of Beauty and 
Goodness, is an elaboration of the pseudo-Dionysian structure of the 
universe. It establishes an emanative movement from the single and 
immobile transcendent One out of which beauty derives in four stages 
which are variously apprehensible to man. Hence, the Good is the
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transcendent existence of God, and Beauty, as we perceive it, is the
act, or accident, making His Goodness manifest to us:
... bonum quidem ipsa supereminens dei existentia dicitur. Pulchritude 
actus quidam sive radius inde per omnia penetrans; primo in angelicam 
mentem, secundo in animam totius et reliquos animos, tertio in naturam, 
quarto in materiam corporum.^24
The terms with which Ficino chooses to describe the nature of the
Beauty manifest in the hierarchical Creation is made clear in his 
metaphorical choice of words: ’’radius... penetrans”. The closest 
approximation for the description of the divine act is our knowledge 
of the perception of light which he uses as a physical metaphor for 
a spiritual presence. Just as the sun is the source of the light which 
irradiates this world, so is God’s Beauty made manifest to man in His 
Creation. The beauty of bodies, or corporeal objects, is but a shadow 
of His Beauty:
Amor enim fruende pulchritudinis desiderium est. Pulchritudo autem 
splendor quidam est, humanum ad se rapiens animum. Nempe corporis 
pulchritudo nihil aliud est quam splendor ipse in colorum linearumque 
decore. Animi quoque pulchritudo, fulgor in doctrine et morum 
concinnitate. Lucem illam corporis, non aures, non olfatus, non 
gustus, non tactus, sed oculus percipit. Si oculus solus agnoscit, 
solus fruitur. Solus igitur oculus corporis pulchritudine fruitur.^^5
Beauty in individual corporeal objects, therefore, can only be
126apprehended by the highest and most spiritual of the senses, sight.
A basic problem arises when one considers the nature of this beauty, 
as it is perceived by man. Although it is a reflection of divine
Beauty, man can only perceive it imperfectly, since his perception, 
unlike that of the angel who contemplates God directly and is subject 
only to multiciplicity, is a physical apprehension of the body’s beauty 
which is subject to plurality and mobility deriving from the Plotinian
One. The beauty which we perceive is in the first instance external,
and then, it is, as such, a reflection of the internal, or the soul’s
beauty. Its purpose is to draw us to the internal goodness. By means
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of the cognitive function of the senses we are drawn to the interior 
Good that lies reflected therein. This beauty is perceived by the 
eyes and ears in the gestures, acts, and voice of the object, which
reveal the soul:
Virtus etiara animi decorem quemdam pre se ferre videtur in verbis, 
gestibus, operibus honestissimum. Celos quoque sublimis eorum 
substantia clarissimo lumine circumfundit. In his omnibus interna 
perfectio producit externam. Illam bonitatem, hanc pulchritudinem 
possumus apellare.^^7
The imperfect nature of our perception of Beauty leads us to comprehend 
it as a dual component of the beautiful and the good. Beauty is then 
a composite of the Good, which is found in the body that is perceived,
and its external manifestation to which we are drawn when it is
acknowledged by our higher senses. The hierarchic and emanative
conception of the structure of the universe, which determines the
understanding that we have of the source of this beauty which is the
origin of our desires, is,then,consistent with the belief that it is a
reflection of the face of God in the soul, or spirit, acting as a 
. 128mirror. This interpretation of the beauty perceived leads Ficino 
129to reject the Stoic conception of beauty, which defines it as a 
merely harmonious perception of symmetry, and therefore, reduces our 
comprehension of it to its physical manifestations:
Sed spiritus in punto omnem corporis amplitudinem spiritali modo et 
incorporea imagine suscipit. Placet utique animo ea dumtaxat speties 
que ab illo suscipitur. Hec autem licet exterioris corporis simulacrum 
sit in eo tamen est incorporea. Ergo speties incorporea placet. Quod 
placet, id cuique gratum. Quod gratum, hoc denique pulchrum. Quo 
efficitur ut amor ad incorporeum aliquid referatur atque ipsa pulchritudo 
spiritale quoddam potius rei simulacrum sit quam corporea speties.
Sunt autem nonulli qui certam membrorum omnium positionem sive, 
ut eorum verbis utamur, commensurationem et proportionem cum quadam 
colorum suavitate esse pulchritudinem opinentur. Quorum nos opinionem 
proterea non admictimus quia...?-30
131Hence, love, which Ficino defines as being a ’’desire for Beauty",
132arises from the individual perception of "corporeal images", which
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according to the text quoted above, are considered to be "incorporeal 
images" by virtue of their presence in sight. At this point it is 
obvious that the distinction between incorporeal and corporeal images 
is very fine, and difficult to establish. The distinction can logically 
be considered to be one of intention. The image perceived, if it 
remains at the origin of the perception, is always corporeal, inasmuch
as it is representative of a body, however, it is incorporeal as long
as it is considered to be the object of the spirit’s intellection.
This is the contentious issue that this paragraph, if not the entire
"Fifth Discourse" tries to establish and clarify. Ficino*s solution
lies in his usage of the light metaphor in conjunction with the theory
of the animate or mirror, and the scholastic division of the senses 
133into two groups, physical and spiritual. Hence, the image that is 
perceived by sight, which is a spiritual sense, must be incorporeal, 
since the representation present in the eye is not physical. The 
presence of an entire body in the eye being impossible, it can only 
be present to the eye:
Imago ilia in visu et animo, cum isti sint incorporei, corpus esse non 
potest. Quo enim pacto caelum, ut ita loquar, totum parva oculi pupilla 
caperetur si modo corporali reciperet? Nullo profecto.^34
Sight is, then, light reflected in the spirit which informs the soul. It 
carries a spiritual image reflecting light originally present in the 
object. As such it Is a sensual movement, which, as in Hughes de Saint 
Victor’s theory of the imagination, informs the soul of corporeal 
images. In the "Sixth Discourse", which comments on Socrates’ opinion
and resolves the various tentative definitions of love made in the
previous discourses, Ficino’s position on this matter becomes clear.
What he describes is the Victorine-Platonic "sensualitas", normally
attributed to imagination or phantasy:
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Sed anima ubique spiritui presens imagines corporum in eo tamquam in 
speculo relucentes facile inspicit perque illas corpora iudicat. Atque 
hec cognitio sensus a Platonicis dicitur. Dum eas inspicit, similes 
illis imagines multo etiam puriores sua vi concipit in se ipsa. 
Huiusmodi conceptionem imaginationem phantasiamque vocamus.-*-36
This description, which is introduced by a medical reference to the
function of the spirit and its effect on the elemental balance and
heat of the body, is clearly parallel to the rhetorical concept of 
imagination-phantasy. As in the latter, the way in which the spirit’s 
function is evaluated depends on the manner in which the object is 
apprehended, and its effects on the soul and the body, between which 
the spirit acts as a mediator. The passage quoted above goes on to 
examine the problem of the effects on the soul that the corporeal 
images perceived have, and the intrinsic limitations of their nature, 
especially in the intellection of the "eye of the soul" (animi acies). 
Ficino’s interpretation of this theory is conditioned by his dependence 
on Proclus’ definition of the more spiritual function of phantasy as 
a lesser manifestation of the intellect’s capacity to apprehend 
universals in individual sense-objects:
Hie concepte memoriter servantur imagines. Per has animi acies 
sepenumero incitatur ad universales rerum ideas, quas in se continet, 
intuendas. Ideoque dum unum quemdam hominem et sensu cernit et 
imaginatione concipit, intellectu rationem definitionemque hominibus 
omnibus communem per innatam illi humanitatis ideam communiter 
contemplatur et que fuerit contemplata conservat. Animo igitur 
formosi hominis simulacrum conceptum semel apud se reformatumque 
memoriter conservanti satis esset amatum quandoque vidisse. Oculo 
tamen et spiritui que veluti specula presente corpore ipsius imagines 
capiunt, absente dimictunt, perpetua formosi corporis presentia opus 
est, ut eius illustratione continue lucescant, foveantur et oblectentur 
Igitur et isti, propter indigentiam suam, presentiam corporis exigunt 
et animus iis ut plurimum obsecutus eamdem cogitur affectare.^37
Perception and its implications are affected by the spirit as it 
informs the body and the soul. Although his initial premiss stresses 
the desirable intuitive virtue of phantasy to perceive universal ideas
in the images, Ficino is quick to point out that this same perception
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is not transcendent when it remains in its intermediary state as the 
object of the eye of flesh in the imagination ("Oculo...spiritui"), 
and not that of the "keen eye of the soul" (animi acies). The 
deficiency of sensorial perception is evident inasmuch as it must 
continually renew its vision of the corporeal object, unlike the 
intellectual perception which forms a universal idea of the object.
Hence phantasy, which can raise the soul to divine perception, can 
also lead to the characteristic fall of the soul which is subject to 
the inclinations of the senses in what it perceives.
The role played by the rhetorical theory of imagination in the
Commentarium is of capital importance. Its function duplicates that
of love; it is a manifestation of love’s presence. Since love is
initially defined as a desire for Beauty and ultimate union with it,
and Beauty is an act manifesting the transcendent Good in its objects,
138then love is a movement of desire, determined by individual
perception within the gradualist structure of the Dionysian universe.
For this reason, Ficino, while still commenting on the words of Diotima,
develops a cosmic theory of demonology which is basically a re-formulation 
139of the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy concerning the 
nature of angels. The theory of love which Ficino establishes is then 
strongly affected by a certain definition of the relation between the 
body and the soul, which as in the ambivalent implications of the 
rhetorical theory of imagination, also entails a dual understanding of 
the concept of melancholy. Hence, before embarking on a description 
of the significance of Ficino’s quintuple division of love, and the 
notion of "furore", one must comprehend the importance which the position 
of the soul has in Ficino’s system, and aspects of this condition 
which determine its relation to imagination and melancholy.
According to Ficino, as most Christian Neoplatonists, the soul
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is essentially in a state of fallen grace. Although it is divine in 
its origin, it has fallen into the body, and therefore it is a prisoner 
of chaos. Ficino uses the myth of the androgyne to illustrate this 
state. It is originally a comic piece in Plato’s Symposium given to 
Aristophanes, but here it is explained by Cristoforo Landino, who 
through "integumentum" uses it to describe the "descensus ad inferos”.
The rebellion of the androgynes is consequently interpreted by Ficino 
as a pagan version of the Fall of Man. As in the biblical narrative 
of Adam and Eve’s ejection out of Eden, when the soul fell it became 
subject to necessity, or the vicissitudes of the body. By far the 
most important theme of this section is the problem of the soul’s 
cognitive capacity. Before their fall the androgynes were fully circular, 
their rebellion against the gods resulted in their being split into two 
halves. In Ficino’s interpretation of this myth the full circle of 
the androgynous form represents the original disposition of the soul 
to know reality both through its natural reason and right reason, which 
is infused reason, that is, divine illumination. The rebellion of the 
androgynes is considered to be the product of Satan’s sin, pride. In 
other words, the fall of the soul was caused by its belief that it 
could surpass divine illumination by the sufficiency of its natural 
reason. This led to the loss of infused reason, and the immersion of
human souls into matter:
Homines, id est, hominum anime. Quondam, id est, quando a deo creantur. 
Integre sunt, duobus sunt exomate luminibus, ingenito et infuso. Ut 
ingenito equalia et inferiora, infuso superiors conspicerent. Deo 
equare se voluerunt. Ad unicum lumen ingenitum se reflexerunt. Hinc 
divise sunt. Splendorem infusum amiserunt, quando ad solum ingenitum 
sunt converse statimque in corpora cecidere.^O
Hence the soul, which is trapped in the body, is basically deprived of 
the divine light to guide it in its operations, and it has to rely on 
its natural reason. What it perceives by natural reason is first
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apprehended in the light of natural reason through the senses, as in
the movement of imagination. This again presupposes that although it
is in a fallen state, it can be redeemed, if by gaining consciousness
of the weakness of natural reason it turns its contemplation towards
things divine, and through contemplation is granted "recta ratio” in 
141the Augustinian sense. The soul is bound to the body, nevertheless,
it remains one and immutable, and therefore, although its natural
reason is informed by the senses, it is independent. Ficino establishes
this point by arguing that the body is subject to temperamental 
142fluctuations, whereas the soul is not. The body is,then,considered
to be an instrument, or servant, of the soul. On this point Ficino
is once more simply in agreement with the Christian-Augustinian 
143tradition, according to which the body is subject to the government
of the soul. 144 This naturally places the onus for the activities of
the individual, both physical and spiritual, on the soul, such as in 
145matters of sin. It is the soul that sins, not the body. Ficino 
approaches this problem through the medical theory of the spirit, which 
is the instrument of cognition natural and divine. Hence his
interpretation of the operations of the soul leads him directly to the 
complex theoretical problem of the interrelation between the physiology 
of the individual and his psychology:
Quo fit ut qualitates, quia a corpore necessario substinentur, ab 
aliqua superiori substantia que neque corpus sit neque in corpore 
iaceat, fiant atque regantur. Huiusmodi anima est, que corporibus 
presens et insidens, ipsa se substinet et qualitatem vimque complexionis 
corporibus tribuit, per que tamquam instruments in corpore et per 
corpus varias operationes exercet.146
In this, and previous passages, Ficino conflates the Augustinian theory 
of the soul as a mirror with that of the medical "spiriti". It is, 
therefore, somewhat difficult to distinguish between the spirit and 
the soul, as he indicates the two are always together (above 136). It
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must then be assumed that by referring to the medical theory of the
spirits he consciously creates a median that logically enables him to
maintain the notion of the soul’s independence from the body, while
still making it possible for him to explain and describe the physiological 
147and psychological effects of the soul on the body. By this means it
is possible for Ficino to account for the movement of the soul as it 
is affected by its relation to body through its epistemological function.
Everything that the soul apprehends through the windows of the
senses it judges by natural reason. The latter only enables it to see 
itself, and things ’’below” it, that is, corporeal bodies. That which 
is incorporeal it does not truly apprehend. In other words, it cannot
perceive the hierarchic members above it by its own power, natural
reason: ’’Ideoque per eum utpote sibi equalem se ipsam et que infra se
sunt, id est, corpora omnia, anima videt quidem, deum vero et alia 
148superiors non videt.” Clearly, this natural light is insufficient, 
and it is only through the grace of divine illumination that the soul 
is able to operate purely in spiritual contemplation. Without the light 
of the "recta ratio” the soul is basically confused. Hence, the initial 
use of natural reason can only turn the face of the soul towards the
divine object, because it enables the soul to know itself, that is to 
know the majesty of its divine origin and its limitations in its 
present state separated from its source. Right reason can only
proceed from God. Without this assistance the soul is prone to a
constant state of fluctuation between contemplation and bestiality,
and therefore it loses its dominion in order to follow the baser
inclinations of the flesh. This fluctuation is intimately related to 
the ambivalent epistemological function of the imagination, which can 
either raise the soul to universal heights or cause it to fall to the 
duplicity of corporeal bodies:
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Anima tamen nostra, quod summopere dolendum est, hec enim est totius 
nostre infelicitatis origo, anima, inquam, sola ita corporalis forme 
blanditiis delinitur ut propriam posthabeat spetiem, corporis vero 
formam, que sue umbra est, sui ipsius oblita sectetur.1^9
As in the implications of the theory of imagination, the soul’s
enamourment of her corporeal form results in torment. From the above
quotation, Ficino goes on to describe the fall of the soul in his 
explanation of the myth of Narcissus. The mythological figure is used 
as a symbol of the soul which becomes enamoured of the image it perceives 
in a well, that is, the spirit, so that by lowering itself to seek 
union with it, it renounces its majesty. The fall of the soul is 
brought about by its inability to discern between the image which is 
a reflection, or shadow, of Beauty, and the source itself, it is a
misuse of natural reason:
Sed eius umbram in aqua prosequitur et amplecti conatur, id est, 
pulchritudinem in fragili corpore et instar aque fluenti, que ipsius 
animi umbra est, ammiratur. Suam quidem figuram deserit. Umbram 
numquam assequitur. Quoniam animus corpus sectando se negligit et 
usu corporis impletur. Non enim ipsum revera appetit corpus sed sui 
ipsius spetiem a corporali forma, que spetiei sue imago est, illectus, 
quemadmodum Narcissus, affeetat. Cumque id minime advertat, dum aliud 
quidem cupit, aliud sequitur, desiderium suum explere non potest. Ideo 
in lachrimas resolutus consumitur, id est, animus ita extra se positus 
et delapsus in corpus, pernitiosis perturbationibus cruciatur 
corporisque infectus sordibus quasi moritur, cum iam corpus esse potius 
quam animus videatur. Quam utique mortem ut Socrates devitaret, Diotima 
ipsum a corpore ad animum, ab hoc in angelum, ab eo reduxit in deum.150
Hence, the struggle of the soul is only overcome when it is
reintegrated into the cosmic hierarchy of the pseudo-Dionysius. As
in Hughes de Saint Victor’s theory of the imagination described in 
151the ”De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", the soul’s enamourment for
corporeal objects leads to its fall, and thereby, its loss in divinity;
it moves away from its divine nature and becomes corporeal ("cum iam
corpus esse potius quam animus videatur"). The love of these corporeal 
152objects is not condemned as such, since the beauty which attracts
the soul to these bodies is a reflection of the face of God in them.
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As the above quotation indicates, it does not desire the body, but it
is enticed by its image ("Non enim revera corpus..."). The fall of
the soul is, then, an abuse of the rational powers misdirected, which
abdicate eventually to the rule of the flesh. This is an example of
the natural reason’s insufficiency. That love which turns strictly
to the desire of union with corporeal beauty, beyond its necessary 
153reproductive function, deviates from its ultimate intention which 
is love of God, and not of objects for their sake. The abuse of natural 
reason, an excessive faith in its power, transforms the corporeal 
images, which are meant to draw us on to God’s beauty, into the ultimate 
objects of our intentions:
Lucem illam infusam atque divinam statim ad naturalem reflexi negleximus. 
Altera ergo posthabita, servavimus alteram. Ubi dimidium nostri tenemus, 
dimidium pretermisimus. Certo vero etatis tempore a naturali lumine 
ducti, divinum affectamus quidem omnes..A54
Clearly,then, what natural reason apprehends is severed from the light 
of right reason. Hence, the soul turns from the one to the other, and
never to both simultaneously. Therefore, since the soul has two
distinct faces or means of cognition, it is unable to love God perfectly 
while still being enamoured of this world. Contemplation approximates 
divine love, because it impels natural reason upwards to the perception 
of that which is divine and therefore calls on, and prepares the soul 
for, the gift of right reason. It is not, however, a substitute for 
the love of God;^^^ it is only a means which must be forsaken in order 
to attain union with God. Since the grace of God cannot be attained
by natural reason, but only desired by it inasmuch as it can create 
that longing by making the soul conscious of the source of that beauty
156which it contemplates sensually, then that grace must be given by God.
On this matter Ficino echoes again the Augustinian and evangelical 
concept that it does not suffice to have knowledge of God’s existence
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and attributes in order to redeem the soul, one must also love Him:
157”Qui deum cognoscunt non dum illi placent nisi cognitum diligant.'’ 
Consequently, it is evident that fruition of God’s love and Beauty 
presupposes an ascesis from this world,since within the Dionysian 
hierarchy this grace is the movement of the soul upwards and away from 
the corporeal objects it perceives: •
Ipsius itaque unius lux penitus simplicissima infinita pulchritudo est, 
quia nec materie sordibus inquinatur, ut corporis speties neque ut 
animi forma temporali progressions mutatur neque ut angeli speties 
multitudine dissipatur.... Similiter lumen ab omni corpore liberum, 
infinitum, nam sine modo ac termino lucet, quod natura lucet sua, 
quando ab alio minime terminatur. Itaque dei lux et pulchritudo, que 
mera est prorsus, ab aliis omnibus absoluta, absque dubio infinita 
dicitur pulchritudo. Infinita pulchritudo immensum quoque requirit 
amorem. Quapropter te obsecro, o Socrates, ut certo quodammodo et 
termino cetera diligas; deum vero amore diligas infinito neque ullus 
divino modus assit amori.159
As the above passage indicates things of this world can be loved 
moderately, but this is only because they reflect divine Beauty.
Their corporeal duplicity is rejected in favour of divine love. This 
translates itself in extremely tangent terms, subsequent to the above 
passage and terminating the sixth discourse which comments on Socrate’s 
speech which is central to the whole work, culminating in an 
unmistakably evangelical jubilation:
Nos autem, o viri clarissimi, non solum sine modo deum, ut iubere 
Diotima fingitur, sed deum solum amabimus..., Et quisquis hoc in 
tempore sese deo caritate devoverit, se denique recuperabit in deo.... 
Verus autem homo et idea hominis idem. Ideo quisque nostrum in terris 
a deo separatus, non verus est homo, cum a sui idea sit formaque 
disiunctus. Ad earn nos divinus amor pietasque perducet. Cumque hie 
discerpti simus et mutilati, idee tunc nostre amando coniuncti, integri 
homines evademus, ut deum primo in rebus coluisse videamur, quo res 
deinde in deo colamus, resque in deo ideo venerari, ut nos ipsos in 
eo pre ceteris amplectamur et amando deum, nos ipsos videamur amasse. u 
(underlining mine)
This vision of love spiritualizes the sentient apprehension of this 
world by acknowledging the presence of God’s shadow in it. This does 
not eliminate, however, the necessity of an ascesis from the
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multiplicity of matter and the corporeal imperfection of the world we
perceive. It is a fundamental desire to overcome the corporeal
condition ("discerpti simus et mutilati") of this world, by recovering 
the original condition of man, his soul’s true nature, ("idea... 
formaque"), which lies in God alone. This love is, then,of things at 
the plenitude of their reality, that is, as they are found in God, 
and of God in them, not of things in themselves.
The reflection of God in this world is perfecting, but not 
perfect, and it must therefore be transcended. The importance of this 
ascesis is made obvious by Ficino’s assertion that divine grace is a 
gift of enlightenment that lifts man out of the corporeal world into 
which he (his soul) has fallen. The ’’furore” is here clearly 
identified with Augustinian illumination characteristic of the
evangelical movement:
Divino autem furore super hominis naturam erigitur et in deum transit. 
Est autem furor divinus illustratio rationalis anime, per quam deus 
animam a superis delapsam ad infera, ab inferis ad superna retrahit.
The distinction between natural reason and right reason, which Ficino
deliberately emphasizes, leaves no doubt as to how he understands the 
life of the soul in its unredeemed state. As in Hughes de Saint Victor, 
the kind of perception that the soul has of the world below it, from
its position within the body, leads to a constant rise and fall of the 
spirit. In view of the implications of this condition, the intermediary 
function of the spirit’s sight in collusion with the imagination which 
informs both the soul and the body of corporeal objects made incorporeal
by their presence in sight, necessitates that the soul incline itself
to the spirit in order to recognize the objects perceived. Hence,
this movement lowers the soul and raises the body thereby causing a 
constant fluctuation in the soul’s inclinations. It is,then again,by 
means of images that the soul is drawn to corporeal and spiritual
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objects, and is torn between the two:
Amor, ut diximus, ab aspectu ducit originem. Aspectus inter mentem 
et tactum est medius, hinc semper contrarias in partes amantis 
distrahitur animus et sursum vicissira deorsumque iactatur. Interdum 
amplexus cupido suboritur, interdum vero pudicum celestis pulchritudinis 
desiderium et modo ilia, modo istud pervincit et ducit.-^62
Hence, since all love is born of sight, and divine love can only be
attained by the gift of divine grace, which distinguishes natural
reason from right reason, it follows from this premiss that all human
love, which depends on the intermediary function of sight and imagination, 
163is fundamentally contemptible because it is a source of anguish. A
certain reservation must be made for contemplative love, for although
it too depends on the sense of sight, it does so with spiritual intent
and represents the upper limits of natural reason. Contemplative love,
when it is maintained as such, and if it is directed to the divine, is
praiseworthy since its intention is turned to the source of Beauty,
not its deceptive shadow. On this matter Ficino is explicit:
Accedit ad hec quod et ferinus et humanus amor sine indignatione esse 
numquam potest.... Itaque formosos odis simul et amas odis tamquam 
fures et homicidas, tamquam specula celesti fulgore micantia mirari 
cogeris et amare.164
Thus, although Ficino places spirituality in the secular context, by
stressing the participation of the divine in objects, the love which
he describes does not incline to a strict pantheism, God is not present 
165in the object but reflected in it. Similarly, he distinguishes
very tangently the limits of the human dignity in relation to Divine 
majesty, without inclining to Manicheist dualism. All love in this 
world, which is subject to necessity, manifests imperfection. The
reflection of Beauty in this world is but the shadow of God, and it
is only by ascesis that the source of the beauty can be loved perfectly.
The ascesis required to overcome limitations imposed on the
soul by its fall into the dark recesses of the body presupposes that
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its recovery of its original condition will be effected within the
hierarchical system of the Areopagite’s gradualist universe. Similarly, 
the fundamental microcosmic conception of man’s place in this system 
requires that, owing to his relation to the elements, his complexion,
though not his free-will, be subject to the effects of cosmic
organization and changes. As I have pointed out previously (above,
notes 146 and 147), the bond between the body and the soul created by
the intermediary position of the spirit suggests that there exists an
intimate connection between the elemental physiological component of
the individual that is, his complexion, and his psychological character
and stability. The combination of medical and astrological theory in
the Commentarium in Convivium provides an extensive iatromathematical
explanation for the close mutual relations between physiology and
psychology. In spite of the interpenetration of astrology, physiology
and psychology, Ficino never seems to incline to the heretical notion 
166of astrological determinism. This is undoubtedly due to the
stringent, and somewhat artificial, structure of his hierarchical 
division of the types of love. Ficino’s understanding of Love depends 
on its function as a universal bond; since love is defined as a desire
for union with Beauty, love is a movement between the lunar and sublunar
creation, and it is therefore the means by which the soul can aspire
to its integration into the Summum Bonum. The movement of love
between the divine and matter naturally affects the point at which
these two meet, that is, the microcosm which is man. In order to
explicate the problem of the physio-psychological interpenetration of 
that which is spiritual and that which is elemental, or the fluctuating 
movements of the soul between the two, Ficino devised a quintuple
classification of love which integrates the Aristotelian tripartite
classification of the Nicomachean Ethics within what is in reality a
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dualist vision of love. The three kinds of love to which human beings 
are subject by their dual composition are the bestial, human or mixed,
and honest, which signifies contemplative or angelical. These, like 
man’s nature, his soul, lie between Chaos and God. As I shall attempt 
to explain this construction is partially artificial inasmuch as Love’s 
two extremes are indeterminate. This allows for a physio-psychological
gradation which forms a link between the two extremes, while still
maintaining a non-pantheistic division, and thereby rendering ascesis
necessary.
The Ficinian structure of the amorous universe is implicitly 
dualist. Whilst Ficino contends that love is essentially good, since 
its source can only be described as good and it is a desire for Beauty, 
he is still obliged to account for the negative aspects of desire that
are considered to be love, and which moralists use in order to
associate love with evil. The manifestation of these two aspects of
love is perceptible in the individual’s constitution, that is, in the
tension that exists between the body and the soul, in which unrestrained
contrary desires incline the soul, which is the efficient agent, to 
167one of the two basic kinds of love. The cosmic explanation provided 
by Ficino in order to clarify this state of affairs is based on a 
series of dualist principles. These are, the existence of two Venuses, 
two demons, and two kinds of mental alienations, follies, or ’’furores". 
All of these principles, because they affect man the microcosm, are
translated into a theory of complexions which has to accommodate the
divine and the physical, and, as such, their presence in the
Commentarium in Convivium revolves around the notion of melancholy as
a temperament and an illness. Love in the individual is,then,subject 
to the bipolarity of melancholy as either a divine gift of frenzy or 
sinister insanity, thereby inclining the individual either to divine
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contemplation or bestiality. Hence, throughout the Commentarium in
Convivium an extensive case is made of the physiological effects of
melancholy, in particular in the sixth and seventh speeches, which 
rely considerably on the medical explanation of Aristotle's Problem
XXX, i.
The dualism implicit in this system could have entailed serious
problems of orthodoxy were it not for the fact that from the outset
Ficino tempered the theoretical opposition between the two Venuses by
stating that the second, whose function is generation^ proceeds from
the first and only becomes bad when man uses its generative, or physical,
nature beyond its intended purpose. The key distinction between the
two is found in their different quality. Whereas the Celestial Venus
is pure intelligence, and, therefore, does not partake of matter
either in its origin or end, as Ficino explains: "Mens autem ilia a 
168materie corporalis consortio est aliena", the Vulgar Venus is found
mixed in matter. It follows from this that the first is divine and
the other worldly:
Denique ut summatim dicam, duplex est Venus. Altera sane est
intelligentia ilia, quam in mente angelica posuimus. Altera vis
generandi anime mundi tributa. Utraque sui similem comitem habet 
amorem. Ilia enim amore ingenito ad intelligendam dei pulchritudinem 
rapitur. Hec item amore suo ad eamdem in corporibus procreandam.
Ilia divinitatis fulgorem in se primum complectitur; deinde hunc in 
Venerem secundam traducit...» Cum primum human! corporis speties 
oculis nostris offertur, mens nostra que prima in nobis Venus est, 
earn tamquam divini decoris imaginem veneratur et diligit perque hanc 
ad ilium sepenumero incitatur. Vis autem generandi, secunda Venus, 
formam generare huic similem concupiscit. Utrobique igitur amor est.
Ibi contemplande hie generande pulchritudinis desiderium. Amor 
uterque honestus atque probandus. Uterque enim divinam imaginem 
sequitur.
... Si quis generationis avidior contemplationem deserat aut 
generationem preter modum cum feminis vel contra nature ordinem cum 
masculis prosequatur aut formam corporis pulchritudini animi preferat, 
is utique dignitate amoris abutitur.169
In the last sentence of the above quotation it becomes obvious that 
although Ficino claims that both Venuses have a divine origin^love of
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the body preferred over love of the soul leads to an opposition.
Although in this passage Ficino establishes a link between the two
Venuses, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the validity
of this bond throughout the development of the Commentarium in Convivium. 
In fact, the two principles which are drawn here together continue to 
polarize when Ficino finds it necessary to explain the movement of the 
soul between them. The two Venuses are, then, conceived of as two 
extremes, and in order to bridge the distance that separates the two 
Ficino has recourse to the theory of demons which serves as a subterfuge
for the two Venuses.
The terms which Ficino uses to present the concept of the two 
demons are quite similar to those used to expose the theory of the
two Venuses, as will be seen below. The variation lies in that unlike
the two extremes represented by the Venuses, the demons are presented 
as intermediaries between the two. They are, therefore, subject to 
movement. It then becomes possible for Ficino to explicate the movement 
of these demons according to the tripartite classification of love 
found in the Nicomachean Ethics and its mediaeval tradition.Hence, 
Ficino introduces the theory of the two demons by using the concept
of the twin Venuses on a cosmic scale. The two Venuses affect the
world soul, whereas the two demons pertain to the life of the microcosm 
within the macrocosm. This leads consequently to an interpenetration 
of the two concepts, the two Venuses, as the world soul, are also 
present in man: '’Gemine autem Veneres iste geminique amores non solum 
in anima mundi, verum etiam in sperarum, siderum, demonum hominumque 
animis insunt.” Thus, the demons actually form a counterpart in 
the microcosm for the two Venuses, who are implicitly representative 
of good and evil, even though Ficino takes special care to point out 
that in this world, which is a reflection of the thought of God,
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nothing can be inherently evil. In spite of this precaution the 
extremities at which the two demons are found does create a polarization 
which is actually tantamount to good and evil. Logically, this is 
evident; if the evil arises out of the soul’s excessive attention for 
the "Cacodemon" which is the procreative urge, it is because the demon 
incites the soul to delve in matter. Although the onus is on the soul 
to exercise moderation by the use of the will, the two demons represent
the poles between which it moves. Hence it is between the movement 
of these two demons that Ficino places the three Aristotelian
classifications of love, as three basic passions of the soul.
"Calodemon" is at the pole of angelical love and therefore, good, 
whereas "Cacodemon" is at the opposite extreme which is bestiality, 
and consequently, evil. Nevertheless, by referring to the two
extremes of love as demons, and therefore, as intermediaries in
constant movement Ficino eludes the implicit dualist view on which 
he relies. By positing the demons in passions they are inclinations 
of the soul, their intermediary stages towards one another are movements
of the soul, and the soul by its divine origin is inherently good. As
such the demons cannot be evil:
In nobis autem non duo tantum sed quinque amores reperiuntur. Duo 
quidem extremi, demones. Medii tres, non demones solummodo, sed 
affectus. Profecto in hominis mente eternus est amor ad divinam 
pulchritudinem pervidendam, cuius gratia et philosophie studia et 
iustitie pietatisque officia sequimur. Est etiam in generandi 
potentia occultus quidam stimulus ad sobolem procreandam. Isque 
amor perpetuus est, quo assidue incitamur, ut superne pulchritudinis^y^ 
illius similitudinem in procreate prolis effigie aliquam effingamus.
As two fundamental inclinations of the soul the two demons are
considered to be irreproachable. Moreover, since both participate
in Beauty they are inherently good. As in the case of the two Venuses 
the similarity ends here.for whereas one inclines us to contemplation, 
the other which should bring us to contemplation can also be the
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source of our miseries:
Hi duo amores in nobis perpetui duo sunt demones, quos Plato nostris 
animis semper adesse vaticinatur, quorum alter ad superna erigat, 
alter deprimat ad inferna, alter Calodemon, id est, bonus demon sit, 
alter Cacodemon, id est, malus sit demon, Revera utrique sunt boni, 
quoniam tam sobolis procreatio quam indagatio veritatis necessaria 
et honesta censetur. Verum secundus ideo dictus est malus, quia 
propter abusum nostrum sepe nos turbat et animum a precipuo eius bono 
quod in veritatis speculatione consistit, avertit maxime et ad 
ministeria viliora detorquet.^-73
The phraseology used in the above passage to describe the two demons
is obviously a duplicate of that used to present the theory of the
two Venuses. The demons which are placed in us, that is in our soul
or nature, clearly represent a medium for the interrelation between
intelligible forms and matter. Given that they are originally presented
as a movement they constitute the two inclinations of the soul between
good and evil, theoretically without partaking of evil. It becomes 
unclear, however, whether their position is really intermediary when
Ficino posits them at the antipodes of this movement and introduces
between them the three kinds of loves or passions formulated by
Aristotle. The two demons then become a finality in themselves:
Horum medium amores in nobis tres obtinent, qui cum non sint in animo 
eque ut isti firmissimi, sed incipiant, crescant, decrescant et 
desinant, rectius motus atque affectus quam demones vocabuntur. Horum 
unus equis intervallis ab utrisque distat extremis. Reliqui duo in 
partem alterutram inclinatur.174
These three intermediary loves are then used to describe the movement 
of passion in reaction to the immediate perception of objects by the 
spirit in the microcosm. The demons, who are originally considered 
to be particular manifestations of the two cosmic Venuses, are,then,
conceived of as extremes and not as mere inclinations of the soul in
the microcosm, but rather as two ends towards which our soul inclines;
naturally, both lie beyond the limits of the Aristotelian tripartite
division. The inclination of the soul referred to above Is brought
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about by the reception of Beauty or light from corporeal objects into
the spirit which by its sight informs the soul. The effects which it 
has on the individual are then caused by the movement of imagination
which pertains to the constant fluctuations of these three loves.
Although all three of these passions are present in the individual,
the predominant inclination towards one of these is determined by the 
individual’s complexion. Thus, Ficino states that the inclination of 
the soul to contemplative, human, or voluptuous love is affected by
the astral conditions, or sign, under which he was born. In order not 
to incur the suspicion of heresy on the matter of astrological
determinism, Ficino adds that by his education a man is able to control
his inclination to the effects of a certain kind of complexion, thereby
exercising the power of his free-will on his reaction to his imaginative 
175perception. Love, which Ficino consistently defines as beginning
in sight, is then a movement of the soul in accord with imagination:
Porro cum corporis alicuius figura propter materie preparationem talis est 
maxime qualem in eius idea divina mens continet, oculis obvia perque 
oculos in spiritum penetrans, animo evestigio placet, cum illis 
consonet rationibus, quas veluti rei ipsius exemplaria turn nostra 
mens, turn generandi potentia olim divinitus accepta conservat. Hinc 
triplex, ut diximus subrepit amor. Aut enim ad contemplativam, aut 
activam, aut voluptuosam vitam prompti et proclives geniti educative 
sumus. Si ad contemplativam, statim a forme corporalis aspectu ad 
spiritalis atque divine considerationem erigimur. Si ad voluptuosam, 
subito a visu ad concupiscentiam tangendi descendimus.-^^
The relation of this description of the three kinds of love to the
physiological theory of complexions becomes clearer when it is
understood in the context of Ficino’s first introduction of the concept
of the demons. This is done in the previous pages of the Commentarium
within a presentation of the cosmic elemental order of the universe.
Within this scheme the tripartate division of love is applied to the 
concept of ’’heroes love" or "amor hereos", as a movement between 
divine and bestial love. Ficino undoubtedly knew the implications of
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"amor hereos" from his readings of Arnau de Vilanova. Although 
Ficino*s graphic interpretation from "hereos" to "heroes" is different 
this only reflects his superior knowledge of Greek. In this context
the polarization between love as unformed Chaos and the intelligible
forms or ideas becomes evident:
Demon autem venereus triplex est amor. Primus in Venere celesti a 
Platonicis ponitur, in ipsa scilicet angelice mentis intelligentia. 
Secundus in vulgar! Venere, in ea videlicet potentia quam habet mundi 
anima generandi. Qui duo propterea demones afjellantur quia inter 
informitatem et formam sunt medii, ut et supra tetigimus et paulo 
post latius explicabimus. Tertius ordo demonum planetam Veneris 
comitantium. Horum quoque triplicem ordinem ponimus. Alii ignis, 
alii purissimi aeris, alii crassioris et nebulosi aeris elemento sunt 
assignat!. Omnesque a greco vocabulo, heros, quod amorem significat, 
heroes, id est amatorii nominantur.'
Ficino*s concern is then with melancholy love, "amor hereos". In the 
passages of the Commentarium in Convivium which describe the three
intermediary passions, or loves, drawn from the divisions of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Ficino is interested in describing the effects 
of this on the microcosm. He consequently embarks on an extensive 
expose of melancholy as it is described in Aristotle’s Problem XXX, i, 
and attempts to come to terms with the closely related ambivalence of
imagination-phantasy.
The view that Ficino takes of melancholy, and hence, of "amor
hereos”, is basically that of his predecessors, the moralist mediaeval
writers of treatises on love; that is, he considers it to be a taciturn 
178and malevolent temper. Yet, Ficino is also conscious of the
bipolarity of Saturn and the beneficent aspects of melancholy; what
is commonly a source of insanity, can also be a gift of divine frenzy.
He makes use of this knowledge as the background for his commentary
on the origin and nature of Love given by Diotima and repeated by 
179Socrates. Diotima*s description of Love is interpreted by Ficino
in medical terms which rely partially on the works of al Razi, one of
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180the Arabic commentators of Aristotle’s Problem XXX. The
interpretation is applied to Ficino’s theory of the five kinds of
love which he had previously established; however, because this
section of the Commentarium in Convivium focuses principally on the 
melancholy instability of the lover and the means by which both
extremes are attained, the author is concerned above all with the
three intermediary loves. These are the object of the vicissitudes 
of love, not the two extremes or demons, which as I have explained 
above are not really a movement but an end in themselves. These 
three intermediary loves, all of which are the product of sight, 
and therefore, imagination, correspond to the various manners in which 
the soul apprehends the object perceived; they are ’’Contemplativi
181hominis amor divinus, activi, humanus, voluptuosi ferinus cognominatur.”
The usage of the theory of melancholy from an astro-medical point of
view enables Ficino to account for the lover’s fluctuations between
the three kinds of love on a physiological basis, that is, it provides
a rational explanation for the soul’s movement to, or away from,
revelation. Hence it is also an argument for the immortality of the
soul. He consequently introduces this passage by pointing out that
all the traits of Love as enumerated by Diotima are applicable to all
five kinds of love, but in particular to the three intermediary loves.
By so doing, he sustains the cosmic implications of Love’s divine
origin. The subject of this passage isjthen^the three loves: ’’Hec
licet omnibus insint amorura generibus, in tribus tamen mediis tamquam 
182nobis manifestioribus clariora videntur.” Diotima’s description 
is a play on the inherent contradictions of these three loves. Ficino
uses the physiplogical implications of these contradictions in order 
to describe the standard medical type of the melancholic; because of 
this, love and melancholy become hardly distinguishable, as it will
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be obvious from the rest of this study.
The point of departure for the merging of the concept of 
melancholy with that of love can be found in the description of the 
birth of love. Love is engendered by the Celestial Venus, and 
therefore, his real function is to bring souls back to the place of 
their divine origin. Love which is found in beauty is the source
of the soul’s recollection of its nature:
In Veneris natalibus genitus Venerem sequitur, id est, cum supernis 
illis spiritibus quos vocavimus Veneres, genitus, hominum animos ad 
superna reducit. Ac pulchri desiderio capitur, cum Venus ipsa 
pulcherima sit, id est animas accendit summe divineque pulchritudinis 
desiderio cum ipse sit in illis spiritibus ortus, qui deo proximi, 
dei decore summopere illustrantur atque ad eosdem nos radios erigunt.
The lofty function of love to participate in divine Beauty and draw
souls back to God is used by Ficino as a Saturnine trait introducing
melancholy. Saturn, and the complexion associated with it, melancholy,
also have this lofty function, as does phantasy, all lead mens’ souls
to the initial perception of the intelligible forms in the Summum 
184Bonum. Indeed, Saturn who is the father of the gods is at the
origin of the divine parnassus, moreoever as a result of his overthrow
and castration by Jupiter, which led to the birth of Venus, he is
given to purity and contemplation. Hence, in spite of his taciturn
and dark nature which associates him to death and insanity, he is also
benevolent as a source of divine frenzy. Ficino, immediately after
explaining the birth of Love, goes on to discuss the description of
his physical features which is an analysis of the melancholy complexion,
as it is based on the properties of the melancholy humour, that is,
185cold and dry. This is applied to Diotima*s portrait of Love:
Preterea cum vita omnium animantium atque arborum et terre fertilitas 
in humore et calore consistat, ad demonstrandum amoris inopiam utrumque 
deesse illi tarn humorem quam calorem Diotima innuit, cum aridum et 
macilentum dixit et squalidum. Quis enim ignoret arida et sicca esse 
ilia que deserit humor? Quis item pallorem dicat et squalorem aliunde
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quam sanguinei caloris defectu venire?
The pallor and grayness of skin is basically a standard feature of
the melancholy temperament, especially when it is in proper conjunction, 
187by adustion, with the choleric temperament. This is a fairly well
known method of describing the atrabilious character’s capacity to be
raised into the realm of loftier aspirations. Whereas melancholy, or
black bile, on its own is heavy and slow, as well as, cold and dry,
and is therefore associated with the element of earth which is stable;
yellow bile is associated with fire and is hot and dry. Hence, when
the melancholic humour is brought into proper conjunction with yellow
bile by adustion in the blood, melancholy, which is contemplative,
exercises its most noble functions because it is moved upwards by the
heat of the yellow bile. The opposition between the melancholic and 
188choleric tempers results in the most balanced exercise of virtue.
After having introduced the problems of melancholy from this
point of view, which really pertains to scholastic medicine, Ficino
proceeds to the explanation of the psychological and physiological
effects of melancholy adust and how it is brought about by the action
of the vital spirits, which, as I have already pointed out, he equates
with the Plotinian animate and the Augustinian Pauline mirror. Once
again, the problem of melancholy adust converges with the Chartrian
and Victorine theory of perception in imagination and phantasy, as 
189it was expounded in the twelfth-century rhetorics. Melancholy, as
a nefarious characteristic, is the product of the puddling of the vital 
190spirits resulting from immoderate cogitation on the wrong object.
The immoderate cogitation is a consequence of the melancholy humour
which is stable and therefore leads to a constant love:
Quin etiam diuturno amore pallidi et macilenti mortales efficiuntur. 
Quippe ad duo simul opera vis nature ferme non sufficit, Animi amantis 
intentio in assidua amati cogitatione tota se versat. Illic et
169
naturalis complexionis vis omnis intenta est. Ideo neque cibus in 
stomaco perfecte conquoquitur. Quo fit ut major pars in superfluas 
reliquias emictatur, minor et ea quidem cruda trahatur ad iecur.^l
The immoderate cogitation of the lover on the image of the beloved, 
then, affects directly the seat of passion, the liver, which is also 
the source of the yellow bile. The immoderate cogitation then causes 
the blood to concentrate itself in one place where it is not renewed, 
this creates an exhausted blood of poor quality, lacking in clear 
vital spirits. In subsequent passages Ficino proceeds to explain in 
some detail the effect that phantasy has on the vital spirits. The 
spirits which are weakened by the immoderate cogitation on the image 
perceived as reflected in them, cause vapours to rise to the head and 
lead the brain to create tetric visions, probably by clouding the 
"cella phantastica'’:
Preterea, quocumque animi assidua fertur intentio, illuc et spiritus, 
qui animi sive currus sive instruments sunt, advolant. Spiritus in 
corde ex subtilissima sanguinis parte creantur. In amati imaginem 
phantasia infixam ipsumque amatum amantis animus rapitur. Eodem 
trahuntur et spiritus. Illuc evolantes assidue resolvuntur. Quapropter 
frequentissimo puri sanguinis fomite opus est ad consumptos spiritus 
recreandos ubi subtiliores et lucidores partes sanguinis quotidie in 
reficiendis spiritibus exalantur. Propterea puro et claro sanguine 
resoluto, maculosus, crassus, aridus restat et ater. Hinc exsiccatur 
corpus et squalet, hinc et melancolici amantes evadunt. Ex sicco enim 
crasso atroque sanguine melancolia, id est, atra bilis efficitur, que 
suis caput vaporibus opplet, cerebrum siccat, animam tetris horrendisque 
imaginibus diu noctuque solicitare non cessat.^92
In the above paragraph melancholy as a humour is considered to be a 
product of phantasy on the spirit, which by its effects on the brain 
will naturally affect the rational soul. Consequently, the quality 
of the image perceived in the spirit also plays a part in determining 
the nature of this effect on the soul. The physiological condition 
described above is limited to a basic presentation of melancholy, and 
Ficino limits himself to a repetition of the negative judgement on
the effects of this humour.
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In the ensuing paragraph, however, he points out that the
nefarious effects of the melancholy humour is the product of the
individual’s desire to transform the contemplative virtue of melancholy
into an active or sensual love: "Hec illis accidere consueverunt qui,
amore abusi, quod contemplationis est ad amplexus concupiscentiam 
193transtulerunt." After having established this proviso Ficino then 
begins to rectify the negative inferences of melancholy, in order to 
introduce concepts related to "melancholia generosa". This he does 
by having recourse to the standard scholastic theory of melancholy 
adust formulated by Albert the Great. Ficino proceeds to compare the 
two complexions, melancholic and choleric, and point out their 
beneficial virtues, in particular by stressing the redeeming contemplative
value of the former. Whereas the melancholic is slow to love and
constant, the choleric quickly falls in love and is inconstant. However,
both the melancholic and the choleric overcome their nefarious
inclinations, and their tendency to carnal, or bestial, love by seeking 
spiritual pleasures. These are spiritual delights obtained by the more 
spiritual senses, hearing and sight, which make them the best disciples 
of Venus. The understanding in this statement is that they are lovers 
of the Celestial Venus, not of her counterfeit. This is reinforced by 
the closing statement, towards which the entire discussion of melancholy
seems to have been directed, that Socrates is a melancholic:
Quamobrem colerici et melancolici homines, tamquam unicum remedium et 
solamen molestissime ipsorum complexionis, cantus et forme oblectamenta 
sectantur. Ideoque sunt ad Veneris illecebras proniores. Et Socrates, 
quern Aristoteles melancolicum iudicavit, ad amandi artem ut ipsemet 
profitebatur erat omnium propensissimus. Idemque de Sapho melancolica, 
ut ipsa testatur, possumus iudicare. Nec non et Maro noster, quern 
colericum fuisse eius effigies indicat, quamvis pudicus, fuit tamen 
proclivior ad amandum.194
The important point, in the above paragraph on the amorous nature of 
both melancholics and cholerics, is that it includes both Socrates
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and Vergil, both of whom Ficino considered to be models of his 
195Platonism, as I have remarked previously. In subsequent passages
of the Commentarium in Convivium Ficino ceases to refer to cholerics 
in order to focus on the melancholy which is the complexion of Socrate^ 
whose figure dominates the entire work. It suffices to point out that
Ficino has introduced the problem of the choleric complexion in his
portrait of Love in order to combine it with that of the melancholic 
and introduce the concept of the great man, following St. Albert the 
Great’s definition of Aristotle’s Problem XXX, i..
Melancholy, then, becomes one of the principal underlying factors 
in the concept of the Socratic way of life, which it is the Commentarium 
in Convivium’s object to present. In both the Socratic way of life 
and melancholy the common denominator is contemplation and the effects
that it has on the movements of the soul. It is a means to the divine
’’furore”, which is Augustinian illumination, and, as such, both
represent a "perfective* way of life by which man imitates ’’the God-loving 
196Celestial Intelligences”. The exhortation which follows the
passage quoted above, and concludes the "Sixth Discourse” is the 
evangelical message to which I have referred previously. In order 
to come to an accurate understanding of the implications of the theory 
of love set forth by Ficino in the Commentarium, it is important to 
note that although he insists on the .contemplative love as the only 
real love, Ficino is conscious of the duality of love, just as he is 
of melancholy. Both love and melancholy have their origin in an 
epistemological experience set in sight, the ambivalent result of this 
experience then suggests that there are two means of cognition, or 
two "furores”, one leading to the extremes of the Celestial Venus and 
the other to the Vulgar Venus. These two "furores" are described in 
the concluding discourse of the Commentarium, which is an expose of
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the applications of Ficino’s theory in Guido Cavalcanti’s "Dona me 
prega...." In this final part of the Commentarium Ficino turns to 
the problem of imagination’s ambivalence when it is apprehended in 
the light of natural reason. On this matter he echoes the theory of 
imagination formulated by Hughes de Saint Victor, and uses the latter’s 
metaphor of enamourment of natural reason for imagination as a burning 
shirt or skin which it is impossible to rid oneself of, in order to 
describe the earthly love of natural reason as a burning disease of
the skin^ in terms highly reminiscent of the "De Unione Spiritus et
„ . „197Corporis :
Inquietudo quoque amantium tarn diu necessario perseverat quam diu 
infectio ilia sanguinis per fascinationem iniecta visceribus permanens, 
gravi cor premit cura, vulnus alit venis, cecis membra flammis adurit.
A corde siquidem in venas, a venis in membra fit transitus. Hac 
denique expurgata amantium immo vero amentium cessat inquietudo. Id 
longum in omnibus requirit temporis spatium; in melancolicis vero 
longissimum, presertim si Saturni influxu fuerint irretiti. Adde et 
amarissimum, si Saturno retrogrado vel Marti coniuncto vel Soli 
opposito mancipati sint.^98
The disease of love described in the above quotation is directly 
related to Saturn and melancholy as a nefarious state. Conjunction 
of Saturn with Mars does not refer to melancholy adust, which depends 
on a proper mixture of melancholy in the choleric humour, or vice
versa, but to a disproportionate combination which causes a vehement
passion. The reference to Mars and the Sun indicates a firing of the 
stable and constant melancholy humour, and hence an incessant passion
in which the nefarious aspects of melancholy are accentuated. This 
disease is then considered to produce insanity, as does melancholy, 
its origin in sight is once more the source of "immoderate cogitation", 
or, as it is called in the above passage, it is "an infection, or 
puddling, of the blood by fascination”. It is then, the outcome of 
the second "furore", which is insanity, and which is also intimately 
related to "melancolia negra", the humour that causes man to fall to
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the level of beasts, as does physical love. On the problem of the 
two ’’furores” Ficino draws his arguments mainly from the Phaedrus, 
in order to provide rational evidence for the two "furores" on the 
basis of astral medicine and Lucretius’ theory of sight which gives 
a physical explanation for the problem of perception in imagination 
and the soul’s enamourment of the object it perceives reflected in 
the spirit. The two* furores* are, then, considered to be states of mental 
alienation, one as insanity since it causes the soul to lose its 
dignity, and the other as redemptive divine illumination:
Plato noster furorem in Phedro, mentis alienationem definit.
Alienationis autem duo genera tradit. Alteram ab humanis morbis, 
alteram a deo provenire existimat. Insaniam illam, hanc divinum 
furorem nuncupat. Insanie morbo infra hominis spetiem homo deicitur 
et ex homine brutum quodammodo redditur. Insanie duo sunt genera. 
Alterum cerebri, alterum cordis vitio nascitur. Cerebrum sepe adusta 
bili, sepe sanguine adusto,nonnumquam atra bili nimium occupatur... 
Quando enim humores illi retinentur in corde, angustiam et solicitudinem 
pariunt, non dementiam.200
199 .
The melancholy adust referred to above is not Albert the Great’s 
"melancolia non naturalis" but a violent adustion which engenders 
madness. The two kinds of madness are, however, caused by melancholy, 
depending on its predominance in the heart, which is the source of
sadness, or in the brain where it causes a demented state of alienation.
Ficino approaches this problem by suggesting that there are two kinds 
of alienation, one which is divinely inspired, and the other which is 
a humoural problem of insanity in its various manifestations affecting
the heart or the brain.
A superficial approach to the Commentarium in Convivium would
leave the reader with the impression that Ficino, like most mediaeval 
201moralists writing on love, associates melancholy only with insanity. 
Close examination of the text evinces the contrary. Ficino repeatedly 
points out that Socrates is a melancholic. It is this particular
complexion, which makes true and constant lovers, and is a contemplative
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virtue, that prepares Socrates to receive the gift of divine "furore” 
The innate contradiction which is particular to the melancholy 
complexion is then transferred to Ficino’s description of the nature 
of love. Thus, in his portrait of Socrates, Ficino turns to Diotima’ 
description of love, and states that Socrates is the model for the
portrait of Love, and that this portrait is also that of melancholy. 
This concept brings together "melancolia generosa" and Love:
Numquid, o optimi viri, illud in superioribus animadvertistis, quod 
dum Plato ipsum fingit amorem, Socratis omnem pingit effigiem ac 
numinis illius figuram ex Socratis persona describit quasi verus 
amor ac Socrates similimi sint atque ideo ille pre ceteris verus sit 
legitimusque amator? Agite iam amoris picturam illam in animum 
revocate. Videbitis in ea Socratem figuratuni. Socratis personam 
ante oculos ponite. Macilentum, aridum, squalidumque videbitis, 
hominem scilicet natura melancolicum, ut fertur atque irsutum, 
extenuatum inedia, incuria sordidum.^^2
This is the man whose pagan model is to be followed, and whom Diotima
exhorts to Christian love. That a Christian writer, such as, Ficino
should present Socrates, the melancholy philosopher, as the portrait
of Love, and of "the true and legitimate lover", might seem to the
inexperienced reader of Ficino to be a case of paganism, since for a
Christian, Christ can be the only true lover. In fact, the portrait
which Ficino draws of Socrates is the portrait of Christ. In his
other writings Ficino frequently turns to the Apuleian, and early
Christian, tradition which saw in Socrates a metaphor, or adumbration 
203of Christ. As in the Confirmatio Christianorum per Socratica the
explanation that Ficino provides for the portrait of Love-Socrates 
is a very evangelical description of the virtues of the "vita 
apostolica", it is a praise of poverty and charity seeking the inner 
light in the imitation of Christ-Socrates applied to daily life. The 
explanation for the description of Socrates is pushed to the extent 
that at certain points which lack a proper Christian explanation 
Ficino forces his intention onto the text of the Symposium, and as a
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result, the commentary is adequate to Christ, though perhaps not to 
the text, as for instance: "Ad fores, in via, sub divo dormiens.
Hec apertum pectus et cor patens omnibus in Socrate nostro significant."^^ 
This frequent metaphor of the welcoming arms of Christ clearly indicates 
the primarily Christian-evangelical intention of FicinoTs Commentarium 
in Convivio, and the significance of the Socratic way of life. It is
an exhortation to the contemplative and evangelical life.
It should be evident from what I have discussed until now that
the theory of love formulated by Ficino is novel when compared with
the love treatises written by mediaeval moralists. The latter work
within the traditional ecclesiastical structure, their perception of
love is a social hierarchic comment on the secular society outside the 
205traditional institution of the Church. It is therefore the point
of view of the "vita monastica". Their approach reflects a distinction
between religion and life; concepts such as the "dignitas hominis" do
not find a place in this system. These 'moralists are concerned with
the condemnation of love as lust, that is, of an excess pertinent to
a fallen creature redeemed only within the institution of the Church.
It is, therefore, open to doubt whether the point of view expressed
by the moralists, who are men of the cloth, is representative of the
love expressed by poets, although it may condition some poetical works
it is not an "ars poetica". Unlike its mediaeval predecessors,
Ficino’s theory of love pertains to the well-established secular
tradition of Christian Neoplatonism, which is intimately associated
with "vita apostolica", or the evangelical current, beginning in the
twelfth century and reaching its maturity in the sixteenth century
with the growth of the merchant class, and the economic collapse of 
206the Hundred Years war. Ficino seems to be more indebted to the
"ars poeticae" than to the mediaeval treatises. Hence, in his final
176
definition of true love in the Commentarium in Convivium Ficino does
not really depart from the theoretical background known to poets
writing in the preceding century: '’Verus enim amor nihil est aliud
quam nixus quidam ad divinam pulchritudinem evolandi, ab aspectu
corporalis pulchritudinis excitatus. Adulterinus autem ab aspectu 
207in tactum precipitatio.” It might be argued that the very fact 
that love is a desire of divine Beauty reflected in human corporeal 
beauty is novel, however, this is an inherent part of the pseudo­
Dionysian tradition of the evangelical current also present in 
twelfth-century poetic rhetorics. The very fact that Ficino chose 
to close his Commentarium by explaining the sense of a poem by Guido 
Cavalcanti, Dante’s friend, indicates that he made no claim to the 
absolute novelty of his theory of love. The principal novel aspects 
of Ficino’s contribution to the theory of love are, his use of Plato 
as his authority, although without discarding Aristotle, and his 
extensive coordination of astral and medical theory in order to
establish the positive value of melancholy with which he creates the 
208Renaissance concept of the genius. Finally, all of this is subordinate
to an evangelical orientation which creates a social ideal of conduct,
which is codified in the Cortegiano, but which really has its roots 
209in the Imitation of Christ.
In spite of the apparent novelty of the theory of love in the
Commentarium in Convivium, and affined concepts, on this too some 
reservations must be held in Ficino’s handling of these problems. The 
mediaeval moralists, such as Andreas Capellanus, seemed to condemn 
love because it was an immoderate cogitation born from the vision of 
corporeal objects, which by the action of the senses, degenerated into 
lust. As can be gleaned from the quotation above (207) Ficino does 
not entirely depart from this point of view. Differences lie in the
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understanding which Ficino has of the nature of perception-imagination,
which is similar to that of poetic rhetoricians following the Chartrian 
210and Victorine school which is the object of Capellanus’ irony.
211Ficino, like Capellanus, places the origin of love in sight, but
212unlike the latter, he stresses that the object perceived is spiritual,
and similarly that beauty is not external but lies within and is 
213reflected by the corporeal object, as the twelfth-century Chartrian 
and Victorine rhetoricians had done. Ficino gives this conception of 
love a new orientation by focusing on the Christian intention within 
a secular context, which became applicable to the idealized Renaissance 
court. Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium is, then,not entirely 
severed from tradition; it uses much of the previous philosophical
theories. Hence, just as the mediaeval scholastic moralists had relied 
on the tripartite division of friendship in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, Ficino integrated this division into a system that emphasized 
the interrelation of the Good and the Beautiful, by acknowledging the 
participation of the Good in the Beautiful, a point which was inherent 
to the Dionysian tradition in which he was working. Evidently, this 
could only lead to the increased role played by vision in this system.
The theory of perception that Ficino resorted to had to be compatible 
to the Areopagian emanantist system, that is, it had to apprehend the 
Creation in a spiritual light. This aspect of Ficino’s theory was 
also conditioned by his reaction against the Averroesian negation of 
the soul’s transcendental nature. Just as love in this system is 
transcendental, so is the medium for this love, the soul. It is 
understood to be independent from the body and of divine origin. As 
it governs the body, it is the true nature of man, and from this, one 
understands the importance of the "dignitas hominis” in this theory 
of love. The subjacent implication of this theory is the Augustinian
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definition of the soul, and the problem of perception is then focal
to the entire work. It is a matter of how light is reflected on the
mirror, or eye, of the soul, and thus, the author is confronted with
the ineluctable problem of the "descensus ad inferos". In order to
resolve the problem of the soul’s fall Ficino resorted to the Plotinian
concept of the animate, which he interpreted in the light of the
scholastic medical theory of the vital spirits. Perception, or vision,
is then initially based on a poetic and rhetorical conception which 
214echoes Matthieu de Vendome*s metaphor of the architect. As such,
the object perceived by the soul in the mirror of the spirit is
primarily an imagination or phantasy. It is not necessarily a "vain 
215imagination". The world is vanity, but it is also a reflection of 
the face of God, and, as such, that imagination is also a key to the 
divine vision. The imagination may lead to divine vision, but if the 
soul becomes enamoured of the object the image that is purely reflected 
in the mirror of the spirit becomes puddled. The problem of melancholy, 
entailed by the bipolarity of imagination, then needed to be explained, 
especially since Aristotle in Problem XXX, i_ had pointed out that 
Socrates was a melancholic, and that Ficino had set himself the latter
as a model. Ficino resolved the problem of the melancholic around the
notion of "amor hereos" (which relied on Arnau de Vilanova) on the
basis of scholastic and astral medicine, thereby combining the notion
of the genius with that of Augustinian illumination in the Platonic
concept of the divine "furore". As such, the virtuous love described
by Ficino is Christian love for God, and God only, in His Creatures.
Like his twelfth-century predecessors Ficino was quick to point out
that this love was practised by few, just as there are few melancholy 
216great men; they are "alii Diane et Palladi consecrati". Few spend
their life in contemplation, and even fewer are granted the gift of
179
divine illumination. The key problem, however, remains that of 
making men conscious of the nature of the Beauty to which they feel 
attracted, that is, to make them acknowledge the source of that beauty
as the real object of their love. The task was to incline courtiers
to contemplative, or angelical, activity, and the means was to remind
the soul of its divine origin in order to turn it away from the
necessity of this world, and, therefore, to overcome the inclination
of the soul to matter. That solution could only lie in faith, which
is the love of God to which we are inclined by the Beauty of this
creation, but which must be surpassed to reach its source. Behind
the glib rhetoric of the Platonic dialogue, medical and astral
references, the sensibility and intention of Ficino in the Commentarium 
217in Convivium remains that of the ’’vita apostolica”.
Clearly, Ficinian Platonic love is a very complex extension of
the philosophical intention present in Petrarch’s works, and like the
latter, it finds its origins in twelfth-century Chartrian and 
218Victorine thought, and evangelism. It is this philosophical content 
that Bembo integrated, somewhat superficially, in his renewed
Petrarchism. The theoretical elaboration for the basis of Bembo’s
Petrarchism is found in his love treatise, Gli Asolani. A prominent
characteristic of the various love treatises that were written in the
wake of Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium, with the notable exception
of Leone Hebraeus’ Dialoghi d’Amore, is that they are primarily
literary works, with philosophical pretensions, and not philosophical 
219works; consequently, they do not have the breadth of their model.
They are nonetheless firmly indebted to Ficino’s work, and the 
apparent superficiality in their content is due to the fact that they 
are intented for a vaster public. In this sense, they popularize
themes and topics that are central to Ficino’s Commentarium. Hence
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these works which imitate the dialogue form, are often set in a
Renaissance court, and have a general air of being a trivial 
220entertainment, like the mediaeval "cortsd’amor". This contributes
to giving the reader the impression that they have a more ’’courtly” 
aspect than Ficino’s work. Due caution should be exercised here, 
however, since the more "courtly” aspect which they have is not 
necessarily so because they go back to ’’courtly love", but is also
attributable to the fact that Ficino’s own work is rooted in the
poetic tradition preceding it, which the modern critic may, or may not, 
221choose to associate with the amorphous term "courtly love". As
usual, this approach can distort our perspective, if applied
dogmatically. The works on Neoplatonic love which succeeded the
Commentarium in Convivium did not entirely overlook the inner tensions
of the lover, which are generally understood to be conflicts inherent
to human love, but they concentrated principally on the blissful 
222effects of the rapture and the divine vision. This accounts for
the somewhat inexact impression propagated by literary critics that
Neoplatonic love attains fulfilment on earth, in human love, and that 
223it, thereby, justifies human love. There is a certain measure of
truth in this point of view, for inasmuch as it is less concerned 
with human excesses than mediaeval moralists it reflects a greater 
confidence in man’s power not to abuse the dignity of love. For this 
reason the definition of the soul as representing the true nature of 
man, being of divine origin, and therefore, governing the body, becomes 
a central topic of these treatises. As in the Commentarium in 
Convivium the supremacy of the soul asserting its divine origin is a 
focal theme of the treatises, for this reason, and because of the 
public for whom these are intended, a point which was subjacent to 
Ficino, and to Ausias March, acquires greater prominence, that is,
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the power of the lover’s free-will to control his passions.
Owing to this, there is a tendency to shift the accent from love 
225as a desire for Beauty to love as an affection of the will; as 
226Bembo’s hermit remarks the two are not necessarily exclusive. It
does shift the emphasis, however, towards the realm of social conduct, 
which corresponds to the requirements of the public for whom these
treatises were written. Bembo clearly defines his intention in Gli
Asolani; he teaches now not to err in what is inevitable:
Ma percicoche tra le molte cagioni, le quali il nostro tranquillo 
navicar ci turbano, ed il sentiero del bon vivere ci rendono sospetto 
e dubiosso; soule con le primiere essere il non saper noi le piu 
volte, quale amore buono sia, e qual reo: ilche non saputo fa, che 
noi le cose, che fuggire si devrebbono amando, e quelle che sono da 
seguire non amando, e tai volta o meno o piu del convenevole ora 
schifandole e ora cercandole, travagliati e smarriti viviamo...
The social orientation of these treatises reveals that they form an
"artificial” literary genre, which superficially sets moral standards
of conduct within the Renaissance court, and appear to elude the
228inherent problems of the tension between the body and the soul,
because they are principally concerned with the end result of Ficino*s
theory. This social conduct is, however, directed towards an
evangelical end, which is fulfilled by at least one character.
Consequently, great emphasis is placed on the origin of love in
sight, and remains central to all arguments. However, the reader
will seek in vain an elaborate discussion of the problems entailed
by perception; they are present but not discussed, because the author’s
intention is to convince his readers of the superiority of contemplative
life, and not to discuss the difficulties. It is then not surprising
to find that, "the philosophical elements, as we shall see, soon
become stereotyped; the author’s main effort was to express with
literary grace, in polished prose, sentiments and theories that were 
229far from original." Thus, one of the more interesting aspects of
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the literary love treatises is to elude the complexity of Ficino’s
work by reducing the human problems entailed by perception to a
matter of reason and will. In so doing they accentuate a point which 
230Ficino attempted to escape, that of the duality of love, as can 
be seen in the above quotation from Gli Asolani, and ironically it 
gives the impression that human love can be an end in itself. Yet, 
its principal aim remains to extol the virtues of contemplative life 
in order to entreat man to polish the mirror of his soul, and 
ultimately turn his love to God.
Part II: The Re-Formulation of Ficino’s Theory in the Works of his 
Successors.
In seeking to distinguish excessively the Neoplatonic theory
of love from its mediaeval predecessors, critics have focused their
attention on the predominant role played by reason in the "trattati
d’amore". This, as I have indicated previously, seems to be a source
of distortion in the critical perspective. The problem of reason’s
function in love is of utmost importance in the Dialoghi d'Amore of
Leone Hebreo, Ficino’s most worthy successor. It has been contended
that Hebreo’s definition of love, which advocates that true love,
whether it be honest or dishonest, always involves passion, torment
and jealousy, is a prolongation of the ’’courtly love" attitudes
present in the cancionero tradition were it not for the concept of,
"extraordinary reason which Leon Hebreo rather shamefacedly conjures
up as a last minute expedient, after his own argument has led him to 
231deny reason, as commonly defined, any power over love." This 
extreme position towards Hebreo can only be based on a lack of 
familiarity with his, and related, texts and the problems that Hebreo 
confronted. The Dialoghi d*Amore are greatly indebted to the
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Commentarium in Convivium. However, since they do not constitute 
a commentary their scope is far greater, and consequently, they are 
also much more diffuse. Although the language and method of the 
Dialoghi d’Amore is firmly rooted in the tradition of Aristotelian 
scholasticism, the content is primarily inspired by Plato’s dialogues, 
and one must add, often perceived through Ficino’s eyes. The problems 
with which Hebreo deals are fundamentally the same as Ficino’s, and 
the eclecticism of both works cannot be overlooked. The Dialoghi 
d’Amore are primarily interested in one problem, which in Ficino is 
found in the conclusion, that of the two^furoresT Whereas Ficino 
eluded the problem by stating that divineMfurore*is true love, but 
the other is insanity, Hebreo is conscious that both furores are a
kind of love, and hence, all love is ’’furore”. His intent is to 
explain the relation between the two, that is, that which they have 
in common. He is, therefore, far more subtle and complex than Ficino.
It is not my purpose to explore the relations that exist between the 
two authors. My concern is to clarify the significance of 
’’extraordinary reason" in Hebreo’s system, in order to demonstrate 
the relation that this has with melancholy and imagination, as in 
Ficino’s system.
Although the Dialoghi d’Amore begin with the introduction of 
various basic Aristotelian principles in the first dialogue, they
move in the second and third dialogues towards an eclectic
conciliation of Aristotle and Plato, and also Moses. Hence, Hebreo
opens his dialogues by repeating the Nicomachean Ethics’ tripartite
classification of friendship, which he, like his mediaeval predecessors, 
233applies to love. In the third dialogue he proceeds to an exposition
of what he calls the Platonic tripartite division, which he 
conciliates with Aristotle, and demonstrates their inherent
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234 ,compatibility. This is a key point in Hebreo s system, unlike
Ficino he does not adopt, or create, a quintuple division of the
kinds of love. There results from this many of the complexities, as 
regards the role of reason, which may confuse the reader. By dividing 
love into five kinds, it was relatively easy for Ficino to explicate 
the movement of the soul towards divine love, and to distinguish 
between contemplation of the divine in the individual’s vision of the 
world, and love of God, or divine rapture. The various stages of 
reason’s role in the preparation of the soul to receive the light of 
right reason could be neatly associated with each one of these kinds 
of love. By remaining within the limits of a tripartite classification, 
Hebreo, whose logic is transcendental, is severely restricted, and he 
is obliged to expand the internal boundaries of his reasoning, 
especially as concerns honest or contemplative love. In this context 
the various facets of reason, which is not a monolithic faculty,
become fragmented. This is the source of much of the awkwardness
235present in his text. It is, therefore, imperative for him to
explicate the relation between reason and intellect, the latter being the
236means to true love. Should the reader seek a weighty discussion
of love in the first dialogue he overlooks the actual intention of 
the author. This is what I believe has been the pitfall of the vast 
majority of critics. The central topic of this dialogue is the 
relation that exists between reason and intellect; although it is 
continuous source of discussion in the Dialoghi d*Amore it is here 
that it is most explicitly defined, as is its role in love. For this 
reason this initial dialogue is by far the shortest, and most terse
of the three. Hebreo, like Ficino, begins by establishing as his 
point of departure the insufficiency of individual reason:
’’manifestamente es imposible que un hombre conozca todas las cosas
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237juntas, y cada una por si distintamente....” What reason knowsj
it can do so only through information imparted by the senses: "por
ser todas materiales, se dice con verdad que no pueden estar en el
entendimiento si primero no se halla en el sentido que las conoce 
238materialmente." Immediately after having defined the nature of
individual reason in these terms Hebreo focuses on the closely related
problem of the sensual perception of material, or corporeal, objects
and how they come to be apprehended spiritually. This again repeats
the basic description of the movement of imagination informing the 
239intellect. This consequently engages him onto the arduous problem
of how reason informs the intellect, and how it thereby comes to
recognize spiritual objects. It is the subjacent question of the
insufficiency of our reason, and also of our intellect, which
introduces the problem of the two intellects; that which is potential 
240and the other actual, or agent. Hebreo*s explanation focuses on 
this point to direct his discussion to a teleological end. It is 
axiomatic to his philosophical position that: "es el entendimiento 
agente que, copulandose con nuestro entendimiento posible, ve todas
rj
las cosas en acto juntamente con la vision espiritual y clarisima."
Our intellect can only know its objects in their reality when it is
enlightened by the actual intellect. However, Hebreo*s discussion
is theological, and therefore, he brings this eclectically into its
religious context: "el entendimiento actual que alumbra al nuestro
posible es el altisimo Dios; y... la bienaventuranza consiste en el 
242conocimiento del entendimiento divino." Hence, it is obvious that 
in Hebreo‘s system, reference to reason, and to the individual 
intellect, is intended to have the significance of "the eye of flesh", 
which cannot of its own light apprehend spiritual clarity. Hebreo 
then compares potential intellect, that is, human intellect with the
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eye of the bat which can perceive objects in darkness but is blind 
to light; similarly, the individual intellect apprehends corporeal 
objects but needs divine light to know their spiritual, or real,
nature:
Esta doctrina sola trata de las cosas espirituales y eternas, el ser 
de las cuales, de parte de su naturaleza, es mucho mayor y mas conocido 
que el ser de las cosas corporeas y corruptibles, aunque de nosotros 
son menos conocidas que las incorporeas, por no poderlas comprender 
nuestros sentidos como a aquellas. De manera que nuestro entendimiento 
es en el conocimiento como el ojo del murcielago en la luz y las cosas 
visibles, que la luz del sol, que en s£ es la mas clara, no la puede 
ver, porque su ojo no es bastante a tanta claridad, y ve el lustror 
de la noche, que le es proporcionado.243
As all Neoplatonists Hebreo is, therefore, concerned with the recovery
from the ’’descensus ad inferos”; however, owing to his interest in the
problem of the "furores” he gives priority to the vision of God, which
is the soul’s original state of plenitude. Thus, our intellect,
informed by reason, needs the assistance of the divine intellect,
which is the source of all that is good, and therefore, lies at the
origin of the felicity which we, our soul, seek. Given that felicity
is the ultimate aim of man in the Summum Bonum, love is the means to
beatitude, which can only be found in God, and Him alone. It is,
therefore, to be found only in the vision and knowledge of the Divine
Being. Reason, which informs the intellect can only choose the object
in which one believes that felicity is found, its function is to
direct an act of volition. Hence, love binds the will: "la sujeccion 
244del amor liga primero la voluntad del amante". Thus, love is a
rapture.
On the problem of divine felicity Hebreo, unlike Ficino, 
maintains that the love of God must be attained Intellectually. On 
this key matter his eclectic position compels him to satisfy two 
fundamentally opposite points of view: that union with God is
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attained through love, or that it is gained by the knowledge one has
of Him. However, since Hebreo understands love to be a rapture of
the intellect, love is always knowledge; thus: ’’Siendo Dios el
verdadero y solo objeto de nuestra felicidad, nosotros le amamos con 
245conocimiento y le conocemos con amor.” This conflation of two 
opposite views as to how man attains Felicity, requires that since 
Hebreo has acknowledged the insufficiency of individual reason and 
intellect, he explicate the movement of divine grace. Owing to this 
he further develops the theory of the two intellects as two means of 
knowledge; the first is analytic and preparative, whereas the second,
which is divine, is unitive:
porque has de saber que de Dios todas las cosas amadas y deseadas se 
hallan en dos modes de conocer: el uno es antes del amor que de El 
se causa, el cual no es conocimiento perfectamente unitivo: el otro 
es despues del amor, el cual conocimiento es fruicion de perfects
unidn.246
The key phrases in the above quotation are "antes del amor" and 
"despues del amor". They indicate fairly explicitly that the first 
kind of knowledge is the recognition of the nature and worth of the 
object apprehended. Xt perceives the object and that which makes it 
desirable. The second kind of knowledge is intelligence of the 
desired object apprehended, which is gained by experience, that is, 
by the subject’s experience of the object in its state of plenitude. 
It can then be correctly inferred that the first kind of knowledge is 
discursive, whereas the second is intuitive. As I have stated 
previously, discursive reason can only prepare the soul, or the 
intellect, for attaining unitive beatitude. The latter is the aim of 
love which Hebreo understands to be copulative union: "Y as£ es en 
toda otra cosa amada y deseada, que en todas es medio el amor y deseo 
que del imperfecto conocimiento nos lleva a la perfecta union, que es
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247el verdadero fin del amor y del deseo...." This enables Hebreo to
establish, like Ficino before him, that the true end of love is union
with God. On this point it may appear to the reader that Hebreo makes
greater concessions than Ficino, for he sometimes seems to imply that
this love can be found on earth. This is not surprising when one 
248considers the pantheistic inclinations of his thought; it is a 
point that distinguishes him from the Christian wtrattadist^*, and 
serves as a constant reminder that he does not work within the
Dionysian-evangelical tradition of his contemporaries. Yet, even this 
difference must be approached with caution. Hebreo‘s tripartite 
division of love enables him to state that divine copulation, or
unitive spiritual love, can be attained while the soul is still on
earth. Even to this he sets considerable limitations, stating that 
this is an exceptional case which can only occur with great difficulty. 
Thus, in spite of his pantheism, Hebreo finds it necessary to contend 
with the problem of the union of the body and the soul. Divine 
copulation requires that the soul leave the body, and therefore, the 
problem of the soul’s immersion in matter remains a prominent
consideration:
Bien es verdad que en esta vida no es muy facil alcanzar la tai 
beatitud, y cuando se pud:L^ese haber, no es muy facil, continuar 
siempre en ella. Y esto porque, mientras vivimos, tiene nuestro 
entendimiento alguna manera d.e vinculo con la materia de este nuestro 
fragil cuerpo; y por esta causa alguno que en esta vida llego a tai 
copulacidn no continuaba siempre en ella, por la ligadura corporeal.249
The exceptional nature of this union with the divine Being is
explicitly described as a gift of divine grace, which involves the 
characteristic illumination of the soul. In Hebreo*s epistemology
it is the soul’s individual intellective reason that is illuminated.
HebreoTs terminology in the description of this process is almost too
specific, for rather than refer to the illumination as the rise of
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the soul, it is for him the uplifting of the rational intellect aided 
by the light of God:
Este amor y deseo tan grande hace que seamos abstrafdos en tanta
contemplacitfn que nuestro entendimiento viene a levantarse de tai 
manera que alumbrado de una gracia divina, sabe a conocer mas alto 
que al humano poder y a la humana especulacion conviene, y llega a 
tai unidn y copulacion con el Sumo Dios que nuestro entendimiento 
se conoce ser antes razon y parte divina que entendimiento en forma 
humana.250
It is implied in this quotation that the intellect is of divine origin, 
and that it is fulfilled by union with its original cause. This raises
the problem of how Hebreo understands the nature and function of the 
soul. This can be clarified by a survey of Hebreo’s various descriptions
of the transition from the individual to the divine intellect.
The above quotation provides two points around which the
philosophy of Hebreo develops. These are the individual intellect’s
limitations and its divine origin. Discursive reason informs the
intellect of the nature of the objects which are apprehended by vision
and imagination. It perceives these objects to be a reflection of 
251the ’’shadow of God” in the Creation. This can only cause the
intellect to rise up towards the original light of God, or to fall 
and lose Itself in the flesh. As I mentioned above, this role is 
normally attributed by other Neoplatonist writers to the soul. It is 
therefore, somewhat unclear how Hebreo understands the position of 
the intellect in relation to the soul. Should his reasoning be that 
the soul is inferior to the individual intellect, then it would have 
to be corporeal. This is not so.
Intellection in the Dialoghi d’Amore is obviously understood
to be an illumination, as I have stated above. This is further
substantiated by Hebreo’s reference to the individual intellect as a
mirror: ’’Porque nuestro entendimiento es un espejo y ejemplo, o por
252decir mejor, una imagen de las cosas reales.” Thus, our intellect,
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that is, potential intellect, is a receptive faculty which is
informed either by the senses mediated by discursive reason, or by
the divine intellect which is Augustinian "right reason". The duality
of the intellect, as agent and potential, can be the source of serious
problems of comprehension for the reader of Hebreo. It is sometimes
unclear when he refers to the intellect, whether he means the potential
or actual intellect. Hence, when he defines the soul as a means
between the intellect and the body: "el anima es medio entre el 
253entendimiento y el cuerpo”, the reader has to understand that
Hebreo considers the soul to be a mean between the actual intellect
and the corporeal world. In this respect, Hebreo repeats a fundamental
Platonic point of view, as defined previously in note 26 above: "l’ame
est 1’intermediate entre le monde intelligible et le monde sensible".
The account which he gives subsequently of the soul’s activities can
only substantiate this. For Hebreo, as for Ficino, the soul has two
faces, one which is inclined to the flesh which provides sensual
knowledge of particulars, and the other which tends to the knowledge
of universals, which is the function of the potential intellect. This
description is fundamental to my purpose, because at this point Hebreo
establishes that the potential intellect is the intellective reason
of the soul. It is this reason which will receive divine reason, by 
254which I understand Augustinian illumination, or "right reason".
It follows from this description that sensorial intellection will 
always be present at the origin of any love whether it be mundane or 
divine "furore”, since particular objects perceived, which inherently 
reflect the shadow of God, can cause the soul to fall to their corporeal 
beauty, or draw them on to the divine good which is at the source of 
this love. Yet, when the soul soars to celestial heights only
intellective reason can be present, since it is the object of divine
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rapture or illumintation. Reason alone which turns only to the lower 
face of the soul can lead to sensual love, whereas reason which turns 
to the contemplation of the spiritual light that animates corporeal 
objects is the source of our spiritual knowledge of the latter, and
when it is aided by divine reason it transcends its limits to attain 
knowledge of God’s Beauty:
La primera cara hacia el entendimiento es la razon intelectiva.,. La 
segunda cara que tiene hacia el cuerpo, es el sentido, que es el 
conocimiento particular de las cosas corporeas... Estas dos caras 
tienen contrarias u opuestas movimientos que, asi como nuestra anima 
con el primer rostro o conocimiento racional hace de lo corp6reo 
incorporeo, as£ con el segundo rostro o conocimiento sensible, 
alleg£ndose a los cuerpos sensitivos y mezclandose con ellos, abrevia 
lo incorporeo en lo corptfreo. Con estas dos maneras de conocimiento 
son conocidas de nuestra anima las hermosuras corporales con la una y 
otra cara, esto es sensitivamente y corporalmente, o racionalmente e 
intelectivamente. Y conforme a cada uno de estos dos conocimientos 
de las hermosuras se causa en el anima el amor de ellas, que es amor 
sensual por el conocimiento sensible y amor espiritual por el 
conocimiento racional.255
By spiritual love, Hebreo understands contemplative love at a human
level. Thus, in themselves, neither sensual nor spiritual love is
actually transcendental, for each is subject to the limits of human
intellection. Although spiritual love is impelled by the intellectual 
beauty of particular objects ("hace de lo corporeo incorporeo"), it 
cannot be said to rise beyond human limits, since intellective reason 
needs the enlightenment of "right reason". This problem is in fact a 
discussion of the movement between the two forms of intellection, 
which is imagination or phantasy. Hence, all intellection is subject to the 
bipolarity of the latter. This will be the object of further 
discussion below, subsequent to Hebreo’s treatment of "heroic love".
The point to be made here is that intellective reason is a receptive 
faculty which lies at the centre of intellection, and the soul which 
is enamoured of the objects it perceives will either abandon intellective 
reason for the flesh, or transcend it for divine love.
192
Hebreo, who had previously described heroic men as: "aquellos
que tuvieron alguna virtud heroica y hicieron actos semejantes a los
divinos y cosas dignas de eterna memoria, como las divinas",^6 gives
a fairly detailed account of ’’heroic love”. El Inca Garcilaso refers
to this passage as a description of the "genero de hombres heroicos”,
that is, "amor hereos”. It is a very positive statement on melancholy
love. Like Aristotle, Hebreo classifies the life of the soul according
to three kinds, the names which he uses for these kinds of lives,
reveal his intentions: bestial, moral, and heroic. The definition
of "heroes" which X have given above (256) is equally applicable to
Hebreo*s description of love that is guided by extraordinary reason.
Ordinary reason tends to the moral preservation of the individual,
whereas the second drives him on to do great things: "Asimismo nos
manda la primera razon procurar lo util y los placeres honestos, y la
segunda nos manda fatigar y trabajar el animo y la persona por las 
✓ 257cosas mas nobles y dignas de ser amadas con razon.” This point is 
particularly important, because it implies that the second form of 
reason, extraordinary reason, moves the individual to "heroic action", 
or as the previous quotation indicated, to "heroic virtue". The 
latter, which impels men to quasi divine acts, as does "melancholia 
generosa" which in Ficinian thought, is the source of the Renaissance 
concept of the great man. Hebreo tells us that these heroic lovers 
surpass sensorial cognition and use it to contemplate the spiritual 
forms present in material bodies, and become enamoured of the former.
A love such as this is evidently spiritual and contemplative:
Estos enderezan el conocimiento sensible al racional como a propio 
fin, y tanto estiman por hermosuras las sensibles con la cara inferior 
cuanto se sacan de ellas las hermosuras racionales con la superior, 
que son las verdaderas hermosuras, segun te he dicho. Y aunque allegan 
el anima espiritual con el rostro inferior a los cuerpos, para tener 
de la hermosura de ellos el conocimiento sensible, en continente levantan 
en movimiento contrario las especies sensibles con la cara superior
193
racional, sacando de ellas las formas y especies inteligibles y
reconociendo ser este el verdadero conocimiento de la hermosura de 
ellas, dejan lo corporeo y sensible como a feo y corteza de lo 
incorporeo o sombra o imagen suya. Y de la manera que enderezan el 
un conocimiento al otro, asi enderezan el un amor al otro, esto es, 
el sensible al inteligible; que tanto aman las hermosuras sensibles 
cuanto el conocimineto de ellas los guia a conocer y amar las 
espirituales insensibles cuanto el conocimiento de ellas los guia a 
conocer y amar las espirituales insensibles a las cuales aman solamente 
como a verdaderas hermosuras y se deleitan en fruicion de ellas y al 
resto de la corporalidad y sensualidad no solamente no le han amor 
ni se deleitan en ella, antes la aborrecen como a fea material y 
huyen de ella como de danoso contrario.
This description of heroic love brings to mind Hughes de Saint Victor’s 
detailed account of the movement of imagination. The remarkable dif­
ference is in Hebreo’s readiness to accept the inherently good nature 
of this movement, which causes him to attribute positive spiritual 
qualities to ”amor hereos”. Various specific points can be made on 
the basis of the above quotation. Heroic, or spiritual, contemplation 
of intelligible forms in corporeal objects is considered to be directed 
to the proper end of man; in Hebreo’s own words ’’propio fin”. It can 
then be reasonably assumed that Hebreo’s concept of the soul rests on 
the belief that it is immortal. This is confirmed in a previous 
discussion on this matter by Hebreo: "si el hombre no fuera 
verdaderamente inmortal, segun el anima intelectiva, que es el
verdadero hombre, no desearan todos los hombres la inmortalidad como 
259lo desean." Thus, Hebreo echoes the fundamental Neoplatonic belief 
in the immortality of the soul, understood to be rational or intellective, 
not vegetal or animal. The intellective soul is understood to be man's 
true nature. In this sense Hebreo confirms the subjacent theme of 
the "dignitas hominis” in his work, and remains consistent with the 
basic tenets of Ficino’s thought.
The second point to be raised concerning the aforementioned 
quotation 258, is.that Hebreo is describing what he explicitly refers 
to as a movement based on perception. The particular trait of this
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movement is that it enables the subject to apprehend the intelligible 
forms or species which animate material, or corporeal, objects. This 
movement is, irrefutably, imagination or phantasy informing the 
particular intellect of the divine reflection in corporeal objects.
It is important to take a close look at Hebreo’s choice of words which 
exposes a dialectically graduated movement. First he equates image 
and divine reflection: ’’corteza de lo incorporeo, o sombra o imagen". 
That which is perceived is beauty or "hermosura", which is seen in 
bodies. These are the shell of that which is not corporeal, in other 
words, that which animates the body. This, in turn, is a shadow, 
which if it represents beauty is reflective of its source. This can 
only be God, as I have already determined concerning Hebreo’s thought. 
Finally, as it is reflected in our potential intellect, which is a 
mirror, that shadow is an incorporeal image of the body perceived.
Thus, the movement described is imagination or phantasy, and like 
"amor hereos" or melancholy, to which it is so closely related, it is 
considered very favourably in Hebreo’s thought. Indeed, it is 
considered to be a spiritual cognitive virtue, as usual, subordinate
to intellective reason:
La imaginacion y fantasia, que comprehende, discieme y piensa las 
cosas de los sentidos, conoce muchos mas actos, oficios y casos 
particulares, graciosos y hermosos que mueven el anima a delectacion 
amorosa, y asi se dice, una hermosa fantasia, un Undo pensamiento, 
una linda invencion. Y mucho mas conoce de lo hermoso la razon 
intelectiva, la cual comprehende gracias y hermosuras universales 
corporeas e incorruptibles en los cuerpos particulares y corruptibles...,
Technically, on the definition of imagination and phantasy Hebreo is 
closer to the Aristotelian definition, and limits its transcendent 
role, which he subsequently attributes more to the intellective reason.
This is a point that does not always remain clear in the course of the 
Dialoghi, since as we will see he does turn to the implications of 
Proclus’ definition, when he refers to phantasy and implicitly
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distinguishes it from imagination.
It is obvious from the function specifically attributed to
imagination that Hebreo does not underestimate the power of corporeal
sensation which informs the intellective soul. Like Ficino before
him, Hebreo clearly states, after having given an ample description
of the transcendent power of beauty, that the corporeal mixture of
the soul is the source of its infelicity: ”la mezcla de las cosas
corporeas impide la felicidad de nuestra anima, privandola, con la
luz sensual del rostro inferior, de la luz intelectual del rostro 
261superior, que es la propia beatitud suya...." His considerations 
on this problem rest entirely on the notion that the proper end of 
man, whose real nature is his intellective soul, is contemplation or 
union in God, which also represents a state of ascesis from the 
material world. Thus, Hebreo states that although God created man 
and woman for the propagation of the species, man’s real purpose is 
to return to paradise. Therefore, he re-asserts his belief that
although man is a composite of flesh and soul, the real nature of
man is not this composite, but the soul itself which is divine in 
origin: ’’Dios hizo al hombre y a la mujer en forma que podian
engendrar, pero el propio fin del hombre no es el engendrar sino el 
felicitarse en la contemplacion y en el para£so de Dios....”^^
Taking into account the limitations of the potential intellect, it is 
evident that the soul’s contemplation will first be directed to the
shadow of God as it is reflected on earth. This is the ”luz sensual
del rostro inferior” to which the soul is bound as we are told in 261
above. It must, therefore, be found in particular beauty. Hence, 
just as Hebreo states that love has its origin in reason, that is, 
in the particular intellect, so does he state that love proceeds from 
Beauty: ’’Yo no te he dicho que el amor consiste en la hermosura, sino
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que procede de ella, y que el amor se halla donde esta la hermosura 
263que lo causa.” Love is not beauty, but as in Ficino, it is a 
264desire for union with the component Beauty-Good, and since the
source of all beauty is God, then love seeks union with God. Hebreo 
is then perfectly justified in his subsequent claim that the greatest 
love is not mundane, or perishable, but angelical love which remains 
in the direct contemplation of God's Beauty:
el faltar la hermosura causa amor y deseo de ella, sino que
principalmente cuando es muy conocido del amante a quien falta, y 
es juzgada por buena, extremada, deseable y bella, entonces la desea 
para gozarla, y cuanto el conocimiento de ella es muy claro en el 
amante tanto es mas intenso el deseo y mas perfecto el amor. Pues 
dime, joh Sofial, Zen quien se halla este conocimiento mas perfecto: 
en el mundo angelico o en el corruptible?2^
Consequently, even in his treatment of Filo's intellectual reaction to 
Sophia's particular beauty, Hebreo is quick to point out that the 
beloved's image is a source of torment for the lover. Like Hughes de 
Saint Victor's metaphor of the shirt, the image is considered to be 
venemous. After an extensive description of the movements of the 
soul, in which he explains the similarity of the soul to the moon, 
thereby establishing a microcosmic elemental relation, Hebreo states 
that if the soul is excessively drawn to the beauty of corporeal 
images it loses its rational control. The result is that the individual 
is subject to the rapture of the flesh, which is insanity, which Hebreo
equates to bestial existence:
Cuando el £nima se inclina fuera de medida a las cosas materiales y 
corporeas y se enloda en ellas; pierde la razon y la luz intelectual 
en todo; porque no solamente pierde la copulacion divina y la 
contemplacicm intelectual, sino tambien su vida activa se hace en 
todo irracional y pura bestial, y la mente o raztfn no tiene lugar 
alguno ni aun en el uso de sus lascivias.266
Corporeal beauty can then be said to have a rapturous quality that 
causes the soul's intellective reason to become enamoured and forget
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its original purpose. Since his metaphor is microcosmic Hebreo gives
a medical explanation of the rapture. He repeats, although in less 
detail, Ficino's theory of the effect of imagination on the vital 
spirits, which described the intense presence of the beloved’s image 
on the mirror of the soul, which resulted in a clouding of the cell 
of phantasy in the forelobe of the brain, and after having consumed 
all the vital clear spirits, caused a puddling of the mirror as long 
as the object was not present to the lover’s sight. Hebreo repeats 
this explanation of the action of the ’’spiriti”, which, indeed, he 
describes as a kind of rapture:
Non e dunque giusta la tua querela, contra di me, che quando tu, o 
Sophia, m’hai veduto rapito dal pensiero senza sentimienti, era a 
1’hor’ mia mente con tutta 1’anima si ritirita a contemplare l’immagine 
di tua belleza,...
Velenosa di tai veleno che manco se li truova remedio, che a 
niuno de corporali toschi, che cosi come il veleno va dritto al cuore, 
e di li non si parte fin’ che habbi consumati tutti i spiriti, quali 
gli vanno dietro, et levando il polsi, et infrigidando gl’estremi, 
leua totalmente la vita, se qualche remedio esteriore non se
gl’aprossima, cosi l’immagine tua e dentro de la mia mente, e di li 
mai si parte atrahendo a se tutte le virtu et spiriti, et con quelli 
insieme la vita totalmente leuerrebe, se non che tua persona esistente 
di fuora, mi recupera gli spiriti e sentimenti levandoli di mano la 
preda per intertenermi la vita.267
This is yet another instance of love understood to be immoderate
cogitation on a particular object, initiated by the movement of 
imagination. As is characteristic of such occurrences, reason loses 
its dominion over the movement of the soul. It is a case of insanity 
brought about by a mundane rapture of the intellect, which Ficino also 
considered to be a kind of insanity, as I have previously indicated 
concerning the "Sixth Discourse" of the Commentarium in Convivium, 
quotation 136. The key to the above passage is that the beloved 
object must always be present. The eye of the soul, which for Hebreo 
is the potential intellect, is brought to contemplate corporeal images,
and constantly requires the presence of the object in order to renew
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the presence of the image on the mirror. As in Ficino, this movement 
of the soul is a distortion of phantasy or imagination, which should 
lead the lover on to divine contemplation. Hebreo, like his predecessors, 
makes a very important point on this matter concerning the role of
reason. He explicitly states that those who have sufficient discretion 
do not allow phantasy to overcome reason: ”No conviene que la fantasia 
impida a la razon en los tales como tu ioh Sofia!Reason is 
therefore overwhelmed and not present when the soul becomes enamoured 
of corporeal objects, but in divine love intellective reason necessarily 
retains its original guiding role by catching intelligible forms on
its mirror and inciting the soul to seek the source of that beauty.
Thus, by illumination in divine rapture the limits of potential 
intellect are transcended, but not absent.
It can consequently be said that reason has two qualities; it 
receives divine illumination, and it polishes the mirror of the soul 
so that it may be illuminated by strengthening volition. Thus, 
individual reason is always subject to rapture; should the soul incline 
to the flesh, it loses its dominion, but if the soul turns to its true
end which is divine contemplation, reason is transcended. This
transcendence is basically complementary, especially prior to
illumination which is its end, because,thenzintellective reason
delights in objects that are proper to the soul, the individual
intelligible forms. Intellective reason tends towards transcendence; 
it is readied for illumination if it acknowledges that the objects of 
its fantasy are but a reflection of the source of its love. When
intellective reason acknowledges a transcendent end, even in particular 
objects, it becomes more than reason, much as Hughes de Saint Victor 
had described the ascent of the soul. Guided by the divine light,
which it perceives reflected on earth, intellective reason moves the
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soul to act heroically, and transforms corporeal objects into their
images in God. It approximates divine Beauty by which the soul prepares
to receive the gift of illumination that brings together intellective
reason and right reason. Extraordinary reason is this movement towards
illumination; it is reason transcending itself as it moves to the 
intellection of intelligible forms.
Ficino had defined both kinds of love, mundane and divine, as
states of mental alienation, or folly. Hebreo repeats this, as the
point of departure for the Dialoghi d’Amore, and even includes in this
concept the theory of the two Venuses, which he seems to take to a 
269much further extreme. Differences between him and his immediate
contemporaries seem to arise not only from his approach to the subject 
of love, but also from his use of language. It is principally in his 
definition of true love that this is evinced; here, the flaws of his 
terminology become acutely noticeable. True love must correspond to 
the true Felicity to which the soul aspires to return. As such, true 
love is love of God, who is also the true end of intellection. The 
human intellect being imperfect, it must be aided by divine grace, 
without this it is subject to fluctuations between sensuality and 
spiritual love of corporeal objects. The reality of the kinds of love 
that are directed to corporeal objects is not denied by Hebreo, as it 
was by Ficino, who implied that human love is not real but a counterfeit, 
even though he grudgingly acknowledged the necessity of procreation.
What Hebreo states is not that love is never ruled by reason, but that
human, or potential reason, acting under the guidance of its own lights 
is doomed to torment, which is a loss of reason’s dominion, because 
of the soul’s position in the body. On this matter, Hebreo is in 
agreement with Ficino and other "trattatisti”. Phantasy or imagination, 
which are good in themselves, because they inform the soul of the
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shadow of God’s beauty, can, by function of their intermediate position, 
beguile reason and entice the soul to corporeal love. Thus, it is
vital that the soul, or intellective reason, which is a potential 
intellect, recognize that this corporeal beauty is a reflection
of intelligible Beauty. In order to do so, the potential intellect 
must turn by contrition to the agent intellect which will guide it.
Hence, as I have stated previously, it turns to the light of ’’right 
reason” in the Augustinian sense, as it is reflected in this world.
The awkwardness of Hebreo’s vocabulary on this matter is evident:
El perfecto y verdadero amor, cual es el que yo te tengo, es el padre 
del deseo e hijo de la razon y en mi lo produjo la derecha razon 
cognoscitiva, que conociendo haber en ti virtud, ingenio y gracia de 
no menos grande atraccion, mi voluntad, deseando tu persona, que 
realmente fue juzgada por la razon ser en toda cosa bonfsima y 
excelente y digna de ser amada, se aficiono; esta aficion y amor 
hizo convertirme en ti, engendrandome deseo que tu te conviertas en 
mi.270
In this intitial definition of true love a possible source of confusion
is the reference to "right reason", "la derecha razon cognoscitiva",
which the Italian edition of 1535 registers as "la retta ragione
conoscitiva". This is not a reference to right reason as it is
found in Ficino, it is not Augustinian illumination. To the contrary,
Hebreo is here referring to natural reason acting alone. He is using
the term "right reason" in its later scholastic sense, as it is
frequently used by Ockhamists. It is intended to mean "by correct 
272reasoning", that is, reason arrived at by a logical judgement. As 
can be observed in the above quotation, after having stated that his 
love is the product of a correct reasoning, he lists his arguments. 
Further usage of this term in its Ockhamist sense is evident throughout 
the text of the Dialoghi d*Amore. A comparison of this passage with 
Hebreo’s definition of bestial love contrasted with human or mixed love .
is quite enlightening:
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Amore bestiale, amore humano, e amore divino, chiama bestiale 1*amore 
escessivo de le cose corporee, non temperato dall’honesto, ne misurato 
della retta ragione, cosi ne le dilettationi soperchie carnali, come 
ne la cupidita, e avaritia dell’utile, e altre fantastiche ambitioni, 
pero che mancando in tutte queste la moderatione e_ temperamento dell1 
intelletto humano restano amori d’uno animale senza intelletto, et 
veri bestiali, et chiama amore humano quello che e circa le virtu 
temperatiue di tutti gl’atti sensuali, et fantastichi d’esso huomo et 
moderanti la lorro delettatione; Il qual* amore per havere la materia 
corporea, et la forma intellettuale, et honesta, il chiama amore humano 
per essere composto 1’huomo di corpo et intelletto; Et chiama amore 
diuino 1’amore de la sapientia, et dell’ eterae cognitioni, il quale 
per esser tutto intellettuale, honesto, et tutto formale senza compagnia 
di materia alcuna corporea; il chiama Diuino, pero che In questo solo 
gl’huomini sonno participi de la diuina belleza.^73 (underlining mine)
In this quotation divine love, which should be explicitly related to
right reason in its Augustinian sense, is not. Instead, one finds
that it is associated with measure and right reasoning used to restrain 
bestial love. In a subsequent phrase this function is attributed to 
’’the moderation and temperance of human intellect”* As in his definition 
of true love, Hebreo uses the term "right reason" to refer to correct 
reasoning which moderates or tempers the activity of the soul, and is 
directed to the proper preservation of the body. Hebreo confirms this 
in his definition of ordinary reason: "El intento de la primera es 
de regir y conservar al hombre en vida honesta, de donde todas las
otras cosas se enderezan a este fin; y todo lo que a la buena vida 
humana impide, lo desvia y reprueba la razon." Clearly then, this 
kind of "right reason" does not have a transcendental function, it 
only helps the Individual make sound moral choices.
On the basis of these premisses the conclusions reached by
Hebreo concerning reason are logical. Natural reason can shew the 
lover the proper object which he must love. It can discern and judge
individual beauty, but more than that is needed to raise the soul to 
divine contemplation. This entails a logical concatenation. If love 
is a desire.to unite with the beautiful object, and if that particular 
object sensorially perceived is bound in flesh, it follows that
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object so intently that it does not recognize the source of that
beauty, will lead the soul to seek union with the object, and since 
the object is physical, that union will be of a physical nature. This 
is intellective reason that turns its face strictly to the information
that it receives from the senses. If it does so intellective reason
ceases to tend to the right preservation of the individual, and thus,
it looses its dominion over the lover’s will. In this situation both
the soul and its eye, which is intellective reason, fall. It is then 
true that love becomes a state of rapture, or alienation, beyond the 
control of natural reason. On the other hand, Divine love Is also a 
state of rapture; since the agent intellect is greater than potential 
intellect, natural reason is raised and transcended by divine reason. 
Thus, Hebreo correctly states that love is a state of rapture, or 
alienation, beyond the control of natural reason, or the potential 
intellect, regardless of whether this love is virtuous or non­
virtuous: ”el desenfrenamiento no es propio del amor lascivo; antes
tiene una misma propiedad con cualquiera eficaz y grande amor sease 
275honesto o deshonesto.” The difference between honest or dishonest
love lies in that all love in which natural reason, or potential 
intellect, is not turned towards the light of the agent intellect is 
a kind of insanity, as Ficino had defined it.
The key to Hebreo’s reasoning is not that he condones love as 
a torment when it is dishonest, but that both kinds of love are 
affected by ’’furore”, worldly or divine. Dishonest love is a 
misdirection of natural reason which does not recognize the source of
the beauty it perceives. As such, both kinds of love are manifestations
of melancholy. This is evident in the passages immediately following
natural reason, acting on its own light and turned to that particular
Hebreo’s definition of true love. Hence, in a description of the
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effects of love Hebreo explicitly refers to the source of these loves
as ’’furor”. The picture which he traces of the lover is that of a
melancholic individual. In order to understand this passage correctly,
that is to say, in its context, one has to realize that this description
is made prior to the introduction of the concept of "extraordinary
reason”, and it corresponds to the portrait of melancholy as a negative
quality, which is to say, an illness. To the contrary "extraordinary
reason" is "melancolia generosa", which is the quality of heroes and 
276great men, as is evident from my previous discussion of "heroic 
love" in Hebreo (quotations 256 to 258). Thus, what this description 
of the melancholy lover has in common with "melancolia generosa", is 
that it has the potential to become a heroic virtue, and that it is a
state of "furore":
el verdadero amor a la razon y a la persona hace fuerza con admirable 
violencia e increible furor, y mas que otro impedimento humano perturba 
la mente donde esta el juicio, y hace perder la meraoria de toda otra 
cosa y de s£ solo la llena, y en todo hace el hombre ajeno de si 
mismo.277 (underlining mine)
Up to this point Hebreo is describing the state of folly engendered 
by immoderate cogitation on the beloved object, which in this case is 
indeterminate. The effects which he associates with this rapture are 
normally associated with "melancolia negra", which is the illness of 
sensual love. They are, however, sufficiently unspecific to be 
attributable to any form of intense contemplation:
Hacele enemigo de placer y de companra, amigo de soledad, melancolico, 
lleno de pasiones, rodeado de penas, atormentado de affliccion, 
martirizado de deseo, sustentado de esperanza, instigado de desesperacion, 
fatigado de pensamientos, congojado de crueldad, afligido de sospechas, 
asaetado de celos, atribulado sin descanso, trabajado sin reposo, 
acompattado siempre de dolor, lleno de suspiros, de respectos y desdenes, 
que jamas le faltan.^78
In their context these traits of the melancholy lover are consequent 
to a loss of natural reason. It is at this point that Hebreo alters
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the direction of his logic. This love, which overpowers the will, can 
be sensual; however, he immediately points out that love that is born 
of reason, that is, that has been chosen by correct reasoning, is not 
satisfied by sensual delight because its proper function is to seek 
its end in that which is spiritual. This leads him to describe what 
is essentially ’’heroic love”. The torment which the lover endures is 
not caused by lust, but by the presence of the soul in the body which 
reflects the soul’s beauty, and this situation renders complete 
penetration or union between the souls of the lover and the beloved
impossible:
Porque el tai amor es deseo de union perfects del amante con la persona 
amada, la cual no puede ser sino con la total penetracion del uno en 
el otro. Esto en los &nimos que son espirituales es posible, porque 
los espfritus incorporeos con los mentales y eficacfsimos efectos pueden 
conpenetrarse... Pero en los diversos cuerpos que cada uno de ellos 
requiere propio lugar seftalado, esta tai union y penetracion no se 
puede alcanzar, respecto de la que se desea, deja despues de alcanzada, 
mas ardiente el deseo de aquella union que perfectamente no se puede 
conseguir. Y procurando siempre la mente del amante la enters 
conversion en la persona amada, deja la propia, viviendo siempre con 
mayor afliccion y pena por el defecto de la union, la cual ni la razon, 
ni la voluntad, ni la prudencia pueden limitar ni resistir.279
The perfect union which is referred to above has to be of a spiritual 
nature. It seems to me that Hebreo’s reasoning is that the noble 
purpose sought in this love, with its very impossibility, endows it 
with a heroic dimension. It is love which seeks a spiritual end since 
it is drawn to the spiritual beauty of the beloved. Thus, this love 
which is governed by extraordinary reason seeks an end in the shadow 
of Beauty, and it is doomed to failure because it recognizes only 
imperfectly the source of its passion. Extraordinary reason is 
therefore not right reason, but reason moved by the light of right reason 
towards love of the divine through beauty which is perceived in 
particular objects. In this sense it is reason yearning for right 
reason. It predisposes the lover for divine rapture. Hebreo can
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rightly say that extraordinary reason is far more worthy than ordinary
280reason, because it is more than natural reason; it is a transcendent
reason.
The two ensuing dialogues of Hebreo’s work are directed to the
didactic end of making the lover realize the true aim and source of
his love. The concluding paragraphs of the Dialoghi d*Amore confirm
this intention. Although Hebreo had previously pointed out the divine
nature of beauty as it is perceived in this world, it is here that
the various strands of his reasoning come together in a defense of
divine love. In fairly explicit terms, Hebreo explains that the beauty
of the beloved draws the lover upwards to the apprehension of the
divine face or image. Even though Hebreo states that divine rapture
transcends phantasy, the spiritual beauty to which he refers, and which
serves as a catalyst for this love, is inevitably anchored in the
perception of the ’’image” of the beloved. Imagination is then at the
origin of Hebreo’s description of love. This is rendered particularly
true by the very fact that his entire construct is based on the premise
that the soul is made in the image of God: ’’Siendo nuestra anima 
281imagen pintada de la suma hermosura." This concept is axiomatic
to the lover’s experience of the beloved’s beauty, since beauty is
the manner in which the body reflects the soul. The beloved is,
therefore, an image of divine beauty: "porque aquella persona es 
282imagen de la divina hermosura." The function of this beauty is
not to be an end in itself; it serves to recall to the lover’s soul
that it itself proceeds from Divine Beauty: "Y la imagen de aquella
persona amada en la mente del amante aviva con su hermosura la 
283hermosura divina latente." Through contemplation the lover is 
drawn upwards to a state of quasi-divine rapture: "Y por esto llega
el amante a ser tan intenso, ardiente y eficaz que roba los sentidos,
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la fantasia y toda la mente, como lo haria esa hermosura divina cuando 
retirase a sf en contemplacion al dnima humana. The problem of
grace acting directly, that is to say, illuminating the lover, still 
remains. As in Hughes de Saint Victor, the movement of the rational 
soul towards God, also brings God to move downwards towards the soul. 
Thus, love of particular beauty is transcended:
no puedes negar que la suma hermosura divina, que es mayor y m£s 
excelente que todas en infinito, no sea atraida del amor de una mente 
humana baja y finita^ si ella le ama a reamarla y a retirarla en su ^35 
felicfsima delectacion unitiva mediante el amor que aquella le tiene.
By the love that we have of His Creation, we are drawn to God, and He 
to us. This mystic vision has strong pantheistic overtones in Hebreo’s 
thought, as I have noted above. Yet, this is the basis of the 
Dialoghi d’Amore, which presents a theory of love which is more dualist
than Ficino’s.
Although it is not specifically conceived of in a Christian 
context, Hebreo’s theory of love is directed towards a predominantly 
Christian public, and like that of Ficino, it sets its ultimate goal 
in a mystical union with God. This confirms Hebreo’s definition of 
the proper end of man which is, to seek contemplative union. This 
definition is also affected by a conception of the nature of the soul 
that is intimately associated with the ’’dignitas hominis”, the soul 
is of divine origin and is the nature of man. Contemplation, in its
various manifestations, is then central to Hebreo’s discussion of love. 
As I have noted previously, love is always a ’’furore" in Hebreo’s 
system. The point of departure for his description of the lover is 
based on the standard ’’mediaeval" conception of melancholy as 
"melancolia negra". This is altered by the introduction of the 
corrective principle of extraordinary reason which is the source of 
"melancolia generosa” and is a predominant factor in Hebreo’s positive
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understanding of ’’amor hereos" as heroic love. Now, Hebreo does not, 
to my knowledge, introduce all the complexities of Aristotle's 
Problem XXX, i. in one central explicit discussion. However, this 
does not overrule the strong possibility that he was very conscious 
of all their implications. Hebreo was undoubtedly familiar with 
Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium, and consequently should have known 
the fundamental concepts of melancholy, if not their sources. A point 
of reference in Hebreo’s Dialoghi d’Amore for understanding his
vision of the two kinds of "furore" is his discussion of the cosmic
influences of Saturn. He devotes an extensive passage to the
bipolarity of Saturn, which he associates with melancholy, and, hence, 
with contemplation:
Hace los hombres en quien domina melancolicos, tristes, pesados y 
tardos y de color de tierra, inclinados a la agricultura, edificios 
y oficios terrenos; y el planeta domina tambien todas estas cosas 
terrenas,... Denies de esta, de grande ingenio, profunda cogitacidn, 
ciencia verdadera, consejos rectos y constancia de animo, por la 
mixtura de la naturaleza, del padre celeste con la madre terrena. Y 
finalmente, de la parte del padre da la divinidad del anima, y por 
parte de la madre la fealdad y ruina del cuerpo.286
This quotation sums up the spiritual evolution of the lover described 
in the Dialoghi d’Amore, from being an insane individual prone to 
jealousy and torment, to a beatific union. The contrary nature of 
Saturn in this passage is evident. The interesting point is that, 
although Saturn is not directly linked with love, one notes that 
after having pointed out the negative aspects of "melancolia negra", 
Hebreo passes directly onto the traits of "melancolia generosa" which 
evince the noble powers of the soul, and that the opposition between 
the two is immediately associated with the duality of the human form. 
This duality is associated with "Saturn-melancholy” and the earthly 
element, opposed to "Saturn-melancholy" father of the soul’s divinity. 
Here the two aspects of Saturn are brought together; Saturn as a
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generator of life is associated with the figure of the father who 
imparts the spirit which animates matter, and as the earthy element
Saturn is the corruptible matter which receives the spirit and is 
also considered to be the mother figure. Similarly, the two kinds of 
melancholy represent these two directions which Saturn can take. Hence, 
just as ’’melancolia generosa” is the source of all noble aspirations 
that stem from profound cogitation, or contemplation, turned to 
spiritual ends, so is extraordinary reason, which is reason moving the 
individual soul back to its origins. It is, therefore, contemplative 
reason that turns the soul to the light of God. Hebreo’s assimilation 
of Ficino’s theory of the ’’spiriti” combined with the concept of 
melancholy, serves to articulate a theory of love in which imagination 
and phantasy play a key role in raising the soul to its place of origin. 
This love,*heroic love”, which is guided by contemplative reason turning 
towards the illumination of right reason, has the same ultimate 
intention as that of Ficino; were it a Christian work, one would have 
to say that it has an evangelical intention. It seeks to turn the 
attention of man to God by awakening his consciousness of the presence 
of grace in nature.
Hebreo’s Dialoghi d’Amore are, therefore, quite compatible 
with the spirit that animates the works of his Christian humanist
contemporaries. Although his use of technical terms differs, it can 
be said that reason does, in fact, guide love in his Dialoghi d'Amore. 
The role of reason in Hebreo’s work is basically not that different 
from that which we find in Bembo’s Gli Asolani. It will suffice for
the purpose of our discussion to turn to the third book of Gli Asolani, 
that is, to the speech of Lavinello, which has a profound influence on 
the Cortegiano and Garcilaso and Boscan, in order to understand just
how Bembo conceived of the role of reason. However, in order to
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establish a proper perspective one has to understand the positions of
Perrotino and Gismondo. Before entering into the particulars it is 
best to sum up the three points of view, as they are traditionally 
understood. Perrotino discusses love as mediaeval moralists do; it 
is considered to be a source of sorrow, because it is lust. Gismondo 
articulates an Epicurean praise of love which is diametrically opposed 
to Perrotino’s speech. Lavinello’s point of view begins by conceding 
that both Perrotino and Gismondo are right, and turns to the tale of 
the hermit in order to show them that they are also wrong because they 
have failed to acknowledge the real source of their love.
Perrotino’s speech can best be understood to be a description 
of love as ’’melancolia negra”. It is love as a mundane folly, and it 
is treated as a kind of insanity, a point which Gismondo repeatedly
turns to in order to establish that Perrotino*s love is not love.
This attitude basically corresponds to Ficino’s description of bestial 
love, but it should be noted that in Lavinello’s speech Bembo does not 
entirely condemn Perrotino. The latter’s love is clearly defined in 
his own description of the lover’s immoderate cogitation:
Che comunque s’addormenta il corpo, corre 1’animo e rientra subitamente 
ne suoi dolori; e con immaginazioni paurose, e con piu nuove guise 
d’angustia tiene i sentimenti sgomentati insidiosamente e tribolati: 
onde o si turba il sonno e rompesi appena incomunicato, o se pure il 
corpo fiacco e fievole, si come di quello bisognoso, il si ritiene, 
sospira il vago cuore sognando; triemano gli spiriti solleciti, duolsi 
1’anima maninconiosa, piangono gli occhi cattivi awivezzi a non ^gy 
mendormendo che vegghiando la immaginazion fiera e triste seguire.
The immoderate cogitation of the lover is bent on the imagination’s 
obsession with the corporeal image of the beloved. Perrotino’s 
description of the lover’s torment corresponds to that of "melancolia 
negra”. Melancholy and imagination, which is the source of the former, 
have the negative effect of robbing the lover of his reason, or as 
Hughes de Saint Victor would have it, reason becomes excessively
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enamoured of the image it perceives. The description of the effects
of that folly does not entirely follow that of mediaeval moralists 
such as Andreas Capellanus, but echoes again Ficino’s theory of 
phantasy distorted by a clouding of the vital spirits. This description 
also corresponds with Hebreo‘s portrait of the lover subjected to
torment when he follows the dictates of natural reason alone. In all
of these cases imagination misdirected is the source of ’’melancolia 
negra”.
Gismondo’s repudiation of Perrotino’s definition of love as 
an illness, is based on the notion that love is a natural affection
which is good when it is guided by reason. Imagination in this context 
is granted a much greater function, because it is the source of the 
lover’s joy. In this sense, it is love that proceeds from vision, 
and therefore, claims to be originally contemplative. However, as in 
the texts of the mediaeval moralists in which irony determines the 
authorial intention, one has to consider what is being contemplated
and to what end. As one can recall, Ficino had made an extensive case
concerning the nature of beauty as an intelligible form, and gone to 
particular pains to contrast his definition which is based on the 
immortality of the soul, with the standard Stoic definition, which 
considered beauty to be based on the harmonious relation of parts.^^
In this sense beauty was considered to be a physical accident of the
object perceived. This position is contrary to that of Ficino.
Gismondo’s understanding of beauty corresponds to the Stoic conception,
and also to the description of beauty and imagination found in 
289Andreas Capellanus’ De Amore. It is described not as imagination, 
which it ”de facto” purports to be, but like in the De Amore, as a 
thought (pensieri-cogitatio):
Le quali dolcezze tuttavia quante sieno, non diro io gia: che non
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farei a raccontarle piu bastante, che io mi fossi a noverar le stelle 
del cielo; ma quali se noi vorremo in qualche parte dirittamente 
riguardare; quanto diletto e da credere che sia dun gentile amante il 
correre alia sua donna in un punto col pensiero, e mirarla, per molto 
che egli le sia lontano, ad una ad una tutte le sue belle parti 
ricercando? Quanto poi ne’ costumi di lei reintrato la dolcezza 
considerare la cortesia, la leggiadria, il senno, la virtu, 1’animo,296e le sue belle parti?
This interpretation of the lover’s meditation on the lady is basically 
sensual. Although it refers to the praises of the lady’s moral virtue, 
this is understood as pertaining to the courtly etiquette that goes 
with the ’’cortesia” and makes the lady all the more desirable. The 
aim of this contemplation of the lady is sensual and it ultimately 
requires the physical presence of the lady. Some concessions are 
made beyond the physical aspirations of this love, but they are
subordinate to the procreative ends of the lover. The function of
reason, as it is understood by Gismondo, is to restrain the excessive 
sensuality of the lover. Gismondo turns to the standard explanation
of the two faces of the soul in order to establish the differences
between lust and his sensual love guided by reason:
Sono adunque due, si come di sopra s’e detto le strade dell’animo o 
Donne; l’una della ragione, perlaquale ogni naturale movimento 
s’incammina; 1’altra della perturbazioni, per cui hanno i non naturali 
a loro traboccamenti la via.291
Reason used in this way is not transcendental; it is directed strictly 
to the preservation of the species. This is simply natural reason.
The role attributed to it in the second book of Gli Asolani is not
incompatible to that which it has in Hebreo’s Dialoghi d*Amore. What 
can be logically argued, however, is that Bembo devotes a larger section 
of his work to the defense of this aspect of love than does Hebreo, 
undoubtedly because it was a position in defense of love with which 
he expected his readers to be more familiar, and which, after having 
exposed it, he could undermine better in Lavinello’s speech.
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Nevertheless, this does not affect substantially the common background
present in both Hebreo and Bembo.
Perrotino and Gismondo expressed two extreme points of view
concerning love, the former describing it as an illness and the latter
as a boon. Lavinello’s point of view is intermediate; it accepts that
love can be either good or evil according to the end to which man uses 
292it. Perrotino and Gismondo’s statements concerning love are 
misleading, because for them love does not have a transcendental end. 
Thus, Bembo’s introduction to book three of Gli Asolani sets the tone 
for Lavinello’s speech by focusing the attention of the reader on two 
points, the immortality of the soul and our reason’s„insufficiency. 
Perrotino was conscious of the soul’s immortality and divine nature, 
but love, which he understands to be physical, seems incompatible with 
the soul’s dignity. Perrotino’s view is excessively dualist and 
he is not conscious of the presence of grace in nature, and hence 
misdirects his love. This is the object of Bembo’s statements on the 
insufficiency of natural reason, which without the guidance of faith, 
or the light of right reason, cannot perceive properly the spiritual 
essence of things which lies hidden by nature in the material forms: 
’’che ci tenga la pura midolla delle cose cosi riposta, e di mille 
menzonge, quasi di mille buccie, coperta e fasciata.” The problem 
of discerning the ’’pure marrow" of things, that is, their spiritual 
essence, is an evangelical problem (see note 59) of seeking grace in 
nature. The reader’s attention is turned towards a different question 
of epistemology than that concerning Perrotino’s and Gismondo‘s theory 
of love. Difficulty in perceiving the spiritual participation of 
bodies in grace, arises not from a flaw in these bodies, but out of 
the weakness of our reason or judgement:
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che la debolezza de nostri giudizi e molta; ... Che se alia debolezza 
de nostri giudizj s’aggiugne la oscurita del vero, che naturalmente 
pare che sia in tutte le cose, vedranno chiaro questi cotali niuna 295 
altra differenza essere tra essi, e quelli, che di nulla cercano....
Bembo clearly understands human judgement, ’’giudizio ”, to be natural 
reason. In this sense, it is the equivalent of Leone Hebreo’s ’’retta
j1 ragione”,. as a logical judgement whose validity is limited to the
immediate, or untranscendental, circumstance. As such, it is necessary 
that natural reason seek the enlightenment of right reason in order to 
find the exact truth, which is a spiritual truth beyond the reach of 
the eye of flesh. Hence, natural reason turns to the immanent light 
that animates bodies and is perceived only with the eye of the soul.
The weakness of natural reason which is referred to above is that by 
its intranscendental nature it remains attached to corporeal objects, 
and is subject to incline to the imperfection of matter. This weakness 
can only be overcome when reason turns entirely to the light of faith.
Lavinello’s speech concerns this turning of reason, and the 
arguments are developed along two principal lines, that form two 
distinct sections of the speech. The first is a praise of human 
contemplative love, which Hebreo would equate with moral love. The 
other is an exhortation to love of God, involving an extensive 
apology for the love of the divine essence present in corporeal objects;
in this sense it is the ’’heroic love” of Hebreo that turns the souls
of men towards the love of God. The latter, which is the more important 
of the two, is the message of evangelical love. Thus, as in Hebreo, 
one finds that Bembo actually divides love into four kinds: sensual, 
mixed or human, contemplative, and divine. Contemplative love can be 
broken down into two kinds, corporeal contemplation, and incorporeal 
contemplation. One can, therefore, say that without doing so 
explicitly, Bembo actually follows the Ficinian divisions. Contemplative
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love in the first part of Lavinello’s speech depends on reason and
will, and in particular on the latter. Like Hebreo, and Ficino before
him, Lavinello defines love as a desire: ’’ogni amore, ed ogni disio
sono quel medesmo e 1’uno e l’altro. E questi sono in noi di due 
296maniere solamente, o naturali, o di nostra volonta." This desire 
is subject to choice, and the latter is controlled by natural reason. 
Lavinello’s argument is that the quality of the desire, or love, is 
determined by the correct judgement that the individual makes of the
object of his love, which affects his choice. Desires are of two
kinds, as the quotation above indicates. Natural desires are those 
that are directed to the preservation of the individual. They are good 
as long as they are not abused. Desires of the will can incline the
soul to good or evil, because they involve a choice which is based on 
human reason, which is inherently defective. Thus, desire may be good 
or bad according to the goal set by the will:
... perciocche la nostra volonta puo ingannarsi, e piu sovente il fa, 
che io non vorrei, e buoni, e rei esser possono altresi, come sono i 
fini, a cui ella dirizza il disio.... Perche esso, e buono, e reo 
esser puo secondo la qualita del fine, che dalla nostra volonta gliS date.297 4 8
The quality of the end determines that of the desire. It is on the
basis of this premiss that Bembo recalls that man was created to 
fulfil a more lofty end than animals, and therefore, his end is
transcendent, it must fulfil the nature of the soul.
This forms the theoretical background from which Lavinello turns 
to a direct criticism of Gismondo’s description of beauty. Like 
Ficino, Lavinello stresses the importance of the first two senses, 
sight and hearing, which are the most spiritual ones. Thus, he embarks 
on a defense of the definition of love as a desire for beauty, and
adopts the definition of beauty as being primarily intellectual, not
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physical as Gismondo had claimed. The latter’s notion of beauty is 
sensual, and this conforms with his conception of love. It is not 
like the virtuous love of Lavinello which is a tempered desire for 
beauty of the mind as it is reflected by the body. This is what
Lavinello explains to Gismondo:
La qual belleza che cosa e, se tu con tanta diligenza per lo addietro 
avessi d’intendere procacciato, con quanta ci hai le parti della tua 
bella donna voluto jeri dipignere sottilmente; ne come fai, ameresti 
ti gia; ne quello, che ti cerchi amando, aresti agli altri lodato, 
come hai.... E adunque il buono amore desiderio di bellezza tale, 
quale tu vedi, e d’animo parimente, e di corpo; ed a lei siccorae a 
suo vero obietto, bate e stende le sue ali per andare. Al qual volo 
egli due finestre ha; l'una che a quella dell’animo lo manda, e questa 
xe l’udire; 1’altra che a quella del corpo lo porta, e questa e il 
vedere.298
This love then partakes equally of the body and the soul, like Hebreo’s 
moral love it is not transcendental: "Hay otros que mas verdaderamente 
pueden llamarse hombres, porque la cara del anima que esta hacia el 
entendimiento esta no menos llena de lumbre que la que esta hacia el 
cuerpo.” Lavinello’s love depends extensively on sight and hearing, 
and is, therefore, predominantly contemplative. One has to note, 
however, that Bembo leaves certain aspects of this contemplation 
somewhat unclear, for although Lavinello’s love is directed to the 
soul of the lady, sight remains anchored in the corporeal form of 
beauty. This love is therefore imperfect and not truly virtuous.
Bembo awaits until the speech of the hermit in order to make the 
transition from the corporeal image to the incorporeal image, although 
the poems that are found between the two sections provide some 
preparation for his definite statement on the divine nature of beauty.
The theory of love presented by Lavinello lies between the two 
extremes possible in love; it is tempered love. As such it serves to 
turn the soul towards the enjoyment of beauty and is a first step in
the preparation of the soul to receive illumination. It fulfils the
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capacities of natural reason to their limit; beyond this, the lover 
must be moved by the light of right reason. For Lavinello all love 
that is not contemplative is evil, and he only grudgingly admits 
procreation:
Perche se il buono amore, come io dissi, e di bellezza disio, e se 
alia bellezza altro di noi e delle nostresentimenta non ci scorge, 
che l’occhio, e 1’orrechio, ed il pensiero; tutto quello, che e dagli 
amanti con gli altri sentimenti cercato fuori di cio che per sostegno 
della vita si procaccia, non e buono amore, ma e malvagio: e tu in 
questa parte amatore di bellezza non sarai, o Gismondo, ma di sozze
Gismondo’s love is considered to be love of the flesh, which is matter, 
and therefore, ugly. The implicationjin Lavinello’s speech that beauty 
is animated by the soul^ is that love is directed strictly to that 
particular source of beauty. The poems that follow do much to clarify 
Lavinello’s position and its posterior implications. In particular a 
passage in the third poem ”Da poi ch'Amor in tanto non si stanca” 
articulates two basic propositions inherent to Lavinello’s theory; 
that the soul is in a fallen state, and that the vision of the lady 
causes the soul to recall its former state of grace prior to its 
’’descensus ad inferos". These are the elements that temper the lover:
E cosi d’ogni parte si disgombra
Per lo vostro apparir noja, e tormento.
L’altro e, quando parlar madonna sento:
Che d’ogni bassa impresa mi ritoglie;
E quel laccio discoglie,
Che gli animi stringendo a terra inclina 
Tai; ch’io mi fido ancora,
Quand’io sard di questo career fora,
Far di me stesso a la morte rapina;301
This love aims to transcend death, and therefore, to free the soul from
necessity, since matter is subject to death, but the soul is not. This 
is the underlying spiritual element in Lavinello’s love. It rests, 
however, on a contradiction, because it does not clearly identify the 
source of this beauty, and consequently, it is subject to the
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vicissitudes of natural reason. The hermit’s function is to clarify 
this point, by fulfilling Ficino’s intent to make men aware of the 
source of that beauty as the only true end of their love.
The hermit’s speech is in keeping with the intentions of
Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium, but it leaves the reader with a
sense of incompletion. A most important aspect of Gli Asolani’s
shortcomings is that as a social treatise it fulfils the obligation
of showing the reader the correct path of love, but at no time does
it actually embark on an explanation of the complex problem of ’’furore”,
or divine illumination, and ’’melancolia generosa”. The elements are
there, and exemplified in the person of the hermit, but they are not
explained. Thus, Bembo will go to extensive lengths to show how the
lover must move towards God, but perhaps for reasons of orthodoxy he 
302subtly omits any reference to God’s movement towards man. It can be
argued that illumination is the ultimate aim of the hermit’s description 
of heroic love, as it is found in Castiglione’s ficticious speech of 
Bembo which is based on a reading of Gli Asolani. Nevertheless, 
illumination is discreetly reserved for the hermit whose ascesis causes 
him to lead an evangelical life of charity and poverty, and although 
his illumination is not described, he is a contemplative individual, 
and during his conversation with Lavinello he has moments of ecstasy.
He is,then, the living example of the superior melancholic to be
imitated. He is Bembo’s Christian Socrates.
Lavinello’s speech and his description of love had placed great 
emphasis on reason as a guiding factor in his human contemplative love. 
The hermit’s speech serves to urge the reader to place his reason in 
the guidance of divine light, that is, to acquiesce to faith. Unlike 
Perrotino and Gismondo, Lavinello made no references to imagination,
although his definition of love based on the two spiritual senses
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implied the participation of imagination. It is on the basis of the
problem of imagination that the hermit corrects Perrotino and Gismondo, 
and develops the spiritual aspects of Lavinello’s theory. In order 
to do so, the hermit returns to the fundamental points raised by 
Bembo’s introduction of the third book, the insufficiency of natural 
reason in comparison to God’s Providence:
Tanto e largo e cupo il pelago della divina prowidenza, o Figliuolo, 
che la nostra umanita in esso mettendosi ne termine alcuno vi truova, 
ne in mezzo puo fermarsi:, perciocche vela di mortale ingegno tanto 
oltre non porta; e fune di nostro giudicio, per molto che ella vi si 
stenda, non basta a pigliar fondo: in maniera, che bene si veggono 
molte cose tutto di awenire volute, ed ordinate da lei: ma come 
ella awengano, o a che fine, noi non sappiamo: si come ora, in questo 
mio conoscerti, diche ti maravigli, e awenuto.303 (underlining is mine)
The hermit begins his speech by pointing out to Lavinello a very
important factor in the insatisfactory nature of his contemplation of
corporeal objects, that our humanity, that is, our rational soul,
cannot fathom the bounds of things of its own power; nor can it rest
in the middle. The latter is in fact the position advocated by 
304Lavinello. Love therefore cannot rest on the guidance of reason 
alone. The soul’s instability, and the weakness of reason, will 
eventually cause this love to incline to the possession of the corporeal 
objects it contemplates.
Lavinello’s definition of love as a desire for beauty is 
consequently questioned by the hermit. It is considered to be the 
source of corruption in his love, because desire involves a lack of
the object that is coveted, and hence, a propensity to possess or
unite with that object, which in this case is particular corporeal
beauty. The hermit, therefore, denies the validity of this definition
in order to re-assert the more orthodox definition that love is an
affection of the will, and not a desire. This, of course, is not 
essentially contradictory to the theory of Ficino, and represents only
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a temporary shift in emphasis in Gli Asolani. Lavinello*s definition 
does not delineate clearly enough the role played by imagination or
phantasy, and how the lover is to distinguish between corporeal and
incorporeal beauty. As we have seen above (298), Lavinello attempted
to distinguish on the basis of the senses. The distinction drawn by
the hermit is made by discussing the problem of intellection and
volition. As faculties of the soul both are divided into three parts,
in which imagination is "the last echo of the intellect”, as Proclus 
305has defined phantasy. Imagination is then again the ambivalent 
source of love, which can be either good or bad. In a parallel 
construction love is also conceived of as the last vestige of the will 
equivalent to imagination:
Perciocche v’e primieramente l’intelleto; che e la parte de lei acconcia, 
e presta alio ’ntendere, e puo nondimeno ingannarsi: V’e per secondo 
lo intendere, che io dico: il quale non sempre ha luogo; che non sempre 
s’intendono le intelligibili cose: anzi non 1’ha egli, se non tanto, 
quanto esso intelletto si muove, e volge con profitto d’intorno a quello, 
che a lui e propos to per intender si e per sapersi: Ewi dopo queste 
ultimamente, e di lorno nasce, quella cosa o_ luce, £ immaginne, £ 
verita, che dir la vogliamo; che a noi bene intesa si dimostra, frutto 
e parto delle due primiere: laqual tuttavia se e male intesa, ne 
verita, ne immagine, ne luce dire si puo; ma caligine e abbagliamento, 
e menzogna: Cosi ne piu ne meno sono nella nostra voglievole parte 
del medesimo animo pure tre spezie per gli loro ufficj propria, e 
dall’altre due partita ciascuna. Conciossa cosa che v’e di prima la 
volonta: la qual puo e volere parimente, e disvolere, fonte e capo 
delle due seguenti: E che v’e dopo questa il volere, di cui parlo: 
e cio e il disporsi a mettere in opera essa volonta o molto o poco, o 
ancora contrariamente; che e disvolendo: E che v’e per ultimo quello, 
che di queste due si genera: il che se piace, amore e detto: se ^95 
despiace, odio per lo suo contrario necessariamente si convien dire, 
(underlining is mine)
This forms the keystone of the hermit’s argument. It serves to explain 
why Lavinello’s temperate love is intermediate. Simultaneously, it 
introduces the theme of ’’melancolia generosa”, for if Perrotino’s love 
was ’’melancolia ncgra” stemming from the dark imagination (see 287), 
the hermit’s heroic love is based on a correct appreciation of the 
imagination. Thus, in the love of corporeal images the intellect and
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the will remain uncertain concerning the veracity of the object
perceived, and therefore, can come to hate the object that has
captivated them. Here, as elsewhere in the works of his predecessors, 
Bembo is confronted with the problem of the imagination’s ambivalence.
His solution is found in the power of the free will to enable the
individual to make a choice, which can incline the soul either upwards
to the love of God, or to the love of matter. The will can orient the
soul either to the life of the senses or to that of reason. The
latter can then control the senses with the aid of the will, and guide 
the soul to the recognition of true Beauty. The hermit’s argument 
runs full circle, and he returns to Ficino’s standard definition of 
love as a desire for union with true Beauty:
Perciocche non e il buono amore disio solamente di bellezza, come tu 
stimi: ma e della vera bellezza disio, e la vera bellezza non e 
umana, e mortale, che mancar possa, ma e divina, e immortale: alia 
qual perraventura ci possono queste belleze innalzare, che tu lodi, ^97
dove elle da noi sieno in quella maniera, che esser debono, riguardate.
The hermit’s argument is basically face-saving, that is, it
sets forth a more ’’institutional” understanding of grace, because it
claims to place knowledge of God before love, since love is subordinate
to reason. In spite of this, Bembo returns to the evangelical
orientation of his sources to expound the basic concepts of Dionysius
the Areopagite which Ficino had adopted. Particular beauty reflects
Divine Beauty, and men who seek it in this life, leave this mortal
life to become themselves god-like: "Perciocche iddij sono quegli
uomini, Figliuolo, che le cose mortali sprezzano, come divini, ed 
308alle divine aspirano, come mortali." This divine state, which is 
heroic love, as it is understood by Hebreo and Ficino, is also reason 
moving, or oriented, towards divine light. It is reason that becomes 
more than human reason, because it makes men god-like. The subsequent
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parts of the hermit’s speech are a defense of the two principles 
subjacent to this proposition. These are: the concept that the soul 
is divine and that it represents the true nature of man, and that God 
is reflected by the Creation. Owing to their divine nature the souls 
are immortal and seek divine Beauty in the individual objects that 
surround us, but since these are composite and imperfect the souls
are never satisfied:
Essi percio che sono immortali, di cosa, che mortal sia, non si 
possono contentare. Ma perciocche si come dal sole prendono tutte 
le stelle luce, cosi quanto e di bello oltra lei dalla divina eterna 
bellezza prende qualita, e stato, quando di queste alcuna ne vien 
loro innanzi, bene piacciono esse loro, e volentieri le mirano, in 
quanto di quella sono immagini, e luminicini: ma non se ne contentano, 
ne sene soddisfano tuttavia, pure della eterna, e divina, di cui esse 
sowengono loro, e che a cercar di se medesima sempre con occulto 
pungimento gli stimola, disiderevoli, e vaghi.309
Souls evidently perceive particular beauty as a reflection of divine 
Beauty, that is, as an image conceived by the senses. It is, therefore, 
a problem of transcending this imagination. The hermit’s speech 
culminates in an exhortation to seek a world free of the necessity that 
is inherent in the corporeal world. This entails a description of 
angelical love, and therefore, the truly contemplative love of the
hermit does lead to illumination. His account of that which is
apprehended by the "eyes of the soul” is explicitly given in terms 
of divine light emanating from the First Cause:
Perciocche certa cosa e tra coloro: che usati sono di mirare non meno 
con gli occhi dell’animo, che del corpo: oltra questo sensibile e 
material mondo, ... essere un’ altro mondo ancora ne materiale hfe 
sensibile, ma fuori d’ogni maniera di questo separato, e puro che 
intorno il sopra gira; e che e da lui cercato sempre, e sempre ritrovato 
parimente, diviso da esso tutto, e tutto in ciascuna sua parte dimorante, 
divinissimo, intendentissimo, illuminatissimo... 310
The intelligible world is perceived first in the material world in 
which it is reflected, the eyes of the soul seek the source of this
reflection, and it must be supposed that the enjoyment of that light
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is the goal of the soul.
The contemplation of intelligibles is compatible with, and 
arrived at by? the guidance of natural reason, which turns the face 
of the soul towards the face of God reflected in the Creation. Natural
reason, aided by the will, polishes the mirror of the soul, and arrives 
at a better .intelligence of that which it contemplates and be fit to 
receive grace. This vision is not subject, however, to reason, any 
more than it is in Hebreo's Dialoghi d'Amore. It is accessible to the 
soul only when natural reason is transcended by right reason. Bembo 
clearly conforms with the request of Ficino, to exhort man to turn his 
affections to the real source of particular beauties that enthrall him 
in this world, that is, to God. Gli Asolani is concerned with making
courtiers.conscious of the divine nature of the soul and its true
aspirations. Bembo’s intention is then beyond the limits of natural 
reason, as he repeatedly stresses himself.
The expression of Ficinian love-concepts in Gli Asolani is
severely restricted by the social orientation of the work. Further
shortcomings may arise from the cautious religious intention that
pervades the text, and which owing to the strained Italian religious
climate at the moment Bembo was writing, is of a lesser evangelical
nature, inasmuch as it places knowledge before love, at least in the
hermit’s theoretical presentation. Undoubtedly for this reason, Gli 
311Asolani appealed to Counter-Reformation writers such as Gil Polo.
Bembo’s work then becomes remarkable for what its author chose to veil, 
or omit, from the essential elements of Ficino’s love theory. Possibly
also for the latter reason Gli Asolani is considered to have been of
less influence on the development of literary theory in the Renaissance, 
especially in the greatest period of Petrarchism in the first sixty 
years of the sixteenth-century, than either Ficino, Hebreo, or
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Castiglione. The elements which Bembo omited include the development 
of the theory of "melancolia generosa", and divine "furore", which 
although they are embodied by the hermit, are not explicitly presented 
since the author does not go into the complex astro-medical details 
which are so important in Ficino’s work. Nevertheless, the main sources 
of inspiration for Bembo’s work remains Ficino’s Commentarium in 
Convivium; this combined with his knowledge of Petrarch, places Gli 
Asolani in the midst of the Christian humanist evangelical tradition.
The presentation of Neoplatonic love theory in the Libro del 
Cortegiano is a conscious effort to return to the ideological background 
formulated by Ficino in the Commentarium in Convivium. Although it is 
greatly indebted to Bembo’s Gli Asolani as a literary genre, and like 
so many of the Italian love treatises it has the general superficiality, 
or cautiousness, of Bembo, it has the merit to turn its attention to 
the most important points of Ficino’s theory; these are melancholy, 
furor, and imagination. Hence, the Cortegiano cannot be said to be a 
highly original work in this respect, and it does not contribute any 
outstanding novelty to the theory of Renaissance Neoplatonic love. It 
is, however, the most important vehicle for popularizing Ficinian 
Neoplatonism. Various aspects of the Commentarium in Convivium that 
were not developed by Bembo receive due attention in the Cortegiano.
One of the most important facets of Castiglione’s expose of Ficino’s 
love theory is that it presents a very explicit summary of the
rhetorical theory of imagination, which Bembo had barely mentioned.
As I pointed out in my discussion of the Commentarium in Convivium, 
this is the pivotal point of Ficino’s theory, which contributes to 
the continuity of Chartrian thought as opposed to its manipulation by 
moralists such as Andreas Capellanus. That Castiglione consciously 
returns to this point is of particular importance for the study of
312
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Ausias March’s continuity among the Castilian Petrarquistas. It is 
primarily Castiglione’s book that seems to have been instrumental in 
affecting the orientation of the Italianate current as it was
introduced in Spain by Boscan and Garcilaso.
Castiglione approaches the problem of love within the broader 
context of the perfect courtier’s virtues, and the latter’s obligation 
to inspire the Prince to lead a virtuous life. The dialogue has a 
’’courtly” orientation, and its overt intention is to present a code 
of social propriety. The philosophical elements are, therefore, 
subordinate to literary entertainment which focuses on the ’’dubbio" 
of what kind of love is adequate to men of different ages. The 
discussion of love is the culmination of the Cortegiano. It is
preceded by an extensive presentation on the role of reason in the 
government of the soul. Reason,then, becomes the key to a virtuous 
love which is proper to the life of the courtier, and Castiglione 
repeats the essential points of Gli Asolani concerning natural desires 
and desires of the will. This leads to the affirmation that knowledge 
precedes desire, since desire can only be of that which the soul has 
taken cognizance, and the standard Neoplatonic definition of love as 
a desire to enjoy beauty. These points, which are common to Neoplatonic 
love treatises, with certain variations of emphasis in each, combine 
in Castiglione’s work to formulate the notion that the proper end of 
man is intellectual, or angelical love, which is a volitional desire.
The will, which represents the soul’s real inclinations which can only 
be to return to its true centre of origin, is fulfilled only by 
angelical love. One is correct in stating that Castiglione’s 
understanding of virtuous love is based on the proper use of reason, 
but it must be noticed that reason does have limitations, since its
function is strictly limited to the direction of a choice:
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dalla ragione nasce la elezione, che e propria dell’uomo; d’all
intelletto, per lo quale l'uom puo comunicar con gli Angeli, nasce 
la volonta. Cosi adunque come il senso non conosce se non cose 
sensibili, l’appetito le medesime solamente desidera: e cosi come 
Vintelletto non e volto ad altro, che alia contemplazion di cose ^^3
intelligibili, quella volunta solamente si nutrisce di beni spiritual!.
This passage succintly presents the theory of love expounded by
Castiglione. Reason determines choice, and thereby guides love.
Castiglione, like Bembo, focuses principally on the role of reason 
which is to guide the soul towards intellectual perception. One is 
constantly reminded of Hughes de Saint Victor’s model in which 
imagination informs reason of intelligible forms present in images 
which the latter raises up to the intellect. This remains the 
subjacent understanding in perception. Hence, Castiglione must also 
contend with the problem of reason’s orientation. After having defined 
the end of man as the pursuit of spiritual good, the question still 
remains concerning how man is to recognize this aim. Thus, all love 
in Castiglione’s treatise remains subject to choice, for reason may 
turn the soul either to cognition wrought by the senses or the 
intellect, although in either direction man continues to seek beauty:
L’uomo di natura razional, posto in mezzo fra questi dui estremi, puo 
per sua elezione inclinandosi al senso, owero elevandosi alio 
intelletto.... Di questi modi adunque si puo desiderar la bellezza.
The ensuing discussions in the Cortegiano further examine the definition
of Beauty which is sought by the soul, and the constant fluctuations
of the rational soul.
Beauty is defined by Castiglione, following Ficino, as an 
influx of divine goodness in the corporeal human form. This initial 
definition of beauty is limited principally to the perception of the
physical harmony and grace of the body. This is somewhat like
Lavinello’s definition prior to his enlightenment by the hermit, it 
concentrates on the sensual manifestations of beauty. Subsequent
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references to beauty develop the notion of the interpenetration of 
the Good and the Beautiful, by returning to Ficino’s definition of 
the concentric concept of beauty as an accident emanating from the 
Good. Castiglione weaves this definition of beauty together with a 
theory of perception that enables him to dispatch the notion of 
"melancolia negra". This repeats Andreas Capellanus’ standard 
definition of love as a passion born "ex visione et immoderata 
cogitatione":
Ma parlando de la bellezza che noi intendemo, che e quella solamente 
che appar nei corpi, e massimamente nei volti umani, e move questo 
ardente desiderio che noi chiamamo amore, diremo che e un flusso della 
bonta divina..., onde piacevolmente tira a se gli occhi umani, e per 
quelli penetrando s’imprime pell’anima, e con una nuova suovita tutta 
la commove, e diletta, ed accendendola, de lei desiderar si fa.315
The beautiful object, which is primarily corporeal, comes to be 
desired by the soul which apprehends it sensually, that is, in vision. 
In other words, the rational soul becomes enamoured of the object.
Part of the underlying mechanics of Castiglione’s exposition of this 
problem rests on the precept that desires are moved indiscriminately 
towards any object that they conceive to be good because it is 
physically beautiful, and, therefore, they need the guidance of reason 
to distinguish the real nature of the object which is known to them 
sensually. Hence, in this instance, the soul is acting without the 
guidance of reason} it is deceived by sensual cognition and conceives 
of beauty as being limited to the corporeal form of the body. It 
seeks physical possession of, or union with, the object perceived, as 
a consequence of having turned to guidance of the senses. Thus, love 
is good only when the soul is guided by reason: "e pero chi pensa, 
possedendo il corpo, fruir la bellezza, s’inganna; e vien mosso non 
da vera cognizione per elezion di ragione, ma da falsa opinion per 
l’appetito del senso....’’ The implication of this statement is
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evidently that beauty which is reflected by the body is not inherent 
in the body’s corporeality, but in its spiritual form, and that any 
attempt to enjoy beauty through the possession of the body is deceptive. 
This misguided love is, therefore, a folly based on an imperfect 
knowledge of beauty which can only be found rationally. In order to 
arrive at this point, Castiglione, like Bembo and the other courtly
treatise writers, simplifies the notion of the movement of the soul.
He does not refer to the fall of reason as it becomes enamoured of the
object sensually perceived, but rather, to the guidance of the senses.
As a result of this he eludes any discussion of the position of the 
soul, and is able to introduce almost immediately a description of 
the ’’melancholy lover”, who is a victim of the senses deceit:
perche ancora nel principio, e nel mezzo di questo amore altro non si 
sente giammai, che affani, tormenti, dolori, stenti, fatiche; di modo, 
che 1*esser pallido, afflitto, in continue lagrime, je sospiri, lo star 
mesto, il tacer sempre, £ lamentarsi, il desiderar di morire; in somma, 
1*esser infelicissimo, son le condizioni che si dicono convenir 
agl’innamorati.^l? (underlining is mine)
Castiglione provides a standard description of the melancholy man. 
Without having referred to the medical causes of the affliction of 
"melancolia negra" into which the sensual lover falls, Castiglione 
arrives at a physiological description of melancholy. It is from 
this point that he introduces the alternative to this condition, which 
he considers to be rational love, and describes as that which is proper
to "heroic lovers”.
After presenting the plight of the melancholy lover, Castiglione 
provides an explanation which is based on the central problem of the 
soul’s "descensus ad inferos". The rest of the Cortegiano focuses on 
the problem of the soul’s recovery from its fall. Hence, although his 
intention is to present the vision of the soul in its redeemed state,
Castiglione, like mediaeval Platonists, pays special attention to the
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problem of the recovery. Basic medical explanations describing
problems of perception and ’’innamoramento” are provided once the
author has established the Neoplatonic conceptions of the soul as 
the premiss of his work. He combines two fundamental points, the 
"descensus ad inferos" and the Augustinian definition of the soul 
which is considered to be responsible for the government of the body, 
in order to introduce the concept that the real aim of the soul, which 
is man’s true nature, is contemplation, and that this is affected by 
the soul’s position within the body: "perche ritrovandosi essa 
sommersa nella prigion terrena, e per esser’ applicata al ministerio 
di governar il corpo, priva della contemplazion spirituale, non puo
da se intender chiaramente la verita." Reference to the "descensus 
ad inferos" is consequently fundamental to the theory of love in the 
Cortegiano. The aim of the soul is spiritual contemplation, and 
Castiglione’s own references to the incapacity of the soul to attain 
this goal indicate that the goal sought is illumination. The terms 
he uses clearly express this: "chiaramente la verita". Reason can 
help the soul in its orientation, and to polish the surface of the soul’s 
mirror, but as we shall see it is also insufficient to see the truth
in its real light. The concept of truth in this context is bound to
that of virtue, and both lie in the proper guidance of reason which
can control the senses. Hence, spiritual contemplation is arrived at 
by the guidance of natural reason turning towards the light of right 
reason. Nevertheless, the fallen condition of the soul affects the 
torment which it undergoes in turning towards the light of right reason. 
Hence, contemplation is at the outset conditioned by vision, since
the soul can only be informed of what lies beyond the body by the 
senses which inevitably mislead it:
onde per aver cognizione delle cose, bisogna che vada mendicandone il
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principio dai sensi; e pero loro crede, e loro s’inchina, e da loro 
guidar si lascia.... la empiono d’errori, e false opinion!: onde 
quasi sempre occorre che i giovani sono awolti in questo amor 
sensuale, in tutto rubello dalla ragione.3^0
The soul must, therefore, be inclined to the guidance of rational
choice. Castiglione draws a distinction between rational love in
young men and old men, in the latter age naturally subdues the ardours
of the body, their contemplative love cannot really be called virtuous
because their senses are dulled. It is in young men whose love follows
the guidance of reason that Castiglione finds heroic virtues. These
men are divine: ’’adunque estimo que quei giovani che sforzan gli 
321appetiti, ed amano con la ragione, sian divini.” Subsequent
discussion of these problems in the Cortegiano develop the notion of 
’’heroic love” and clarify some of the inexactitudes created by this 
more simplified presentation of virtuous love.
In the above passages Castiglione insists on the particular role 
to be played by reason in the pursuit of virtuous love. Thus, in the 
above quotation concerning perception he expediently equates heroic 
love with rational love. Yet, because natural reason is limited, this 
love could only be reasonable love without a transcendent end, which 
is the point that Hebreo chose to focus upon. This would not be 
adequate to the divine end of man which Castiglione argues is proper 
to this love. In order to shed light on the awkwardness of his 
statements the author returns to the problem of beauty which helps 
him better to determine towards what end reason is to guide man. This 
re-definition of beauty stresses the interpenetration of the Good and 
the Beautiful, which echoes Ficino’s definition that derives 
principally from Dionysius the Areopagite: "la bellezza... che e cosa 
sacra... dico che da Dio nasce..., ed e come circolo senza centro, non
322puo esser bellezza senza centro, non puo esser bellezza senza bonta....”
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Individual corporeal beauty is then asserted once more to be a
reflection of divine intelligible beauty. In particular corporeal 
objects it is the soul., which animates the body, that reflects this 
influx of divine Goodness. The standard Neoplatonic concept of beauty 
being goodness illuminating the body is, therefore, repeated by 
Castiglione. Thus, after having determined this point he proceeds 
to reconcile love with reason, that is, he refutes the outright 
condemnation of moralists who limit love to "melancolia negra". As 
he states, in a way highly reminiscent of Ausias March and his 
Chartrian predecessors, the love he is about to describe is beyond 
the limitations of the average man; it is part of Love’s mysteries:
"E perche mi conosco indegno di parlar dei misterj d’Amore, prego lui 
che muova il pensiero, e la lingua mia tanto ch’io possa mostrar’ a
questo eccellente Cortegiano amar fuor della consuetudine del profano
323vulgo." Beyond this formulaic presentation of "heroic love" as 
the only love proper to the superior'courtier of the Renaissance, and 
thereby heralding the concept of "melancolia generosa", Castiglione 
introduces the dual problem of contemplation which is based on the 
concept of imagination. Contemplative love is of two kinds; it is 
first mundane contemplative love, and then its proper corollary, divine 
contemplative love. In both of these imagination is the means whereby 
the courtier gains knowledge of universals which spurs his soul on to 
desire divine beauty, and thus, imagination is at the source of
virtuous love. .
In the first part of his expose of the theory of image and 
imagination, Castiglione repeats Ficino’s theory of "innamoramento", 
which is a combination of the Lucretian theory of sight and the 
medical theory of the vital spirits. This is, then, a resume of 
Ficino’s commentary on Guido Cavalcanti’s poem "Dona me prega", 324
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from which Castiglione draws on the physiological explanations.
Although Castiglione does not state it, it is implicitly understood 
that the spirits act as intermediates between the body and the soul, 
and that they are mirrors for the soul in which the image of the 
beloved is reflected. This enables the author to dwell upon the 
corporeal nature of this love since he emphasizes that love is born 
from the sense of sight and pays particular attention to the power 
of the eyes to capture the vital spirits of the lover. Yet, because 
he stresses the importance of reason to guide the soul to the 
contemplation of the spiritual nature of the image, this description 
is a palliative for the immoderate cogitation born out of vision 
previously described as the source of ’’melancolia negra”:
... subito che s’accorge che gli occhi suoi rapiscano quella immagine, 
e la portino al cuore; e che 1’anima cominci con piacer’ a contemplarla, 
e sentir’ in se quello influsso che la commove, e poco a poco la 
riscalda; e che quei vivi spiriti che scintillan fuor per gli occhi, 
tuttavia aggiungan nuova esca al fuoco, deve in questo principio 
prowedere di presto rimedio, e risvegliar la ragione, e di questa 
armar la roca del cuor suo; ... allor’ il Cortegiano, sentendosi preso, 
deliberarsi totalmente di fuggir’ ogni brutezza dell’ amor vulgare; e 
cosi entrar nella divina strada amorosa con la guida della ragione: i
e prima considerar che’l corpo ove quella bellezza risplende, non e 
fonte ond’ ella nasca...325
In this passage it is obvious to the author that love has its source 
in the image that captivates the vital spirits. The power of the 
image originates in the lover’s contemplation. As Castiglione has 
previously demonstrated, this can degenerate into sensual inclination 
and melancholy love. The remedy which he proposes is that reason 
should prevent any fascination for a corporeal image from the outset. 
However, should the power of the image remain unchecked, reason serves 
to remind the lover that the image is but a pale reflection of the 
real source of its beauty, and that it is the source which he must 
seek to love. Hence, the role of reason is to guide the soul towards
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divine love, or limit human love to the spiritual contemplation of
divine light as it is reflected in particular bodies and apprehended 
by the two spiritual senses, hearing and sight. In this first 
introduction to ’’heroic love” Castiglione fulfills the principal 
obligation of the Neoplatonic ’’trattatisti", which is, to remind 
lovers of the real source of their love, and its superiority. This 
does not, however, complete the courtier’s sentimental education.
The message is primarily evangelical and it seeks to assert the 
presence of grace in nature, that is, in the image perceived.
Reason in the Cortegiano has a guiding and corrective function, 
as can be seen above. Its function is to aid the soul to recognize 
the real nature of what It apprehends. It helps the will to polish the 
mirror of the soul. This does not elude the problem of the soul’s own 
instability concerning its movements towards the image which it 
contemplates. After an entertaining interlude concerning the casuistic 
question of the spiritual nature of the kiss, Castiglione returns to 
the topic of the soul’s inevitable movements. He re-introduces the 
theory of the spirits, this time from a strictly medical and physiological 
point of view, thereby approximating Ficino’s original explanation 
concerning the movement of imagination. This is the beginning of a 
shift in the Cortegiano away from stressing the importance of reason 
and towards the superiority of illumination^ or "right reason" in its 
Augustinian sense. The reader is reminded that the contemplative love 
of a physical object can only degenerate into physical love, even 
though reason may choose the object correctly and attempt to check
the senses:
1’anima e inclinatissima ai sensi, e benche la ragion col discorso elegga ben 
e conosca, quella bellezza non nascer dal corpo, e pero ponga freno 
ai desiderii non onesti, pur’ il contemplar la sempre in quel corpo, 
spesso preverte il vero giudicio...326
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Hence, reason in the above passage, as in others, in the Cortegiano, 
refers strictly to natural reason, and as such, its function is limited 
to the making of proper choices and judgements, and to see to the 
preservation of the individual. Love is not a rational state. It is 
consequently natural that Castiglione repeats Ficino1s medical 
description of the vital spirits and the clouding of phantasy which 
he describes as a rapture, or ’’furore”. Hence in the contemplation 
of the spiritual attributes of a physical object, or body, the spirits 
delight in the image, and the soul is transported in phantasy, as 
though it had returned to its celestial origin:
lo star assente dalla cosa amata, porta seco molta passione; perche 
lo influsso di quella bellezza, quando e presente, dona mirabil diletto 
a3l‘ amante,... e mandano fuor per gli occhi quei spiriti che son vapori 
sottilisimi fatti della piu pura, e lucida parte del sangue, il quali 
ricevono la immagine della bellezza, ... onde l’anima si diletta, e con 
una certa maraviglia si spaventa; e pur gode, e quasi stupefatta, 
insieme col piacere sente timore e riverenza; e parle d’esser nel 
centro della sua felicita.327
This rapture is deceptive because all the goodness that the soul has 
found is immediately lost when the object of its contemplation is 
absent. It is primarily a physical contemplation.
Although I have referred to phantasy in this passage out of
necessity, it is important to note that Castiglione at no time actually
refers to imagination or phantasy in this description of mundane
’’furore”. The entire passage is a very poor repetition of Ficino’s
description of the Chartrian-Victorine theory of imagination as it is 
328applied to the vital spirits acting as an animate. Castiglione 
does not approach the problem of the imagination’s ambivalence at this 
point.. Rather almost immediately after the above passage, he refers to 
the imagination as the source of spiritual contemplation, when it is 
properly prepared by reason. Emphasis is placed on imagination, which 
in this context is attributed the capacities of phantasy as defined
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by Proclus; it is the last echo of the intellect. It is imagination 
the enables the courtier to apprehend beauty as an intelligible form, 
and escape the necessity of corporeality. It creates a universal idea 
of beauty by removing the lover’s contemplation from the necessary 
presence of the lady, and hence, escapes the sensuality and torments 
of ’’melancolia negra”:
Per fuggir’ adunque il tormento di questa assenza, e goder la bellezza 
senza passione, bisogna che’l Cortegiano con l’ajuto della ragione 
revochi in tutto il desiderio dal corpo alia bellezza sola, e quanto 
piu pud la contempli in stessa semplice, e pura, e dentro nella 
immaginzaione la formi astratta da ogni materia; e cosi la faccia 
arnica e cara all’anima sua, ed ivi la goda, e seco l’abbia giorno e 
notte, in ogni tempo e luogo, senza dubbio di perderla mai; tornandosi 
sempre a memoria che’l corpo e cosa diversissima dalla bellezza... Di 
questo modo sara il nostro Cortegiano non giovane fuor di tutte le 
amaritudini, e calamita che senton quasi sempre i giovani; come le 
gelosie, i sospetti, li sdegni, l’ire, le disperazioni, e certi furor 
pieni di rabbia; dai quali spesso son’indutti a tanto errore... che 
chiuso nel cuore si portera sempre seco il prezioso tesoro: e ancora 
per virtu della immaginazione si formers dentro in se stesso quella 
bellezza molto piu bella, che in effetto non sara.329
This description of the imaginative faculty coincides with Hebreo’s 
definition of heroic love. It is the remedy for ’’melancolia negra” 
and the torments, such as jealousy, which accompany it. Imagination 
raises corporeal images of bodies to their perception as intelligible 
forms contemplated by the rational soul turned towards the face of 
the intellect. Castiglione's reasoning is that amorous suffering is 
caused by a lack of the object desired by the soul. This love is free 
from suffering because it is not limited to the intellection of 
particulars. It is based on the vision of universals. Yet, this is 
not the real end for which the soul yearns; it merely sets the soul 
in the right direction, for it is as though the soul were contemplating 
the angels who contemplate God, and its real end is angelic love. 
Natural reason, which guides this human contemplative love, arrives 
at its limits with the information imparted to it by the imagination.
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This love is, therefore, insufficient, as is natural reason, because 
the face of the soul is turned towards the vision of corporeal beauty 
which it raises, and it is essentially limited to corporeal beauty. 
Castiglione is, then,compelled to acknowledge that in spite of its 
spiritual nature this love is not an end in itself, because what it 
apprehends is proper to the ’’eye of flesh”. Thus, it prepares the 
soul for divine illumination, but does not attain the goal itself:
perche per essere la immaginazione potenza organica, e non aver
cognizione, se non per quei principii che le son somministrati dai 
sensi, non ja in tutto purgata delle tenebre materiali; e pero, benche 
consideri quella bellezza universale astratta, in se sola, pur non 
discerne ben chiaramente, ne senza qualche ambiguita, per la convenienza 
che hanno i fantasmi col corpo.330 (underlining is mine)
The insufficiency of imagination is thus coupled with the limitations 
of natural reason which it informs, and the "heroic love” which is 
based on these is not perfect. It must be transcended, so that the 
eye of the soul may come to the clear knowledge of Beauty which lies 
in right reason.
Castiglione’s description of ’’heroic love”, which is the 
highest form of human love possible in his system, is natural reason 
moved towards the light of right reason present in the Creation. It 
apprehends intelligible beauty imperfectly with the eye of the flesh. 
Reason in "heroic love” is, therefore, more than natural reason, because 
it is predominantly guided by imagination. The latter is a means 
through which the soul approaches the rapture of ’’melancolia generosa" 
which is a state fit for the intellect. One can say, therefore, that 
the evangelical light which seeks to apprehend the spiritual reality 
of all things in the Creation, and recognizes therein the participation 
of the Good in nature which is beautiful, animates this "heroic love".
It is the spiritual presence of God’s reflection that turns man’s
attention to heroic virtue. All objects of beauty that the lover
perceives are like a book that can reveal the true end of his soul’s 
longing. Hence, what the soul contemplates in divine rapture,'that 
is, in the divine ’’furore" of "melancolia generosa", as we have seen 
Ficino define it, requires an ascesis from worldly beauty, and a 
rejection of worldly love and its delights. "Heroic love" is a means 
to the divine "furore" in the Cortegiano, because it is associated 
with contemplative love of a corporeal object and contemplation is 
characteristic of melancholy. The contemplative man is subject to 
"melancolia generosa" when he uses the contemplation of physical objects 
to a spiritual end and, thereby, avoids "melancolia negra". He is 
graced with divine illumination, because his soul, which is a mirror, 
is polished by the action of natural reason and begins to perceive 
these objects in the light of right reason. The courtier who has 
arrived at the contemplative stage of "heroic love" is spiritually 
above the average man, but he must still perfect his soul by turning 
away from the lure and din of his earthly environment, and follow the 
first glimmer of divine light he has found in his imagination:
Questo grado d’amore, benche sia molto nobile, e tale, che pocchi vi 
aggiungono, non pero ancor si puo chiamar perfetto.... sono come i 
terneri augelli che cominciano a vestirsi di piume; che benche con 
ale debili si levino un poco a volo, pur non osano allontanarsi molto 
dal nido, ne commettersi a’venti, e al ciel’ aperto.331
Thus, because it is based on the effects of imagination, and Castiglione
does not explicitly distinguish this from phantasy, all human love in
his system is inevitably subject to the fallen state of mankind. It
is on this point that Castiglione differs in his approach from Leone
Hebreo who writes after him that heroic love is based on information 
332given by the senses to the eye of the soul.
The Cortegiano like Gli Asolani is a very diluted version of
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Ficinian Neoplatonism. A certain vague inconsistency characterizes
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Castiglione*s exposition of the Ficinian system which he adapts to the
restrictions of Bembo’s work. Castiglione hesitates to assimilate the
vision of divine beauty with the actual presence of His grace, in
spite of his statements to the contrary. Hence, the vision of Beauty
in the imagination seems to be unsatisfactory for Castiglione, and
this causes him to overlap certain explanations concerning the upwards
movement of the soul. It is on this point that he, like Bembo, departs
from some of the more essential elements of Ficino’s theory of vision.
Perhaps in order to maintain a consistently orthodox point of view,
Castiglione distinguishes very sharply between corporeal and spiritual
beauty; for him all beauty that has a corporeal source is corporeal.
The image of the lady perceived by the lover remains predominantly
corporeal in his system, unlike Ficino, who insisted that the image,
333once it was perceived in the eye, had to be spiritual. Thus,
according to Castiglione, the soul’s ascesis from this world occurs 
in three stages. These can be likened to the "via purgativa, iluminativa,
Q Q/
y unitiva" of St. John of the Cross, all of which Castiglione limits 
exclusively to the power of the eye of the soul. When the soul turns 
away from the guidance of beauty it apprehends in the imagination, it 
frees itself of worldly cares:
e cosi in luogo d’uscir di se stesso col pensiero, come bisogna che 
faccia chi vol considerar la bellezza corporale, si rivolga in se 
stesso, per contemplar quella che si vede con gli occhi della mente; 
li quali allor cominciano ad esser’ acuti e perspicaci, quando quelli 
del corpo perdono il fior della loro vaghezza: pero 1’anima aliena 
dai vizii, purgata dai studii della vera Filosofia, versata nella vita 
spirituale, e esercitata nelle cose dell’ intelletto, rivolgendosi 
alia contemplazion della propria sustanza, quasi da profundissimo sonno 
risvegliata, apre quelli occhi che tutti hanno, e pochi adoprano, e 
vede in se stessa un raggio di quel lume che e la vera immagine della 
bellezza Angelica, a lei comunicata; della quale essa poi comunica al 
corpo una debil* ombra; pero divinuta cieca alle cose terrene, si fa 
oculatisima alle celesti.335 (underlining is mine)
Other Neoplatonic "trattatisti", such as Ficino and Hebreo, seem to
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consider that "heroic love", when it is understood to be spiritual 
and contemplative, exercises a purgative role. It is from "heroic 
love" that they proceed to describe the illuminative progress of the 
soul. <In other words, the "trattatisti" explicitly associate "heroic 
love" with "melancolia generosa", which is the divine "furore" that
I
forms the basis of Ficino’s system. To the contrary, Castiglione 
insists on the corporeal origin of contemplation in "heroic love", 
and his interpretation of the theory of vision gives a fundamentally 
different implication to this love. It remains for him a step towards 
the soul’s awareness of its divine origin, but one to be rapidly used 
and left behind. In spite of Castiglione’s own admission that 
imagination perceives universal beauty, "heroic love" remains 
irremediably bound to its corporeal origin. Consequently, in the 
love theory presented by the Cortegiano "heroic love" seems to overlap 
with the spiritual purgative life. It does so even perhaps in a 
contradictory manner since Castiglione is forced to acknowledge that 
imagination gives the soul access to the intelligible forms of the 
objects it contemplates sensually, and yet, the author also claims 
that Angelical beauty is perceived by the eye of the soul. A 
fundamental difference in the Cortegiano, compared to other Neoplatonic 
treatises, is that Castiglione stresses, very much like the mediaeval 
moralists, and in many ways like Ausias March, the human limitations
of "heroic love". This he does because it is based on information
received by the senses which constitutes the image perceived by the 
eye of flesh, whereas the truly purgative life of the soul turns 
inwards to contemplate the pure light which is reflected in the eye 
of the soul. The latter breaks with human love of any kind, and turns
to a religious ascesis. As it is stated in the above quotation, the
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purgative life is found in the study of the "true philosophy" which
makes the soul learned in spiritual life. On this point Castiglione
picks up the most vital strand of his predecessors’ thought. From
Petrarch to Ficino, the only true philosophy is the "philosophia
Christi", which is the Christian humanists* Socratic way of life, so1
that in fact, the only true love proper to the courtier is love of
Christ severed from earthly love, although it is found reflected in
the presence of grace in nature.
The fundamental point in this matter is that Castiglione uses
the idealism of the Cortegiano in order to reassert the doctrine of
the immortality of the soul. Yet, by this very same condition the
true life of the soul is opposed to any kind of earthly delight, such 
as that which is found in the imagination. In the phrase "contemplating 
its own substance" the author understands the contemplation of the 
divine essence of the fallen soul and its regained consciousness of 
its origin and destination after its "descensus ad inferos" into the 
body, which is found in the redemption of Christ. Castiglione does 
not escape the dualist implications of the Neoplatonic love treatises.
He has to deal with the composite nature of the human form, even
though he asserts that the true nature of man lies in his soul and
its divine origin. The soul is still subject to fluctuations, and
the purgative life is the action of natural reason and the will polishing the
surface of the soul’s mirror so that it becomes a clear spirit and
best receives the light of right reason, which, as one can note in
the aforementioned quotation, the soul is said to perceive in itself,
that is, reflected on its mirror. This leads to the second, or divine,
"furore", which is the illumination of the soul by right reason.
Assiduous contemplation, characteristic of "melancolia generosa" is
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the means by which the soul arrives at this second ’’furore”:
e talor quando le virtu motive del corpo si trovano dalla assidua 
contemplazione astratte, owerro dal sonno legate, non essendo da 
quele impedita, sente un certo odor nascoso della vera bellezza 
Angelica; £ rapita dallo splendor di quella luce comincia ad 
infiammarsi; je tanto avidamente la segue, che quasi divina ebria, je 
fuor di se stessa, per desiderio d’unirsi con quella,* parendole aver 
trovato 1’orma di Dio; nella contemplazion del quale, come nei suo 
beato fine, cerca di riposarsi....33° (underlining is mine)
This description of the illuminative ascent of the soul clearly points 
to the divine ’’furore”, it is mystic inebriation, or folly, and 
constitutes a state of rapture. Here again, Castiglione duplicates 
the description that he has given of "heroic love”, for he insists- 
that.at this point the soul moves from the perception of particular 
beauty to that of universal beauty. As I have noted previously, this 
function is proper to imagination or phantasy, and one has to presume 
that in this case Castiglione actually implies a movement of phantasy 
which pertains to the intellect and not reason. The function of the 
illumination is consequently to move the soul from the perception of 
universals considered by its particular, or potential, intellect, to 
the divine agent, or universal intellect:
vede la bellezza divina; ma non pero ancor’ in tutto le gode
perfettamente, perche la contempla solo nei suo particolar inteletto... 
Amore dona all’anima maggior felicita, che secondo che dalla bellezza 
particular del corpo la guida alia bellezza universal di tutti i corpi, 
cosi. in ultimo grado di perfezione dallo intelletto particular la guida 
alio intelletto universale.337
Hence, at this point, once it enjoys intelligible beauty, the soul 
ceases to be subject to any fluctuations, and by assuming its 
angelical nature it unites with God. Like the angel it is not subject 
to mobility, but only to multiplicity and thus loses its bond to
matter, in order to unite with its divine source. This union raises
the soul to the ultimate goal of its journey; it becomes aflame with
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divine love: ’’I1anima accessa nel santissimo fuoco del vero amor 
338divino.” The illumination is then complete, since by its union 
with God the soul recovers its pure angelical nature, and Castiglione 
points out that it no longer has any need of reason: ”ma piu non ha 
bisogno del discorso della ragione”. It is filled with the
light of right reason towards which it has been guided by natural, 
or discursive, reason, which has inclined it to make a correct choice. 
What is then abandoned is natural reason, and Castiglione’s phrasing 
of this evolution is fairly clear*"discorso della ragione". Ambiguity 
arises from the fact that unlike Hebreo his .references to reason seem
to be limited to natural reason. This presents another aspect of the 
general problem of how love is conceived to be compatible with reason.
In spite of being deeply indebted to the Areopagian tradition of 
Ficino’s Platonism, the Cortegiano recognizes the existence of the 
reflection of God’s goodness in the creation, but it never refers, as 
does Hughes de Saint Victor, to the movement of God towards the soul 
in its description of the soul’s union with God. It is only in the 
last part of Bembo’s speech that Castiglione corrects this oversight 
by beseeching Love, or Christ to pour himself into the hearts of his
lovers:
degnati, Signor, d’udir*’ i nostri prieghi, infondi te stesso nei nostri 
cuori, e col splendor del tuo santissimo fuoco illumina le nostre 
tenebre... purga tu coi raggi della tua luce gli occhi nostri dalla 
caliginosa ignoranza, accioche piu non apprezino bellezza mortale; e 
conoscano che le cose che prima veder loro parea, non sono; e quelle 
che non vedeano, veramente sono...?40
The point that Castiglione makes is of an evangelical nature, since, 
as the last part of this quotation indicates^ it seeks the interior 
light of things, and that is supposed to be the aim of the Courtier. 
However, Castiglione is exceedingly careful to maintain the illuminative 
process within the limits of natural reason, as it moves the soul
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towards the light of right reason. Again, like Bembo before him,
Castiglione’s inconsistencies and ambiguities are best explained as 
being founded on the author’s desire to stay away from problems which 
could have serious religious repercussions at the moment at which he
is writing. These ambiguities are an effort to maintain a basic
orthodoxy towards the institution of the Church? they articulate
problems which the Counterreformation will resolve. Yet, as the above
quotation indicates, he cannot elude that it is only through right 
3A1reason that man comes to ’’possess a true knowledge of things” as 
St. Augustine understands it.
Part III: Conclusion.
The Cortegiano is consequently a courtly manual with a social 
intention, like Gli Asolani. The doctrines which it presents are 
based on Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium, and belong to the same 
current of evangelical sensibility. Neither the Cortegiano nor Gli 
Asolani has the breadth of their source, as does Hebreo. This 
contributes to convey the somewhat misleading impression that natural 
reason is the dominant factor in the Courtier’s life. Yet, upon 
closer inspection of the text one can perceive the inherent contradictions, 
caused by the fact that the author cannot elude the mystic implications 
of his subject. Owing to this situation, Castiglione, like most of 
the Neoplatonists, and Ausias March, focuses his attention on the 
importance of imagination in the lover’s numinous experience. Thus, 
one has to note that Castiglione is at least as exacting as Ausias 
March on the problem of the spiritual love of corporeal beauty. In 
this circumstance, the greatest form of human, or mundane, love is 
that which is based on the perception of divine beauty by the
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imagination, as it is reflected in particular corporeal objects. It 
is this very kind of enamourment that Castiglione associates with 
"heroic love" or "amor hereos" in its highest form. In this respect 
he continues the direction taken by Ficino, for whom melancholy could 
be a source of virtue, unlike the ironical condemnation made of 
melancholy and "amor hereos" by mediaeval moralists such as Andreas 
Capellanus. The only state that can transcend this love requires 
that the lover make an ascesis from all corporeal or wordly love, 
which is only a means to the soul’s true felicity and rest. These 
can only be found in God, and not in his shadow. Hence, no human 
love in Castiglione’s system, or for that matter in any of the 
Neoplatonic theorists I have reviewed, is free from the implicit 
possibility of the soul's fall. Also, in each of these writers, 
reason plays an important part in the preparation of the soul to its 
original state of grace, but it is not strictly through reason that 
illumination is found, faith remains the condition "sine qua non".
As a result of this, there is in each of these works an element of
real necessity that plays an important subjacent part. Even in the 
Cortegiano, in which the problem is eluded, one finds that God is 
inevitably required to move towards the individual soul as it rises 
towards Him. Natural reason plays a guiding role, but it is explicitly 
limited. The return of the soul to its divine origin requires that 
it turn inwards to that which is perceived by its own eyes, but these 
things it can only know when it is granted illumination. In the 
lesser writers, such as Bembo and Castiglione, this aspect of the 
problem is eluded, although it remains present in the background.
I consider, therefore, that the contention that Neoplatonic
love is strictly based on reason is not wrong, but misleading.
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Neoplatonic love theory is not only compatible with, but rooted in, 
a mystical sensibility which orients the life of the individual 
towards a transcendental, or spiritual, reason based on faith. This 
verges on religious irrationality by placing emphasis on the numinous 
quality of the individual’s experience of the presence of grace in 
the midst of the Creation, and therefore, in his daily life. It is, 
consequently, firmly established in the tradition of the "vita 
apostolica", or evangelical current, in its various manifestations 
and adaptations, which finds its apogee in the sixteenth century.
Thus, this sensibility that governs Neoplatonic love theory, is not 
dominated by mere reason, but by "right reason", which in this context 
is a "furore". The reader witnesses in this particular situation the 
evolution of the concept and value of melancholy, and also simultaneously 
the variations in the manner in which the notions concerning "amor 
hereos" are approached and understood by the Neoplatonic writers.
In all of the works I have surveyed, all of which are considered to
be the most representative, tremendous emphasis and value is placed,
not so much on the role of reason which is an insufficient controlling
factor, but rather on that of the imagination, as the means to attain 
illumination or divine "furore", which can degenerate into mundane 
"furore", otherwise known as "amor insanus ferinusque". In cases such 
as that described by Castiglione, heroical virtue is the highest kind
of love prior to divine love. Subsequent variations on the spiritual 
nature of "heroic love", such as those of Giordano Bruno and Hebreo, 
who emphasize the inherently spiritual basis of imagination, are,
therefore, understandable. They represent not so much a contradiction 
to Castiglione’s position, but the logical outcome of Ficino’s theory
of love
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There is a tendency among literary critics to represent the
Neoplatonic love theory of the Renaissance in general, as an ideal
embodying a love free from all contradictions. In this framework it
is understood that for the perfect Renaissance lover the control of 
reason is absolute and determines the pure nature of his love, in 
which reason can only lead the soul to maintain an intellectual love 
of the beloved who is seen as a reflection of divine beauty. Indeed,
one can contend that Renaissance Platonisms tended to orient love
away from mere sensuality, and towards a chaste experience of the
lady's beauty, unlike the lesser Petrarchists who used a similar
343literary tradition to describe their unbridled sensual passion.
However, one should remember that the two literary currents tend to
merge, as R. 0. Jones has demonstrated in the case of Garcilaso de la 
344Vega. This schematization of the problem is but one very limited
facet which corresponds to an individual inclination, and is not
really representative of any particular system, since those reviewed
are manifestly aware of the actual insufficiency of reason acting in
its own light. Natural reason must turn to right reason, which is
the real aim of the Courtier. Castiglione’s own imposition of definite
limits on the role to be played by imagination in the Courtier’s love,
states that it remains bound to its corporeal origins and perceives
the divine shadow imperfectly. The close relation that exists in
this case between imagination and reason, as opposed to phantasy and
intellect, emphasizes the very non-transcendental limits of natural
reason within this system, and argues against an excessively clear-cut 
345explanation of the Neoplatonic theory of love. An interpretation 
of Neoplatonic love theory in the Renaissance that would sear the 
lover's experience of beauty in order to focus strictly on the beatific 
end product is patently misleading.
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This seems to me to be the principal element of a commonly
accepted interpretation of the evolution of fifteenth and sixteenth-
century lyric sensitivity, as it is presented mainly by the late R.
3460. Jones in the field of Spanish. The latter probably follows the
kind of interpretation set forth by P. N. Siegel in his work on 
347Spenser. There is a desire in the works of both of these eminent 
critics to see in the Renaissance the products of an absolutely new 
mentality severed from the Middle Ages. This leads them to overlook 
the numerous points of contact of the tradition within which the 
Neoplatonic writers of love treatises are working. Thus, Siegel, in 
"Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life”, attempted to demonstrate 
how this English poet who, like all the members of Leicester’s following 
formed part of the new Tudor aristocracy, could be an admirer of the 
Libro del Cortegiano and a model courtier, as well as a staunch
Calvinist, like all the members of that faction. Out of this he
tries to explain the points of affinity between the Cortegiano and
Calvinism. His otherwise brilliant expose, which opposes a warped
interpretation of Castiglione’s masterpiece as a work which propounds
a sensualist doctrine in which one attains "a beatific vision of God 
u 349through the senses , overlooks the fundamental point that both are 
actually products of the Areopagian-Erigenian humanist tradition 
within the broader evangelical current, and therefore, that both are 
subject to a similar sensibility. The entire religious movement that 
develops out of the twelfth-century awakening of the "vita apostolica" 
and the crumbling of the feudal agrarian system is founded on the 
doctrines of the interrelation of the Good and the Beautiful, and 
the divine origin of the soul. Yet, it is also profoundly conscious 
of the fallen state of the soul in its "descensus ad inferos", and
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the terrible difficulties that besiege it in its return, including 
the omnipresent question of predestination. Spenser limits the 
description of the lover’s numinous experience to the vision of Beauty 
which the individual can attain, up to a point, by the control he has 
over his reason, but which is not necessarily always present. This, 
in Spenser’s case, is affected by a profound Calvinist faith, and 
the Puritan confidence of being one of the elect, as opposed to the 
ribald Italianizing Catholic Petrarchists. Spenser’s point of view 
is, therefore, conditioned ”a priori” by ’’right reason” in the 
Augustinian sense. In his work reason and faith, or revelation, 
become hardly distinguishable. Hence, this fulfills the primary 
intention of the Neoplatonic treatises, because it demonstrates a 
consciousness of the source of particular beauty, towards which the 
lover’s soul turns. The very same problem is approached slightly 
differently in the work of another excellent courtier and Calvinist. 
Sidney’s Astrophel and Stella is primarily concerned with reason’s 
struggle to regain its control over the imagination with which it has
become enamoured. This can be said to be a demonstration of the
insufficiency of natural reason, which is quite compatible with 
350Sidney’s own profound religious convictions. It represents the
difficulty of the soul to find right reason. Consequently, whether
one considers Spenser’s or Sidney’s interpretation of the spiritual
experience that each describes, one is not confronted with antagonistic
points of view, but with complementary stages of a similar experience, 
351as Siegel himself comes to recognize. The reader only needs to
be aware that no spiritual experience is devoid of tension, and it 
352is this very condition that exalts the lover. The Neoplatonic
lover does aim to control his senses by following his reason which
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should acknowledge the presence of grace in nature, but the reader
must be aware that the control of reason in itself does not constitute
the goal of his love. It must be transcended by acting according to 
the dictates of faith which cause him to go beyond the limitations 
of any particular or worldly love.
The tensions that characterize Sidney’s situation in Astrophel 
and Stella are also present in Ausias March’s poetry; as we have seen 
in chapter III. Ausias March and Sidney do not seek to love without 
the guidance of reason, but in fact, seek reason to redress, or perfect, 
their experience of beauty, and a problem of volition underlies this 
predicament. Reason has recognized the proper object of their love, 
but it cannot be maintained owing to a flaw in the soul’s volition.
It is, above all, a matter of faith, and only then a matter of reason.
The two are inextricably bound, however, because their love represents 
a move from natural to right reason, and the constant alternations 
between the two. Although Ausias March’s erotic experience is 
conditioned by a desire for a spiritual love, the poet rightly says 
that his love can never be wholly pure, since it is always marred by 
the presence of some sensual inclination: "James ami que no fos 
desijos / d'aquell desig que per fretur* avem" (LXXXV, w. 33-34).
This self-condemnation is entirely compatible with the excessive
353heterodox zeal characteristic of Ausias March’s religious sensibility, 
as well as, Castiglione’s interpretation of imagination. As concerns 
the theory of love, in all of the above cases, including that of 
Ausias March, imagination and its ambivalence remains the dominant
problem, especially if this love is meant to be contemplative, for 
melancholy can affect variably the orientation of the soul. In Ausias 
March’s poetry, the importance of these elements, originating from
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his approach to the rhetorical theory of imagination, as in the
Neoplatonic Renaissance love treatises, and in particular that of
Castiglione, make it understandable that Boscan’s and Garcilaso*s
assimilation of the Italianate Neoplatonic sensibility, after having 
been influenced by Ausias March, is not a miracle. The apparent 
change is based on the evolution of a greater acceptance of concepts 
such as, ’’amor hereos”, melancholy as a beneficial trait, and imagination, 
all of which form part of the tradition within which Ausias March’s
poetry is written.
The problem in determining the nature of Neoplatonic love
theory in the Renaissance of the sixteenth century is not, strictly
speaking, one of reason, but rather a question of faith reconciled
with love which recognizes the presence of grace in nature, and is
moved towards the source of that grace. Reason does play a role in
the recognition and guidance of this love, but the real crux of the
matter rests in the will which polishes the surface of the soul’s
mirror, that is, it acknowledges the spiritual reality of its objects,
and respects them. This is the object of the Neoplatonic love
treatises following in the wake of Ficino. Neoplatonic love is the
culmination of a secularization of a religious sensibility, to which
I have referred as the ’’evangelical current". When Hebreo argues 
354that love binds the will, as usual, he displaces the centre of
gravity in the individual’s perception of particular objects towards 
an extreme development of the concept of the "furores", and the will 
is bound either by lust or irresistable grace. Other "trattatisti" 
vary the emphasis of grace’s presence, but even in Bembo, the will, 
which pertains to the intellect, transcends reason. It is, therefore, 
evident to me that the Neoplatonic lover does seek a harmonic
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microcosmic balance that orients him towards ’’rational love” in which 
reason retains its dominion over the senses. As in Castiglione, this,
however, is really reason subordinated to faith, since as all the
"trattatisti” indicate that reason is an insufficient instrument of
the soul and that it is always subject to the fluctuations of the 
soul’s reactions to imagination and phantasy. The aim of the Renaissance 
Neoplatonic lover is not wordly love, which he is urged to turn away 
from, but which he can accept spiritually as a "modus vivendi”. He 
actually seeks union with God severed from sentient life which is
misleading for the soul.
To argue that the Renaissance created a kind of love which was 
to be guided strictly by reason is quite another matter that needs to 
overlook the long tradition preceding the "trattatisti", and tends to 
confuse the mission of Ficino with the rise of rationalism. The point 
never to lose sight of is the predominance of Augustinian "recta ratio"
which remains inextricably bound to the problem of the question of
/
the ambivalence of imagination, and a favourable interpretation of
melancholy as the temper of the superior individual. Mediaeval poets
working within the evangelical current, such as Ausias March, in whom 
the predominant Lullian strain of thought has been repeatedly recognized, 
are virtually in complete agreement with the doctrine of the Cortegiano.
They, however, realize the difficulty of implementing an ideal,
because they experience it. They are not writing a theoretical
treatise on love, but a lyrical description of the lover’s actual 
experience. As a result of this divergence, the aforementioned 
interpretation of Renaissance Neoplatonic love theory as "rational 
love”, is too clear-cut. It creates a distinction between what is 
mediaeval and what is Renaissance which puts the text out of focus,
251
forgetting that many of the concepts handled by poets, rhetoricians
and theorists are: "a large hors dToeuvres board: some of its
dishes are more popular earlier and some later, and the number and
size of helpings varies continually; the choice offered is always 
355wide; but the range of choice remains basically the same.” Dronke’s 
sumptuous description of the ’’evolution" of the concept of melancholy 
as pertaining to individual inclination is perfectly adequate to the 
problem of love with which it is closely related. Thus, the notion
that Renaissance love aims at the control of reason and love of the
Middle Ages does not, overlooks and obliterates, problems of individual
inclination and sensibility, as well as the historical existence of 
a constant and ineludable tension between moralists representing the 
position of the Church and the agrarian feudal nobility, and certain 
poets, writers and thinkers, whose orientation, while not in overt 
conflict with the Church, echoes an evangelical consciousness mainly 
pertinent to a new commercial and fundamentally bourgeois aristocracy 
in its ascendance. In the latter, the Areopagian-Erigenian consciousness, 
which crystallizes in Ficino, predominates. Thus the view that:
It is important not to confuse the Neo-Platonic view of love with 
that of the Middle Ages. According to the former human love could 
occupy first place in the mind without wrong, provided that love 
was spiritual; in the central medieval view, only divine love could 
rightly come first 356
is misleading because the key "caveat” in this statement is "the
central medieval view". The latter is an indeterminate factor whose
very ambiguity leaves the reader extremely uneasy and does little to 
enlighten the text. It will always be open to debate whether the
institution of the Church or the laity represents the central view. 
Moreover, this does not seem to me to resist a close scrutiny of the
works of Ficino, Hebreo, Castiglione, and Bembo. I have repeatedly
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pointed out, from "in context" quotations, that because worldly love 
is based on the effects of imagination, all these writers ultimately
reject earthly love and delights in favour of divine love. The latter 
always "rightly comes first"; these works are not the product of 
classical paganism. This is true, with the possible exception of 
Leone Hebreo, whose pantheism inclines him to spiritualize human love 
somewhat beyond the limits set by Bembo and Castiglione. However,
all the "trattatisti" are concerned with the soul’s ascesis from this
world. The level of respectability which they attribute to "heroic 
love" is based on the recognition of grace reflected in nature, and 
on the belief of the immortality of the soul, but, indeed, human love 
does not "occupy first place in the mind without wrong". It is a 
means that rapidly becomes incompatible with its end, just as the eye 
of flesh is incompatible with the eye of the soul, and both cannot 
see simultaneously, as Ficino insists and his followers repeat. Thus, 
the author of the above quotation, who consistently opposes Hebreo 
as a virtual representative of the "courtly love tradition", ^s, on 
this point, misleading. The confusion lies in the blanket concept 
of "courtly love", which in this instance, in particular, has served 
as an impediment to the clear understanding of the texts in question. 
There then remains to shed some light on this point which is
principally represented by institutional moralists, the prime example
of whom is Andreas Capellanus, who has been the backbone of
twentieth-century "courtly love" criticism, and whose vision is 
fundamentally opposed to that of poets affected by the evangelical
current of the Victorine and Chartrian rhetoricians
253
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
For an extreme example of this attitude see: Jules d’Albi,
Saint Bonaventure et les luttes doctrinales de 1267-1277 Paris:
Arch. Franc. Hist., 1923 , pp. 12, 97, 99, 142 and 251. To a lesser 
extent but still stressing the predominance of Thomism as 
universally representative of mediaeval thought see: P. Mandonnet, 
Melanges Thomistes^ Kain (Belgique) : Revue des sciences 
philosophiques et theologiques, 1923 ; and Maurice De Wulf, Histoire 
de la philosophie medievale, vol. 2? Louvain: Presses Universitaires, 
1924-1925. It is applied in this way to the history of Renaissance 
Platonism by Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, 
New York: Octagon Books, 1968 (reprint from 1935), p. 18:
’’Augustine’s teaching was perpetuated by a long series of followers, 
and it was not until the XHIth century that Aristotelianism, as 
interpreted by Aquinas, became the official system of the Church 
and displaced its rivals, Augustinian and Avicennist...” This 
statement is fallacious, see F. C. Copleston, Aquinas, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1975 (1955), pp. 243-248.
In this light one can turn to the prepatory work done by F. Van 
Steenberghen in La philosophie au XIIIe siecle Louvain: Presses 
Universitaires, 1966^ as well as, H. A. Oberman, ’’Fourteenth-Century 
Religious Thought: A Premature Profile,” Speculum LIII, 1978, pp. 
80-93; and W. J. Bouwsma, ’’The Two Faces of Humanism," Itinerarium 
Italicum, eds. H. 0. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1975 , pp. 3-60.
W. J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism," p. 5.
Phrase coined by D. W. Robertson Jr. in "The Concept of Courtly 
Love as an Impediment to the Understanding of Medieval Texts," The 
Meaning of Courtly Love, ed. F. X. Newman, Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1968, pp. 1-18.
On this point see, among others, F. Van Steenberghen, La 
philosophie au XIIIe siecle, pp. 30-40, who presents a very 
intelligent discussion applicable to all mediaeval studies.
See principally R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic 
Tradition during the Middle Ages, London: Warburg Institute, 1950 
(reprint of 1939), as well as, the resume of the development of 
mediaeval Platonic studies in Van Steenberghen (op. cit.), pp. 14-15.
On this point in general see Leonard Forster, The Icy Fire:
Five Studies in European Petrarchism^ Cambridge: University Press, 
1969 , pp. 118-120, and, in particular, of more importance for the 
introduction and development of Petrarchism in Spain: Joseph G. 
Fucilla, "Pedro de Padilla and the Current of Italian Quattrocentist 
Preciosity in Spain," Philological Quarterly IX, 1930, p. 226, and, 
of course by the same author: "Two Generations of Petrarchism and 
Petrarchists in Spain," Modern Philology XXVII, 1930, and Estudios
254
sobre el Petrarguismo en Espana, Madrid: Revista de Filologia 
Espafiola (Anejo LXXII), 1960. A point to be noted here is that 
the popularity of Ausias March in Spain, wanes after 1565, that 
is, after the death of Jorge de Montemayor, although one can find 
sporadic references to him after this date (see: M. de Riquer, 
Historia de la literatura catalana II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, 
pp. 558-567, and Traduceiones Castellanas de Ausias March,
Barcelona: Instituto de Estudios MediterrAneos, 1946, pp. IX- 
XXXVII). One can infer from this situation that the shift in 
sensibility away from the "evangelical current" which is inherent 
to the Neo-platonism of Bembo’s Petrarchism, affects the popularity 
of Ausias March because his poetry also partakes of the "evangelical 
current" inasmuch as it is affected by the works of Ramon Lull.
On this subject see Jean Festugiere, La philosophie de 1'amour 
de Marsile Ficin, Paris: Vrin, 1941; Nesca A. Robb, Neoplatonism 
of the Italian Renaissance, New York: Octagon Books, 1968» J. C. 
Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1958, Of particular interest is the fact that In spite of 
the somewhat diluted nature of his Neo-platonism as it is found in 
Gli Asolani, which I will discuss below, Bembo is known to have 
possessed an autograph copy of the Commentarium in Convivium 
(Marsile Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet de Platon: text 
manuscrit autographe presente et traduit par Raymond Marcel, Paris: 
Societe d’Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1956, p. 40). Throughout 
this thesis I will refer to this edition of the Commentarium.
Moreover, because Raymond Marcel’s translation is sometimes 
defective, inasmuch as it gleans over certain vital concepts such 
as melancholy, and because the English edition of Sears Reynolds 
Jayne (Marsilio Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Symposium, Columbia: 
University of Missouri, 1944) is considered to be even more defective, 
and it does not follow the autograph edition, I have taken the 
liberty to provide a literal translation of every quotation I have 
made in the text.
9 See N. A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Renaissance, pp. 17-56; 
J. C. Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, pp. 15-66.
Margherita Morreale, Castiglione Boscan: El Ideal Cortesano 
en el Renacimiento Espaffol, Madrid: Real Academia Espallola 
(Anejo I), 1959,
11
12
Amedee Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurss Paris: 
Honore Champion, 1912, p. 341.
A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 411.
This is the basic thesis of Raymond Marcel, Marsile FicinParis: 
Societe d’Edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1958, pp. 50-120; and see 
also, P. 0. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic Scholastic 
and Humanist Strains New York: Harper and Row, 1961^ pp. 57-58.
See M. D. Chenu, "Les platonismes du douzieme siecle," La 
theologie au douzieme siecle ? Paris: Vrin, 1957> pp. 108-141;
255
as well as, F. Van Steenberghen, "Invasion de la philosophie 
paienne," La philosophie au XIIIe siecle, pp. 72-117. Chenu points 
out the very misleading nature of any opposition between
Aristotelianism and Platonism. Whatever the inadequacies of the 
Latin Platonism of the Fathers, the introduction of the Aristotelian 
corpus: "ne ruinera pas le spiritualisme platonicien, qui restera
le climat spontane du chretien, non sans echec pour son evangelisme 
natif, son realisme historique, son efficacite terrestre. Elie ne 
disqualifiera pas non plus la grandeur et verite du neoplatonisme 
du XIIe siecle, qui nous empeche de dresser dans un dyptique 
sommaire, ’l’aristotelisme de la scolastique’ face au ’platonisme 
des Peres’, division erronnee en histoire et equivoque en theologie” 
(op. cit., p. 141).
M. D. Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siecle, p. 116, and 
"Malgre la crue de l’aristotelisme, 1’Areopagite commande la 
theologie du XIIIe siecle" (op. cit., p. 278).
In M. D. Chenu’s analysis of the permanent themes in Augustinian 
thought in Christian philosophical movements, two points must be 
stressed since both concern the principal questions discussed in 
this chapter: "1/ l’homme compose d’un corps et d’une ame, est 
par la meme entre deux mondes, mais l’ame est par elle-meme, une, 
substantielle, raisonnable, individuelle, lors meme qu’elle regit 
un corps; et cette definition determine toute la philosophie 
medievale, malgre la crue de l’aristotelisme. 2/ ce dualisme se 
repercute sur les voies et les moyens de la connaissance: l’ame 
a deux faces, l’une tourne vers le monde intelligible, 1’autre vers 
le monde sensible; 1’experience chretienne favorisera en permanence 
cette noetique, contre les nouveautes aristoteliciennes" (La theologie, 
p. 117). These two points are further developed in the Dionysian 
and Erigenian works which continue to form the basis of philosophical 
and theological speculation in the Middle Ages, as F. Van Steenberghen 
has shown (La philosophie au XIIIe siecle, pp. 182-185). The 
importance of these points in the works of Ausias March, approached 
from an Augustinian point of view, and not the traditional Thomist 
perspective taken by A. Pages and his followers, need not be pointed 
out.
M. Menendez y Pelayo, Historia de las ideas esteticas II, 
Madrid: Viuda e Hijos de M. Tello, 1910, pp. 203-220; "De las
vicissitudes de la filosofia platonica en Espana," Obras completas 
t. 9, Madrid: Victoriano Sudrez, 1918, pp. 80-84. It should be 
noted that in this last work Menendez-Pelayo makes a brief but 
important note to the role played by Hughes de Saint Victor in the 
introduction of Florentine Platonism in Spain, as well as to the 
participation of Lull and Sabunde.
Frances A. Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena,"
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 23^ University 
of London, 1960, p. 40. .
Ibid, and F. A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 
London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1964, pp. 270-271 and 308 (inter 
alia); as well as J. C. Nelson, Renaissance Theory of Love, pp. 4 
and 234.
256
20
24
See below, and note 26 of this chapter.
The presence of scepticism in the Middle Ages long before the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (see J. Huizinga, The Waning 
of the Middle Ages, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1954, p. 164) is 
evident in works such as Alain de Lille’s Complaint of Nature 
(trans. D. M. Moffat, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972, reprint Yale 
University Press, 1908). Although the latter is principally 
concerned with the condemnation of lust, the Complaint is actually 
directed towards a condemnation of scepticism which is a manifestation 
of cupidity. Hence, fornicatio is the subject of the Complaint, and 
it represents all manner of cupidity, as it is defined by St.
Augustine (see D. W. Robertson Jr., ’’The Doctrine of Charity in 
Mediaeval Literary Gardens," Speculum v. 26, 1951, p. 28; see also 
Chapter V "Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love."). Although 
Alain de Lille presents an eloquent defense of Reason as the means 
to attain divine Wisdom, he also condemns it when it is abused as 
deceitful logic: "He is too fond of logic, with whom a simple 
conversion causes the rights of Nature to perish" (p. 4). In 
subsequent passages reason is considered to be "the eye of flesh"
(p. 68)*, and Alain de Lille emphasizes that it is by a misuse of 
the latter that man has forsaken God and His divine order.
Although this attitude may well be based on a misunderstanding 
of Averroes’ theory of the intellect, Albert the Great did write 
his "De unitate intellectus contra Averroem" in 1254, which was 
followed by St. Thomas’ "De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas," 
in reaction to the teachings of Siger de Brabant. Specifically 
against Siger, Albert the Great also wrote the Problemata contra 
Averroista, XV questiones. These works can, therefore, serve as a 
justification for this attitude. For a very explicit expose of 
this problem see Fernand Van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant,
Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1977, pp. 57-70; 121-129; 
347-363, and for the Franciscan point of view on Averroism pp.
33-46.
See above note 16, which is supported by St. Augustine’s 
statement: "quae diversa per eos ago unus ego animus" (Confessions
vol. II, ed. W. H. D. Rouse, London: William Heineman, 1967, re- 
1912, p. 93). For a complete discussion of this subject by St. 
Augustine see City of God, trans. H. Bettenson, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1976, pp. 550-556 (Book XIII, 3-5).
See M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 116.
M. D. Chenu, La theologie, pp. 274-322. The focal point of 
attention in these chapters of Chenu’s work is the rising problem 
of the theories of cosmic determinism and predestination, which is 
prompted by the entrance of the thought of the Greek Fathers into 
popular devotion through Joachim de Flore (see also Harold Lee, 
"Scrutamini Scripturas: Joachimist Themes and Figurae in the 
Early Religious Writing of Arnold of Vilanova," Journal of the 
Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 37, 1974, pp. 33-56), and 
Franciscanism. Of note in Chenu’s work is his reference to
257
contacts between Catalans and Greeks (op. cit., p. 285). Charles 
Fraker has made it clear that this influence was strongly felt in 
the Iberian peninsula in his work on the Cancionero de Baena 
(Studies on the "Cancionero de Baena," Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina, 1966; "The Dejados and the Cancionero de Baena," 
H.R. XXXIII, 1965, pp. 97-117; "Gonqalo Martinez de Medina," H.R. 
XXXIV, pp. 197-217; "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero 
de Baena," B.H.S. LII, 1974, pp. 228-243). Wyclifism, as it 
is understood by Fraker, is preceded by the influence of Scotus 
Erigena on the Franciscan Order (Chenu, pp. 287-288), and by the 
translation of the Greek Fathers who presented a well co-ordinated 
theory of cosmic determinism: "... la theologie d’un Gregoire de 
Nazianze, d’un Denys, d’un Maxime, les trois grands "grecs" envisage 
l’economie chretienne dans son unite supreme, ou les vicissitudes 
de 1’histoire, y compris celles de 1’histoire sainte, y compris 
l’evenement central de 1’incarnation, s’inscrivent, telles les 
libertes humaines, dans les determinismes cosmiques" (op. cit., p. 
290). This along with the key notion of "cause" culminates in the 
pantheistic teachings of Amaury de Bene and David de Dinant (Chenu, 
pp. 314-318), as well as Gilbert de la Porree, all of which 
represent extreme developments of Erigena’s system. In this- 
context it is worthy of note that Ausias March refers to the 
problem of "cause", and, therefore,of determinism within the context 
of predestination: "Ajuda’m Deu, car ma forqa es flaca; / 
desig saber que de mi predestines: / a Tu«s present y a mi 
causa venible" (CV, w. 150-152). See Appendix I.
M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 122. For the sake of exactitude,
I must repeat again that distinctions made between Plato and 
Aristotle are a matter of convenience. Therefore, for a total 
reversal of the position I am taking, which is that of most 
literary historians, see Jaako Hintika, Time and Necessity: Studies 
in Aristotle’s Theory of Modality, Oxford: Clarendon, 1973. It 
will be noted that what Brehier and Chenu are referring to is A.
0. Lovejoy’s "principle of plenitude" (The Great Chain of Being, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, p. 52). Hintika notes 
that "Lovejoy claims that Plato adopted and used the principle 
while Aristotle did not. The truth, it seems to me, is precisely 
the opposite: ..." (p. 95). Hence, once again documented caution 
should be used in the opposition between Aristotle and Plato in 
order to avoid over generalizing and losing the proper focus.
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See H. A. Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A 
Premature Profile," Speculum LIII, 1978, pp. 82-84.
See M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 125 (inter alia), and H. A. 
Oberman, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought," pp. 82-84 and 
86-89.
See Chapter III, note 109.
Etienne Gilson remarks on the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure: 
"D*inspiration essentiellement theologique elle utilise, sans 
fausse honte, la terminologie ou meme la doctrine d’Aristote, mais
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sans la condition expressa que jamais aucun de ses principes 
constitutifs ne viendra se substituer a 1’augustinisme dans 
1*edifice legue par la tradition", La philosophie de Saint 
Bonaventure, Paris: Vrin, 1953, p. 392. See also F. A. Yates, 
"The Art of Ramon Lull: An Approach to it Through Lull’s Theory 
of the Elements," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 
vol. XVII, London: The Warburg Institute, 1954, p. 165, which 
refers to the relation between Saint Bonaventure and Ramon Lull.
See Hans Baron, "Petrarch: His Struggles and the Humanistic 
discovery of Man’s Nature," Florilegium Historiale: Essays 
Presented to Wallace K. Ferguson, eds. J. G. Rowe and W. H. 
Stockdale, Toronto: University Press, 1972,, pp. 19-20; and 
Pierre de Nolhac, Petrarque et l’humanisme t. II, Paris: Honore 
Champion, 1965, reprint of 1907, pp. 232-233.
Sonnet I, v. 3, R. M. Durling ed. and trans., Petrarch's 
Lyric Poems, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 37.
The spiritual sensibility of his work is particularly evident 
in certain instances such as Poem 72, w. 16-21: "Io penso: se 
la suso, / onde’l motor eterno de le stelle / degno mostrar del 
suo lavoro in terra, / son altr’opre si belle, / aprasi la pregione 
ov’io son chiuso / et che’l camino a tai vita mi serra" (ed. 
Durling, Petrarch’s Lyric Poems, p. 163). It is obvious that in 
such verses the source of love is not considered to be the lady, 
but God the Prime Mover, to whom Dante refers as "l’amor che 
move il sole e l'altre stelle" (The Divine Comedy, ed. and trans.
C. S. Singleton, "Paradiso" Canto XXXIII: 145, Princeton:
University Press, 1975, p. 380). Petrarch’s love is, therefore, 
directed to a spiritual end which must reject sensuality.
Francisci Petrarchae, Operum t. I, Basilae: Henrichus Petri, 
1554, republished Ridgewood, New Jersey, U.S.A.: Gregg Press, 
1965, p. 382. This is translated as: "And then the work that 
promised so well and seemed so good, flags and grows unsteady; 
and there comes to pass that inward discord of which we have said 
so much, and that worrying torment of a mind angry with itself; 
when it loathes its own defilements, yet cleanses them not away; 
sees the crooked paths, yet does not forsake them; dreads the 
impending danger yet stirs not a step to avoid it" (Petrarch’s 
Secret, trans. William H. Draper, London: Chatto and Windus, 
1911, pp. 45-46).
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Pierre de Nolhac, Petrarque et l’humanisme t. II, pp. 223-225; 
and P. 0. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, p. 78.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 76.
This is evident in various passages of the "De suiipsius et 
multorum ignorantia," Operum t. II, Basilae 1554, p. 1149, for 
instance: "Credo, hercle, nec dubito ilium non in rebus tantum 
parvis^quarum parvus et minime periculosus est error, sed in 
maximis et spectantibus, ad salutis summa aberrasse, tota.ut
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aiunt vita, et licet multa Ethicorum in principio, et in fine de 
foelicitate tractaverit, audebo dicere, clament ut libuerint 
censores mei veram ilium foelicitatem, sic penitus ignorasse, ut 
in eius cogitatione non dico subtilior, sed foelicior fuerit, vel 
quaelibet anus pia>vel piscator, pastorue fidelis vel agricola, 
quo magis miror quodam nostrorum, tractatum ilium Aristotelicum 
sic miratos quasi ineptias censuerint, idque scriptis quoque 
testati sint, de foelicitate aliquid post ilium loqui.” This 
attitude is consistent with the effects produced by the introduction 
of the Nicomachean Ethics in Europe as studied by F. Van Steenberghen, 
La philosophie au XIIIe siecle, in particular pp. 125-130 (’’nous 
avons ici le point de depart des tendances rationalistes et 
naturalistes qui seront condamnees en 1277..." p. 130).
This work has been studied in detail, from the point of view 
of the circumstances in which it was written, by Raymond Marcel, 
Marsile Ficin, pp. 63-76.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 64.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 62-63.
See, St. Augustine, Confessions Book VII: 9 (ed. W. H. D.
Rouse, pp. 365-371), and City of God Book XIV: 5 (ed. David 
Knowles, trans. H. Bettenson, pp. 554-555).
"... at Platonem, prorsum illis et incognitum nil scripsisse 
asserunt, praeter unum atque alterum libellum; quod non dicerent, 
si tarn docti essent, quam me predicant indoctum. Nec literas 
ego, nec Graecus, sexdecim vel eo amplius Platonis libros domi 
habeo; quorum nescio an ullum isti nomen audierint..." ("De 
suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," p. 1162). See also, Raymond 
Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 54-55; Pierre de Nolhac, Petrarque et 
l’humanisme II, pp. 133-152.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 69; and "De multorum et 
suiipsius ignorantia," p. 1160.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 66.
"De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," p. 1157.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 81; Winthrop Wetherbee, 
Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century. Princeton: University 
Press, 1972, p. 229: "The image is usually attributed to Bernard 
de Chartres on the authority of John of Salisbury, Metalogicon 3:
4" (ed. C. C. J. Webb, Oxford: Clarendon, 1929, p. 136).
See the Chartrian interpretation of the Timaeus following 
Chalcidius* commentary, in M. D. Chenu, La theologie, pp. 118­
122, as well as, W. Wetherbee, Twelfth-Century Platonism, pp. 28­
36, and R. Klibansky, "Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages,"
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Medieval and Renaissance Studies vol. I, 1941-1943, pp. 281-330. 
Similarly one finds in the "De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia" 
specific references to the importance of Chalcidius’ commentary: 
"Sed nec non legisse hoc,^tantos aliorum iudices fas est suspicari; 
que si tamen forsitan non legerunt, legant, si quis est pudor, apud 
Calcidium in Timeum Platonis secundo commentario" (op. cit., p. 
1156) .
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See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Picin, pp. 65-71.
"De suiipsius et multorum ignorantia," p. 1161.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 81.
The Augustinian tradition with its emphasis on interior faith 
and illumination lies behind the sensibility of the "devotio 
moderna": "En signification chretienne, par consequent,
1’interiorite, et d’abord la foi, seront premieres: sans la foi, 
plus d’intelligence de la parole de Dieu; sans la foi, plus de 
sens spirituel de 1’histoire sainte; plus de sacrement efficace.
A cette fonction spirituelle de la signification, repond une 
mystique de 1’interiorite, celle dont le De magistro pose le 
principe methodologique; les elements exterieurs, meme les plus 
autorises, ne seront que des excitants et des adjuvants; la 
philosophie augustinienne de 1 * illumination est ici pregnante, et, 
d&s avant 1’Imitation de Jesus-Christ, une certaine attitude 
individualiste menace la pratique sacramentaire" (M. D. Chenu,
La theologie, p. 176).
The evangelical renewal of spirituality took on many forms, 
but it always originated within a secular circumstance: "les 
laics furent ainsi les plus efficaces promoteurs de la vita 
apostolica dont la reforme canoniale etait loin d'epuiser 1’ideal 
et les exigences... Si le reveil evangelique se produit non par 
une revision institutionelles des formes existantes, mais par un 
retour a l’Evangile par-dela ces formes, il est a prevoir que les 
principes de son effervescence: temoignage de la foi, amour 
fratemel, pauvrete, beatitudes, joueront plus spontanement et 
plus promptement chez les laics que chez les clercs, tenus dans 
le reseau des institutions. Le risque peut etre grand — de voir 
le laic abuser de sa liberte evangelique..." (M. D. Chenu, La 
thdologie, p. 237). Among humanists the evangelical current, 
which has its origins in the works of the Chartrian and Victorine 
masters, could take on an erudite aspect which, while partaking of 
the general sensibility, might not descend to the extremes of 
unorthodoxy that could lead to an "abuse of evangelical liberty". 
This religious sensitivity which returns to the devotion of the 
Early Church has been called "la religion des temps nouveaux" 
(Ibid., p. 239). It is only natural that Petrarch, "le premier 
homme moderne" (P. de Nolhac, Petrarque et 1’humanisme t. I, p.
2) partake of this sensitivity that accounts for similarities 
between his work and that of Ausias March on which numerous 
critics have commented (see Appendix II, L: 8; and in particular, 
Mario Casella, "A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs,"
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Bulletino della Soeieta Dantescha Italiana, Rassegna critica 
degli studi danteschi no. 20, 1913, pp. 205-210; Bernardo 
Sanvisenti, _I primi influssi di Dante, del Petrarca e_ del 
Boccaccio sulla letteratura spagnuola, Milano: U. Hoepii, 1902, 
pp. 372-377; A. Farinelli, Italia e Spagna t. I, Tori: Fratelli 
Bocca, 1929, pp. 67-72; Jose Amador de los Rios, Historia critica 
de la literatura espanola VI, Madrid: Gredos, 1969, reprint of 
1865, pp. 489-526).
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See Chapter I, note 1, as well as M. D. Chenu, La theologie, 
pp. 239-245 in which he sums up the "ddclassement feodale’’.
On the development of the Church’s temporal power and problems 
of conscience that this caused for its members see M. D. Chenu,
La theologie, pp. 252-273, he documents the reactions of individuals 
faced with this situation.
In the twelfth century the arts acquired a high degree of 
respectability in their own right and they ceased to be subordinated 
to theological studies. Thus, philosophy came to be studied for 
its own sake, and not merely as a preparation for theological 
studies. See F. Van Steenberghen. La philosophic au XIII® siecle.
pp. 48-71.
56 M. D. Chenu, La
57 M. D. Chenu, La
58 ’’Pierre Valdo et
226-227.
mqois d’Assise sont des laics... La 
clericalisation des fraternites franciscaines qui incorpore leurs 
membres a la hierarchie ecclesiastique (1210) ne se fait pas sans 
resistance, ni sans scrupules pour frere Franqois... En 1207, des 
Vaudois, sous la conduite de Durand de Huesca, convaincus par 
Dominique qu’ils pourraient poursuivre a l’interieur de l’Eglise 
leur ancienne maniere de vivre, puis en 1210, un autre groupe de 
clercs et de la’ics, avec Bernard Prim, reconcilies a leur tour, 
beneficient d’un regime analogue..." (M. D. Chenu, La theologie, 
pp. 266-267). An important facet of the spread of the evangelical 
movement, which is characterized by a fervent desire to return to 
the fold of the original Church, is that it spreads among the class 
of weavers and merchants, as in the case of St. Francis Assisi 
and Peter Valdo. It shares this fundamental trait with Catharism. 
Denis de Rougemont has noted the affinity that exists between 
Catharism and St. Francis and the bequines (L*Amour et 1*Occident, 
Paris: Pion, 1972, edition definitive, revisee de 1956 et 1939, 
pp. 365-367). Of considerable importance for this study and the 
understanding of Ausias March's works is the fact that the 
evangelical movement shares a certain number of texts with 
Catharism, such as the writings of John Scotus Erigena (F. Yates, 
"Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," pp. 34-42), the novel, Le 
Roman de Barlaam et Josafat, referred to by M. D. Chenu (La 
theologie, p. 284) as being very influential on Alain de Lille, 
and which R. Nelli (Ecritures Cathares, Paris: Denoel, 1959, p.
7) places as one of the key texts of Catharism. Other works
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listed by Nelli include, Le poeme de Boece, Voyage au Purgatoire 
de Saint Patrice, and Vision de Tindal et Saint Paul* The last 
two works, at least, were translated into Catalan. This enables 
us to support the theory of a continuing strain of Catharism in 
Catalonia, as suggested by Jorge Ventura Subirats (”E1 catarismo 
en Cataluha,” B.R.A.B.L.B. t. 28, 1960, pp. 75-168). These texts 
are available in the editions of, A. Pacheco (ed.), Viatges al 
altre mon, Barcelona: 62, 1973; and R* Miquel i Planas (ed.) 
Histories d’altres temps: Viatge al Purgatori de Sant Patrici, 
Visions de Tundal _i Trictelm, Viatge d’en Pere Portes £ 1’Infern, 
Barcelona: Fidel Giro, 1917. Steven Runciman (The Medieval 
Manichee: A Study of the Christian Dualist Heresy, Cambridge: 
University Press, 1960) has pointed out that the Catharism found 
in those writings which have survived the destruction of the 
Inquisition, such as the Cathar Catechism (ed. Rene Nelli, "Le 
Rituel Latin" and "Le Rituel Occitan," in Ecritures Cathares, 
pp. 228-252, and L. Cledat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIIIe 
siecle en langue provenqale suivi d’un rituel cathare, Geneve: 
Slatkine, 1968, reprint of Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887), are very 
reminiscent of the writings of the Early Church (p. 154). Hence, 
it is important to remember that "when a sect is persecuted it is 
because the State is convinced that the sect is undesirable...
The arguments thus become not so much theological as social" 
(Runciman, op. cit., pp. 3-4). In this one is reminded of the 
circumstances surrounding the massacre of the Vaudois in 1554 
(see G. de Felice, History of the Protestants of France, trans.
P. Barnes, London: Routledge, 1853, pp. 46-51). This consideration 
is of particular importance for understanding the religious 
inclination of Ausias March’s poetry. Although my first concern 
in this thesis is the theory of imagination, this leads inevitably 
to religious considerations which I will try to clarify in Appendix 
I. For the moment it should suffice to point out that in Poem CV, 
"Cant Espiritual," verses 209-212 echo a passage of the Cathar 
Catechism (Nelli, Ecritures Cathares, p. 213), which has drawn the 
attention of critics such as, R. Nelli, S. Runciman, and J. 
Ventura-Subirats. This, of course, flies in the face of certain 
"courtly love" critics who derisively refer to de Rougemont’s 
theories as "crypto-cathar" (R. Boase, The Origin and Meaning of 
Courtly Love, Manchester: University Press, pp. 77-80). I do not 
suggest that Ausias March was a belated Cathar, but rather that 
if Lull was affected by the historical presence of Catharism in 
his cultural medium, as F. Yates suggests, then Ausias March, who 
is a Lullian poet (P. Ramirez i Molas, La poesia d*Ausias March, 
Basle: University Publication, 1970, pp. 313-387), does indeed 
echo certain spiritual concepts that pertain to the evangelical 
current, which has many points of affinity with Catharism. The 
point to be stressed is that there is nothing "cryptic" about this 
situation. It is a social reality experienced by Ausias March, 
which plays a historical role that shapes individual and collective 
sensibility. "Courtly love" is a nineteenth-century invention 
which must adjust itself to the existence of certain realities, 
not obliterate them to justify its convenience. One has to 
recognize that until recently, the individual’s life has always 
been directly affected by religious tensions. The notion that: 
"courtly love is inherently ambiguous. Its aesthetic principles 
were inspired not by theology but by Graeco-Arabic physiology"
(R. Boase, The Origin, p. 129), is patently misleading. As I hope
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to have shewn in the text, with the help of research done by 
Klibansky, Saxl, Panofsky, Wetherbee, and Chenu, the two are 
inextricably bound in the lover’s experience of melancholy 
imagination.
59 M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 226.
60 See above note 45.
61 M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and 
Mediaeval Thought, Urbana: University of Illinois, 1927, p. 202.
62 M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 225.
63 See Chapter III, note 26.
See M. D. Chenu, La theologie, pp. 159-209, and W. Wetherbee, 
Platonism and Poetry, pp. 220-226, and D. Kelly, The Medieval 
Imagination, Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978, for a 
survey of the continuation of this "mentalite symbolique" in 
secular literature.
It is out of this consciousness of the symbolic nature of 
the universe that the Chartrian developed the theory of involucrum, 
”et le succes de 1’operation... soutint et etendit le genre 
jusqu’a la Renaissance et au-dela" (La theologie, p. 165). Thus 
we find Erasmus still defending the value of this method in the 
Enchiridion Militis Christiani: "Uti divina scriptura non multum 
habet fructus, si in littera persistas haeresque, ita non parum 
utilis est Homerica Virgilianaque poesis, si memineris earn tota 
esse allegoricam” (quoted in La theologie, p. 166).
In a paragraph that could serve to sum up the theory of love 
developed by Ficino and his followers, St. Augustine states that 
love of created objects is not forbidden provided that God be 
loved in them, because He is in them and they in Him: "Si 
placent corpora, deum ex illis lauda, et in artificem eorum 
retorque amorem, ne in his, quae tibi placent, tu displiceas. 
si placent animae, in deo amentur, quia et ipsae mutabiles sunt 
et illo fixae stabiliuntur: alioquin irent et perirent, in illo 
ergo amentur, et rape ad eum tecum quas potes, et die eis "hunc 
amemus: ipse fecit haec et non est longe" non enim fecit atque 
abiit, sed ex illo in illo sunt, ecce ubi est, ubi sapit veritas: 
intimus cordi est, sed cor erravit ab eo" (Confessions JE, p. 178 
and 180). See also on this subject M. D. Chenu, La theologie, 
p. 182. As I will shew in Chapter V, this is the doctrine of 
Charity of St. Augustine, which affects the evangelical sensibility 
and was well known in the Middle Ages.
See City of God Book XI, Chapter 10 (p. 440 ff.), inter alia: 
"The Trinity is one God; the fact that it is a Trinity does not 
mean that it is not simple... What is meant by "simple" is that
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its being is identical with its attributes.... Accordingly, the 
epithet "simple" applies to things which are in the fullest and 
truest sense divine because in them there is no difference between 
substance and quality, and their divinity, wisdom and blessedness 
is not acquired by participation in that of others... Then it is 
evident that God created knowingly, he created things which he 
already knew... this world could not be known to us, if it did 
not exist, whereas it could not have existed if it had not been 
known to God." Xt is evident then that here too the Creation 
merely reflects the thought of God.
This is the appropriate place to note that Ausias March uses 
the word simple in the Augustinian sense. His love which originates 
in imagination yearns for the contemplation of the lady’s soul, 
that is, her form in its divine attributes. Thus Ausias March 
states "son espirit yo volguzf amar simple" (XCIV, v. 116).
However, at a moment of disillusion he admits that this contemplation 
must be transcended for it will always partake of the flesh "Tot 
element elementat no«s simple" (CXVII, v. 177).
See above 67. It should also be noted that by placing the 
forms in the objects, and thereby denying them a transcendental 
function, "Aristotelianism" is opposed to a symbolic interpretation 
of the Creation: "Avec Aristote les idees sont dans les choses.
La valeur de representation des choses, si le transcendent existe, 
sera a chercher dans les choses, selon leur nature sensible. Le 
"naturalisme" est la condition elementaire du symbolisme. Le pur 
experimentalisme aristotelien elimine le symbolisme, sans profit, 
pour une science de definition..." (M. D. Chenu, La theologie, 
p. 182).
Dionysius the Areopagite, The Mystical Theology and the Celestial 
Hierarchies, Surrey: The Shrine of Wisdom, 1949, pp. 33-34; 
quotation from The Celestial Hierarchies.
"A un siecle de distance, Saint Bonaventure renouvellera la 
meme entreprise, son Breviloquium est... un resume doctrinale tres 
concis, devant servir d’instrument a la lecture organique et 
approfondie de l’Ecriture.... La lettre demeure comme pour Hughes 
la base de cette intelligence.... Mais, en 1250, le temps a marche, 
l1equivalence Sacra Scriptura - theologia est debordee et les 
"Somraes" longues ou breves ont pris consistance et autonomie; 
l’exegese s’est fixee dans un cours textuel, tandis que la 
construction doctrinale s’elabore decidement selon la methode 
toute differente et la dialectique des quaestiones definitivement 
detachees des commentaires" (M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 204).
It is, however, to Hughes de Saint-Victor that the credit for the 
evangelical return to the reading of the Bible as the source goes: 
"Hughes ... a enonce un principe qui va soutenir techniquement 
dans les ecoles le renouveau evangelique populaire qui ramenera 
bientot dans l’Eglise, avec une reforme institutionelle, le gout 
de la lecture directe de l’Ecriture" (La theologie, p. 205).
71 See above note 68.
72 See above note 47.
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W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, p. 30.
M. D. Chenu, La theologie, pp. 108-158. This is one point 
which I have chosen not to elaborate, because of the nature of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, one has to take into account all the. 
variations of Neo-platonism that co-exist within the evangelical 
current.
See above note 51.
See Leonard Forster, The Icy Fire, Cambridge: University 
Press, 1969, pp. 104-105.
The Renaissance represents principally a shift of values, in 
which the mercantile bourgeois socio-economical standards come to 
predominate. Although this segment of the society is assimilated 
by the aristocracy, they form a new class which develops its own 
system of mimetic protection. Ausias March, like many writers of 
his age witnesses the rise of this new economical system, and 
criticizes it bitterly in Poem CIV: ”los cavaliers per mercaders 
s’espachen” (verse 220), in spite of his own assimilation of the 
mercantile economy (see Chapter IX).
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 276. Raymond Marcel’s 
interpretation clearly goes against the theory of Burckhardt 
concerning the ’’paganism” of Cosme de Medici and his circle.
(Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 
trans. S. G. C. Middlemore, London: George Allen and Unwin,
1921 (eighth ed.), p. 499).
See notes 53 and 58 above. Moreover, within the class of 
mercatores and the laity affected by the ’’reveil evangelique”, 
there is also a strong inclination towards anti-clericalism from 
the thirteenth century onwards: "C'est dans ce contexte surtout, 
plus que dans quelques pointes de scepticisme doctrinal, qu’il 
faut observer, assez violentes parfois, et s’affirmant au XIIIe 
siecle, les poussees d’un anticiericalisme tantot reformiste 
(utilise parfois publiquement par l’Eglise), tantot antiecclesias- 
tique dans sa critique des appesantissements sociologiques de 
l’Eglise” (M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 268).
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 413.
Marsilio Ficino, The Letters of Marsilio Ficino, trans, members 
of the London School of Economic Science, preface P. 0. Kristeller, 
London: Shepheard-Walwyn, 1975, pp. 135-136. I take the liberty 
to indicate that the word translated by ”hseart" in this passage 
is ’’animum” which I feel would be best translated by "soul” if one 
is to maintain the physiological term of reference, not the 
idiomatic expression, which is not intended by Ficino.
See Petrarch’s comment in note 37 above.
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’’Hence all the arts which relate to outer things, to the body, 
to the senses and to action, should be subject, and give place to 
contemplation as their queen. This is God’s own activity.... If 
life is a kind of activity and the finer the activity the finer 
the life, then surely contemplation, being the most excellent of 
all activity, both because of its worth and its permanence, is 
also the greatest and most distinguished life...? (The Letters of 
Marsilio Ficino, pp. 188-189). See also Raymond Marcel, Marsile 
Ficin, p. 263.
84 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 543-565.
As Ficino writes in the introduction to the Theologia Platonica, 
his intention is to show the divine essence of the soul which 
reflects the work of the Creator. His intention, as the full 
title of the work indicates, to demonstrate the immortal condition 
of the soul: ”Ego vero cum iam pridem Aureliana authoritate 
fretus summaque in genus humanum charitate adductus, Platonis 
ipsius simulacrum quoddam Christianae veritati simillimum exprimere 
statuissem ad ilia quae dixi, duo prae ceteris diligenter incubui, 
ideoque universum opus Platonicam Theologiam de immortalitate 
animorum inscribendum esse censui. In quo quidem componendo id 
praecipue consilium fuit, ut in ipsa creatae mentis divinitate, 
ceu speculo rerum omnium medio, creatoris ipsius turn opera 
speculemur, turn mentem contemplemur atque colamus” (M. Ficino,
Opera Omnia I, Basilae: Henric Petrina, 1576, p. 78). See also 
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 180, 407, 489, 587, and 
especially pp. 649-650, as well as note 86.
"il ne pouvait pas entreprendre d’ecrire une theologie 
platonicienne avant d’avoir compris et resolu tous les problemes 
que pose la presence de cette ame divine et immortelle dans le 
corps, et ces problemes etaient pour lui d’autant plus redoutables 
que sur la question de 1’immortalite, qui etait la clef de voute 
de son systeme, on declarait a l’envi que Platon et Aristote 
n’etaient pas d’accord. Or, cela il ne voulait pas et il ne 
pouvait pas l’admettre. (Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 351). 
As Marcel goes on to explain, the answer to this dilemma was 
provided by Bessarion’s In Calumniatorem Platonis (see Marcel, 
op. cit., pp. 351-370, in particular, p. 368),
87 See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 419-420, and 594.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 210-211; P. 0. Kristeller, 
introduction to the Letters of Marsilio Ficino vol. I, p. 21;
Ardis B. Collins, The Secular is Sacred, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1974; "Ficino is more indebted to Christian theology 
than to Platonism, for he develops a position which follows the 
spirit and letter of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles (op. 
cit., p. 4).
89 Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 519 and 601-602.
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One must always remember that for Ficino the text of the 
Symposium is read with a specifically Christian intention, that 
is, in the light of St. Augustine, St. Thomas and the pseudo- 
Dionysius. Thus, Raymond Marcel can rightly say that in his 
commentary Ficino "a reduit la lettre a la plus simple expression” 
(Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 116). This is consistent with 
the approach taken by Thomas Gould on the historical problem of 
love: ”In the history of the idea of love, at least, the 
Renaissance does not appear to have been a crucial turning point. 
After all, there is not really much more Plato in Spenser or 
Ficino than there is in Dante” (Platonic Love, New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963, pp. 9-10).
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 647.
P. 0. Kristeller, "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio 
Ficino," Traditio XI, 1944, pp. 257-318; The Philosophy of 
Marsilio Ficino, trans. V. Conant, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1943, pp. 14-19; Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 87 
and 638.
The text is reproduced in: Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity 
of the Platonic Tradition, London: Warburg Institute, 1950, 
reprint of 1937, pp. 45-47.
R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, p. 42.
R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, p. 36.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 645, and M. D. Chenu,
La theologie, pp. 316-319. Unlike Amaury de Bene and David de 
Dinant, Gilbert de la Poree was never excommunicated, however, 
he and his followers who professed a strong admiration for the 
Greek Fathers (Chenu, p. 276), were held in disfavour until they 
ceased to be of any importance after the fourth Lateran Council 
(1215).
On the influence of Dionysius the Areopagite on the Chartrians 
see M. D. Chenu, La theologie, pp. 174-178; W. Wetherbee, Platonism 
and Poetry, pp. 57-60. For his importance concerning the development 
of the thought of Ficino, as acknowledged by the latter, see R. 
Klibansky, The Continuity, p. 42; Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, 
pp. 743-744.
See notes 17-19 above.
Arnaldo della Torre (Storia dell'Academia Platonica, Firenze: 
Carnesecchi e Figli, 1902) following the interpretation of 
Burckhardt (see note 78), believed that the Commentarium in 
Convivium was originally written in 1467, but that it had been 
rewritten for Lorenzo il Magnifico in 1475, and that the text 
known to contemporary scholars was the latter, since the former
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had been destroyed (see della Torre, op. cit., pp. 587-609). In 
support of his theory della Torre interpreted a phrase used by 
Corsi in his life of Marsilio Ficino, "ex pagano miles Christi 
factus", as meaning that between 1459 and 1469 Ficino had undergone 
a spiritual crisis, first realizing the errors of Cosme de Medici’s 
paganism and then becoming a.faithful Christian, and a priest.
These arguments are summed up by Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, 
pp. 348-355, and in greater detail in Commentaire sur le Banquet 
de Platon, pp. 11-41. Raymond Marcel in the pages quoted above 
goes to great lengths to shew that the Commentarium was first 
written in 1469, by basing his theory on the research of M. J.
Hak (Commentaire, p. 37), and then by showing that "paganus" in 
Renaissance latin was frequently used to refer to secular individuals, 
who could be excellent Christians, and not to pagans as della Torre 
and Burckhardt thought (Marsile Ficin, p. 355). The conclusion 
of Raymond Marcel, which I accept, is that: "le de Amore, qui est 
bien de 1469, et qui n’a jamais ete revu ni corrige, non seulement 
n’est pas 1’oeuvre d’un paien, mais temoigne d’un christianisme 
eclaire et d’une pidte d’autant moins douteuse qu’elle se 
manifeste jusque dans les termes" (Marsile Ficin, p. 354).
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 326-327.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 327.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 329-330.
See W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 36-48; M. D. Chenu,
La theologie, p. 165; and Douglas Kelly, The Medieval Imagination.
Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1978, pp. 22-23.
See Daniel Carl Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary 
Theory in Bernardus Silvester’s Twelfth-Century Commentary on the 
Aeneid, Ph.D. Thesis: Chicago, 1967, p. 84. On the authorship 
of the Commentary, see The Commentary on the First Six Books of 
the Aeneid of Vergil Commonly Attributed to Bernardus Silvestris, 
eds. J. W. Jones and E. F. Jones, Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1977, pp. IX-XI.
From the Prohemio di Marsilio Ficino sopra la Monarchia. di Dante, 
quoted in footnote pp. 327-328 of Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin.
As Raymond Marcel points out in the introduction to the 
Commentarium: "C’est encore pour prouver la nature spirituelle
de la Beaute, qu’il a tant insiste sur le role des yeux dans la 
naissance de 1’amour. Cela est d’ailleurs si vrai que 1’image 
en est vieille comme le monde. Mais ce que Dante, et Petrarque 
en particulier, avait dit avant lui de la fascination, Ficin a 
voulu le demontrer pour ainsi dire scientifiquement, et l’on doit 
avouer que sur ce point ses arguments demeurent problematiques 
et n’ont guere plus de valeur que ses inferences astrologiques" 
(Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 113). This statement is exact in 
what concerns the relation of Ficino’s theory of love and that of
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Dante and Petrarch^ however, I believe that the latter part of 
Marcel’s affirmation is inexact. The medical and astrological 
references area iatromathematical description of melancholy, of 
the highest importance, as I hope to show below by basing my 
analysis on the work of R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, 
Saturn and Melancholy, London: Nelson, 1964, which, it must be 
pointed out in order to do justice to Marcel’s excellent work, 
was not available to him at the time he prepared his study of 
the Commentarium.
See Charles Trinkaus, ’’The Dignity of Man in the Patristic 
and Medieval Traditions and Petrarch," in Tn Our Image and 
Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought 
vol. I, London: Constable, 1970, pp. 179-199; and Note 109 in 
Chapter III of this thesis.
It is worthy of note that although it was not met with success, 
Ficino made an Italian version of his Commentarium in order to 
increase its circulation (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 114).
This work, which has important theological implications, was then 
intended to be read by a large secular audience.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, pp. 649 and 653;
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 113.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 407.
M. Ficini, Opera Omnia vol. I, p. 609.
"In Epistolas D. Pauli, ascensus ad tertium coelum, ad Paulum 
intelligendum," Opera Omnia vol. I, pp. 425-472.
See M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 173; Raymond Marcel, 
Marsile Ficin, pp. 321 and 434.
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 664.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 107.
See Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 495; R. Klibansky,
E. Panofsky and F. Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy, p. 263 ("Arnaldus 
de Vilanova, who somewhat resembled Ficino in his many-sidedness, 
and whose work De Conservanda iuventute was to some extent the 
pre-humanist forerunner of the De vita triplici..."), and p. 266.
Op. cit. above 116.
On "amor hereos" see Chapter III notes 86, 87 and 100.
P. 0. Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, p. 109.
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See M. W. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination, p. 202. Of 
greater concern for the purpose of this thesis, and because I 
will talk of the influence of Hughes de Saint-Victor on Ausias 
March in the next, is the contribution of the former in the 
development of the concept of the dignity of man, as it can be 
traced in authors such as Pico della Mirandola. Thus, in On 
The Dignity of Man, trans. C. Glenn, New York: Bobbs-Merill,
1965, original 1940, p. 10, we find a key passage which draws 
on the ladder image of the pseudo-Dionysius (Mystical Theology 
and The Celestial Hierarchies, pp. 40-41); Pico states: "But 
if we want to be companions of the angels moving up and down 
Jacob’s ladder...” (op. cit., p. 10). The Areopagite does not 
refer to ’’Jacob’s ladder”, it is a point introduced by Hughes 
de Saint-Victor in the ”De Unione Corporis et Spiritus” (P. L. 
CLXXVIIX, p. 285; see notes 26 and 31 in Chapter III): ’’Vide 
scalam Jacob, in terra stabat, et sumitas ejus coelos tangebat...
Si non sumus angeli volantes, tamen sumus homines ambulantes.
Angeli scala non indigent qui volant divina contemplatione; sed 
homines qui repunt, vel, si amplius, ambulant humana ratione.”
By drawing a comparison between man’s rational soul and angels,
Hughes de Saint-Victor is referring to a fundamental concept of 
the evangelical movement, the divine origin of man, and, therefore, 
to his capacity to recollect the vision of his origin by means 
of the imagination.
See for example, St. Augustine, Confessions II: "et certe 
videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate, nondum facie ad faciem.
(p. 84), and "ubi fulget animae meae” (p. 87). Clearly in these 
passages the soul, illuminated by the grace of God, shines 
imperfectly like the Pauline mirror. As St. Augustine explains, 
the soul is not of the same substance as God, as the Manicheans 
believed ("nor is the soul the same as its wisdom," City of God, 
p. 441). It is illuminated, and in this way, it partakes of the 
divine attributes. Thus, it is a passive receptor of divine 
Wisdom, or light: "the soul itself, even though it may be always 
wise through participation in the changeless Wisdom, which is 
other than itself... there is a certain similarity between the 
two... which makes it quite appropriate to speak of the illumination 
of the immaterial soul by the immaterial light of the simple Wisdom 
of God" (p. 442). As a Platonist, St. Augustine considers the 
soul to be an intermediary between the intelligible and material 
worlds, and as such, it is a mirror reflecting the intelligibles (see
M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 117).
See Chapter III, note 21. Furthermore, Ficino is explicit 
on this point: "Animus autem eo potissimum ad illam est natura 
sua accomodatus quod et spiritus est et quasi speculum deo 
proximum, in quo quemadmodum in superioribus diximus divini 
vultus elucet imago" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 190, see 
also pp. 158, 183, 190 and 207).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 147. Compare this quotation 
with note 69 in the text. The predominant influence of the 
pseudo-Dionysius becomes evident. (Trans.: "Nor is it without 
reason that the ancient theologians place Goodness in the centre
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and beauty on the outer ring. Indeed, the Good is a single 
centre, but beauty, on the contrary is in four circles. God 
is the single centre of everything, and the four circles are 
around God: these are intelligence, soul, nature and matter.”) 
(See also, Celestial Hierarchies, p. 37).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 152. ’’The Good is said to 
be that very outstanding essence of God. Beauty is a sort of 
impulse (force), or beam penetrating everything, first in the 
angelic mind, then into the soul of the entirety and the other 
souls, thirdly into nature, and fourthly into corporeal matter”.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 159. ’’For love is a desire 
to enjoy beauty. But beauty is a certain light which attracts 
the human spirit to itself. Surely the beauty of the body is 
nothing other than the brilliance itself, which is derived from 
the grace of colours and lines. In the same way the beauty of 
the soul is a radiance of learning and the harmony of morals. It 
is not the ears, nor the sense of smell, nor taste nor touch, 
that can perceive that corporeal light, but only the eye. If 
the eye alone can recognize beauty,, then only the eye can enjoy 
it. Therefore, the eye alone enjoys the beauty of the body”.
On sight see note 125 above, and Chapter III, notes 12 and
16.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 178-179. "The virtue of 
the soul also seems to manifest itself in a certain refinement 
of words, gestures, and deeds. Its sublime substance encompasses 
even the heavens with a clear light. In all these matters the 
internal perfection produces one which is external. We can call 
the former Goodness and the latter beauty."
"Unus igitur dei vultus tribus deinceps per ordinem positis 
lucem in speculis: angelo, animo, corpore mundi" (Commentaire 
sur le Banquet, p. 185). This is the basis for the theory of 
the Animate (see Chapter III, note 26). It is also to be noted 
that although Ficino creates the theory of the ’’spiritus" to act 
as the animate in the microcosm, he does not abandon the "mirror" 
function of the soul itself. Although he distinguishes between 
the two, they are always present together (Commentaire, p. 207).
See note 49, Chapter III. The Stoic concept of beauty is 
first enunciated in the Commentarium, p. 142, and see notes 125 and 130.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 183. "But the spirit receives 
in a single point the whole amplitude of a body in a spiritual 
manner, and in the guise of an incorporeal image. It is precisely 
this image or shape (speties, vision, or beauty, or splendour) 
received by the soul, which alone is pleasing to it, and although 
this image may be the semblance of an external body, yet in the 
soul it is incorporeal. Hence, it is an incorporeal image (speties) 
that is pleasing (that delights). And that which delights (the 
soul) is pleasant to everyone, and that which is pleasant is in
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the end that which is beautiful. Hence it is brought about 
that love is attracted to something incorporeal, and beauty 
itself is a certain spiritual semblance of the object, rather 
than a corporeal image. / / There are some, however, who
are of the opinion that beauty lies in a certain disposition 
of the limbs, or, to use their words, a symmetry and proportion 
together with a certain sweetness (smoothness) of colour. We 
do not accept their opinion...."
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"Amor enim fruende pulchritudinis desiderium est" (Commentaire 
sur le Banquet, p. 159).
136
That the image is actually corporeal is evident when we take 
into account Ficino’s theory of sensation-phantasy (Commentaire 
sur le Banquet, p. 207). In the quotation referred to above 
(note 130), Ficino wishes to stress the spiritual nature of beauty, 
although the source of the image apprehended by the senses must be 
corporeal. The distinction drawn by Ficino enables him to go 
beyond the limitations of imagination understood as "sensuous 
memory", as in Hughes de Saint-Victor. It is, however, a very 
fine distinction that is not always maintained by Ficino.
See note 125 above.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 183. "That image which is 
apprehended in the sight and in the soul cannot be a body, since 
those two (sight and soul) are incorporeal. For by what means 
can the whole heavens, so to speak, be embraced by the tiny pupil 
of the eye, if the pupil should receive it physically? This is 
impossible".
See notes 26 and 31, Chapter III. It should also be pointed 
out that Ficino repeats, almost word for word, Geoffroy de 
Vinsauf*s metaphor of the architect and poetic imagination (see 
Chapter III, note 21). Thus, he states in the Commentarium:
"Quo si quis quesiverit quo nam pacto corporis forma animi 
mentisque forme et rationi similis esse queat is, oro, consideret 
edificium architect!. Principio architectus edificii rationem et 
quasi ideam animo concipit. Deinde qualem excogitavit domum, 
talem pro viribus fabricat. Quis neget domum corpus exsistere 
eamque idee artificis incorporee, ad cuius similitudinem effecta 
est, esse persimilem? Porro propter incorporalem ordinem quemdam 
potius quam propter materiam est architecto similis iudicanda.
Age igitur materiam subtrahe si potes, potes autem cogitatione 
subtrahere, ordinem vero relinque. Nihil tibi restabit corporis, 
nihil materie. Imino vero idem erit penitus qui ab opifice 
provenit ordo et qui remanet in opifice. Idem in quovis hominis 
corpore facias. Reperies illius formam, animi rationi quadrantem, 
simplicem esse materiesque expertem" (Commentaire sur le Banquet, 
p. 188).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 207. "But the soul which is 
present everywhere the spirit is, easily examines the corporeal 
images reflected in the latter as in a mirror, and through the
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perception of these images it judges the bodies. And this means 
of cognition is called sensation, or sense perception, by the 
Platonists. While the soul examines these images, it conceives 
in itself, by its own power, images similar to them, but which 
are much more pure. We call such conception imagination and 
phantasy.”
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Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 207-208. "Images thus 
conceived are preserved in the memory. Through these the keen 
eye of the soul is aroused again and again to contemplate the 
universal form of things, which It contains within itself. 
Therefore, while it perceives a certain man by the sense of 
sight and conceives him in imagination, it contemplates him in 
the intellect and by the definition common to all men through 
the idea of humanity innate in it, and finally, it preserves 
what it has contemplated. Therefore, it would be enough for the 
soul, which preserves in its memory the image of a handsome man 
once it has conceived and reformed it, to have seen the beloved 
only once. However, for the eye and the spirit, which catch 
images of corporeal object only when it is present, and lose them 
when the corporeal object is absent, the continual presence of 
the body is necessary, so that they may continually receive light 
from its radiance and remain charmed and delighted. Therefore, 
they too, because of their own need, require the presence of the 
body. The soul, being most indulgent to them is compelled to 
desire the same presence."
In the Sixth Discourse Ficino defines love as an affection 
between that which is beautiful and that which is not: "Atque 
ita amorem ex huiusmodi mixtione medium quemdam affectum esse 
volumus inter pulchrum et non pulchrum utriusque participem" 
(Commentaire, p. 201). This affection involves "movement", since 
what Ficino goes on to describe is phantasy (see note 136 above). 
Thus, Raymond Marcel explains concerning this passage: "Or si 
l’Amour desire la Beaute qui lui manque, mais qu’il n’ignore pas, 
c’est qu’un mouvement s’est etabli entre Dieu et l’homme, mouvement 
qui, comme celui de la pierre magnetique ou celui du feu, affecte 
l’homme en respectant sa nature sans cesser d’etre lui-meme 
fidele a son principe. Ce mouvement ... est 1’Amour lui-meme..." 
(Commentaire, p. 85).
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Ficino himself states: "Bonos autem nostri custodes proprio 
nomine angelos inferioris mundi gubernatores Dionysius Areopagita, 
quod a Platonis mente minime discrepat, vocare solet..."
(Commentaire, p. 203).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 169. "Men, that is, the 
souls of men. Once, that is, when they were created by God.
Are whole, are endowed with two lights, one inborn and the other 
infused. By the inborn, that they might contemplate things equal 
and inferior to them, and by the infused one that they might 
contemplate things superior. They wished to make themselves 
equal to God. They turned themselves towards the inborn light 
only. Hence, they are divided. They have lost the infused 
light, when they turned solely to their own inborn light, and
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have immediately fallen into their bodies.”
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See Chapter III, note 104.
’’Corpus iugiter fluit crescendo, descrescendo, resolutione 
continua, liquefactione calore vicissim et frigore permutatum. 
Anima semper eadem permanet" (Commentaire, p. 171).
The problem of the omnipresent tension between natural and 
right reason is essentially that of the body and the soul, as 
explained by St. Augustine (Confessions II, p. 379): ”nam et 
nos, qui secundum animam creatura spiritalis sumus, aversi a te, 
nostro lumine, in ea vita fuimus aliquando tenebrae; et in 
reliquis obscuritatis nostrae laboramus, donee simus iustitia 
tua in unico tuo sicut raontes dei.” On the question of St. 
Augustine’s dualism, see M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 117.
St. Augustine, Confessions II (p. 93): ”... yet I the soul
being but one, do actuate and govern.”
”... those who imagine that all the ills of the soul derive 
from the body are mistaken... it was not the corruptible flesh 
that made the soul sinful; it was the sinful soul that made the 
flesh corruptible” (City of God, p. 551, Book XIV: 3).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 170. ’’From this it comes 
about that qualities, because they are necessarily sustained by 
the body, come into being and are controlled by some superior 
substance which is neither a body, nor lies in the body. Such 
is the soul, which present and firmly fixed in the body, sustains 
itself and imparts to bodies the quality and strength of its 
temper (complexion). By these instruments it exercises various 
functions in the body and through the body."
See Chapter III, notes 104 and 105 on the medical use of 
the theory of the animate.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 172. "That is why, thanks 
to this light which truly belongs to it, the soul can see itself 
and all that is below it, in other words, the corporeal objects, 
but it cannot see God or the other superior beings.”
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 235. "However, our soul, and 
this is profoundly deplorable, for it is at the origin of all 
our misfortunes, the soul, I say, is alone so captivated by the 
charms of the corporeal form that it neglects its own image 
(speties), and indeed, forgetful of its own self, it pursues the 
form of a body which is its own shadow."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 235. "But he pursues its 
shadow in water and tries to embrace it, that is, he is enamoured
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of beauty in the fragile body and its semblance of flowing water 
which is the shadow of the soul itself. He abandons his very 
own image, and never attains his shadow, since by following the 
body the soul neglects itself, and is not content with the use 
of the body. For it does not really long for the body itself, 
but like Narcissus it is allured by the corporeal form which is 
but the shadow of its own beauty. What it really yearns for is 
the latter, but since it is unaware of this and seeks the one 
while desiring the other, it can fulfil its yearning. Hence, 
bursting into tears he is consumed, that is, the soul placed 
outside itself and having slipped into the body, is tortured by 
destructive passions, and infected by the pollution of the body, 
as it were, dies, since it seems now more a body then a soul.
And so that Socrates might avoid such a death, Diotima brought 
him from the body to the soul, from this to the angel and from 
there to God.”
See notes 26 and 31, Chapter III.
”lbi contemplande hie generande pulchritudinis desiderium. 
Amor uterque honestus atque probandus. Uterque enim divinam 
imaginem sequitur” (Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 155).
"Si quis generationis avidior contemplationem deserat aut 
generationem, preter modum cum feminis vel contra nature ordinem 
masculis prosequatur aut formam corporis pulchritudini animi 
preferat, is utique dignitate amoris abutitur” (Commentaire sur 
le Banquet, p. 155).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 175. ”We have immediately 
neglected that infused divine light, having turned aside towards 
the natural one. So the one having been neglected, the other we 
have preserved. While we have kept one half of ourselves, we 
have let the other go. But led at a certain moment of our 
existence by natural light, we all desire the divine light, in 
fact...."
155 "Verus enim amor nihil est aliud quam nixus ad divinam 
pulchritudinem evolandi, ab aspectu corporalis pulchritudinis 
excitatus. Adulterinus autem ab aspectu in tactum precipitatio" 
(Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 260). As this quotation indicates, 
contemplative love is only a means, not and end in itself. Here 
as in Hughes de Saint-Victor’s "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus"
(see Chapter III, notes 26 and 31), the soul that remains bound 
to the contemplation of beauty found in particular objects will 
inevitably incline to the flesh, because it remains in a constant 
state of fluctuation (see above note 149).
156 "... sed a Diotima fatidica muliere, divino afflata spiritu, se 
accepisse dicebat, mea quidem sententia, ut ostenderet sola 
divinitatis inspiratione quid vera pulchritudo sit, quid 
legitimus amor, qua ratione amandum, homines intelligere posse" 
(Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 199).
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157 Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 176. "Those who know God 
do not please him unless they also love the knowledge" (that is, 
"love the object known to them").
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"Ainsi le message de Diotime nous revele en fait une ascese 
qui, a partir de la Beaute nous conduit a Dieu...’.’ (Commentaire 
sur le Banquet, introduction de Raymond Marcel, p. 97).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 238-239. "Thus the light of 
the One, itself entirely and utterly simple, constitutes infinite 
beauty because it is neither stained by the pollution of that 
which is material, nor changed by the advance of time, as is the 
form of the soul, nor scattered by multiplicity, as is the image 
or beauty (speties) of the angel.... Similarly, the infinite 
light is free from all corporeality, for it shines without 
moderation or end because it does so (shine) through its own 
nature, when it is not limited in the least by any other thing. 
Thus the light and the beauty of God, which is absolutely pure 
and unrestricted by all other things, is said to be, without 
doubt, infinite beauty. Infinite beauty also demands boundless 
love. Wherefore I beg of you, Socrates, to love all other things 
in a fixed and limited manner; but to love God with infinite love 
and not let there be any moderation in divine love."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 239. "We, however, my 
illustrious friends, shall not only love God immeasurably, as 
Diotima is represented as having ordered, but love Him alone.... 
And whosoever in this time will have devoted himself to God out 
of love, he will finally, in the end regain himself in God....
A true man and the idea of man are one and the same. Hence, 
each of us, separated from God on this earth, is not a true man, 
since he is separated from his idea and his form. Divine love 
and piety will lead us back to it, and since we are torn asunder 
and mutilated, then we are joined again with our ideas through 
love, and we will become whole men, in such a way that we seem 
to have worshipped God first among all things, that we may then 
worship things in God, and that we may seem to revere all things 
in God, so that we may find ourselves in Him before all other 
things, and by having loved God perfectly we may have loved 
ourselves."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 257. "But by divine "furor" 
(ecstasy), he (man) is elevated above the nature of man and Is 
transformed into God. Indeed, this divine "furor" is the 
illumination of the rational soul, through which God recovers 
that soul which has slipped down from above to the region below, 
and brings it from those regions below to those above."
162 "Love, as we have said, takes it origin from sight. Sight 
lies between thought and touch; hence, the soul of the lover is 
always torn in opposing directions and is cast up and down, to 
and fro, alternately. At one time the desire to embrace is born, 
at another that chaste desire for celestial beauty, and now that 
one, now this one, conquers and leads the way" (Commentaire sur
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le Banquet, p. 218).
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"Des les premieres pages du Commentaire, nous 1’avons (Ficin) 
vu souligner pour montrer la transcendence de la Beaute,
1’inquietude et 1’angoisse que tout amour humain porte avec 
lui..." (Raymond Marcel, ed., Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 111).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 222. "In addition, bestial 
love and human love can never be said to exist without causing 
indignation (displeasure)... And so you come to hate, and at 
the same time, to love the beautiful; you hate them like thieves 
and murderers, but are forced to admire them and love them like 
mirrors that reflect celestial splendour."
God is not substantially present, but they participate in 
His Beauty, and, therefore, are not wholly distinct from His 
substance. On this point Ficino is consistent with the 
orthodoxy of St. Thomas and the pseudo-Dionysius, see notes 66­
69.
Like most Neo-platonists, Ficino is affected by the doctrine 
of the four temperaments, but he is careful never to let the 
astrological influence of the elements affect the free-will of 
the individual (see Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 273-274). Thus, 
although there is in his system an implicit element of 
predestination concerning the temper of the individual, Ficino 
cannot be said to incline to judicial astrology which would lead 
to a denial of free-will, and entail "astrological fatalism" of 
the kind found in the Cancionero de Baena (see C. F. Fraker, "The 
Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," B.H.S. LII, 
1974, pp. 230-240). Ficino follows orthodoxy as defined by St. 
Augustine (City of God, pp. 184-185, Book V: 5), and St. Thomas 
Aquinas (The Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province, London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1941, 
pp. 157-162, Book I, Q. 115, art. 3-4). The direction taken by 
Ficino is anteceded by Arnau de Vilanova and Ramon Lull (Saturn 
and Melancholy, p. 95; Arnau de Vilanova, Obres Catalanes vol.
II: Escrits medics, ed. M. Batllori, Barcelona: Barcino, 1947, 
p. 70; and Ramon Lull, "Arbre de Ciencia," Obres Essencials vol. 
I, eds. Tomas i Joaquim Carreras i Artau, Barcelona: Selecta, 
1957, p. 715 and 1043 note 92).
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See Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 218: "... hinc semper
contrarias in partes amantis distrahitur animus et sursum vicissim 
deorsumque iactatur."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 154. "The Angelic Mind is 
absolutely free from any commerce with corporeal matter."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 154-155. “Finally, to 
summarize, Venus is twofold. The one is, of course, that 
intelligence which we have placed in the Angelic Mind. The other 
is the power of generation attributed to the world soul. Each
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one has a companion love which is like it. For the former is 
carried by inborn love towards understanding the Beauty of God.
The latter is likewise carried by its love towards procreating 
the same beauty in corporeal bodies. The former first embraces 
within itself divine splendour, then she transfers this ecstasy 
to the second Venus.... When first the image (speties) of the 
human body is brought before our eyes, our mind, which is in us 
the first Venus, reveres it like an image of divine grace (and 
loves it), and through it the soul is frequently drawn towards 
that image. However, the power of generation, the second Venus 
desires to reproduce a form similar to its own. Therefore, love 
is present in both. In the former by contemplation, and in the 
latter by reproducing it (the desire for beauty). Each love is 
honourable. / /If anyone who is too eager for reproduction 
abandons contemplation, or pursues this act with women beyond 
normal means or beyond natural order with men, or prefers the 
form of the body to the beauty of the soul, then he, in particular, 
abuses the dignity of love."
The terminology I am using in this instance clearly reflects 
the inadequacies of the Platonic-Aristotelian opposition within 
the context of Christian literature. Plato implies in the 
Symposium that there are three kinds of love: physical procreation, 
spiritual procreation and love of Wisdom (The Symposium, trans. W. 
Hamilton, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 23-25 and 84-95).
In the Phaedrus these are more explicitly presented as: "the 
purely sensual, those who are called in the Phaedrus ’lovers of 
honour1, and the lovers of Wisdom" (Ibid., p. 25). In this system 
it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the last two, 
because the "lovers of Wisdom" attempt to, but do not quite, 
transcend physical love. It is around this point that Ficino 
develops a multiple series of divisions based on the Aristotelian 
theory of friendship, which is elaborated in Book VII of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. The latter divides the good into three 
classes, friendship is sought for three purposes: utility, 
pleasure, or goodness (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J. A.
K. Thomson, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976, pp. 260-269). This 
classification is based on the three kinds of lives described 
in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, as pleasurable, political 
and contemplative (Ibid., p. 68). In mediaeval or renaissance 
Aristotelianism, these are labelled "provechoso, deleitable, y 
honesto" (Leone Hebreo, Didlogos de Amor, en Obras Completas 
del Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, B.A.E. CXXXII, ed. P. Carmelo 
Saenz de Santa Maria7 Madrid: Atlas, 1960, p. 17). Mediaeval 
translators of the Nicomachean Ethics interpret these three lives 
as sensual or bestial, human or mixt (that is, love controlled 
by reason), and contemplative, as one finds in Guillem de Copons* 
Catalan translation of Brunetto Latini’s Livre dou tresor: "A 
comtar fan tres vides: la una es de concupiscencia e de cobejanca; 
la II es vida ciutadana, qo es de seny, de proesa e d’onor; la 
terqa es contemplativa. E los de mes viuen segons la vida de les 
besties, que es apellada vida de concupiscencia" (B. Latini,
Llibre del Tresor vol. II, ed. C. J. Wittlin, Barcelona: Barcino, 
1976, pp. 111-112). It is on the basis of such divisions that 
Hebreo attributes to Plato, undoubtedly following Ficino’s 
handling of these three divisions, the latter classification.
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The evolution of this tripartite division is conditioned by two 
factors. The Augustinian Neo-platonic conception of the position 
of the soul as an intermediary between God and matter favoured 
this kind of classification, and moreover, it is an inherent part 
of the Biblical exegetical tradition, such as in Guillaume de 
Saint Thierry’s commentary on the Song of Songs which classifies 
life as "animal, rational, and spiritual" (see M. D. Chenu, La 
theologie au douzieme siecle, pp. 298-299). This broader context 
is unfortunately overlooked in most exposes of the mediaeval 
tradition of this tripartite classification such as, A. Pages,
Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, Paris: Honore Champion, 1912, 
pp. 298-323; and Rene Nelli, L’Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: 
Privat, 1963, pp. 247-264). When Ficino came to use this tripartite 
division he was less concerned with Aristotle or Plato than with 
an essentially Christian tradition, and he expanded the limits of 
this division, which is present in the Symposium, in order to deal 
with the various manifestations of human activity from a physio­
logical basis rooted in Aristotelian theory, as found in Problem 
XXX (see note 176).
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 211. "Now these twin Venuses 
and twin loves are not only present in the World Soul, but also 
in the souls of the spheres, of the stars, of demons and of men."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 211. "In us, however, one 
finds not only two but five loves. The two extremes are, of 
course, demons. The three intermediaries are not demons at all, 
but passions. Certainly, in the mind of man, love leading to 
the contemplation of divine beauty is eternal, by reason of which 
love we pursue the study of philosophy and the duties of justice 
and piety. There is even in the power of generation a certain 
hidden stimulus to procreate offsprings, and that love by which 
we are constantly incited to recreate in the figure of the 
procreated infant some similitude of celestial beauty, is eternal."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 211. "These two eternal loves 
within us are the two demons which Plato foretells will always be 
present in our souls, of which one elevates us to the regions 
above, the other drags us down to the regions below, the one being 
Calodemon, that is, the good demon, the other Cacodemon, that is, 
the evil demon. In truth both are good, because the procreation 
of a child, as well as, the search for truth are thought to be 
essential and honourable. The second to some extent is called 
evil, since because we abuse it, it often throws us into confusion 
and greatly turns the soul away from its principal good, which 
consists of the contemplation of the truth, and it twists us 
towards quite worthless occupations."
174 Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 211-212. "Between these two 
are within us three loves which, since they are not so stable as 
the others, but have beginnings, increase and decrease, and 
cease to exist, they are more correctly called impulses and 
passions than demons. Of these, one lies at an equal distance 
from both extremes. The remaining two incline in either direction."
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175 See note 166 above. In the "De Vita Coelitus Comparanda" 
(Opera Omnia I, Basel: Henric Petrina, 1576 (Torino: Bottega 
d’Erasmo, 1962), p. 534), Ficino points out that one can come 
under the beneficial influence of melancholy-Saturn by the 
exercise of free-will, and thereby become a superior man. As R. 
Klibansky, E. Panofsky, and F. Saxl indicate: "Ficino is 
convinced that not only are children of Saturn qualified for 
intellectual work but that, vice versa, intellectual work reacts 
on men and places them under the dominion of Saturn, creating a 
sort of selective affinity between them" (Saturn and Melancholy, 
p. 261).
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Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 212. "Furthermore when the 
image of someone’s body, which comes before the eyes and through 
the eyes penetrates to the spirit, it pleases the soul instantly, 
because the composition of matter is of such a sort that the 
divine mind contains it in its idea, and since it agrees with 
the seminal reasons which both our mind and the power of generation 
once received from divinity and preserve as models of the thing 
itself. From this the tripartite love we have spoken about springs 
For we are either born or educated to be eager and inclined 
towards a life of contemplation, or one of action, or one of 
sensual pleasure. If it be the life of contemplation then 
immediately we are elevated from the sight of a corporeal form 
to the contemplation of the spiritual and the divine. But if it 
be the life of sensual pleasure, we suddenly descend from seeing 
to the desire to touch." Furthermore Ficino goes on to classify 
these three loves as I indicated in note 170: "Contemplavi hominis 
amor divinus, activi, humanus, voluptuosi ferinus cognominatur"
(p. 212). (See note 181.)
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 205. "The Venereal demon is 
in fact a threefold love. The first is placed by the Platonists 
in the Celestial Venus, that is to say, in the very intelligence 
of the Angelic Mind. The second is placed in the Vulgar Venus, 
namely in that power of generation which the World Soul possesses. 
These two are also called demons because they lie between Chaos 
and Beauty, as we have mentioned above and will explain a little 
later on. The third is the order of demons who accompany the 
planet Venus. In these two we place a threefold order. Some 
are assigned to the element of fire, some to pure air, and some 
to denser and misty air. All are called "heroes", that is, 
lovers, from the Greek word, "heros" which means love."
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See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 255-274. Peter Dronke points 
out in his review of Saturn and Melancholy (Notes and Queries 
vol. 12, 1965, p. 356), that the main drawback of this point is 
that it artificially establishes a distinction between the 
mediaeval and the renaissance concepts of melancholy, when in 
fact both views are consistently present.
The Symposium, pp. 81-82.
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Reference to Al-Razi is made in the ninth chapter of the 
Sixth Discourse of the Commentarium (Commentaire, p. 214):
"Eumque Rasis medicus cohitu, ieunio ebrietate deambulatione 
curari precepit." It is also possible that Ficino relied on 
Saint Albert the Great’s Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 
which introduces the concept of melancholy adust. The latter 
plays an important part in Ficino’s theory of love, as I will 
shew below. See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 69-72.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 212. ’’The love of the 
contemplative is divine, that of the active man is human, and 
that of the voluptuous man is bestial.”
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 213. "Although all these 
traits are found in all kinds of love, they are seen most clearly 
in the three intermediary loves which are best known to us."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 213. "Born on the birthday 
of Venus he follows Venus, that is, born with those spirits from 
above which we call venereal, he brings the souls of men back to 
the regions above. But he is seized by ci desire for beauty, 
since Venus herself is most beautiful, that is, he fires souls 
with the desire for the highest, divine beauty, since he himself 
was born among the spirits, who being close to God are illuminated 
magnificently by the grace of God and raise us towards those same 
rays."
"It is Saturn who leads the mind to contemplation of higher 
and hidden matters, and he himself, as Ficino says in more than 
one place, signifies "divine contemplation" (Saturn and Melancholy, 
p. 260). See also, ibid., pp. 271-273, and in particular, pp. 
337-338, which specifically refers to Raymond Lull’s treatment 
of the lofty functions of Saturn in the Tractatus novus de 
astronomia, which, as all of Ramon Lull’s works, may have influenced 
Ausias March’s thought, as we will see in Chapter V. Furthermore, 
see Chapter III, notes 79-85.
See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 10, 17, 103, 145.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 213. "Besides, since the life 
of all living things and trees as well as the fertility of the 
earth lies in humidity and heat, Diotima, in order to demonstrate 
the poverty of Love, inferred that both humidity and heat were 
lacking in him, when she said that he was dry, thin and a dirty 
grey-green. For who would not know that the things which moisture 
abandons are arid and dry? Likewise, who can say that pallor and 
greyness (squalor) come from any other source than the lack of 
warm blood."
"The Saturnine man is the worst of all men... His skin is 
dark, brown, yellowish or almost greenish" (Saturn and Melancholy, 
p. 191, paraphrasing Michael Scott, Liber introductorius, Oxford:
MS. Bodley 266, fols. 150v sqq.).
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188 "If that melancholy be not violently affected by "adustio", 
it will generate vital spirits which are abundant, constant and 
strong. For this reason, such people have firm convictions and 
very well regulated passions, and they will be industrious and 
possess the highest virtues” (Albertus Magnus, De animalibus 
libri vol. II, quoted from Saturn and Melancholy, p. 70). I do 
not refer specifically to Albertus1 theory but to the medical 
tradition following Avicenna (Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 86-89).
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See note 135 above.
See Chapter III, notes 87, 95, and 100.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, pp. 213-214. ’’Indeed, by a 
lengthy love mortals become pale and thin, inasmuch as the power 
of nature is hardly adequate for two tasks at once. The attention 
of the lover’s soul is absorbed by perpetual thoughts of the 
beloved, and to this end the power of his entire temperament is 
directed. Hence, no longer is the food in his stomach completely 
digested, and as a result of this the major part is released as 
superfluous residues, while the lesser part is carried to the 
liver in a raw state."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 214. "Moreover, wherever the 
attention of the soul is drawn, there too fly the spirits which 
are the vehicles or instruments of the soul. The spirits are 
created In the heart from the thinnest part of the blood. The 
soul of the lover is dragged down towards the image of the beloved, 
fixed there by imagination (phantasy), and into the beloved himself. 
And the spirits are dragged in the same direction. Perpetually 
flying thither they are weakened. Wherefore it is necessary that 
a continuous recharging of pure blood take place in order to 
recreate burnt out spirits, where the clearer parts of the blood 
are each day exhausted in the refurbishing of spirits. On account 
of this, when the pure clear blood has been weakened, there remains 
blood that is impure, thick, dry and black. From this the body 
becomes dry and squalid (dirty grey-green), and lovers become 
melancholic. For from the dry, thick, black blood emerges 
melancholy, that is, black bile, which completely fills the head 
with its vapours, dries the brain, and does not cease to trouble 
the soul day and night with hideous and horrifying images."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 214. "These things usually 
happen in the case of those who, abusing love, have transformed 
what belongs to contemplation into a desire for physical love."
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 215. "For this reason choleric 
and melancholic men seek music and the pleasures derived from the 
visual enjoyment of corporeal forms, as the sole cure and solace 
for their most troublesome temperament. Hence, they are more 
inclined to the charms of Venus. Socrates, whom Aristotle 
considered to be melancholic had the greatest propensity of all 
towards the arts of loving, as he himself confessed. In the same 
way we can consider Sappho a melancholic, as she herself witnesses. 
Even our master Vergil, whose portrait indicates him to have been
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a choleric, was somewhat inclined to love.”
See note 105.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, The Mystical Theology and 
the Celestial Hierarchies, p. 39.
See Chapter III, note 31.
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Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 255. "Out of necessity the 
restlessness of lovers perseveres as long as that infection of 
the blood, remaining fixed in the entrails as a result of 
fascination, oppresses the heart with deep anxiety, nurtures the 
wound in the veins, and burns the members (limbs) with invisible 
flames, passing from the heart it goes on to the veins and from 
these to the members (limbs). Only when this has finally been 
purged, does restlessness in lovers, or rather, in madmen, cease.
In all instances, indeed, this requires a long period of time; 
the longest in the case of melancholy men, especially if they 
have been ensnared under the influence of Saturn. In addition, 
it is an interminable period of time if they were seized when 
Saturn was in decline or in conjunction with Mars, or opposite 
the Sun."
See note 176.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 245. "In the Phaedrus our 
Plato defines "furor" as an alienation of the mind and he teaches 
that there are two sorts of alienation. One he believes comes 
from human illness, the other from God. The former he calls 
insanity, the latter divine frenzy. Smitten by Insanity a man is 
act beneath the form of man, and somehow returns to being an animal. 
There are two types of insanity. One arises from a vice of the 
brain and the other from a vice of the heart. Often the brain 
is excessively occupied by scorched bile, often by scorched blood, 
sometimes by black bile.... For when these humours are held 
within the heart, they engender anxiety and restlessness, not 
madness..
For example, in the many references to melancholy found in 
Alfonso Martinez de Toledo’s Arcipreste de Talavera, it is always 
seen as a sign of madness with no redeeming value, as in: "Mis 
que mas quando son onbres coloricos, que son prestos a las manos 
e reyna subyto la malenconia en ellos, e fazen en un punto e en 
una (hora) cosa de que se arrepienten por todo el ano, o quiqa 
toda su vida; o le matan subyto e va a las penas ynfernales 
condepnado" (ed. J. Gonzalez Muela, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, p.
195). See also Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 75-97 and 109.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 242. "Surely, my friends, you 
have noticed in what was said above that while Plato depicts Love 
itself, it is entirely the portrait of Socrates that he paints, 
and he describes the image of that god from the persona of Socrates,
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as though true love and Socrates were the same, and as if he, 
before all others, were the true and legitimate lover. Come, 
recall to mind that picture of love. You will see in it the 
figure of Socrates. Place before your eyes the figure of 
Socrates. You will see a man, thin, dry, and pale grey-green 
(squalidus), doubtless, melancholic by nature, as they say, and 
rough, unkempt, underfed, dirty through lack of attention.”
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin, p. 626.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 243. "Sleeping out of doors, 
in the street under the sky. These words mean the open breast 
and heart of our Socrates, open to all."
I am thinking here of moralists such as Andreas Capellanus 
in particular. As I hope to show in Chapter V, and as D. W. 
Robertson ("The Subject of the De Amore of Andreas Capellanus,"
M.P. vol. 50, 1952-1953, pp. 145-161) has partially demonstrated 
secular love for Capellanus can only signify fomicatio, and as 
such it can only be a condemnable activity. Therefore, Capellanus 
distinguishes very clearly between the experience of love in the 
"saeculum" and the Church. For a contrary, but intelligent, point 
of view see D. Kelly, "Courtly Love in Perspective: The Hierarchy 
of Love in Andreas Capellanus," Traditio XXIV, 1968, pp. 119-148.
206 As M. D. Chenu has shown the growth of the evangelical 
movement is intimately associated with the evolution of the laity, 
and in particular, the commercial laity, as is evident in the 
case of the "devotio moderna" in Deventer. The Hundred Years 
War, which undermined the agrarian economy of France and England, 
lead to the growth in power of the Italian middle class families 
such as the Medici who financed the French war effort (see Maurice 
Keen, The Pelican History of Medieval Europe, Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1968, pp. 238-239). This led not only to the growth 
of the mercantile class, but also to the involvement of the 
aristocracy in commercial transactions of a mercantile nature 
(Ibid., pp. 241-243), which eventually contributed to the 
dissolution of the feudal social structure. The alteration of 
the cornerstones of the mediaeval economy directly affected the 
religious outlook of that society.
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Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 260. "For true love is 
nothing other than a certain struggle roused by the sight of 
corporeal beauty attempting to fly up to divine beauty; false 
love on the other hand is the descent from sight to touch."
Saturn and Melancholy, p. 247.
This phrase is a matter of convenience. I am not suggesting 
that the Cortegiano is "influenced" by Thomas a Kempis* Imitation 
of Christ, but that as a "rifasciamento" of the Commentarium in 
Convivium, it is Indebted to the evangelism of Ficino which runs 
also in Erasmus* Enchiridion (see A. H. T. Levi, "The Neoplatonist
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Calculus," Humanism in France at the End of the Middle Ages and 
in the Early Renaissance, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1970, p. 231). The ideas which it expresses are basically 
a development of those pertaining to the "devotio moderna", that 
is, they represent the ideology of a new nobility arising out of 
the commercial middle class. I am therefore referring to the 
Imitation as the principle representative of the evangelical 
current prior to Florentine Neoplatonism. By creating the perfect 
courtier, Castiglione creates a kind of secular saint, much as 
St. Francois de Sales does in the Introduction a la vie devote.
See Chapter V.
For Capellanus* definition of love see note 7 Chapter III.
See notes 130-134 above.
See notes 123-125 above.
See note 135 above.
Jean Festugiere (La philosophie de 1 * amour de Marsile Ficin, 
Paris: Vrin, 1941, p. 34) confuses the issue by suggesting that 
beauty perceived by the lover is always a ’’vain imagination”:
”La Beaute exterieure est eparse, composee, imparfaite, ... et 
qui l’aime n’aime qu'un songe, une vaine imagination." This use 
of the word "imagination” is not wrong; it is, however, misleading, 
since Ficino uses imagination as a cognitive faculty which serves 
to identify true beauty which is interior.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 199. This follows in the 
tradition of Alain de Lille’s Complaint of Nature and the 
mediaeval poetic tradition of the mythological Metamorphosis 
Goliae (see W. Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry, pp. 134-136, 
and P. Dronke, Medieval Latin and the Rise of European Love-Lyric 
vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon, 1968, pp. 367-369), which Ausias 
March follows in his mythological Poem LXXV, which I will briefly 
examine in Chapter V.
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See note 209.
With no wish to belittle the contributions of N. A. Robb 
(Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance) and J. C. Nelson 
(Renaissance Theory of Love), two things should be pointed out 
which affect my interpretation. First, they both tend to follow 
the Burckhardt-della Torre approach to Renaissance Neoplatonism, 
and, therefore, present Florentine Neoplatonism as a novelty, 
somewhat divorced from anything happening outside Italy. In the 
second place, this kind of isolationism Is further carried to the 
point.of showing Neoplatonism as something devoid of passion, as 
an experience of an ethereal nature. By following the direction 
taken by Raymond Marcel, and exploring the text of the Commentarium
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in the light of Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl’s Saturn and
Melancholy, as well as, Chenu’s and Wetherbee’s studies on
medieval Platonisms, I have attempted to re-adjust this point 
of view into what I believe to be the proper perspective.
Naturally, my interpretation of the.Commentarium, concerning 
certain passages, has considerable particular affinity with 
those of Robb and Nelson, but I diverge from them by considering 
Ficino to be primarily a Christian Platonist, rather than a 
disciple of Plato. As A. H. T. Levi has suggested: "the 
Neoplatonist vogue in sixteenth-century France is certainly not 
unconnected with the central concerns of evangelical humanism..." 
("The Neoplatonist Calculus," p. 232). It is this direction 
which I am following, but with the difference that, on the basis 
of Chenu’s research, I am applying the concept of evangelism 
prior to the Reformation.
Again A. H. T. Levi notes that one has to take into account 
the tensions involved in Ficino's theory of love which attempts 
to reconcile both earthly and spiritual love: "It seems important 
to insist on this point, because a good deal of work on sixteenth- 
century authors still assumes that the love for which Ficino ‘ 
himself coined the term "Platonic" is a spiritual aspiration which 
remains emphatically insulated from passion and instinct... At 
its highest point, and at its nearest to Ficino, sixteenth-century 
Neoplatonism was the vehicle for a daring investigation precisely 
into the connection between the love which is instinctively based 
and that which was spiritually perfective... Significantly, 
neither Pico della Mirandola, nor Bembo, nor Castiglione dares 
to go so far as Ficino" ("The Neoplatonist Calculus," pp. 237­
238). Yet, as we have seen in Chapter III, this is precisely 
what Ausias March does, with an intensity that certainly surpasses 
that of Ficino, and makes him so important for the proper 
understanding of Spanish Golden Age poets. Levi’s point of view 
naturally flies in the face of that of Paul N. Siegel ("The 
Petrarchan Sonneteers and Neo-Platonic Love," Studies in Philology 
vol. 42, 1945, pp. 164-182), who presents Platonic love as an 
inclination of the soul guided entirely by reason, and therefore, 
dispassionate: "Whereas chivalric love has as its very centre
sexual intercourse outside marriage and is an overwhelming passion 
which Ignores the dictates of reason, .., neo-Platonic love is 
governed by reason and is in one of its many aspects an idealization 
of marriage (p. 164)... The neo-Platonic sonnet-cycles... 
emphasize that the love of which they speak is a "chaste" love, 
and there is no conflict between reason and passion (182)."
Siegel’s approach is also that taken by R. 0. Jones ("Ariosto 
and Garcilaso," B.H.S. XXXIX, 1962, pp. 153-164; "The Idea of 
Love in Garcilaso’s Second Eclogue," M.L.R. XLVI, 1951, pp. 388­
395; and "Bembo, Gil Polo, Garcilaso: Three Accounts of Love," 
Revue de litterature comparee XL, 1966, pp. 526-540), and 
followed by A. Sole-Leris ("The Theory of Love in the Two Dianas," 
B.H.S. XXXVI, 1959, pp. 65-79, and "Psychological Realism in the 
Pastoral Novel: Gil Polo’s Diana Enamorada," B.H.S. XXXIX, 1962, 
pp. 43-47).
220 See Gaston Paris, "Le conte de la charette," Romania XII
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1883, p. 529, and Amy Kelly, ’’Eleanor of Aquitaine and Her 
Courts of Love,” Speculum vol. 12, 1937, pp. 3-19, and J. 
Festugiere, La philosophie d*amour de Marsile Ficin, p. 3.
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See J. Festugiere, La philosophie d’amour de Marsile Ficin 
pp. 3 and 20. This author sees Ficinian Platonism as a 
prolongation of ’’courtly love”, whereas, as I pointed out before 
in note 219, Jones and Siegel who understand "courtly love" to 
be oriented towards sexual love, distinguish sharply between the 
two. Once more confusion here originates in the amorphous term 
"courtly love".
See note 219, and J. C. Nelson, The Renaissance Theory of 
Love, p. 119, and P. Floriani, Bembo e Castiglione (Roma: 
Bulzoni, 1976), p. 172. .. ............
See note 219.
J. C. Nelson (The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 107) remarks 
that in Gli Asolani: "will is the source of love and hate."
This point is also made by Ficino, see notes 166-176. It follows 
the basic Augustinian notion that sin originates in the will 
(Confessions vol. I, pp. 341-342, Book VII: 3), that is, in the 
soul (see note 145). This is also expressed by Ausias March 
(see Chapter III, note 35) when he defines sorrow as a lack of 
discretion, it is understood that this is a defect of the will.
See above note 224, and P. Bembo, Gli Asolani. Opere tome 
II, Roma: Francesco Hertzhause, 1729, reprint, Ridgewood, New 
Jersey: Gregg, 1965, p. 58: "Conciossa cosa che v’e di prima 
la volonta: la qual puo e volere parimente, e disvolere, fonte 
e capo delle due seguenti:...."
Gli Asolani. p. 58: "E sia per me, se cosi a te piace, 
amore e disiderio quello stesso."
Gli Asolani, p. 4.
This, of course, is consequent with the impression projected 
by P. N. Siegel and R. 0. Jones (see note 219). As J. C. Nelson 
remarks on Ficino’s followers: "The trattatisti overlook the 
existence of emotional, psychological and esthetic factors in 
sensual love" (The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 70). This also 
seems to me to be true of the way these writers deal with the 
problem of love as a whole, since by oversimplifying the 
participation of the body, they focus principally on the ascension 
of the soul, and on the nature of the beauty which it contemplates 
As a result, they seem to overlook the tension that really 
concerned Ficino in his handling of the theory of melancholy.
As I hope to shew, however, this is the first impression which 
the reader receives, a closer look shews that the basic problems 
are assumed to be known by the reader.
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J. C. Nelson, The Renaissance Theory of Love, p. 73.
See above, the quotation concerning note 227: "quale amore 
buono sia, e qual reo."
A. Sole-Leris, "The Theory of Love in the Two Dianas," p. 77. 
This interpretation of Leone Hebreo is taken up by R. 0. Jones 
in Ariosto and Garcilaso (p. 162), and developed in "Bembo, Gil 
Polo and Garcilaso," in which Jones forwards the idea that Leone 
Hebreo’s theory of love favours jealousy, as does "courtly love": 
"Montemayor quoted Leone Hebreo in support of a view of love 
which in its lachrimosity, its acceptance of jealousy and 
suffering as the true lover’s lot, is recognisably courtly love... 
in a new setting" (p. 531). Although Jones expresses some 
reservations as to Montemayor’s usage of Leone Hebreo, it seems 
to me that his interpretation of Hebreo, and of the indeterminate 
term "courtly love," is misleading. In the first place, jealousy 
as it is used by the trattatisti such as Hebreo and Giordano 
Bruno, does not only signify a destructive passion, "it is pain 
suffered through the deprivation of the beloved object" (P. E.
Memmo, Giordano Bruno’s "The Heroic Frenzies," Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina, 1964, p. 29). As such it is not 
condoned by Hebreo, who like Ficino (see note 137 above) sees 
in it a misguided physiological effect of a sensual inclination 
to love. As I will show in the text Hebreo repudiates this kind 
of love, which does not acknowledge the real object of the soul’s 
yearning. In second place, if we take "courtly love" to mean 
love as it is practised by the troubadours, then one has to note 
that according to them, jealousy was a vice, and they certainly 
did not base their conception of love on it, as Erich K&hler 
("Les troubadours et la jalousie," Melanges de langue et de 
litterature du moyen age et de la renaissance offerts ja Jean 
Frappier tome I, Geneve: Droz, 1970, pp. 543-559) has demonstrated. 
Yet, it is true that in the parody of "courtly love" found in the 
Spanish cancioneros, jealousy does play an important role, thereby 
imitating the ironical rules of love set down by Andreas Capellanus. 
However, the Intention of the latter work is unclear (see 
Chapter V). Therefore, R. 0. Jones’ theory is based on a series 
of uncertain premisses which invalidate his otherwise very 
sensitive study.
N. A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, pp.
197-198. ......
The edition of Leone Hebreo’s Dialoghi d*Amore throughout 
this thesis, except in exceptional circumstances, is the 
Castilian translation of El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Dialogos 
de Amor de Leon Hebreo, Obras Completas I (B.A.E. CXXXII), ed. 
Carmelo Saenz de Santa Maria, Madrid: Atlas, 1960. Reference 
to the point just made in the text is to be found on page 17.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 213.
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On this matter I tend to disagree, for reasons which will 
be obvious in the course of analysis, with J. C. Nelson. It is 
not so much the classification of love that affects Leone’s 
text, but his various uses of ’’reason", "right reason" and 
"extraordinary reason" (see J. C. Nelson, The Renaissance Theory 
of Love, p. 88).
See Dialogos dg Amor, p. 42: ”E1 perfecto y verdadero
amor... es padre del deseo e hijo de la raz6n,” see note 270 for 
the complete passage in the text.
P.ial9gog p. 34.
PialQSgg p. 35.
"las cosas espirituales se conocen por los efectos vistos o 
sentidos como ves por el continuo movimiento del cielo se conoce 
que el movedor no es el cuerpo ni virtud corporea, sino 
entendimiento espiritual apartado de materia, de manera que si 
el efecto de su movimiento no fuera primero en el sentido, no 
fuera conocido el movedor. A este conocimiento sucede otro mas 
perfecto de las cosas espirituales, que se hac entendiendo 
nuestro entendimiento la ciencia intelectual en si misma, 
hallandose en acto, por la identidad de la naturaleza y union 
sensual que tiene con las cosas espirituales" ( Didlogos de Amor, 
p. 35).
"Y es entendimiento posible, es todas las cosas en potencia, 
que su propia esencia no es otra que entenderlas todas en potencia 
Y si es entendimiento en acto, puro ser y pura forma, contiene en 
si todos los grados del ser, de las formas y de los actos del 
universe, todos juntamente en ser, en unidad y en pura simplicidad 
( Didiogos £e Amor, p. 36).
Didlogos de Amor, p. 37.
Didiogos de Amor, p. 37.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 36.
Didlogos de Amor, p. 44.
Didlogos de Amor, p. 37.
Didlogos de Amor, p. 38.
Didlogos de Amor, p. 38.
See N. A. Robb, Neoplatonism of the Italian Renaissance, p. 
201; and Suzanne Damiens, Amour et Intellect chez Leon l’Hebreu,
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Paris: Edouard Privat, 1971, in particular, pp. 178-181.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 39.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 39.
La hermosura corporal, que es sombra de la espiritual” 
( Dialogos de Amor, p. 185).
Dialogos de Amor, p. 18.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 193.
See note 104, Chapter III.
Dialogos de Amor, pp. 193-194,
Dialogos de Amor, p. 71.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 45.
Dialogos de Amor, pp. 193-194
Dialogos de Amor, p. 164.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 135
Dialogos de Amor, p. 194
Dialogos de Amor, p. 174
Dialogos de Amor, p. 153,
See above, note 207.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 153.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 117.
The typesetting of the B.A.E. edition is defective at this 
passage, and renders the text incomprehensible. X have, 
therefore, turned to the original 1535 edition (reprinted in 
Leone Ebreo: Dialoghi dTAmore, Hebraische Gedichte, ed. Carl 
Gebhardt, Heidelberg: Societatis Spinozanae, 1929, p. 19, 
Dialogo terzo).
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Dialogos de Amor, p. 157.
See> Dialogos de Amor, p. 169.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 42.
Again the B.A.E. edition is defective, see Leone Ebreo: 
Dialoghi d'Amore, p. 33, Dialogo primo.
See note 104, Chapter III.
Again the Spanish text is defective, Leone Ebreo: Dialoghi 
d * Amore, p. 137, Dialogo terzo.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 45.
Didlogos de Amor, p. 43.
See R. Klibansky, F. Saxl and E. Panofsky, Saturn and 
Melancholy, pp. 271-273 in particular.
Dialogos de Amor, pp. 43-44.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 44.
DiAlogos de Amor, p. 45.
"La segunda (razon) es mas digna y de mas eminente grado...” 
( Dialogos de Amor, p. 45).
Dialogos de Amor, p. 226.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 226.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 226.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 226.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 226.
Dialogos de Amor, p. 78.
Gli Asolani. p. 22 (for edition see note 225).
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See note 129 above.
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300
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Andreae Capellani, De Amore, ed. E. Trojel (Munchen: Eidos, 
1964), p. 5; and see note 7, Chapter III, and note 40, Chapter V.
Gli Asolani, p. 42.
Gli Asolani, p. 33.
This repeats Ficino’s point of view, see note 207 in the 
text.
”... che cosa amore si sia, e quanto danosa e grave: ilquale 
incontro la maesta della natura scellerato divenuto noi uomini 
cotanto allei cari, e da essa de 1’intelletto, che divina parte 
e, per ispeziale grazia donati, accio che cosi piu pura menando 
la nostra vita al cielo con esso s’aviaciassimo di salire; di 
lui perraventura miseramente spogliandoci ci tiene col pie 
attussati nelle brutture terrene in maniera, che spesse volte 
disawenturosamente v’offoghiamo” (Gli Asolani, p. 22).
p. 49.
pp. 49-50.
p. 52.
p. 52.
p. 53.
Ditlogos d£ Amor, p. 193
p. 53.
Gli Asolani, p. 56.
Gli Asolani was written between 1495 and 1505. It seems to 
me that for the reader who does not take into account the 
situation in which Bembo found himself, Bembo’s intention 
concerning the problem of illumination remains unclear. Indeed, 
for a man who possessed Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium it 
does seem strange that he should have omitted such an important 
part of the master’s theory. Yet, when one recalls that Bembo 
was writing at a moment when the revolt of Savanarola shook 
Florence and led to a violent confrontation with the Church of 
Rome, and that furthermore, Savanarola was considered by Ficino 
to be a model of divine ’’furore”, it is not so surprising that 
Bembo purged his work of references to divine love. Gli Asolani 
is then strictly concerned with the kinds of human love, and 
thereby avoids violating the bounds of strict orthodoxy.
293
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
Gli Asolani, p. 57.
Gli Asolani, p. 62: "E in fine sappi che buono amore non 
e il tuo. Il quale posto che non sia malvagio in cio, che con 
le bestievoli voglie non si mescola, si e egli non buono in 
questo, che esso ad immortale obietto non ti tira: ma tienti 
nel mezzo dell’una e dell’altra qualita di disio; dove il dimorare 
tuttavia non e sano....”
See Chapter III, note 80.
Gli Asolani, p. 58.
Gli Asolani, p. 61.
Gli Asolani. p. 61.
Gli Asolani. p. 61.
Gli Asolani, p. 63.
See R. 0. Jones, ’’Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso,” pp. 526­
533.
See Pietro Bembo, Gli Asolani, intro. R. B. Gottfried, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1954, p. XVII; and
J. Festugiere, La philosophie de 1’amour de Marsile Ficin, p. 43.
Baldessar Castiglione, Il libro del Cortegiano, Opere 
Volgare e Latine, ed. Cornelio Bentivoglio, Padova: Giuseppe 
Comino, 1733, pp. 226-227.
Il libro del
Il libro del
II libro del
Il libro del
p. 227.
p. 227.
p. 227.
p. 228.
These are the words used in the translation-edition of 
George Bull (Baldesar Castiglione, The Book of the Courtier, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, p. 328). Yet, the Italian editions 
(Corneglio Bentivoglio, p. 238; and B. Castiglione,Il libro del 
Cortegiano, ed. Vittorio Cian, Firenze: G. C. Sansone, 1947,
Book 4, liv. 15) use the word ’’divine" instead of "heroic." The 
implication remains, nonetheless, the same. By "heroic" 
Castiglione refers to the divine, or god-like, nature of man in 
the context of the concept of the "dignity of man" (Saturn and
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Melancholy, p. 246). Hence, in a previous passage on which all 
versions concur Castiglione uses the word ’'heroic" in this sense 
(Cian, 4: xxii: 18-20; Bentivoglio, p. 207; and Bull, p. 299): 
"In somma sara glorosissimo, e carissimo agli uomini, e a Dio; 
per la cui grazia acquistera quella virtu eroica che lo fara 
ecedere i termini della umanita..." (Bentivoglio). This is also 
the reading followed by Juan Boscan (Margherita Morreale, 
Castiglione £ BoscMn: El Ideal Cortesano en el Renacimiento 
Espaiiol tomo II, Madrid: Real Academia Espaftola, 1959 (Anejo I), 
p. 16). The significance, as I will show in the text, corresponds
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Ficino’s use of "heroic" or "heroes”.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 228.
Il libro del Cortegiano. pp. 228-229.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 229.
Il libro del Cortegiano. p. 231.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 234, One
reminded of similar claims by Ausias March in Poem XVIII, studied 
in Chapter III.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, Discourse VII, chapters IV and 
V, pp. 246-250 in particular.
Il libro del Cortegiano. p. 234.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 237.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 237.
See Chapter III, notes 26, 31 and 104, and in the text of 
Chapter IV between notes 188 and 192.
Il libro del Cortegiano, pp. 237-238.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 238.
Il libro del Cortegiano, pp. 238-239; see also quotation 
258 in text.
One notes that the difference in attitude lies in the fact 
that Leone Hebreo understands "heroic love" as the perception 
of the form of corporeal objects raised upwards so that they 
may be apprehended by the eye of the soul (see note 331).
See in the text, quotation 130, and the subsequent discussion.
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San Juan de la Cruz, El.Cantico Espiritual, ed. M. Martinez 
Burgos, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1969, p. 18.
Il libro del Cortegiano, p. 239.
XI libro del Cortegiano, p. 239. Again it is interesting 
to note that the ’’rest” sought in contemplation, referred to in 
the above quotation, lies at the source of Ausias March’s problems 
Indeed, the frustration experienced by Ausias March is that 
although he apprehends the first glimmer of divine beauty in the 
"gest" of the lady, he, like the Courtier, must transcend this 
initial vision in order to find "rest" in the source of that 
beauty. Thus, in XCIX, his delight in the lady’s beauty, which 
first seems to be the delight of his soul, becomes a source of 
torment: "Lo meu repos treball es convertit, / e lo meu 
goig en tristor sens remey" (w. 21-22). In Poem LXXIX, he 
realizes that this corporeal beauty is not the real source of 
delight: "0 foil Amor, qui vostre delit vol, / sobre loch 
fals ha son contentament; / per qo repos no te«n l’enteniment 
/ car si no *1 ver l’enteniment no col" (w. 41-44). This 
reaches a purely religious expression in the "Cant Espiritual", 
Poem CV: "Axi la fi de tot en tot humana / no da repos al 
apetit o terme, / mas tan poch l’om sens ella no ha 1’altra:
/ sent Johan fon senyalant lo Messies" (w. 125-128). Here 
Ausias March is referring to the fact that the perception of 
beauty by imagination can lead to divine love, but that it is 
not an end in itself. This is furthered in the ensuing verses:
"No te rep&s qui null altra fi guarda, / car en res als lo 
voler no reposa; / qo sent cascu, e no»y cal suptilesa, / 
car fora Tu lo voler no*s atura" (vv. 129-132). In other words 
Ausias March explicitly recognizes, like the "trattatisti", that 
there is no rest for the will, except in the cause of Beauty,
which as he indicates, is God.
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Il libro del Cortegiano, pp,
Il libro del Cortegiano, p,
Il libro del Cortegiano, p,
Il libro del Cortegiano, p
See Chapter III, note 104.
239-240.
240.
240.
242.
As in the question of "courtly love" the attitude taken is 
largely a matter of personal choice. One should note, however, 
that for moralists "amor hereos" is rarely met with favour.
Thus, Robert Burton (The Anatomy of Melancholy, New York: Farrar 
and Rinehardt, 1927, pp. 650-659, Part 3, Member 1, subsection 2), 
collects most things said on melancholy, and continues to view 
it as "melancholia negra", still considers "heroical love" to be, 
"this mad and beastly passion... named by our Physicians Heroical
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Love, and a more honourable title put on it, Noble Love, as 
Savanaxola styles it, because Noble men and women make a common 
practice of it..." (pp. 657-658). Melancholy heroical love in 
these terms stands at the opposite pole of the heroical love 
referred to by Castiglione and the other trattatisti. It is 
what Rene Nelli calls "amour de chevalier", which he believes 
was condemned by the troubadours (R. Nelli, L’Erotique des 
troubadours, Toulouse: Edouard Privat, 1963, pp. 64-65).
343 See note 219. For Siegel, Petrarchism, which he equates 
with "courtly love", is basically disguised sensuality: "It was 
not without reason that contemporary satirists and reformers 
denounced the sonneteers as "lascivious". The exaggerated 
laudation of the mistress and the complete humility of the lover 
in the Petrarchan sonnet do not represent an idealization of 
womanhood. Rather do they represent a degradation of women, for 
the literary and social convention which gave them this purious 
elevation sprang from a point of view in which they were so 
many conquests to be gained" (pp. 169-170). The Neoplatonic 
lover stands at the opposite pole: "The veneration and awe with 
which he regards his mistress is not the mere rhetoric of the 
Petrarchists; it is the expression in literary terms of the 
genuinely idealistic sentiments of the Platonist who sees in 
the beauty of his mistress a manifestation of God" (p. 177). On 
this last point, I would agree with Siegel. Many critics have 
complained that Ausias March has never described his lady, as 
Petrarch does, and that, therefore, he does not express a Platonic 
point of view. Yet, as Siegel indicates, this is the most 
important point for understanding the so-called "non-courtly" 
intention of an author such as Ausias March. As I hope to 
demonstrate in Chapter V, Ausias March’s beloved takes on a 
purely sapiential character, and he conceives of her beauty as 
"a manifestation of God".
344 This seems to me to be evident, in particular, in R. 0.
Jones, "Ariosto and Garcilaso," B.H.S., XXXIX, 1962, pp. 153-164, 
in which he studies Garcilaso’s use of the two conceptions of 
love. The merging of the two literary conventions is the object 
of the study of Sharon Ghertman, Petrarch and Garcilaso: A 
Linguistic Approach to Style, London: Tamesis, 1975; and, of 
course, Rafael Lapesa, La trayectoria poetica de Garcilaso,
Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1968, re-edition of 1948, pp. 
73-124.
345 Thus, Siegel himself has to note in "The Petrarchan Sonneteers 
and Neo-Platonic Love," pp. 180-181, that in Sidney’s Astrophel 
and Stella, reason eventually wins out over the senses, and the 
situation remains one in which the lover has to choose between 
love of God or love of the lady: "Sidney’s Astrophel and Stella 
is the dramatic representation of the conflict within a man who 
passionately desires a married woman — a conflict which is 
finally resolved by his mastering his passion and turning his 
mind from earthly love to the love of God. The Platonism with 
which the sonnets are infused gives philosophic significance to 
the inner conflict of Astrophel. Astrophel’s love for Stella is
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not a purely physical one of the Petrarchan sonneteers. He 
loves the beauty of her mind even more than that of her outward 
appearance, and finds in her ’’all vices overthrow, Not by rude 
force, but sweetest soveraignitie Of reason.” However, the 
teachings of virtue cannot still in him the desire to win her 
fully in a love consummated by bodily union" (p. 180). I would 
argue that this situation, which quite appropriately belongs to 
the tradition of the Neo-platonic trattatisti, is also that 
faced by Ausias March, as I have shown in Chapter III, and will 
illustrate in Chapter V. Clearly then, this runs against the 
rather too clear-cut distinction made by R. 0. Jones in his 
"Bembo, Gil Polo, Garcilaso" (pp. 536-537) in which he assimilates 
Pages’ interpretation and attempts to place Ausias March in the 
all too neat classification of "courtly lovers": "The idea that 
love is a sort of madness because it is hostile to reason is 
present throughout the courtly love tradition, but it was one 
of the things courtly lovers willingly accepted. The moralist’s 
loco amor is an expression of repugnance. Ausias March provides 
a relevant illustration. His poetry describes the anguish of 
being torn between carnal and spiritual love, and his despairing 
renunciation of all human love at last in favour of love of God... 
For Ausias all love between man and woman is madness, because 
man’s true end is elsewhere, and in search of it Ausias renounces 
the world... The remoteness of this form Garcilaso need not be 
underlined" (pp. 536-537). The inexactitude of these last four 
sentences should be obvious from what I hope to have indicated 
in the body of this thesis. If Garcilaso imitates Bembo’s theory 
of love, it is patent that Bembo preaches the renunciation of 
wordly love. Furthermore, as Chapter III has shewn, and V will 
illustrate, spiritual love between man and woman is possible in 
certain instances in Ausias March’s poetry. For him, as for the 
trattatisti, an excessive inclination to the love of corporeal 
objects leads to mundane "furore".
346 R. 0. Jones, "The Idea of Love in Garcilaso’s Second Eclogue," 
M.L.R. XLVI, 1951, pp. 388-395; "Ariosto and Garcilaso," B.H.S. 
XXXIX, 1962, pp. 153-164; "Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso," Revue 
de litterature comparee v. 40, 1966, pp. 526-540; as well as, 
"Garcilaso, poeta del humanismo," Clavileno, no. 28, 1954, to 
which Jones constantly refers but which I have been unfortunately 
unable to consult. I wish to point out that I agree with what 
Jones has to say about on the content of Garcilaso’s poems; where 
I beg to differ is on the perspective with which he approaches 
Neo-platonic theory.
In his desire to present Renaissance love theory as something 
radically different from the mediaeval "courtly love" Jones 
("Bembo, Gil Polo and Garcilaso," pp. 534-540) has rejected E.
L. Rivers’ interpretation of the identity of Severo in Garcilaso’s 
second eclogue ("Las Eclogas de Garcilaso: Ensayo de una 
trayectoria espiritual," Actas del Primer Congreso Internacional 
de Hispanistas, ed. Frank Pierce and Cyril A. Jones, Oxford: 
Dolphin, 1964, pp. 420-425). Rivers’ main argument is that: "El 
amor del pastor Albanio es el misrao loco amor de la tradicion 
medieval, una sensualidad desenfrenada que rompe tanto con el 
codigo del amor cortes como con la moralidad cristiana" (p. 421).. 
"El mejor remedio para este amor, en la experiencia de Nemoroso,
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es la eficaz doctrina de cierto Severe, trasunto poetico de un
fraile cisterciense bien historico. Esta doctrina por Nemoroso,
parece ser combinacidn ya tradicional de filosofia estoica y
ascetismo cristiano; no hay aqui ninguna escala de sublimacidn
neoplatdnica, porque el pecaminoso deseo sensual tiene que
destruirse radicalmente; no se lo mira como primer escalon que
pueda conducir eventualmente al amor espiritual, sino camino del
infierno” (p. 422). Various objections should be raised against
Rivers’ claims. First, concerning his interpretation of Neo-platonic 
love, it is obvious that Rivers does not take into account the 
problem of imagination, which lies at the origin of all amorous 
experience and can turn love either into a transcendental 
confrontation with Beauty, or debase it by dragging it down to 
mere lust. This takes one directly to the second major objection.
Rivers’ partial approach to the problem is a result of his
excessive reliance on the notion of "courtly love". In all
fairness it must be said that in spite of his exacting criticism
R. 0. Jones does not approach the problem of Albanio’s folly
properly either, because he too is excessively concerned with distinguish!
Garcilaso’s individual sensibility from that ubiquitous notion
"courtly love". This concept is in great part an invention of
modern critics, and in this case it is a source of error. Thus
Jones is correct In saying of Rivers* analysis that: "Hardly
anything can be based on this in the way of interpretation unless
we fall back on the notion that the soul was in harmony so long as
reason maintained its supremacy" (op. cit., p. 537), this, of
course, merely repeats the opinion of A. A. Parker ("Theme and
Imagery in Garcilaso’s First Eclogue," B.H.S. vol. 25, 1948, pp.
222-227). Although correct, Jones’ statement overlooks that in 
Bembo, as in other trattatisti, the will precedes reason, if 
Garcilaso is following Bembo, then surely it would be more exact 
to refer to the will’s efficacious mirror-polishing as the source 
of the soul’s harmony. Moreover, Jones also remains oblivious to 
the underlying problem of the imagination as the actual source of 
Albanio’s madness. Indeed, a closer scrutiny of Garcilaso*s text 
reveals that Albanio’s madness is caused by the absence of Camila, 
and as such, it represents the kind of sensual heroic love studied 
by Ficino in the Commentarium in Convivium VI, 6 (Commentaire, pp. 
206-208; see in this chapter note 191-8).Although in the first part 
of the eclogue Albanio’s love seems pure, it is?as always^based 
on sensual perception of Camila’s corporeal form. It is in this 
that his spirit takes delight, and which is the origin of Albanio’s 
misfortune, as he states: "El placer de miralla con terrible / 
y fiero desear senti mesclarse, / que siempre me llevaba a lo 
imposible; / la pena de su ausencia vi mudarse, / no en pena, 
no en congoja, en cruda muerte / y en un infierno el alma 
atormentarse" (w. 320-325; Garcilaso de la Vega, Poesias 
Castellanas Completas, ed. E. L. Rivers, Madrid: Castalia, 1972).
Prior to Albanio’s description of the nature of his illness, 
references to the "Clear Spirit" abound. In typical Macrobian 
terminology, the soul is considered to be the "clear fountain" 
which reflects the "mdsica divina": "Convida a dulce sueno / 
aquel manso rhido / del aqua que la clara fuente envia, / y las 
aves sin duefio, / con canto no aprendido / hinchen el aire de 
dulce armonfa" (w. 64-69). In this way Albanio describes his 
distempered love: "En medio del invierno esta templada / el agua 
desta clara fuente, / y en el verano mas que nieve helada" (w.
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1-3). The comparison with Bembo’s Gli Asolani presented by Jones 
must be put in its proper perspective. The madness of Albanio’s 
love in its lowest moments is the same as the love of Perrotino 
in the first part of Gli Asolani, and when Albanio describes the 
blissful life which he found with Camila, before his fall, his 
love is that of Lavinello, prior to the hermit’s sermon which 
reveals to Lavinello that the source of beauty is not the corporeal 
object, but the Goodness of God reflected in that object, and that 
it is to this that he must turn his attention. Thus, as Ficino 
and his successors repeatedly stress, any love that fixes its 
attention in a corporeal object will ultimately incline either to 
the flesh, or to its real source. Albanio, who is unaware of 
the divine source of his love, has been enthralled by the 
imagination of the lady’s form, and by immoderate cogitation on 
this particular object, his reason has been dragged downwards by 
the flesh. Indeed, in verses highly reminiscent of Ausias March 
and Hughes de Saint-Victor, such as for instance: ’’Amor, Amor, 
un abit m’e tallat / de vostre drap, vestint-me 1’espirit; 
en lo vestir, ample molt l’e sentit / e fort estret, quant
sobre mi.s posat” (LXXVII, w. 25-28), and ’’Solen pensar de
fer-hi aparell / per a jaquir tan singular amich; / si creu no 
sab que li sia«nemich / puix gran delit li es vengut per ell’’ 
(CXXI, 33-36, and for an analysis of this imagery in Ausias March 
see Chapter V). Albanio describes his plight as the shirt of 
imagination which has penetrated the flesh and rooted itself into 
the very marrow of the lover where new spirits are recreated: ”En 
amigo tai, verdad es eso / cuando el mal sufre cura, mi Salicio,
/ mas este ha penetrado hasta el hueso” (w. 143-145; in order to 
avert any confusion, the similarity between these verses and those 
of Ausias March lies in verse 145, amigo here refers to Salicio, 
not to Love as it does in March’s Poem CXXI). Verse 145 is a 
reference to Ausias March’s shirt of Nessus, also used by Garcilaso 
in Sonnet XXVII. From these clues, Severo’s identity and the 
remedy for Albanio’s illness can be found. The remedy alluded to 
by Salicio is clearly outlined in the first part of the eclogue, 
and various references are made to it in subsequent passages.
Salicio identifies Albanio’s madness with ’’fortuna”: ’’qu’el que, 
viviendo aca, de vida ufana / y d’estado gozoso, noble y alto / 
es derrocado de fortune^ (w. 104-106). Fortune is worldly, as 
is Albanio’s madness, and his distempered love is not to be 
confused with the action of Providence. It can only be redressed 
by following the counsel of Wisdom, as Boethius has taught countless 
generations of Christians. Thus, against these worldly vicissitudes, 
Salicio suggests that the remedy lies in sleep. In his description, 
this sleep renews the soul. This is no ordinary sleep, it is a 
voyage to the Bowl of Liber (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream 
of Scipio, trans. William Harris Stahl, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1952, Book I: XII: 7-12, pp. 135-136). This 
voyage represents the rise of the soul above the dross and din of 
Chaos, by which it regains some consciousness of its divine origin, 
and once refreshed can renew its ’’descensus ad inferos”, or rather, 
as Macrobius would have it, it is the soul turning back to its 
own waters (Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, II: XVI: 22-25, 
pp. 242-243). Therefore, Salicio says: ”y al que de pensamiento 
fatigado / el sueno bana con licor piadoso, / curando el corazon 
despedazado, / aquel breve descanso, aquel reposo / basta para 
cobrar de nuevo aliento / con que se pase el curso trabajoso”
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(w. 89-94). Severo*s role is to give Albanio consciousness 
of his soul’s divine origin and destiny, as well as, the true 
source of beauty, like Bembo’s hermit he awakens "heroic virtue" 
in the lover. As a consequence, the eclogue functions as an 
organic unit. The description of the history of the house of 
Alba, and in particular, of Fernando, is a portrait of heroic 
virtue set entirely at the service of God. Unlike Albanio, 
Fernando follows Christian Sapientia, not fortune (w. 1419­
1432), that is, not merely reason, but right reason in the 
Augustinian sense, and thereby becomes a model of Christian 
virtue. The proper understanding of this eclogue does not lie 
in whether the intention is mediaeval or not, but rather in its 
evangelical humanist context. As a result Rivers is partially 
correct in saying that Severo is a Cistercian friar preaching a 
"combinacion ya tradicional de filosofia estoica y ascetismo 
cristiano" (op. cit., p. 422), as is Jones in seeing love as a 
return to harmony by following the dictates of reason, if one 
bears in mind that it is not mere reason that the trattatisti 
tell lovers to follow, but "right reason," or evangelical reason, 
which is faith as the fundamental way to a virtuous life.
Severo’s teaching is concerned with turning "melancolia negra" 
into "melancolia generosa", of which Albanio and Fernando are 
models. Thus, to all ends and purposes, Albanio’s madness is 
mundane fury, or "loco amor".
See note 219 above.
P. N. Siegel, "Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life," 
Studies in Philology vol. 41, 1944, pp. 201-222.
"Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life," p. 218.
See note 345 above; "for religious piety is the most 
important element of the character of Sir Philip Sidney, who, 
as De S&lincourt has pointed out, represented Spenser’s ideal... 
etc." ("Spenser and the Calvinist View of Life," pp. 201-202).
"No other sonnet-cycle gives this effect, for the mind of 
no other writer — except Sidney, whose Astrophel and Stella, 
as we shall see, expresses its author’s neo-Platonism in a 
different way — was so completely permeated with the spirit of 
Renaissance Platonism" ("The Petrarchan Sonneteers and Neo­
Platonic Love," p. 178).
Again,see A. H. T. Levi, "The Neoplatonist Calculus," pp. 
237-241. It should be noted that this tension exists irregardless 
of whether this love is sensual or not. As a physical desire, 
love in the cancioneros has frequently been described as a love 
of non-attainment leading to a situation of have and have not 
(see Otis H. Green, "Courtly Love in the Spanish Cancioneros," 
P.M.L.A. LXIV, 1949, pp. 247-301). This situation is repeated 
in the Neo-platonic love theories, when.it obviously leads to 
a situation of "laetus horror" (see Chapter III, note 59).
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See Appendix I.
See note 244.
P. Dronke, "Saturn and Melancholy,” Notes and Queries CCX 
(vol. 12, new series), 1965, p. 356.
R. 0. Jones, "The Idea of Love in Garcilaso’s Second 
Eclogue,” p. 391.
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Chapter V Melancholy: The Mirror of Courtly Love
Ambiguities inherent in the concept of melancholy, and 
related terms such as imagination and reason, which allow for a 
broad range of variations in determining the nature of the lover’s 
experience, can serve as a point of departure towards understanding 
the level of irony used by mediaeval writers, when discussing the 
subject of love. As I remarked in the third chapter of this 
thesis, the dual nature of melancholy and imagination is reflected 
by the discursive gradation of love into three different kinds, 
which generally follows Aristotle’s tripartite division of 
friendship, as it is commonly found in the Nicomachean Ethics 
The use of this division, which is not particular to Ausias March, 
is found in most writers and poets from the thirteenth century 
onwards. The varying degrees of emphasis in the use of this 
division depend largely on the authorial intention. Thus, one 
can suggest that the significance which this division assumes in 
an individual work depends on the understanding that each 
particular author has of beauty. This will inevitably condition
the value which he attributes to each kind of love. The extent
to which the use of this division reflects the author’s realization
that love is an essentially spiritual experience, depends on the
individual’s acknowledgement of the presence of grace reflected
in the heart of nature. This division is, then, subordinate to
the definition of beauty handled by the author, for the latter. This
definition reveals the actual orientation that theauthor gives to his
treatment of love; the tripartite classification only does so
subsequently. Thus, one notices that Andreas Capellanus implicitly 
2divides love into three kinds. His division, like that of his
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contemporaries and successors, is based on the heritage of
Aristotelian terminology, but the intention is radically different
from the Stagirite.
The most remarkable facet of Andreas Capellanus1 system
is that he deliberately confuses the problem of love by suggesting
that "amor purus" is merely a kind of sexual titilation. As a
consequence, love in his work does not have a transcendental 
3function; it remains the state of a fallen creature.. As X hope 
to shew, this is intimately related to his denial of the presence 
of grace in nature. His "courtly lover", like Bembo’s Perrotino, 
is therefore subject to "melancolia negra", that is, mundane folly
in its basest form.
Melancholy in its various aspects reflects all kinds of 
love possible within the "courtly experience", because it is 
intimately related to a problem of perception of beauty. It seems 
to me that mediaeval moralists single out a certain negative aspect 
of that experience in order to demonstrate the incompatibility of 
secular life with religious sanctity, which, in their view, can
only be found within the institution of the Church. This creates
-.4an impression of a dual standard of values or "sic et non",\ which 
is actually a negation of secular spirituality. Thus, one point
predominates in my mind concerning the importance of melancholy 
for the interpretation of the somewhat inconsistent concept, 
"courtly love". Melancholy cannot be dismissed outright as being 
only a state of mental alienation, such as mediaeval moralists
present it. It is also a state of interior meditation and
consciousness which is characteristic of the spiritual orientation 
present in the general current of evangelical thought which is
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closely associated with secular spirituality. As Klibansky, Saxl 
and Panofsky have demonstrated, the historical development of the
notion of melancholy goes together with that of Italian humanism
- >5and the northern Reformation.. The overall re-assessment of the
notion of melancholy is part of the growing unrest that eventually 
gives rise to the twin movements of the Reformation and Counter­
Reformation, inasmuch as humanism and Reformation:
both aimed at making this ’’personality” as far as possible 
independent from the lashings of tradition and hierarchy, by 
which it had been supported as well as restrained; at enabling 
it to seek unaided its individual approach to God and the world
(underlining is mine),
Although it is not exclusive to the evangelical current, the 
evolution of melancholy is closely related to it, as I have 
attempted to shew in previous chapters. Similarly, as I have 
remarked until now, melancholy is associated with problems 
concerning reason and imagination, both of which affect the 
nature of the lover’s experience, numinous and otherwise.
A distressing point in the standard concept of
Renaissance love theory which I discussed in the previous chapter,
is that it conveys the impression that while the Renaissance
Neoplatonic lover follows his reason, his mediaeval counterpart
the courtly lover, does not. Indeed, mediaeval moralists, such 
y
as Andreas Capellanus, and Alfonso Martinez de Toledo, represent 
the lover as an individual subject to the torments of "melancolia 
negra", which is considered to be irrational folly, or "loco amor" 
This seems to imply that the lover does not follow the dictates of 
his reason. In this way, they reduce any possible understanding 
of love to a state of madness, or "amor hereos" as it is commonly
g
understood. Por modern critics, one of the main sources of
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problems in this instance is undoubtedly, Gaston Paris1 definition
of "courtly love" as regards his interpretation of the theory of
love in the Chevalier a la Charrette. This, ,he believed corresponded
to the social innovations of Marie de Champagne’s court, codified 
9by Andreas Capellanus in his De Amore.
In order to clarify the evolution of sensibility that
differentiates Ausias March’s particular approach to the question
of love from that of Andreas Capellanus, I will proceed to a
comparative analysis of the essential content of the De Amore and then of
the poetry of Ausias March. Reasons for singling out Andreas
Capellanus’ work in order to understand the moralists’ point of
view should be obvious since it is "not only one of the few long
documents in the tradition of "courtly love" literature, it is
also the only statement of theory which we have concerning this 
„ 1°literary convention", and any understanding of Ausias March
requires that one come to terms with the problem of "courtly love". 
Furthermore, although I do not pretent to provide a complete 
interpretation of the De Amore, this approach is justified by
the fact that A. Pages has frequently pointed out that Ausias
March must have known the De Amore. He repeatedly attempted to
establish parallels with the Valencian poet’s work in order to
demonstrate Ausias March’s relation to "courtly love"'..
A. Pages’ interpretation of "courtly love" is based on
the commonly accepted theory of Gaston Paris that close relations 
must have existed between the court of Champagne and that of 
Provence, because of the presence at Troyes of Marie de Champagne 
whose mother Alienor d’Aquitaine was originally from southern 
France. The basis of Paris’ theory is that the De Amore is an
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accurate description of the court of Marie, and that it was
written at her request in order to codify love as it was practiced
by the members of her suite. It should be noted that what Gaston
Paris suggested in a very convincing theory, which was quickly
accepted as fact by subsequent generations of critics, such as 
12J.J. Parry, is a matter of conjecture. Indeed, in a very solidly
documented study, "The Court of Champagne as a Literary Circle”,
J.F. Benton has demonstrated the lack of evidence for many of the 
relations that Gaston Paris assumed existed, including that of 
Marie and Alienor. Above all, Benton has been able to question,
on the basis of historical evidence adduced for his documentation
of the court of Champagne, the reality of Paris’ belief in the
existence of an immoral behaviour, such as "courtly love", which 
13might necessitate a codification. As regards historical evidence, 
Paris’ theory seems to be based on the acceptance at face-value of 
statements made by Andreas Capellanus, and a series of rash pre­
suppositions.
It may seem to many critics that on the basis of Benton’s 
research one might be inclined to liquidate the problem of the 
existence of a code of love which is known to contemporary 
criticism as "courtly love". I believe, however, that caution
should be exercised in this matter. When a moralist codifies a
system, as Andreas Capellanus does with an ironical intention, he
does not portray social reality as it actually exists, as Gaston 
Paris thought, but he selects an aspect that directly concerns his 
intention. It is social criticism from an extremely partial point 
of view. As satire, it does reflect, at least, the social etiquette 
of his time, and thus, the essential elements of courtship, many
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of which are perennial. The moralist creates a ’’caricature" grossly 
distorting an aspect of the society of his time, which he brings
into relief in order to meet his didactic ends.
The source of problems present in courtly literature is
the question of social relations within a highly hierarchical feudal 
15structure. In such a structure social positions and roles are 
rigidly determined, so that transgression of these limits is subject 
to strictures. The interpretation of the nature and value of social 
relations between classes is not subject to a single monolithic 
blanket term, but to an individual point of view which is conditioned 
by well-established moral and social prejudices of which the author 
may, or may not, be conscious. Courtly love is not a single global 
term determining these variable attitudes, but the general
articulation of this problem. Should one choose to replace the
term "courtly love" by one which is more frequently used in the
Middle Ages, such as "fin’ amor", the problem of the individual
authorial intention cannot be evaded, since "fin’ amor" can refer
to sexual love, as well as spiritual love depending on the sense 
16that the author gives it, and the degree of irony he is using.
However, even when it is used derisively "fin’ amor" denotes an 
intellectual refinement, that is, a matter of wit, which is not 
present in "courtly love". I return to the definition of D. Kelly 
in order to clarify the question of the different orientations that
can be given to the subject of love in a feudal context, since not
all love can be limited to a problem of social forms as moralists
treat it:
Fin’ amors as used in the Middle Ages and courtly love in modern 
parlance, are not always synonymous. The difference lies in the 
divergent connotations of the adjectives courtly and fin. Courtly 
love commonly suggests the arts of love, rules and directives,
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prescribing specific conduct and fixing sentiment within an exact 
mold. It is held to be essentially deductive, functioning on an 
elaborate etiquette covering every conceivable circumstance and 
action. That which is fin evinces finesse. Finesse characterizes 
"la puissance intuitive”, as one critic puts it, ”la faculte de 
saisir confusement la realitd profonde des objets concrets”, that 
is, the essential and indicative elements of experience.
Beyond the articulation of the problems of social relations in a 
class system, which presents "courtly love" as the "rules and 
directives" subjacent in the interaction of the members of this 
society, there is the individual concern with the interior elements 
of the personal experience of love. This dual approach to the 
overall problem of "courtly love" is characteristic of two divergent 
spiritual attitudes present in individual poets. Both attitudes 
are directly affected by the treatment of imagination as a means of 
perception and knowledge, determining whether individual spiritual 
experience is interior or not. It is precisely this element of
interior preoccupation, finesse as the need to seek out the innermost
reality of corporeal objects, which ultimately leads to "tristesse"
18as a kind of poetic melancholy, resulting from the individual 
experience of "laetus horror" at the realization of the distance 
that separates the subject from his ideal, that differentiates
Ausias March from Andreas Capellanus.
In this instance the heart of the question is not, as
traditional criticism understands it, whether there exists or not 
a definite code of love that would characterize "courtly love", but 
a matter of individual sensibility within the Christian European 
cultural tradition. Both "courtly love" and "fin* amor", as they 
are defined by D. Kelly, are conceived under the aegis of a Christian
feudal circumstance. They share that similarity, because they are
the product of the individual’s experience of that circumstance.
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Thus, "fin’ amor” and "courtly love” can overlap, although they do 
not necessarily do so. They are divergent expressions of a common
experience. The more an individual shifts his interest towards the
problems surrounding intelligible reality, the more his expression
of love moves away from concern with the exterior practice of
"courtly love". His interest in the formal aspects of the secular
experience wanes, even though the interior experience is,a 
19spiritualization of the secular. .
"Fin* amor" as I understand it, following Kelly, is a
posterior development of, or a divergent attitude from, "courtly
love" which is principally a ludic occupation, and therefore, what
Huizinga understands to be an exterior regulatory activity of a 
20social group. It is ingrained in society and determines ways in 
which members of that society interact; as such it is not a fully 
conscious activity, but an inherited mode of understanding one’s 
function within a culture. In a feudal society there is a profound
consciousness of hierarchical distinctions between classes. This
is so important that it forms the basis of Andreas Capellanus’
21De Amore. The problem of "courtly love" in Andreas Capellanus* 
perspective can then be said to evolve out of this question. A 
ludic activity such as "courtly love" characterizes the manner in 
which a class, or group of classes, understand the nature of their 
hierarchical relation within the broader context of society. Ludic 
activity of this sort is not simply frivolous. It serves to 
distinguish this group, and therefore, it acts as an inbred ritual 
of self-preservation preventing social usurpation, much as manners 
and etiquette can limit the intrusion of "outsiders" within a
particular group and tend to produce a conformist attitude. Since
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it maintains social stratification "courtly love" can be said to 
have an inner codification which inevitably transpires into any 
product of the feudal culture, as in the case of literature, 
inasmuch as this product tends to reflect the vital context of 
the society within which, and for which, it is written.
Two points raised by Benton in "The Court of Champagne
as a Literary Centre" are of considerable importance for what X
have just said. Following Paris and Parry, many critics have
accepted as fact the tentative identification of Andreas Capellanus
as the chaplain of Marie de Champagne. Without denying the
possibility of Paris’ hypothesis, this identification has been
brought into doubt by Benton’s research which underlines the
flimsy nature of Paris’ evidence. For Benton, although Andreas
may have been a chaplain to the king of France, as Capellanus
himself points out in the De Amore, he may never have held that 
. 22position at Marie’s court. This takes me to the second point 
raised by Benton, which concerns the audience for whom the De Amore
was written. It is evident that Marie is never referred to
as a libertine social innovator who might have promulgated the 
doctrine of adultery as a way of life. Nor is there any documentation 
referring to the existence of her "corts d’amor", in any writings 
of her contemporaries. To the contrary, reports of her extreme 
devoutness and piety abound. Although this might simply be a 
matter of flattery, we have no evidence that might disprove
contemporary statements, and it is surprising that Paris’ description 
of a departure from traditional morality within a rigidly structured 
feudal society should have gone unnoticed. This raises the 
following problem. The many translations and commentaries of
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Latin Biblical works that Marie requested to be made for her use
evince that she had little or no knowledge of Latin; thus, the
De Amore could hardly have been written her:
The question of Marie1s Latinity bears on the intended audience of 
Andreas’ De Amore, for if Marie could not understand De Amore 
without the help of a translation, there is little reason to 
think that it was written for her delectation. The obvious 
audience for a Latin treatise would be clerics and a few well- 
educated laymen, who might have found the first two books of 
De Amore amusing rather than instructing. 23
This last point gives a new dimension to the reading of the De Amore
in the light of modern scholarship, such as that of M.D. Chenu,
concerning the evolution of religious sensibility within feudal 
24society. The De Amore is not intended to serve as an immoral
code of behaviour for a vast courtly public, as I will shew, but
as a delightful piece of entertainment for a literate elite, that
is for the clergy and the higher aristocracy, such as Marie’s
husband, Henri Comte de Champagne, and his immediate entourage.
Hence, one can reasonably, if still tentatively, advance the
suggestion that this work ironically purports a point of view
concerning love as a general subject, which is compatible with
the religious sensibility of the agrarian feudal system, that is,
the point of view of the ’’vita monastica”, reacting against the 
25social implications of the ’’vita apostolica".
Here again one cannot come to a clear understanding of
the significance of these currents by treating them as units 
pitched against one another. As in the case of "courtly love" - 
"fin* amor", the "vita apostolica" and the "vita monastica" are 
both Christian ideals, and as such, they share a common background 
of aspirations and traditions, in spite of the eventual conflicts 
which are linked to socio-economic factors in the sixteenth century.
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They are divergent, not opposite, means of understanding the
redemptive message which is based on Charity. As D.W. Robertson
has remarked, the doctrine of Charity lies at the heart of mediaeval
Christianity, and it is constantly contrasted with cupidity:
we may use the classic formulation included in the De doctrina 
Christiana (III, 16:10) of St. Augustine: "Charitatem voco motum 
animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se atque proximo propter 
DFeum: cupiditatem autem, motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo 
et quolibet corpore non propter'Deum”. The opposite of Charity, 
as St. Augustine describes it, is cupidity, the love of any 
creature, including one’s self, for its sake. These two loves,
Charity and cupidity, are the two poles of the mediaeval Christian 
scale of values,
As it should be obvious from what I have said until now in all
preceding chapters, it is not only a question of "mediaeval scale”, 
but simply of Christian values, since the Renaissance "trattatisti" 
explicitly preached that the lover should abandon all forms of 
cupidity and turn his attention to the ultimate goal of his soul, 
which is Charity. Consequently, Charity in the Augustinian definition 
is the aim of both the "vita apostolica" and the "vita monastica".
The key difference between the two is to be sought in the
implications of their approach. This divergence is based on a
fundamental contradiction in their conception of beauty. The 
27evangelical current has its roots in the "orientale lumen", and
the teachings of the pseudo-Dionysius and Erigena, who understand
the beauty of sensible forms as a reflection of divine Goodness.
It is out of this context that the basic notion of the dignity of 
28man is developed. The evangelical sensitivity acknowledges the 
presence of grace in wordly goodness, within a secular context, 
and therefore, it aspires to the enrichment of secular spirituality. 
The "vita monastica" stresses the incompatibility of secular life 
with religious spirituality, for although it recognizes that the
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creation as the work of God must partake of His grace, it is also
the seat of corruption. This excludes individual beauty as a 
source of spiritual plenitude, since it is viewed primarily as a 
source of deceit to be shunned. Just as it relegates melancholy 
to a state of madness, so does it reduce imagination to deceitful
corporeal vision devoid of a transcendental function. Thus, the 
’’vita monastica” separates sharply the divine from the wordly, as 
it does the institution of religion which is represented by the 
Church, from secular life which it views as a source of cupidity.
The De Amore is an extensive treatise, presented as a
series of dialogues, describing secular cupidity, and written from 
29a monastic point of view. The condemnation of cupidity in the
De Amore depends on the interaction of two points: the author’s
treatment of the concept of beauty, and his continuous references
to reason with an ironical intention. The distance that separates
Charity from cupidity in mediaeval works is paralleled by that
which differentiates mere knowledge from wisdom, that is, scientia 
30from sapientia* In other words, sin, which St. Augustine defines 
as originating in a misdirection of the rational soul, is governed 
by the role played by natural reason (scientia) which is blinded by 
its own light and does not recognize its source, right reason 
(sapientia). These two triplical sets of concepts commonly grouped 
under ’’reason" ("knowledge-scientia-natural reason" vs. "wisdom- 
sapientia-right reason") are the source of ambiguity manipulated 
by the author of the De Amore with an ironical intention, as D.W. 
Robertson has shewn in his "The Subject of the De Amore". They 
represent his conscious use of reason in the form of rational, or
reasonable, arguments, with the veiled exclusion of the individual
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loverTs awareness of the existence of grace. This results in the
consistently "foolish" action of the lover who acts without the
guidance of right reason. Humour arises from the fine line that
separates the lover’s action from sin, since he does not really
have knowledge of grace the foolish lover is not really sinning,
but his actions can be viewed as sinful by the reader, because out
of pride the lover allows his natural reason to assume the role of
right reason. He purposefully disobeys the commonly known will of
God which is repeatedly shewn to him in the course of the dialogues.
33The lovers in the De Amore, therefore, always follow their reason, 
that is, their scientia, but the absurdity of their actions to which 
Capellanus consistently refers as "foolish" is evident when one 
notes that the author has removed from his characters any possibility 
of seeing their actions in the light of sapientia. Hence the 
De Amore is an amusing story of cupidity. It is an ironical 
portrayal of sin, because all sin arises out of cupidity, and in 
the De Amore reason guides sin. The author uses reason in relation 
with love as a source of cupidity which has its seat in the "saeculum"' 
because natural reason cannot of its own power transcend that context. 
As a result the lover moves in a direction opposite to Charity,
Reason then directs love towards the preservation of the species, 
and as such, love is bent on the concern of the object for its 
own sake. Pram this point of view, Capellanus treats love in the 
secular context as cupidity, or fornicatio, and plays with the 
inherent contradiction of love as signifying either Charity or 
cupidity:
The fact that the word love (amor) could be used for either Charity 
or cupidity opened enormous possibility for word-play. It is also,
I believe, responsible for the manifest preoccupation with "love" , 
in mediaeval literature... St. Augustine interpreted the word
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fornicatio in the Scriptures to mean not only illicit conjunction 
of the sexes, but also idolatry as any aspect of love of the world 
as opposed to the love of God. When luxuria or fornicatio is used 
symbolically either one well describes the sin of Adam and Eve and 
may justly be placed as the crowning fruit of the Tree of Babylon. 
The evil tree suggests idolatrous sexual love, an extreme form of 
cupidity and a reflection of the Fall.
This clearly explains what so many critics have considered to be 
the idolatrous nature of "courtly love" viewed by moralists.
There remains to understand the ironical significance of Capellanus1 
handling of the sin of pride, which is principally affected by the 
point of view he takes regarding the place of Charity in this
w orId.
When the word-play surrounding the doctrine of Charity 
and cupidity is taken to its ultimate consequences, it is evident 
that love based on Charity, or guided by the light of right reason, 
would naturally have to take on a sapiential character. In a
secular context such a love would naturally have to be founded on
a reflection of the divine attributes in nature, as it is understood
in the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian tradition. This is patently not
the case in the De Amore. A survey of the introduction of this
work can reveal the basic premisses set down by Andreas Capellanus
before developing ironically the problems that these imply. As I
said above, the concept of beauty voiced by the author is a
fundamental factor determining his intention. It constitutes the 
36basis of the "double lesson" on love which Andreas gives to his
young friend "Gualteri", or "Gauthier”. Thus, in his introduction
of the subject matter to Gauthier, after giving his classic
definition of love as a "passio quaedam innata procedens ex 
37visione et immoderata cogitatione", which I have shewn in
Chapter III to mean that it is basically a movement of imagination
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Capellanus goes on to describe what he calls the lover’s "meditation" 
The latter is particularly important since it reveals the way in 
which Capellanus interprets the innermost intention of all the
lovers’ actions in the De Amore. He views this to be fornicatio
because when he defines love as a "passio" Andreas does not merely
wish to indicate that it is a "suffering", but rather he refers to
its broader context in which "passio implies an act contrary to 
38reason" . This does not mean an act free from reason, which is
always present in man by virtue of the nature of his soul which 
39is the source of sin , but an act of misguided reason that departs 
from the light of right reason or sapientia towards which natural
reason should be turned. It is a foolish act of the rational soul
which is guided by the light of natural reason and can, therefore, 
only be oriented towards the flesh. The definition of the lover’s 
meditation used by Capellanus then acquires its proper significance. 
Beauty perceived by the lover is characterized by the very absence 
of any spiritual reality. It is, at best, the relation of harmonious 
parts following the Stoic definition of beauty that the Renaissance 
"trattatisti" took care to deny, as I have pointed out in the 
previous chapter. Imagination in this circumstance is limited to 
the apprehension of physical attributes, and therefore, it is a 
vain, or deceitful, imagination that can only cause the rational 
soul of the lover to be drawn to the flesh. Capellanus ironically, 
if not cynically, labels this process as the lover’s "complete
meditation":
Postmodum mulieris incipit cogitare facturas et eius distinguere 
membra suosque actus imaginari eiusque corporis secreta rimari ac 
cuiusque membri officio desiderat perpotiri. Postquam vero ad hanc 
cogitationem plenariam devenerit, sua frena nescit continere amor, 
sed statim procedit ad actum. (underlining is mine).
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This meditation is not contemplative, although it claims to be so.
It is lust that leads immediately to uncontrolled action. The
intended point of reference in this instance is that Capellanus,
who undoubtedly knew the works of his contemporaries, the Chartrian 
41and Victorine thinkers, denies any spiritual function to
imagination and at the same stroke he refutes their definition
of beauty. As a consequence of this, it seems to me that Capellanus’
description of the lover’s ’’complete meditation” as concupiscence
directed towards an earthly object is a tongue-in-cheek reference
to Chartrian and Victorine epistemology, because it uses its
terms in order to deny any spiritual value to the secular object,
and thereby sets grace outside of the limits of the lay context.
Subsequent references to melancholy also serve to deny the merit
of interior meditation, since these reduce melancholy to a state
of madness: ’’Qua quidem cessante illico melancolia ex adverso 
42consurgit, in eo suum sibi locum vindicat ira...”. Here ira is 
A* 3not the Chartrian "power to reject unwanted things” as it is
used by Bernardus Silvestris, but outright madness. In view of the
definition chosen by Capellanus to characterize the object of love
in the De Amore, it is obvious that the lover can only be moved
in a direction away from the fundamental teachings of the ’’vita
apostolica”. Like imagination and melancholy, beauty in Capellanus’
work is a source of deceit, and not a reflection of divine goodness.
The interesting point raised by the subject of the De Amore is not
simply that its intention is to illustrate the doctrine of Charity 
45after the-Fall, as D.W. Robertson has shewn, but that it parodies 
a certain concept of Charity in order to refute it and replace it
by another.
44
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In a work of vast ambiguity, as is the De Amore, it can
be argued that by denying the lover the capacity of knowing the
real source of beauty, and stressing his foolishness, the author
is actually supporting the evangelical point of view. This is
always a possibility. However, the problem of acknowledging grace
is central to the doctrine of Charity, and the author’s explicit
denial of the spiritual function of imagination indicates the
important fact that he does not consider grace to be present in the
secular context. This can be further elucidated when we approach
the text as a problem of social hierarchy, which as I repeatedly 
46stressed, with M.D. Chenu, is fundamental to the development of 
the ’’vita apostolica”. The De Amore is concerned with cupidity, 
the basis of which is pride. In a rigidly structured feudal 
society, social mobility is considered to be usurpation? that is, 
a form of pride much like Satan’s. This can be shewn to be one 
of the principal themes of the De Amore.
The acts of the lovers illustrated in Capellanus’ work
constitute the norm of conduct and aspirations prescribed for 
. 47Gauthier. The latter, is introduced as an innocent, if not simply 
gullible, young man who has recently fallen in love. The conduct 
taught by Capellanus is a parody of courtly social etiquette viewed 
and judged by a clerical moralist, and as such it provides
entertainment for the reader. That this conduct is not set forth
as a model, as Paris thought, is obvious from the moral implications 
that underlie Andreas’ narration. Each case of love represents 
foolish action, as I have noted. In other words each lover is a
fool. The classical definition of the fool is provided by the 
first verse in Psalms XIV and LIII: ’’Dixit insipiens in corde suo:
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non est deus”. This is, of course, absolutely consistent with 
the concept of beauty presented by Andreas, as well as D.W. 
Robertson’s interpretation of the De Amore. The fool is so 
intently enthralled by the delights of this world for their sake 
that he fails to recognize the existence of the source of all 
goodness. Similarly, the lover does not acknowledge true beauty, 
or the existence of grace, and like the biblical fool he moves
away from Charity and sapientia. Xt is not surprising that at
the very end of the De Amore Andreas concludes his presentation 
to Walter by asking him why he wishes to act like a fool and lose 
the grace of God:
cur stulte quaeris amare...? ... quam si iuxta volueris praesetem 
exercere doctrinam, et sicut huius libelli assidua tibi lectio 
demonstrabit, omnes corporis voluptates pleno effectu, Dei tamen 
gratia, bonorum consortio atque virorum laudabilium amictia iusta 
manebis ratione privatus...” (underlining is mine).
As Psalms XIV and LIII suggest the fool not only fails to recognize 
the pre-eminence of God and, therefore, moves away from any possible 
redemption, but he subverts the divinely ordained social order.
He is a symbol of cupidity, and the love of the fool reflects his 
pride as he rises against the commandments of God; it repeats the 
cause of the Fall. The fool is then not only a trickster, he is 
a Godless man who wilfully spreads confusionThis traditional 
aspect of his character is confirmed by his folkloric relation with 
Seth-Typhon, but more specifically in the literary tradition, as
in the fifteenth-century French dialogue entitled, Fatrasie de 
51 . .Coquars, which is one of the finest documents on the mediaeval 
definition of the fool. Here the fool is overtly described as a 
social usurper:
Coquart mignot qui descognoit la gache,
Ja soit venu de basse et humble place,
Qui aux plus grans se veult comparer (verses 13-15).
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In the first book of the De Amore Andreas specifically establishes 
a series of social comparisons for Gauthier’s benefit. In all but
one of these dialogues, which is concerned only with lovers of the
same class, it can be shewn that there are specific references to 
52the social confusion spread by the love of the fool.
The concern for "nobility” is, above all, a worldly
matter, and Andreas uses the ambiguous definition of nobility as
excellence of character in order to present the subject of nobility
as a kind of vanity, or pride. There is no character in the De
Amore who does not eventually claim to have an excellent character,
and therefore, nobility. In the De Reprobatione Capellanus
explicitly states that all these claims are mere vainglory:
Sed et nulla mulier invenitur ex tarn infimo genere nata, quae se non 
asserat egregios habere parentes et a magnatum stipite derivari, et 
quae se omni iactantia non extollat. Et haec sunt, quae vana gloria 
tamquam propria quaerit. ^3
Indeed, in the first book of the De Amore each lover begins his
courtship by either praising the nobility, or excellence of character,
of the lady, or staking his own claims to nobility. In each of
these attempts to seduce the lady he tries to persuade her to 
5 Areturn his love by using rational, "reasonable" arguments. The 
lover attempts to gain the lady’s confidence through the deceit 
of flattery, by appealing to her pride which is the source of
cupidity. As a consequence one can say that each one of these
brief dialogues is a representation of the Fall, as D.W. Robertson 
55has shewn in the case of the garden reference in the De Amore.
Andreas Capellanus treats the subject of love in the secular context 
as a non-transcendental activity. For this moralist, it is a 
libidinous activity subject to worldly fortunes, and therefore, an 
earthly delight contrary to the fruition of the Lord. The courtly
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love which he teaches Gauthier is fornicatio which he considers to 
56be "damnabile crimen” through which ’’homines coelesti hereditate 
57privari”; in brief, a sin that entails the eternal damnation of
the soul.
The irremediably sinful nature of courtly love as it is
conceived by Andreas Capellanus evinces that this writer does not 
allow for a spiritual experience deriving from the secular context. 
The intention underlying his irony is evident. As a manifestation 
of pride and cupidity "courtly love", which Andreas describes by 
parodying an aspect of the social customs of his time, is worldly
vanity that keeps man from attaining the grace of God. Indeed, in
the Reprobatione this love that Gauthier pursues is classified as 
the work of Satan against the Charity of God:
Praeterea ipsum Deum sine omni dubitatione castitatis et pudicitiae 
caput esse scimus atque principium; diabolum vero amoris et luxuriae 
auctorem esse, scriptura referente cognovimus. Et ideo auctoris 
quoque ratione tenemur in perpetuum pudicitiam conservare et 
castitatem, luxuriam penitus evitare, quia, quod diabolo auctore 
constat esse perfectum, nihil posset hominibus parare salubre nec 
aliquid conferre laudandum. ^8
There is an important authorial slip in the first book of the De
Amore which reveals that this attitude towards secular love is not
merely part of the Reprobatione, but that it pervades all aspects 
of Capellanus’ thought. The author’s intention is to distinguish 
sharply between the secular and the spiritual life, the earthly and 
the divine. The women in the first part of Capellanus’ treatise 
are representative of Eve before the Fall; they defend themselves
from the cunning of cupidity presented in reasonable arguments,
until they are eventually tempted. They serve as the mouthpiece 
for Capellanus’ actual point of view. A notable point is that the 
good sense, or wisdom in a loose sense, of the women increases as
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their social standing increases. Andreas’ point of view is most
clearly articulated by the woman of the higher nobility, and it is
in her speech that he reveals his presence when he forgets himself 
59and writes: "let us turn our pen" thereby making it clear to the 
careful reader that it is he, Capellanus, rebuking the lover, not 
the lady:
Vanam quidem mundi gloriam non affecto nec sine re verbis propriis quaero 
ditare amicos, sed ad melioris vitae merita vos invitare nitebar, 
non quasi amoris volens damnare ministeria, sed mundanis rebus 
superiores causas esse praelatas cupiens demonstrare. Sed divinarum 
rerum ad praesens disputatione omissa, stilum ad amoris vertamus 
judicium. Gauderem igitur plurimum, si vestra lingua tacente 
propria solummodo vos facta laudarent, quia Salomone testante omnis 
laus in proprio ore vanescit. Praeterea quid exspectavit tam magna 
et effusa largitas vestra? Quam diu tardavit haec, quae video, 
interpola et attrita vestimenta donare? Numquid divitiis abundant 
milites universi, et nullus reperitur egenus? 60 (underlining
is mine).
This is, in a nutshell, the essential content of the De Amore.
Capellanus pitches the vanity of this world against the message
of Divine Charity. The former is embodied by the claims and
desires of the courtly lover whose personal vanity and pride find 
their expression in his intent on all manner of fornicatio, which
pervades secular life. For the author, Charity is only possible
in a religious ascesis from this world. Capellanus consequently
preaches monastic Charity, not evangelical piety, as the only way
to salvation. It is for this reason that he states that he does
not intend to condemn Love’s service, which is founded on the
feudal order of society, but to shew the lover that there is a
greater love above?which has nothing to do with wordly tribulations. 
Clericalism plays a maj or part in the De Amore, and
although Capellanus does indulge in some tongue-in-cheek anti­
clericalism, he also stresses that the real nobility is that of
the clergy. This is entirely in keeping with general tone of his
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work. If nobility is a matter of excellence of character, as •. 
Capellanus repeats throughout his text, then it is evident that 
the most virtuous persons should be those who devote their life
to the service of God. Nobility of the cloth is not secular, and 
therefore, should not be stained by corruption and cupidity. This 
is how he describes the life of the clergy:
Clericus ergo nobilissimus iudicatur ordinis praerogativa sacrati, 
quam nobilitatera ex Dei constat gremio processisse et divina 
clericis voluntate fuisse largitam... Sed quo ad hanc nobilitatem 
ad amorem clericus spectare non potest; hac enim nobilitate inspecta 
clericus non debet amoris operibus deservire, sed omnem carnis 
delectationem tenetur penitus declinare et ab omni corporis 
inquinamento immaculatum se Domino custodire, cuius creditur 
gestare militiam. Clerico igitur nobilitatem non sanguinis 
propinat origo, nec saecularis valet removere potestas, sed ex 
Dei gratia tantum concessa probatur et eo ministrante largita, 
et a Deo solo huiusmodi possunt nobilitatis pro sui tantum 
excessibus privilegia denegari.
This statement is entirely consistent with what Andreas says in 
the Reprobatione. Excellence of character, and hence, a virtuous 
life, is chastity. This is what Capellanus recommends to Gauthier
in the conclusion of his work. It follows that a chaste life in
the author’s system can only be found in the clergy, because true
nobility is clerical and non-secular. Much of the irony of the
De Amore lies in the opposition between the secular and the sacred
whose terms of reference overlap, as does for instance the concept
of nobility, but Andreas is careful never to let the two worlds
mingle. Charity, in the Augustinian sense, is possible only in a 
62monastic context . When Capellanus talks of the love of the
clergy he does so with the intent to ridicule and to chastise.
After having explicitly stated that clerics should never engage 
in amorous activities, Andreas does give a description of how the 
cleric can indulge in love. Again, his concession is ironical, for 
if the cleric takes to courting, he loses his nobility, which is
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entitles him to "courtly love". In Capellanus’ own words, the
cleric who falls in love must: "subire certamina, iuxta sui 
63sanguinis ordinem sive gradum". Our common parents are
Adam and Eve who lost the state of grace. Thus, the cleric falls 
from grace, because when Capellanus states that the cleric in love 
must return to the rank of his parents, he adds that he understands
this to mean, what he has already explained concerning the ranks
of different men: "sicut superius edocet plenarie gradibus hominum
insinuata doctrina, suo sermone utatur et amoris studeat applicari 
.. 64militiae • This doctrine is clearly laid out in the introduction
and subsequently repeated, the ranks of men all originate from our
first parents: "Nam quum omnes homines uno sumus ab initio stipite 
6 5derivati unamque secundum naturam originem traximus omnes" .
With this statement it is also evident that Capellanus insists on
the fallen state of mankind, and is not concerned with the theme
of the dignity of man. He views courtly love as a wordly delight
which is fundamentally incompatible with divine love since it is
a perpetuation of the original sin: "... qui Domino contendunt
perfecte servire, eius prorsus debent obsequio mancipari et iuxta 
66Pauli sententiam nullo saeculari debent adimpleri negotio" .
This statement, uttered by the foolish lover, is merely reasonable 
in the context of Capellanus’ intention. The perfect life is
then the monastic ideal to which Andreas adheres.
As I have tried to shew, Andreas Capellanus’ religious 
point of view is in keeping with the definition of beauty that 
introduces the subject of the De Amore. In a subsequent passage 
Capellanus provides the reader with further indications of how he 
conceives of the nature of "courtly love". He associates it with
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the Augustinian notion of the eye of flesh, which is natural reason.
As such, imagination does not assume a transcendental function in
his system. It is reduced to corporeal vision, and therefore, to
deceitful imaginings which lead to "melancolia negra". The noble
lover articulates these concepts in the fifth dialogue:
Quando vero vos non possum corporali visum aspicere nec super vos 
constitutum aerem deprehendere, undique contra me cuncta incipiunt 
elementa consurgere, et varia me poenarum incipiunt allidere genera, 
nullo possum gaudere solatio, nisi quantum falsa mihi demonstratione 
dormienti somni sopor adducit. 67
The references to melancholy found in this passage, and further
developed in the course of the text, include elemental imbalance
and sadness which afflict the melancholy lover. These are, by
extension, signs of mental alienation. They constitute the norm
of "courtly love" set by Andreas Capellanus, and are predominantly
determined by his concept of beauty. As I have repeatedly noted,
love in the De Amore is, in fact, a desire for this wordly beauty
which the lover seeks to fulfill actively. Owing to the fact that
this beauty remains untranscendental, love that pursues it is
opposed to any spiritual experience. Furthermore, because this
beauty belongs to the "saeculum", secular experience is viewed
as cupidity, and love in that context can only be concupiscent.
68By denying a truly transcendental function to love, Capellanus
reduces it to a parody of the rules and directives that cover
every aspect of social interaction within the feudal context.
This is not the "fin’ amor" defined by Kelly, but his "courtly
love".
By referring only to what I have tried to shew in 
Chapter III, the "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus stands at 
the opposite pole from the experience described by Ausias March
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who, through his readings of Ramon Lull, is affected by the
sensibility of the evangelical current initiated by Hughes de 
Saint Victor, as are the Renaissance Neo-platonic ’’trattatisti”.
The distance that separates Andreas Capellanus is evident inasmuch 
as both authors ultimately reject earthly delights as a kind of 
cupidity, but it is a much more complex problem in Ausias March, 
because he is conscious of the presence of grace as it is found 
reflected in mundane beauty. Thus, unlike Capellanus, who rejects, 
from the outset, the Erigenian concept of concentric beauty 
interpenetrated with Goodness, Ausias March attempts to adjust 
to the spiritual realities of mundane beauty and ultimately 
transcend it, much as the Renaissance ’’trattatisti" did. Whereas 
Capellanus’ De Amore is based on an outright rejection of wordly 
goodness, Ausias March views the beauty which he finds in this 
world as a means to divine perfection:
es lo comment 
segons lo cors
Alguna fi en aquest mon se troba; 
n*es vera fi, puys no fa l’om felix:
per on altra s’acaba, 
qu* entendre pot un home
(CV, w. 113-116).
The beloved in the poetry of Ausias March must? then, take on a 
sapiential character which she does not have in Capellanus’ theory
of love.
The contrast between Andreas Capellanus’ De Amore and 
Ausias March’s poetry inevitably begins with the manner in which 
the. Valencian poet apprehends the beloved. Capellanus denies 
any function to right reason to worldly love. The latter is 
considered to be lust resulting from the misguided activity of 
natural reason, and therefore, the beloved is perceived strictly 
in terms of physical beauty. As I pointed out above, this is
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expressed in terms of proportional symmetry which is not
transcendental. Ausias March’s aesthetic appreciation has
diametrically opposite consequences. His vision of the lady
is based on a blissful intellectual experience. As I noted in
my analysis of Poem XVIII in Chapter III, phantasy in Ausias
March’s poetry becomes a means to the enjoyment of true Wisdom
beheld in the contemplation of a particular corporeal object.
Phantasy in this context is understood to be the intellectual
abstraction of the particular form to its universal idea, and
as such, it is also the illumination of the clear spirit, or
the enlightenment of right reason. Poem XVIII presents a
description of love primarily in sapiential terms, but only by
extension does it imply that the beauty of the lady has sapiential 
connotations. Indeed, this poses a basic problem concerning 
Ausias March’s conception of the lady’s beauty and the manner 
in which he describes it. It is through the proper understanding 
of the significance and usage of the imagery that one can come 
to terms with the significance of the lady in Ausias March’s love.
One has to remember that within the canons of the poetry
of Ausias March’s French predecessors one can find justifications
for describing the lady as Sapientia. Oton de Granson, following
Guillaume de Machaut, had suggested in the "Canplainte de Saint
Valentin" that since the lover was enamoured of the ideal image 
69of the lady, that image was transferrable to another lady.
The first result of this proposition is that although there might 
be a variation in the number of ladies loved, their fundamental
qualities remain the same. Hence one notes the similarities that exist
between all the loves of Oton de Granson. This characteristic
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has also been noted in the poetry of Ausias March, who does not 
delve into the physical description of his various ladies, but 
does present a consistent spiritual portrait. In his request 
to Amours Oton de Granson, who has lost his loved one, asks to
be granted the love of another lady. In his description of this
new lady as he would like to find her, the image which Oton de
Granson draws focuses on her archetypal quality? she is a
reflection of the beauty of Paradise:
Je feray vers vous mon devoir 
D’aler par tout a mon pouior 
Vers celle dont faictes devis,
Qu’a plain on peult apparcevoir --De beault£ le droit paradis (w. 188-192)/
Characteristically, on the basis of this criterion Oton de Granson 
notes, after having been granted his request, that this new lady
is in every way similar to the last:
J’entray en trop forte pensee,
Car aucunement resserabloit 
A la belle qu’avoye amee,
Pour qui mon coeur tant se douloit (w. 205-208)/
The elevation of the lady to the embodiment of the beauty of
Paradise implies that she is not merely "the Imitation of an 
73idea", but of all ideas in God. She is the worldly reflection
of God’s Wisdom, or Sapientia Dei. At this point one notes that
this situation can lead to the merging of religious considerations
with the general problem of worldly love, as I hope to shew in
Ausias March’s use of this kind of imagery. It is a secularization
of the sacred, for Sapientia is a reflection of the divine Logos,
74and therefore, of Christ. When the question of earthly love is
set in this context, that love is divine love. The love of the 
poet for the lady Is a means towards his love for God, as Poem 
CV quoted above indicates. Thus, as Marie-Louise von Franz explains,
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Sapientia is divine Wisdom:
In patristic literature she was mostly interpreted as Christ, the 
pre-existent Logos, or as the sum of rationes Aeternae (eternal 
forms), of the “self-knowing primordial causes", exemplars, ideas, 
and prototypes in the mind of God. She was also considered the 
archetypus mundus "that archetypal world after whose likeness 
this sensible world was made," and through which God becomes 
conscious of himself. Sapientia Dei is thus the sum of archetypal 
images in the mind of God.‘5
In view of the range of implications inherent in Sapientia it is 
not surprising that in Poem XVIII, in which the vision of the 
beloved takes on sapiential characteristics, the lover’s rapture 
leads to his "well-tempered" condition. This also implies that 
in Ausias March the lover’s meditation on the sapiential nature 
of the lady leads to "melancolia generosa", which, as I hope to 
demonstrate in the course of this expose, is counterbalanced by 
the presence of "melancolia negra" caused by laetus horror 
experienced at the material existence of the lady. The sapiential 
characteristic of Ausias March’s love is, then, based on the 
experience of melancholy imagination.
, Although Ausias March never really develops the physical 
description of his beloved, the sapiential nature of the lady 
which is evident in Poem XVIII, touches on the question of her 
identity. However, as in Oton de Granson, the poet’s love is not 
oriented towards the physical reality of a definite individual, 
but with the image which she embodies. Yet, Ausias March takes 
the implications of Oton de Granson’s proposition beyond the 
limits of the French poet’s intention, to the limits of the 
image’s spiritual reality. This consideration leads me to believe 
that the proper interpretation of the poetry of Ausias March 
depends on a re-assessment of the question of the lady’s identity 
through the analysis of the imagery by which she is known to us.
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In Poem XXIII the reader is told that her name is "dona
Teresa" . As a result of this various scholars have considered 
76Ausias March to be "el cantor de Teresa" , in the Petrarchan 
fashion. Evidence for this identification is based on a note by 
Luis Carroz de Vilaragut, written in the sixteenth-century in the 
prologu-e of his manuscript of Ausias March’s works. This note states 
that:
Fonch lo dit cavalier mossen Ausias March... molt affectat servidor 
de dona Teresa Bou, dama valentiana, tan gentil com virtuosa, 
honesta y savia, com les obres fetes en son servey e lahor mostren, 
en servici de la qual en vida e apres mort de aquella escrigue 
la major part del present libre, per les obres del qual veuran 
les mes acabades e perfectes amors honestes que may ningun 
enamorat cavalier ha sentit ni escrit.??
Vilaragut’s information seems to proceed from the conflation of
references to the lady in Poem XXIII as "dona Teresa", and in the 
78maidit, Poem XLII, as "Na Monbohi". According to Pages, "Bou"
is a common last name in the area of Valencia, and this theory,
which seems to be based on the merging of two antithetical poems
that do not warrant the identification of "Teresa" with "Na 
79Monbohi", is absolutely hypothetical. Yet, it must be noted 
that the disparity between these two poems does not make them 
absolutely exclusive. They represent the two extremes of Ausias 
March’s reaction to the image of the beloved. Poem XXIII is 
representative of his elation at the contemplation of the
sapiential qualities of her image, whereas Poem XLII voices his 
frustration at the limitations of spiritual image imposed by her 
physical reality. It seems however, that even when these two 
poems are understood in this frame of reference Pages’ objection 
can be sustained on the grounds that these two names are accidental 
references to the lady that do not necessarily betray her identity.
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Indeed, critics do not seem to have noticed that "Monbohl" is a 
80reference to a rustic location in Catalonia. In the maldit
Ausias March culminates his imprecations by calling the lady 
"Na Montbohi'', that is? "Lady Montbohf” which has derogatory 
implications consistent with all of Poem XLII. To the contrary, 
in Poem XVIII ”dona Teresa” has Biblical implications, as I hope 
to shew below. Hence, Ausias March’s abstract treatment of the 
lady, primarily as a figura for his love, invalidates any attempt
to identify her beyond the limits of the text. However, internal 
evidence based on Ausias March’s use of sapiential language in
the ’’Cants d’Amor" can reveal the nature of the reference to
"dona Teresa".
Peter Dronke divides the language of love into three 
81types: mystical, noetic, and sapiential. The description of 
the lady is primarily based on the use of sapiential language, 
inspired by the Salomonic Books of Wisdom. Although these three 
languages concur in the expression of the poet’s love, one can 
distinguish between the mystical language as a profane definition
of his erotic aspiration resulting from the idealization of the
lady, and the noetic language, which is the philosophical expression 
of this love in its metaphysical context. The description of the 
lady consequently depends on the poet’s understanding of love in 
its mystical and noetic expressions.
The identity of "Teresa" is, therefore, a basic problem 
of perception immediately subordinated to the nature of the poet’s 
love. One of the most striking images used by Ausias March to
describe the nature of his love is that of the fire that burns
without smoke. This alchemical image of love is related to the
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notion of pure substances which burn without creating a residue,
and derives from the mystic imagery of Hughes de Saint Victor.
In his Commentary on the Ecclesiastes, Hughes de Saint Victor
explains that the perception of divine love begins imperfectly
in carnal desire, but that the contemplation of God’s Beauty
perfects this love so that it burns in a pure fire: ’’The fire,
then, appeared first in flame and smoke, then in flame without 
82smoke, and lastly as a pure fire, without flame or smoke”. This 
image is found in an early poem of Ausias March. It is part of 
a medical description of the lover’s suffering in which the poet 
states that his ills proceed from an everlasting pure fire which
he bears within himself:
Alt e amor, 
sper, vinent 
me son delits, 
la por del mal, 
e port al cor 
e la calor
d’on gran desig s’engendra, 
per tots aquests graons,
mas dona’m passions 
qui»m fa magrir earn tendra;
sens fum continuu foch, 
no«m surt a part de fora (HI, vv. 1-6).
The medical description is evidently one of melancholy adust as a 
83condition for pure love. The combination of choler and melancholy
is clear inasmuch as the description of the lover’s condition is
that of a cold and dry person, that is one who is thin (verse 4),
who is affected by the fire of choler and therefore burns inside
(verse 5), but yet is cold outside (verses 6), and hence is
predominantly melancholic. In the context of this poem the image
of the smokeless fire has a twofold meaning. For the poet’s
particular circumstance it is a metaphor of the hidden love that
cannot be revealed. On a metaphysical level, it combines with the
medical metaphor to express the poet’s pure love. None of these 
84implications is contradictory. The very secrecy of this love
implies purity, since as an interior love it is a contemplative
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delight, which, as I have shewn in Chapter III, relies on the
idealizing function of imagination and phantasy. The latter can 
cause contemplation to degenerate into "melancolia negra" if it 
seeks the active realization of this love. Yet, at the outset
this contemplation is based on a mystical precept and seeks 
divinity through love. In one of his last "Cants d'Amor", Poem 
LXXXVII, Ausias March sums up this problem:
assats a mi 
que pur* amor 
Mon delit es 
e romanch trist
es caussa descuberta 
no pot en dona caure. 
vida contemplativa,
devallant en l'activa 
(LXXXVII, vv. 267-270).
The true, or "honest" love often referred to by Ausias March is
this contemplative life which is proper to melancholy imagination, 
and conflicts with the act of loving.
Consistent with the Erigenian aesthetic of the evangelical 
current, contemplation leads Ausias March to express his love as a 
purified ideal in which he perceives divinity. The "figura" of 
the lady is taken as a medium for this contemplation. The first
stanza of Poem L clearly expresses the numinous character of this
experience:
Si com aquell 
no pot esser 
si que res fet 
en son delit 
- per inperfet 
e sino«n Deu 
axi Amor, 
tot lo restant
qui per sa*nfinitat 
de res finit content,
, ab algun element, 
no *1 haura contentat 
lo delit mundh. posa 
sa penssa no ss’atura -, 
vds amant, m’assegura;
del mon li fa gran nosa (L, vv. 1-8).
In this stanza the poet's love of the lady is equated to that of
God, who is true infinity. The beloved is, therefore, contemplated
as a reflection of the Divine Being, that causes the lover to 
transcend "worldly delight".
Ausias March places particular emphasis on two aspects
334
of the object contemplated. Although he never describes her 
physical attributes, two features of her spiritual, or inner,
85beauty are reiterated throughout his poetry: "gest" and "seny".
Apart from the general philosophical implications of the latter in
Catalan, it implies wisdom, intelligence, and personal control over
the self. It is dominion of the self through wisdom, and as such,
it is an expression of potential power. Consequently, in his use
of ”seny” Ausias March applies it to the figure that best embodies
wisdom and power in the mediaeval mind, Solomon: ”e si hagues
tant seny com Salamo" (IX, v. 10). The contemplation of the idea
of the beloved leads the lover to love her "seny": "Co que yo am
de vos es vostre seny" (XXXIII, v. 5). This trait is closely
associated with the topos of the lady as Sapientia. Through the
power of her "seny” the lady dominates the lover. He stands
powerless before her as he does before Divine intelligence:
mon pensament, minvant, m’a ja vencut; 
so presoner, pahoruch, per vostre seny.
tots mos actes afrena, 
res no <1 pot enfrenar (CI, w. 43-46).
Lo vostre gest 
e mon voler
As one can observe in this quotation, the power of the lady which 
is basically contained in the "seny", finds its expression in the 
"gest". "Gest", which Ausias March uses more often than "seny", 
is the physical manifestation of the "wisdom", or the lady as 
"agens intellectus".
In his description of the innamoramento Ausias March 
explicitly states that his love originates in the contemplation of 
the lady’s soul, or spirit, which precedes physical contemplation. 
Again in Poem L, Ausias March sums up this notion in the tornada:
Lir entre carts, 
no m’entra pas 
vostr* esperit 
e com de mi
^o que»m fa vos amar: 
solament per la vista;
es aquell qui.m conquista, 
no*us mostrau desaltar (L, w. 41-44).
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Love of the lady as ’’esperit" is only possible through the
perception of the beloved object as she is revealed by her "gest".
87"Gest" is not only the graceful movement, or bearing, of the lady
which would be primarily physical beauty, it is also the beauty of 
88the face. That is, the expression of the face through which the
eyes communicate the beauty of the soul. Poem XXIII defines the
nature of this particular intellectual perception, as a beauty
that lies beyond proportion and colour:
Quant ds del cors menys de participar 
ab l’esperit, coneix bd lo grosser:
vostra color y ell tall pot bd saber,
mas ga del gest no pora bd parlar (XXIII, vv. 13-16).
Hence, like Ficino and the Florentine Neoplatonists Ausias March 
89rejects the Stoic concept of beauty. Indeed, in the preceding 
verses Ausias March stresses that this beauty, which he perceives 
in the gest, is not external but incorporeal and interior:
Tot mon parlar 
res no valrr^, 
e los vehents 
en creur* a mi,
als qui no*us hauran vista
car fe no*y donaran,
ue dins yds no veuran,
llur arma serh trista
(XXIII, w. 5-8, underlining
is mine).
The melancholy that ensues from the lady’s beauty, as Ausias March 
intends to describe it, is caused by the "laetus horror" (verse 8). 
Thus, in verses 13 to 16 quoted above the poet claims that the 
uncouth man is unable to perceive the "esperit" of the lady and 
knows only her physical beauty, he is, therefore, oblivious to 
her "gest". In this context "gest" is equated with "esperit", and 
as we have seen in Poem CI, it is closely bound to the "seny". 
Through the "gest" Ausias March perceives the soul or "esperit" of 
the lady which finds its expression in her "seny". One can,
therefore, advance that in a Neoplatonic context the lady is a
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reflection of the divine Intellect, and hence, her beauty reflects
divine Goodness.
As the "dona angelicata", the lady embodies Sapientia, 
and is characterized by the irradiating power of her intellect. 
Ausias March equates the illumination that he receives from the
lady with that of God-. In Poem LVI, which is addressed to Lir
entre carts^this illuminative process is described as a mystical
extasis received through the contemplation of the lady’s grace 
which is preceded by the light of God:
Tot simplament 
visch en delit 
que lo cor fosch 
clar posseech, 
e no-y veig als 
si transportant 
res no»m defall 
la mb de Deu
e sens dolor alguna 
ab ma voluntat solta,
qui la tenia »nbolta, 
fent-me .lum sol e luna;
que pur* amor entrega 
en.la person* amada; 
a vida contentada,
a mi res no denega (LVI, w. 25-32).
The pure love of God is found in the beloved, that is, as verse 30
states, it is transported in the beloved person. Hence, the 
beloved’s illuminative power is the combined light of the sun and 
the moon. This is God’s pure love, the sun, reflected in the 
lady, the moon. This is an image of plenitude in which matter 
(moon) and spirit (sun) complement one another, which symbolizes
the union of opposites, and the temperance of elements, much as 
90we have seen in Poem XVIII. . Thus, since God’s love is in the
beloved, the beauty of Lir entre carts is compared to that of the
sun and the moon. The use of this metaphor to describe the lady’s
beauty ultimately proceeds from the Song of Songs: "Quae est ista,
quae progreditur quasi aurora consurgens, pulchra ut luna, electa 
91ut sol". Thus, in his use of the noetic language the poet
ultimately returns to the concepts of the mystical language, 
because both are rooted in the perception of the lady as Sapientia.
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The senyals used to refer to the lady can also be
considered to contribute to the description of the lady. These
may refer to various ladies and form cycles in Ausias March’s
poetry, although this point may be irrelevant, as I have argued 
92above. The two main senyals will concern us, Plena de seny
and Lir entre carts. Both have religious implications stressing
the sapiential context of Ausias March’s love. Plena de seny
echoes the liturgical phrase "Maria plena de gracia", and reflects
the concept of Mary "as mediatrix, and Sapientia as a divine 
93telos"‘. In the Song of Songs, Lir entre carts is a simile 
describing the beloved: "Sicut lilium inter spinas, sic arnica 
mea inter filias"’. Consistent with the western exegetical 
tradition of the Song of Songs, when Ausias March refers to Lir
entre carts he conceives of the archetypal image of the lady as
the soul and as Mary, that is, as serving the double function of 
95mediatrix and Sapientia.
Given the implications of the image of the lady in the 
senyals of Ausias March’s poetry, it is logical that one should 
first seek a sapiential relation in the name "Teresa", as the 
lady seems to be called in Poem XXIII. Ihrthermore, since this 
poem belongs to the Lir entre carts cycle,references to the Song 
of Songs are consequent. This poem is a description of the lady 
on a purely spiritual level. As quotes I have made above from 
this poem indicate, Ausias March attempts to speak of the "gest" 
of the lady in order to reveal the beauty of her "espirit" (XXIII, 
w. 13-16). Hence, the contents of Poem XXIII justify this analysis
In Poem XXIII one of the salient characteristics is that
Ausias March compares Lir entre carts to a city, Venice. In lyric
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poetry this kind of imagery is very infrequent. The converse
comparison is much more common: a city can be compared to a
woman, as in the romance "Abenamar, Abenamar". In this poem
Granada is personified as a lady. This is a formula which Menendez- 
96Pidal considers to be particular to Arabic literature: ”En el
romance Abenamar se utiliza una imagen propia de la literatura
arabe, considerando a una ciudad como novia pretendida: Granada 
z 97dialoga con el rey Juan II”. Menendez-Pidal goes on to note 
that in Arabic literature the lord of the country is referred to 
as the bridegroom of the land. Thus, the king is definitely seen 
as the lord who offers to wed the city, and therefore, to possess 
physically Granada. In the romance the king tries to convince 
Granada by offering her a dowry that would place her above the 
other "ladies”, Cordoba and Sevilla. This situation is reversed 
in Ausias March1s poem. As I have indicated above, he does not 
seek physical possession. As a result, the nature of his relation 
to the lady is also inverted; Lir entre carts rules over him, and 
she is already considered to be above all other women.
Consequently, one notes that Ausias March moves in a 
different tradition. Indeed, Ausias March’s use of the city
simile can be shewn to stem from the Judeo-Christian tradition
of the Song of Songs. In the Vulgate version of the biblical
poem the lover gives the following description of the beloved:
Pulchra es, arnica mea, suavis, et decora sicut Jerusalem: terribilis 
ut castrorum acies ordinata.
Averte oculos tiws a me, quia ipsi me avolare fecerunt... (VI: 3-4). 
In these verses the beloved is described as beautiful and "fitting”, 
"elegant" or "decorous" as Jerusalem. This comparison is followed 
in verse 3 by another simile reiterating the idea that the beauty
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of Jerusalem is awesome. Thus, the beauty of the beloved is 
terrible as well-ordered regiments of a "fortified place", "castle" 
or "military camp".^^ Finally, her power is such that her eyes 
can set the lover in flight, or simply, reduce him to her dominion.
Stanzas four and five of Poem XXIXI use a variation of
the biblical metaphor. After praising Lir entre carts, who seems 
to be referred to as "dona Teresa", Ausias March compares her to 
Ifenice. Her beauty is the product of her well-ordered and .
decorous bearing which overwhelms lust. I quote the two stanzas 
in question:
Sol per a vds 
que Deu retench 
ffetes n’a *ssats 
mas compliment 
havent en si 
que res no*1 fall 
al horn devot 
past d’entenents
basta la bona pasta
per fer singulars dones: 
molt shvies e bones, 
dona Teresa *1 tasta; 
tan gran coneximent
que tota no*s conega: 
sa bellesa encega;
es- son enteniment.
Venecians no 
tan pasciffich 
suptilitats, 
e del cors bell 
Tan gran delit 
e occupat se 
que lo desig 
a leig voler,
han lo regiment
com vostre seny regeix
que*1 entendre*us nodreix, 
sens colpa*l moviment.
tot horn entenent ha 
troba »n vds entendre, 
del cors no*s pot estendre
ans com a mort esth (XXIII, w. 25-40)
The image in these verses
the lady’s "seny" is such
serves to illustrate that the power of
that the peaceful order she generates is
greater than the government of Venice. In this comparison with 
Venice, the concept of "seny" implies that the lady’s capacity to 
create order and to dominate "subtleties", such as passions, is an
expression of her interior beauty (verses 34-35). The implications 
of the word "pasciffich" is important in the interpretation of the 
Song of Songs: it expresses dominion and power, as does "seny". 
Thus, in his first sermon on the Song of Songs Bernard de Clairvaux
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explains that:
Simulque adverto huiuscemodi principiis solas hanc intelligendam 
scripturam mentes invitari pacificas, quae sese jam a vitiorum 
perturbationibus et curarum tumultibus praevalent. 100 
Etienne Gilson translates this text as:
Comme aussi vous devez prendre garde, que par ce genre d’exorde, 
il n’y a que les Sines pacifiques qui savent dominer absolument 
toutes leurs passions et s’exempter de tous les soins importuns 
de cette vie, lesquelles soient invitees a 1’intelligence de 
ces sacres ecrits.
The sense of the adjective "pasciffich" in Ausias March’s Poem
XXIII is similar to that of St. Bernard's text. In both instances
it implies dominion over the self and order from which divine
intelligence proceeds. This concept is developed from verses 37 
to 40 in which the contemplative delight of the intellect dominates 
the lover’s carnal passions. The beloved in the Song of Songs is 
decorous as Jerusalem, which is equated with well-ordered regiments, 
and overwhelms the lover. Similarly, Ausias March’s beloved is 
more orderly than the Venetian government, and the power of her
beauty dominates the lover.
The identity of "dona Teresa" may, therefore, be closely 
related to the comparison of the beloved in the Song of Songs to 
Jerusalem. Close inspection of the poem’s fourth stanza reveals 
that although it begins with a reference to the lady in the first 
person the rest of the stanza is in the third person: "sol per a 
vos" definitely refers to Lir entre carts, but "dona Teresa-1 tasta" 
and the ensuing descriptions are all in the third person. Although 
there is an implicit association between "vos" and "dona Teresa", 
the distance created by a change of person suggests that this is 
a comparison between "dona Teresa" and Lir entre carts, and not
necessarily an equivalence as many critics seem to believe. In
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the modern Catholic Bible one finds that the description of the
beloved in the Song of Songs is slightly different from that of
the Vulgate. Two words are added to the verse comparing the lady
with Jerusalem: ”Tu est belle, mon amie, comme Thirsa, charmante 
102comme Jerusalem" (underlining is mine). The 1590 Latin
translation of the Hebraic version has the same references and
adjectives as the Vulgate, only the reference to Thirsa is added:
103"Pulchra es, arnica mea, ut Thirtza: decora ut Jerusalem".
104The standard Latin spelling for Thirsa is Thersa. Officially,
105Thersa refers to the ancient capital of Israel, but it can also 
be used as the name of a woman, as in Numbers 26:33, 27:1, and 36:11
Given the context of Ausias March’s metaphor, one can 
suggest that the reference in Poem XXXII to "dona Teresa" derives 
from this passage of the Song of Songs as a textual collation. Her 
prime identity is closely related to the figure of Sapientia Dei 
which predominates in Ausias March’s vision of the beloved’s beauty. 
Stanza four has some important parallels with the biblical passage. 
The inner beauty of "dona Teresa" is interpreted in terms of her 
knowledge (verses 29 and 32). Illumination, which results from 
the interior light of right reason found in that beauty, is such 
that it blinds the lover, "sa belleza encega" (verse 31). In the 
Song of Songs Thersa is described only in terms of beauty. 
Metaphorically,this beauty is so radiant and overwhelming that it 
blinds the lover. He begs her to turn away her eyes which perturb 
him, that is, which blind him metaphorically. In the fourth stanza 
Ausias March stresses the beauty associated with "Thersa" : "dona 
Teresa", and in the fifth stanza the decorum of Jerusalem : Venice
is emphasized. Parallelism with the descriptive passage of the
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Song of Songs is as complete as it can reasonably be suggested, 
without being a word for word plagiarism.
From this comparative reading of the two texts I would 
suggest that ’’dona Teresa” is probably a homonymous reference to 
’’Thersa" in the Song of Songs. As such, it is a name with which 
Ausias March refers to his lady Lir entre carts as a sapiential 
figure. I do not deny the vague possibility that Ausias March may 
have known a lady of that name, although this fact cannot be 
substantiated. If it were so, the nature and use of the city 
metaphor would merely reinforce the claim that the name ’’Teresa" 
inspired him to base his description on the "Thersa” of the Song
x n 106of Songs.
The principal objection to this theory of the significance 
of "dona Teresa" will undoubtedly be that the reference to "Thersa" 
in the Song of Songs is not present in St. Jerome's Vulgate. Above 
all I want to make it very clear that it is very possible that 
Ausias March might well have known this reference through a
textual collation between the Hebraic version and St. Jerome's
Vulgate. As I hope to demonstrate below this practice was fairly 
frequent in the later Middle Ages.
In order to understand this possibility, one has to take
into account the textual tradition of this passage of the Song of
Songs and its commentaries- The biblical reference to "Thersa"
in the Song of Songs was lost in the Greek translation which 
108interprets this word as "e06ox£a". . Nevertheless, this name as
a reference to a city remained in the Latin tradition through St.
Jerome’s translation of Eusebius’ Onomastica Sacra. In this text
one finds three references to this name:
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Thersa complacens sibi, quod graece melius dicitur eudoxooa.
Thersa complacitio. quae significatus graece dicitur eudoxCa.
Thersa placens. .
It is then evident that the Latin tradition knew the name of "Thersa", 
but that it was only through a Hebraic version of the Song of Songs
that one could come to know the reference to "Thersa" which I have
discussed above.
It is not necessary to invoke the theory of Ausias March’s 
possible Jewish origins in order to explain the presence of this
, , nometaphor in his poetry. Ausias March could have known these
references to "Thersa" by three other means: an annotated Bible
which would have included this reference, a commentary on the
Song of Songs based on the Hebraic text, or a version of the
Song of Songs prepared by a converso. The validity of these three
possibilities is evinced by the fact that long before Nicholas of
Lyra mediaeval scholars across Europe made extensive use of the
Hebraic text. The commentary of the Psalter prepared by Herbert 
111of Bosham, which is based on the Hebraica, and relies heavily
112on the commentary of Rashi, was written in the late twelfth
century and provides an excellent example of the Latin glossing
of the Hebraic tradition prior to Lyra. As Beryl Smalley has
shewn in The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, there was a
constant intellectual exchange between Jewish and Christian scholars,
so much so that one can rightly say that hebrew was very well known 
113by Christian commentators of the Bible. Furthermore, in the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries conversos played a very important 
role in the translation of Hebraic texts, and as teachers of Hebrew, 
especially in Dominican circles.
The presence of these translators had a tremendous effect
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on the European manuscript tradition of the Vulgate. Bibles based 
on the text of the Vulgate, but which included passages of the 
Hebraica to fill St. Jerome’s lacuna’s, were circulated throughout 
Europe. An example of this practice is the Bible of the Paris
masters, which was the basic text of the Schools:
The Paris masters had proposed a particularly bad text as their 
standard. This was being circulated by stationers, and would soon 
spread over Christendom... Quite alien readings were being 
inserted from biblical quotations in the commentaries of the 
Fathers, from liturgy, and from the Hebrew. J
The particular situation of Biblical scholarship in 
Catalonia presents certain even more interesting aspects. It
is a well-known fact that Peter the Ceremonious and his son John
I boasted that they possessed copies of the Bible, ”en catala, 
francos i fins en hebraic”'.^^ it is> then, not extraneous to 
suggest that the king and the humanists of his court had close 
contacts with Jewish scholars who could expose the meaning of 
the Hebraic text. Indeed, Gerona was a flourishing centre of
117Jewish Biblical studies, before the fatal persecution of 1391.
It is in Gerona that two of the ten remaining fourteenth-century 
Hebrew commentaries of the Song of Songs were written. The first 
by Azriel Ben Menachem, or Ezra de Gerona, does not interest us 
here since it does not comment on the passage referring to ’’Thersa” 
The second is a key work, and it is considered as one of the most
important in rabbinical schools. The commentary of Rabbi Abraham
ben Isaac ha - Levi TaMakh does refer to ’’Thersa”. It is also
important to note that ben Isaac had close contacts with the royal 
119court. Consequently, there is good ground to ask ourselves
whether he may not have discussed his commentary of the Song of 
Songs with Christians. Moreover, given the vast circulation that
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his work had between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, and
the fact that Alfonso the Magnanimous especially fostered Greek 
120and Hebrew biblical studies , one can legitimately suppose that 
his work must have been known by Christians in the fifteenth
century.
Finally, it is impossible to discard the possibility
that of a translation of a fragment of the Song of Songs, or of
the Hebraic commentary. As one knows Ausias March possessed at 
121least a commentary of the Psalms. There exists also a Hebraic
commentary which Ausias March might have known. The commentary
of the Song of Songs attributed to St. Bonaventure is actually a 
122translation of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s work. Consequently, there
is no reason to doubt that Ausias March could have known the
Hebraic version of the Song of Songs. The popularity of the
commentary of the Song of Songs by the Valencian bishop, Jaime
Perez, or Jaime de Valencia, written within Ausias March’s lifetime,
in 1437, and printed in Valencia in 1486, indicates the great
interest that existed in the Catalan-speaking regions for the
Song of Songs. This interest is not foreign to Ausias March, and
one can legitimately suppose that he must have known the passage 
123of the Hebraic version referring to ’’Thersa”.
For reasons to which I have alluded above, the question
of whether or not the name of Ausias March’s beloved is ’’Teresa", 
cannot be answered conclusively, without imposing one’s reading 
on the text and, thereby, violating the basic principle of academic
integrity. Furthermore, were this question to be answered
inequivocally, the answer would contribute little to our understanding 
of Ausias March’s poetry. Her importance lies in her symbolic
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function. Hence, what does matter is that the lady, or the ideal 
figura of the ladies, is consistently viewed as the embodiment of 
Sapientia. From this point of view her ’’identity1’ lies at the 
opposite pole of that which is characteristic of poetas writing in 
the tradition of Andreas Capellanus. The tornada of Poem XXIII 
provides additional evidence of the link that exists between ’’dona 
Teresa” - ’’Thersa” and Sapientia Dei:
Lir entre carts, 
tant que pogues 
meriu-la vos, 
no*s deu posar
lo meu poder no fa 
fer corona *nvisible;
car la qui es visible •
11a on miracl* esth (XXIII, w. 41-42)
The crowning of Lir entre carts mentioned in verse 42 is a definite
symbol of her sapiential character. As I pointed out above, Ausias
March follows the Western exegetical tradition of the Song of Songs
which interprets the beloved as the soul or as Mary assuming the
dual function of Mediatrix and Sapientia. The topos of the 
124crowning of the Virgin is a reference to her function as
Sapientia, since the image of the non-material crown is a symbol 
125of wisdom. Thus, in Alain de Lille’s Complaint of Nature, the 
wisdom of the goddess is symbolized by her crown which shines not 
in ’’false light", but of its own pure light:
The sparkling crown of a royal diadem, shining with dances of gems, 
brightened high on her head. No base alloy of gold, derogate from 
high worth, and deceptive to the eye with false light, supplied its 
substance, but the pure nobility of gold itself.
The crown is, then, a symbol of wisdom and chastity, which serves 
to establish Ausias March’s description of the lady in its sapiential 
context. As such, the lady is a source of illumination, or of 
"melancolia generosa" for the poet’s love, as is evident in verses 
5-8 and 31 of Poem XXIII quoted above.
Characteristically, this illumination which Ausias March
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further describes in Poem XVIII, but which is present in Ausias 
March’s description of the lady’s beauty in Poem XXIII, proceeds 
from his imagination of the lady’s interior beauty. Hence, Ausias 
March claims that this beauty cannot be appreciated by the ignorant
man, which as I will shew below in an analysis of Poems LXXV and 
LXXIX, signifies the majority of mortals. For this reason, Ausias 
March insists on the veracity of his description of the lady in the
first stanza of Poem XXIII:
Lexant a part l’estil dels trobadors 
qui, per escalf, trespassen veritat, 
e sostrahent mon voler affectat
perque no»m torb, dire »1 que trob en vos (XXIII, w. 1-4). 
The "style of the troubadours", which Ausias March describes in
verse 1, is defined in Poem LXXXVII. It is the description of
concupiscent love:
D*aquest voler 
e, per aquest, 
la racional 
del sensual
los trobadors escriuen, 
dolor mortal los toca;
part de l’arma no«ls broca;
aquests apetits viuen (LXXXVII, w. 41-44).
The sensual love that Ausias March attributes to the troubadours
corresponds to Andreas Capellanus’ description of physical beauty 
and its fulfilment. What Ausias March seeks is contrary to this 
love. As verses 4 and 7 of Poem XXIII indicate, it lies in the
lady. The rejection of the poetic fiction of the troubadours
127 128rests on a topos, also used by Jorge Manrique, which is 
found defined in the Complaint of Nature:
Can it be that thou dost not know how poets expose naked falsehood 
to their hearers with no protective clothing... or how they cloak 
the same falsehood with a pretense of credibility that, by means 
of images of objective things, they mold the souls of men on the 
anvil of dishonourable assent; or that in the shallow exterior of 
literature the poetic lyre sounds a false note, but within speaks 
to its hearers of the mystery of loftier understanding, so that, 
the waste of outer falsity cast aside, the reader finds, in secret 
within, the sweeter kernel of truth.
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Ausias March’s reproach to the troubadours is to have limited their
understanding of love to the contemplation of the cortex of the
image of the lady, without perceiving that the source of this
beauty lies reflected in the beauty of the soul. Indeed, his
reproach that they have "exceeded the truth" (verse 2) is based on
the fact that they have acted out of passion, which is how all
commentators interpret "per escalf" (verse 2). Passion arises out
of cupidity. Following the definition of Andreas Capellanus, it
is the result of "immoderate meditation upon the beauty of the
opposite sex, which causes one to wish above all things the 
..130embraces of the other . As I have tried to shew in Chapter III
this is corporeal imagination. Passion, therefore, occurs when
natural reason becomes excessively enthralled with exterior beauty 
131contemplated in imagination. To the contrary Ausias March
describes the spiritual beauty perceived in the lady, which tempers 
his love (verses 4, 21-22 and 39-40). As a result Ausias March’s 
love can be said to focus on the nucleus of beauty which is 
Sapientia Dei, that "sweeter kernel of truth" which Ausias March 
invites the reader to seek, as the real source of the lady’s beauty.
Ausias March’s love is, therefore, rooted in the sapiential 
notion of beauty, which, as I have shewn in Chapter III, is 
compatible with the Dionysian-Erigenian definition of beauty. His 
love must consequently be based on Charity which is contrary to 
the cupidity of Andreas Capellanus’ description of "courtly love". 
Although the rejection of cupidity, in the broad sense, is evident 
in Ausias March’s "cants Morals", inasmuch as these condemn the 
vices of his age, it reaches particular importance in Poems LXXV
and LXXIX.
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gods. 132
Poem LXXV is a little understood allegory of the pagan
As such, it is very reminiscent of the Metamorphosis
133Goliae Episcopi, with the remarkable difference that unlike the
latter it does not begin with a description of the concordia rerum 
of the gods’ pantheon, and does not explicitly lead to a condemnation
IO/
of the "cucullatus populus", although it is an allegory of
hypocrisy. Rather, it follows the direction of the short Latin 
lyric "Dant ad veris honorem / arida florem”, . since it also 
presents the theme of the conflict between Love and Reason. Ausias 
March’s poem is divided into three sections. The first two stanzas 
present the personal problem of the poet, which takes on a universal 
character from stanzas XII to XI, and in the tornada Ausias March 
returns to the topic of the poem. This sums up the problems
articulated in Poem LXXV:
y al savi hom 
la raho pert,
Senyal de be en tota dona cessa, 
com dins son cor vergonya no s’ajusta;
es vici qui»1 asusta:
qui 6s en ell princessa (LXXV, w. 89-92)
As verse 92 indicates the crux of this poem is the loss of reason
as the guiding factor in man’s love. This entails two kinds of
love, foolish love and pure love. In Poem LXXV, Ausias March
expresses the opposition between the two kinds of love by returning
to the tradition of the two Venuses. Diana, as the representative
of Sapientia or Pallas, is the Celestial Venus, while Venus
represents worldly love. This opposition is used not only to
describe the discord of the macrocosm, but also that of the
microcosm. Just as the gods and the planets were used in the 
136Middle Ages to represent elemental configurations, so do their
movements serve to illustrate the tension that exists between the
flesh and the spirit. 137 Ausias March uses this to define the
350
tension of his own love, whichj although rooted in a corporeal 
visiorij seeks a spiritual end. Thus, in the first stanza he presents 
himself as a unique case of the man who knows the extremes of
love’: 138
Qui es aquell 
com yo, qui sent
Qui sdn aquells 
e, juntes mans,
Yo so tot sol 
a no poder 
sino amar.
qui en Amor contemple 
sos delits on abasten? 
qui dole*amargor tasten.
l’adoren fora temple? 
a qui natura streny
his fer ne pus entendre 
e, volent-me’n defendre,
no«m vol seguir a res als fer null seny (IXXV, w. 1-8).
When Ausias March asks the rhetorical question in verses 3-4
concerning who experiences the bitter-sweetness of love, he is
referring to his contradictory experience of love in the search of 
139the melancholy mean, as in Problem XXX,_i. The answer to this
question is given in verses 5 to 8. The bitter-sweetness of
Ausias March’s love arises from the composite nature of the beauty
which he contemplates, and the limitations of his own duality. It 
140is an expression of laetus horror. Verse 4 uses an image which 
clearly defines the nature of his love. It is described as the
love of the devout man who adores Love outside of the temple. The 
image of the devout man is consistently used in Ausias March’s 
poetry as a symbol of the contemplative life (see Appendix II, E: 3), 
just as we have seen it used in Poem XXIII, verse 31 quoted above.
The image of the temple in Ausias March’s poetry can be considered 
to be a variation on the "hostal de Venus" (see Appendix II, A: 13), 
as the place in which the act of love is performed, and it is used 
in this sense in verse 71 of this poem. The particularity of 
Ausias March’s usage of this image in this instance is that he 
notes that the devotion to which he aspires is performed out of 
the "temple" (verse 4). The use of "temple" as a symbol recalls
141
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St. Paul’s metaphor, that the body is the temple of the Holy 
142 ,Spirit. This is consistent with the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian
aesthetic of beauty conceived of as the reflection of divine 
Goodness in particular corporeal objects, which we have seen used 
by Ausias March in Poem XXIII, as the premiss for his love of 
interior beauty as a reflection of the divine telos in Sapientia.
From verses 5-8 Ausias March applies this to his own
situation. His nature, which one can understand to signify his
143complexion, inclines him to the constant contemplation of this
beauty. As a result, verse 8 points out that even his senses are 
1 / /turned towards contemplation, his love is tempered. A
fundamental question is raised by verse 7: Ausias March loves,
and yet defends himself from love. This refers to the problem
enunciated by Hughes de Saint Victor’s "De Unione Corporis et
Spiritus" concerning the role of imagination in the fall of reason 
145to the attractions of the flesh. The tempered condition referred 
to in verse 8, indicates that the action of the will maintains the 
supremacy of reason rising towards intellectual contemplation. 
Hence, the entire poem is consistent with the final verse which 
proclaims that Reason is the "princess" in man, and that its 
supremacy must be maintained.
Stanzas III to XI illustrate the development of these 
ideas. The poet contrasts his love with the carnal yearnings of 
most men and women, which he calls "la pratica dels vius" in Poem 
XIII, verse 10. As he remarked in verse 5, Ausias March attributes
the chaste quality of his love to his complexion, or nature. This 
theme is picked up in verses 11 and 12 in which he claims that the 
powers of the Heavens have made his love, or will, capture his
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"seny”, which is understood as "intelligence” in verse 12. 146
Thus, Ausias March claims celestial influence on his nature 
147(verses 11-12) .
Si»m don solaj, 
si no*y acull 
les potestats 
e fer catiu 
No«m rept algu, 
segons cased
qui»n aquest mon
creeu ferm que yo »1 feny, 
Amor al delit pendre; 
del Cel han volgut vendre 
de mon voler, lo seny.
car tots veig solacar, 
sa qualitat requer;
honor vol he diner,
tinga's esment, ja td causa d’errar (LXXV, w. 9-16). 
The capture of "intelligence" by love returns to the theme of the 
"wise folly", as in Poem XVIII, verses 53-56, because Ausias March’s 
chaste love which is bent on intelligence of beauty, seems foolish 
to other men. Thus, in verse 13 he declares that none should 
challenge his statement, since every man seeks solace according to 
his quality. This quality refers to the tripartite division of the 
kinds of love, and the corresponding three kinds of lives that men 
can lead, which form an integral part of this poem, as we will see 
below. All of Ausias March’s delight is bent on Love (verses 9-10) , 
and this is contrasted with the fornicatio of mankind. Hence, in 
verses 13-16 he introduces the theme of cupidity, which is the 
general folly of mankind, that passes for wisdom in this world.
This is reduced to manifestations of pride and avarice (verse 15), 
which Ausias March rejects (verse 16).
Stanzas III to XI develop the theme of wordly cupidity as 
opposed to Ausias March’s Charity, by means of an allegorical 
discordia rerum which originates in man's fornicatio. It is, 
like the Complaint of Nature, a description of the world in 
discord: "En gran discort esta lo mon possat" (LXXV, v. 41).
The central figure of this allegory is the worldly Venus that lies
at the origin of fornicatio, and against which Ausias March opposes
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Pallas, the goddess of Wisdom. This leads to an opposition between 
the flesh and the spirit. Ausias March’s allegory then becomes a 
description of the various vices cultivated by man. In order to 
stress St. Augustine’s definition of cupidity as the love of a 
creature for its own sake, and not for God’s, Ausias March states 
that each of these vices is a god worshipped by the individual:
e dels desigs 
solempnes ddus 
e sobre tots 
car nostra earn 
Bacus, en part, 
Ceres, muller,
Lo temps dels deus se vol ara mostrar, 
car dintre si un deu cased vol fer, 
on corre lo voler, 
a tots veig adorar;
Venus es mils servida, 
no coneix altre deu. 
sa favor no l’ds greu; 
no n’es enfellonida (LXXV, vv. 17-24).
The gods are then used as symbols of the seven sins to which man
becomes a slave. Venus is, naturally, the symbol of lechery. The
mention of Bacchus and Ceres is based on a popular proverb which is
found in Bernardus Silvestris’ Commentary on the First Six Books of
the Aeneid. Bacchus and Ceres are not only the gods of harvest 
148and wine? they are by extension symbols of gastrimargia which
. 149Cassian subordinates to concupiscentia. Consequently, Silvestris
points out that heat and moisture produced by the digestion of food 
in the body excites lust, and thereby justifies the saying, ’’without 
Ceres and Bacchus, Venus becomes cold”: "Hec autem in corpore per
cibos acta libidinem movent. Ideo dictum est: ’sine Cerere et Bacco 
150friget Venus”. Venus’ other accomplice is Juno, the goddess of
wealth, 151 with whom she shares her influence. Juno combines with
Venus in order to hold sway over Mars and Saturn:
Juno del mon 
diu que deu ser 
Saturn e Mars 
a llur poder
te una gran partida;
pus colt* , al juhi seu.
no torben sa gran veu;
Juno y Venus dan mida (LXXV, vv. 25-28).
Thus, the power of Saturn and Mars is subordinated to the pursuit
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of wealth and carnal love, which are two fundamental aspects of
cupidity. As verse 15 quoted above states, they represent those 
who seek the worldly fruits of "honor” and "diner". The combination
of Saturn and Mars is also representative of "melancolia negra",
152or black bile, thereby fulfilling the warning issued in verses 
15 and 16: "qui*n aquest mon honor vol e diner, / tinga’s esment 
ja te causa d’errar" (LXXV, w. 15-16). Saturn and Mars represent 
the capital sins of ira and acedia which Casian associates with
"tristitia", or melancholy. 153 At the origin of this tradition,
as it was inherited by the Middle Ages, lies Servius’ Commentary 
154of Vergil’s Aeneidt
unde etiam mathematici fingunt, quod singulorum numinum potestatibus 
corpus et animus nostra connexa sunt ea ratione, quia cum descendunt 
animae trahunt secum torporem Saturni, Martis iracundiam, libidinem 
VeneriS, Mercurii lucri cupiditatem, Iovis regni desiderium: quae 
res faciunt perturbationem animabus, ne possint uti vigore suo et 
viribus propriis. 155 -
Their function in the development of the poetry of Ausias March is 
to describe the effects of melancholy on the perturbation of the 
soul. Thus, stanza VIII refers to the instability of Mars and 
Saturn and how they are subordinated to Juno and Venus:
Saturn e Mars 
mas per dos ddus 
guardant honor 
e per haver 
Mars a Saturn 
e l’obehir
per si no han potenca, 
sdn estrem favorits: 
a Venus sdn servits, 
a Juno»n reveren^a.
humilment hobeeix,
entr» ells molt se cambia (LXXV, w, 57-62)
"Melancolia negra" as a nefarious force that arises out of the 
instability of Mars and Saturn, or out of ira and acedia, affects
those men who seek the benefits of Venus and Juno. Since most men
seek these things, Ausias March can rightly contend that the world 
is pervaded by cupidity.
The full significance of these gods, within the entire
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framework of Ausias March’s poetry, becomes clear when they are 
contrasted with Pallas. They represent the two fundamental aspects 
of fornicatio as defined by St. Augustine. As stanza VI points out, 
Venus attracts the majority of men, and Juno’s following, though 
lesser than Venus’, is divided into two groups:
Venus del mon 
tot home bo 
e val-se poch 
Juno td gent 
prop de la mort,
se trau la fina lesta; 
en son ostal se resta,
qui no»y es albergat. 
en dues parts gitada:
cobejosa de viure;
altres, que veig, 
ffam» atenyents
de baix estat delliure, 
ab leig vici guanyada (LXXV, w. 42-48).
As verse 48 indicates, Venus and Juno are obviously associated with 
vice. Venus naturally represents concupiscentia, of which every
man is guilty. Juno, on the other hand, is associated with the
pursuit of ”fama" (verse 48), which is never free from the pursuit
of money. Thus, Juno and Venus represent two kinds of worldly love,
or lives, the life of bestiality or voluptuousness, and that of
mixed or active delights. This is confirmed by the introduction of
a comparison to Pallas whose estate Ausias March pities (verse 63),
This contrast is rendered particularly interesting by the fact that
the significance of Pallas in relation to the other two goddesses
is not developed. She becomes a foil for Diana, the goddess of
Chastity. Thus, Ausias March draws on another symbolic tradition,
which is also described in Bernardus Silvestris’ Commentary on the
First Six Books of the Aeneid. In his integumenturn of the Judgement
of Paris Silvestris associates the three goddesses to the three 
156kinds of lives: "Per Pallada theoricam vitam accipimus, per
157Iunonem actlvam, per Venerem voluptatem". The significance of
Ausias March’s allegory then becomes clear. It is a highly elegant
version of the three kinds of love that are so often described in
356
158his poetry',' Hence, his claim to exceptionality in love, like 
159that of Ficino and his followers, is based on the contention
that contemplative love, the love of Pallas, is practised by the
exceptional few.
The description of the dominion of Pallas is consequently 
based on Ausias March’s pessimistic vision of the fate of Wisdom 
in the saeculum. Pallas’ following consists of Mercury and Diana. 
Reference to Mercury is not based on his association to the seven
capital sins quoted above, but to a development of the traditional 
representation of the soul’s planetary journey, in which she 
receives wit from Mercury3^ Subsequently, Mercury becomes 
associated with eloquence in Martianus Capella’s The Marriage of 
Philology and Mercury, which remained one of the most influential
works in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Thus, Bernardus
Silvestris goes to great lengths to define the etymology of Mercury
with all its contradictions, but stresses that Mercury is, above 
161all else, eloquence. It is, however, in the Ovide Moralise that 
a more distinct picture of his symbolic function can be found. In
his Christian context Mercury is eloquence as the voice of the 
prophets, who despisedcovetousness and rose to the soaring heights 
of contemplation. Furthermore, he is closely associated with
Pallas, or Sapientia Dei;
Par Mercure est entendue eloquence, qui doit estre en chacun bon 
predicateur ainsi comme elle le fut es predicateurs anciens qui du 
monde deguerpirent et mepriserent la convoitise e se prindrent h 
voller en hault par contemplacion devote aux grans joyes de paradis. 
Et au regard de Pallas, qui signifie sapience, parce qu’elle hurta 
a l’uys de la maison d’Envie... Mais elle peut assez sonner et 
preschier aux oreilles des envieux, car a grant paine se veullent 
ilz jamais abstenir et repentir du desplaisir qu’il prennent des 
biens d’autruy ne de la joye qu’ilz recoivent de son dommaige. qui 
est contre le bien de charite, d’amour et de begnivolence. ^62
(underlining is mine).
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The thematic affinity between this passage of the Ovide Moralise 
and Ausias March’s poem is obvious. In both,Mercury and Pallas
serve as the downtrodden representatives of Charity fighting the 
163cupidity of man. Thus, in relation to fornicatio, understood
in
of
en
the restricted sense, Diana,
chastity, or in the words of 
purtd et nettete de vie",^^^
who is the traditional representative
the Ovide Moralise: ”la lune clere
also constitutes a desirable virtue.
Yet, Ausias March notes that although she is praised, nobody cares
to respect her in practice:
Mercurius e
desfalagant 
Diana es de
mas en lo mon 
ver, llur gran 
e totes gens 
colta no es, 
sino hun tro^
Pal*las veu no*ls cal, 
l’orella del hoent; 
favor menys potent;
Deu los ha dat cabal: 
nom pel mon es preycat, 
d’aquestes manen festa: 
car de cascu no*ls resta 
de cam dins dens tarucat (LXXV, w. 31-40).
Thus, Mercury and Pallas, as Wisdom and the eloquence of the prophets,
are gods that protect Chastity, or "vergonya" (verses 75 and 90) ,
which represents a fundamental aspect of the Christian ideal of
Charity.
From this premiss, Ausias March inveighs against the
hypocrisy of his fellow Christians. Although men voice praises of
these Christian virtues and preach their necessity (verses 37-38),
Diana, or the pure and honest Christian life is not practiced
(verse 39). This hypocrisy is vividly depicted in verse 40, the 
X65sense of which has eluded critics. It is seemingly a proverbial
phrase, and recalls in another context, Bertran de Born’s introduction
to his accusation of the lady’s infidelity: ”Je dois porter la 
* > 166langue la ou la dent me fait mal”. The sense of verse 40 in 
Poem LXXV is that the double standard of men who praise, and yet
do not emulate these virtues, leaves a sore point in their
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conscience; thus, the tongue, or flesh, places itself on the tooth 
that hurts, as a palliative. Another possible, and simpler, 
explanation is that as man speaks through his teeth uttering 
praises of Diana, there remains locked in the teeth the carnal
intention which determines the real effects, or practice, of these
statements. Both of these explanations convey the idea that men do 
not try to lead virtuous lives. In verses 69 and 70, Ausias March 
states that prayers are addressed to Diana, but the will is directed 
to Venus. This seems to repeat the metaphorical implications of
verse 40:
Los publichs prechs s’endrecen a Diana,
la voluntat es de Venus entrega (LXXV, w. 69-70).
In the following stanza Ausias March brings together the various 
strands of his allegory by returning specifically to the theme of 
the conflict between Love and Reason, or cupidity and Charity.
Venus, or the voluptuous life, is seen as the victor, since, by 
submitting to her, men relinquish their reason. Ausias March is
careful to point out that the lovers voluntarily give their reason
to Venus, and not that Venus takes it. Hence, Ausias March’s 
statement does not involve astrological determinism, but a 
misguided act of free-will on the part of the lovers who chose to
follow Venus:
Aquelles gents ab la pensa molt vana 
que ab raho james han pau ne brega, 
per llur cor flach, de vergonya fan plega, 
qui*lls met un fre donant-los vida Sana; 
e si lo giny de Venus romp tai fre,
saben-li grat 
qu* en son servir 
fent li present
com axi *s vehen soltes,
no«s mostren ser enboltes,
del millor de llur bd (LXXV, w. 73-80)
The loss of the best in them is the loss of reason. It is also the
loss of pudency which results from the fall of reason to the flesh
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much as Hughes de Saint Victor’s ”De Unione Corporis et Spiritus"
Ausias March, as I will demonstrate below.
In the last stanza Ausias March turns to an image that 
is also found in Alain de Lille’s Complaint of Nature. Diana, who 
represents the virtues of Charity, is trampled by Venus and her 
followers, the vices of lechery, that lead to "melancolia negra"
which wavers between acedia and ira:
En lo comen^, 
mas si lo vel 
Venus colents, 
entre llurs peus
por e Diana »ls te, 
d’ignorants les ha toltes,
Marg e Saturn a voltes,
Diana va e ve (LXXV, w. 81-84)
In the Complaint of Nature Reason is also trampled by Vice, and
Alain de Lille’s image bears strong reminiscences of Hughes de
Saint Victor’s epistemology:
Thus the reason of man, trampled by covetousness, serves the flesh 
and like a handmaid is compelled to wait upon it. Thus the eye of 
the heart sickens blind from mist, and suffers its eclipse, to 
lead an inactive life in solitude. Thus the shadow of the flesh 
basely covers the splendour of human riches and the glory of the 
mind is made most unglorious.
The effects of the "fleshly mist", to which Ausias March refers in 
Poem XCII, verse 38, as "hull ab gota serena", is the concern of 
this poem. It is the "fleshly mist" that covers man’s natural 
reason and causes him to be subject to "melancolia negra" because 
it inclines him to all manner of cupidity.
Poem LXXV is a condemnation of the two kinds of wordly
love, bestial and mixed, which are governed by the wordly Venus. 
Hence, it denies, the merit of any love that leads to "melancolia 
negra". It must be noted, however, that melancholy arising from 
the loss of reason and the pursuit of fornicatio, which Andreas
Capellanus presents as the only forms of love found in the secular
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context, is considerably different from melancholy that arises out
of the experience of laetus horror. The evangelical sensibility
which pervades Poem LXXV represents a fundamental point of divergence
from Capellanus* monastic sensibility. Ausias March, like Ficino,
also condemns that love which leads to "melancolia negra", but not
that love which is guided by reason and seeks in the contemplation 
169of beauty the light of right reason, or Sapientia Dei. As long 
as reason maintains the reins of the soul’s flights, the melancholy 
that results from the laetus horror experienced by Ausias March is 
an incentive to contemplative love which derives from the pseudo- 
Dionysian-Erigenian concept of secular beauty. This clearly 
differs from the condemnation of secular love formulated by 
Andreas Capellanus, which presupposes the loss of reason. Ausias 
March, who still practices worldly love in contemplation, or as 
he states "fora temple", sees a reflection of divine goodness in 
the secular beauty which he seeks to transcend. Hence, Ausias
March aspires to use reason to control his senses. This entails 
tension between the desire to love and the effort to keep the 
rational soul from being drawn excessively towards the corruption 
of the flesh in the movement of imagination. This problem, which 
Ausias March recognizes as a reality which he experiences, is 
perennial in all the Neoplatonizing writers from Hughes de Saint
Victor onwards and Ficino and his followers. This is what
Castiglione, Hebreo and Ficino refer to as the "heroic love" of 
the few which can only be attained by the rational control of 
imagination.^70 As we shall se below, the cult of contemplative 
love leads to "melancolia generosa", as in Poem LXVI, and in turn
entails illumination as in Poem XVIII
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The love of Ausias March is, therefore, based on the 
premiss that it is essentially elitist. The introspective individual 
is made outstanding by his melancholy. It is, as in Castiglione,
love that is based on virtue and the control of reason, which is
cultivated by able-bodied men, not hypocritically by "L’inperfet
hom” (LXXV, v. 65), or the old men from whom "la vida»s devia”
(LXXV, v. 66). It is "angelical" or "heroic" love. Hence, it is
concerned with the tension that exists in the movement of imagination
between the body and the soul, as we have seen in Chapter III.
Such a love, although it is based on a previous cultural tradition,
is evidently not the "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus, nor is
it, as Ausias March notes, the love of the troubadours. It is a
love that transcends "la pratica dels vius" (XIII, v. 10). The
"heroic" implications of this conception of love is evident. It
is implicitly based on the idealization of past lovers, which, as I
noted in the analysis of Poem IX in Chapter III, includes the
literary imagination of mythological figures such as, Pyramus and 
171Thisbe.
The "heroic" conception that underlies Ausias March’s
theory of love is evinced in Poem LXXIX. Ausias March appeals to 
the memory of those true lovers of bygone days who died of chaste
love which is symbolized by a golden arrow:
0 vos, mesquins 
del colp d’Amor 
e tots aquells 
han be amat, 
Veniu plorant, 
ubers los pits 
com fon plagat 
ab quh Amor
qui sots terra jaheu 
ab lo cors sangonent, 
qui ab cor molt ardent 
prech-vos no»us oblideu.
ab cabells escampats, 
per mostrar vostre cor 
ab la sageta d’or
plaga»ls enamorats (LXXIX, w. 1-8).
This reference to the exemplariness of past lovers involves an 
allusion to past literary heroes. This is an example of imagination
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as the creative fancy of the poet juxtaposing the world as it is,
to the world as it should be according to romance. Consequently,
it is only natural that one should turn to Ovid’s Metamorphoses,
in order to find the models of Ausias March’s ideal, for it is
from this tradition that references to Pyramus and Thisbe undoubtedly 
172proceed. The process of assimilation is fairly complex, for
the Valencian poet may also have been inspired by part of Guiraut
de Calanson’s poem: "Celeis cui am de cor e de saber”. Martin
de Riquer has remarked that Calanson’s allegory is, "mig ovidiana,
mig estil Roman de la rose".1^ This is the greatest concession
made to the Ovidian influence in Ausias March’s poetry. Pag^s,
Bohigas, and Rafael Ferreres have used possible influence of
Calanson in order to substantiate the thesis that Ausias March is 
175a belated troubadour. Yet, they do not seem to have noticed the 
vast discrepancies between Calanson’s allegory and that of Ausias
March.
Guiraut de Calanson’s poem is exceptional for having been
the first to use an allegory of Love’s power concerning three 
176arrows, as opposed to the traditional two. Marc-Rene Jung has 
177pointed out that this poem is a static descriptive allegory, and
that the second stanza, which uses the image of the three arrows, 
178describes the process of innamoramento. This is also the opinion
held by the troubadour Guiraut Riquier in his commentary on 
179Calanson’s allegory. In his poem Calanson presents a tripartite 
division of love. One must note that in Calanson’s poem this
division is not related to the nature of the arrows which is
developed in the allegory. Furthermore, this poem does not deal 
with the exposition of an ideal kind of love, like that of Ausias
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March, but with ”fin’ amors”, which in this instance is understood 
180as carnal love. The use of the arrows sent by the god, Amor,
who is represented in the Provencal tradition as a woman, is never
related to the subject of chaste-love in Calanson’s allegory.
M.-R. Jung clearly sums up the content of this allegory:
Apr^s les fleches, les portes et les degrds, nous avons une nouvelle 
division de 1’amour, cette fois en trois, A 1’amour charnel (le 
"menor tertz d’Amor") s’ajoute soit 1’amour naturel, done 1’amour 
des parents, soit 1’amitiS?: les termes qui caract^risent ce "second 
tiers" ne sont pas assez explicites pour que la question soit 
tranchee. Le degre le plus eleve, enfin, est represente par l1amour 
de Dieu. Mais Guiraut de Calanson n’insiste pas sur les deux 
derniers "tiers". Le sujet de la chanson est bel et bien le 
"moindre" des trois amours. Qu’on veuille l’appeler "fin* amors" 
ou amour courtois - il s’agit de l1 amour charnel. •I'&l
The tripartite division of the types of love in Calanson’s poem is
somewhat similar to that of Ausias March, but it is not exactly the
same. It is a variation of this topic in mediaeval literature.
Moreover, it is not explicitly defined, even though it may derive 
182from a common source. finally, one notices that the division
of love in Calanson’s poem is purely accessory, whereas it is 
central to all of Ausias March’s poetry, as in Poem LXXV above.
The context in which Guiraut de Calanson presents the
allegory of the arrows is vastly different from that of Ausias 
March, who is concerned with the unrequited nature of intellectual 
love, or Charity. The second stanza of Calanson’s poem describes
Love’s effects:
Tant es subtils qu’om non la pot vezer,
e corr tan tost que res no-il pot fugir,
e fer tan dreg que res no-il pot gandir
ab dart d’acier, d’on fai colp de plazer,
on non ten pro ausbercs forts ni espes,
si lansa dreit; e pois trai demanes
sajetas d’aur ab son arc estezat;
pois lans’un dart de plom gent afilat (w. 9-15).
Love uses three kinds of arrows on the lover to achieve his end in
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the process of innamoramento. The iron arrow introduces pleasure, 
or desire, of love, those of gold bring hope and delight, and that 
of lead signifies the end of love.^^ As M.-R. Jung has explained, 
this is an allegory describing the successive states undergone by
the lover.184
The concept of succession is the single most important
relation with Ausias March’s use of the allegory of the arrows in
Poem LXXIX. When examined closely this link is tenuous, because
the type of succession and its implications are radically different 
185from that of Calanson. In the latter’s poem a feminine figure
first throws an iron arrow (verse 12), then several golden ones, 
and finally, a leaden one. In Poem LXXIX, Ausias March claims 
that the male figure of Love has used three kinds of arrows in 
three different ages. In antiquity Love used golden arrows, then, 
when he had none of these left, he used silver ones, and finally, 
by Ausias March's time Love had no silver arrows left and began to 
use leaden ones. Yet, Love has found one last golden arrow in his 
quiver and has used it on the poet. Ausias March's problem of 
unrequited love arises from this exceptional situation, for his 
beloved is only struck by a leaden arrow, and because she is
inclined to concupiscent love, she does not care for his chaste
love.
In Ausias March’s Poem LXXIX the allegory of the arrows 
refers only indirectly to the innamoramento. Each arrow imparts a 
type of love, but it does not involve a process in the individual 
development of love. The quality of the arrows only determines 
that of the lovers in three eras. Unlike Calanson’s imagery which
describes the power and the court of Love, and is, therefore,
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basically objective,^^^ the allegory in Ausias March describes his 
own situation as an example of the treachery and failings of Love. 
As in Poem LXXV, this allegory serves to comment on the moral 
decadence of his age, which is contrasted with his "heroic” ideal. 
Hence, the relation between Calanson’s allegory and Ausias March’s 
rests on two points; that Love sends a succession of three arrows, 
and that the poet introduces a tripartite division of the types of 
love. In the first point of relation one finds that the three 
arrows come in a different order and that they have radically 
different implications. In the second point of relation, Calanson 
does not develop his tripartite division fully; this is only 
elaborated upon by his commentator, Guiraut Riquier, again, under 
the influence of a possible common source. The key difference is 
that in Calanson the allegory of the three arrows is absolutely 
distinct from the tripartite theory of love, whereas they are 
perfectly integrated in Ausias March’s poem, exemplifying and 
furthering this constant of the Valencian’s poetry.
Two separate images from Book I of the Metamorphoses 
provide Ausias March with the themes of temporal succession, and 
the opposition between the lover and the beloved resulting from
the effects of Love’s arrows. The first derives from Ovid’s
description of the fall of man from the Golden Age, to the silver, 
bronze and iron ages. The second refers to Apollo’s unrequited 
love for Daphne.
As we have seen above Ausias March opens Poem LXXIX with
an invocation to those lovers who died from the effects of Love’s
golden arrows (w. 1-8). By so doing, he identifies his own
plight with that of heroic ancient lovers. From verses 17-27 Ausias
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March clarifies this reference. Arrows of gold kill the lover, who 
really feels all the effects of Love’s power. Those of silver only 
wound him, and the leaden ones hardly draw blood. Beginning with 
the golden arrows the description of Love’s power follows:
De flexes tals 
ja no te pus 
Ab les d’argent 
mas los plagats,
Ab les de plom 
e son poder
molts passats foren morts; 
que fer guerra mortal, 
sol basta fer senyal, 
de morir sdn estorts.
sdn huy tot sos deports,
no bast* a traure sanch (LXXIX, w. 21-26).
True love is, therefore, induced by golden arrows. At verses 17-18, 
Ausias March states that in the beginning of times Love threw only 
golden arrows:
En aquells temps 
les flexes d’or
que primer d’aquest fon,
Amor totes lan^a (LXXIX, vv. 17-18).
This reference to temporal sequence establishes a correlation 
between true love and antiquity. Thus, Ausias March develops his 
allegory according to a temporal succession describing the 
progressive corruption of man, who has ceased to seek true virtue
in love.
As verses 25 and 26 indicate, Ausias March contends that 
in his times man is incapable of true love, and only he is endowed 
with this virtuous capacity, which we have seen him define in Poem
LXXV as Augustinian Charity. In the temporal succession established 
by Ovid one finds a similar topos concerning the theme of the return 
to the Golden Age in which virtue reigned. The quality of the metal 
by which an age is described in Ovid also refers to the moral 
quality of the men who lived in that era. Thus, Ovid groups the 
different types of men who made up the various ages by referring 
to races of men, and the metal is used as an adjective describing
the moral condition of each race:
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Sub love raundus erat, subiit argentea proles.
Tertia post illam successit aena proles (I, w. 114 and 125) 
The Ovide Moralise develops the moral implications of these divisions 
even more clearly:
Lors li etait le monde dorez
Non pas pour ce que colorez
Fust tous de doree color,
Maes, si com mains valent de l’or
Tuit autre metal qui sont ores,
Valoient miex les gents de lores (I, w. 815-820).
In the context of Poem LXXIX Ausias March assimilates Ovid’s
description of man’s progressive decadence in order to illustrate
man’s fall into cupidity. The loss of virtue is also a central
concern of Ovid’s description. A comparison between the description
of the Golden Age and that of Iron evinces this point. In the age
of gold men were virtuous:
Aurea prima sata est aetas, quae vindice nullo,
sponte sua, sine lege fidem rectumque colebat (I, w. 89-90).
The age of Iron is base. Unlike the men of the Golden Age, who
kept faith, the men of the Iron Age are ruled by vice and greed:
protinus inrupit venae peioris in aevum 
omne nefas: fugere pudor verumque fidesque; 
in quorum subiere locum fraudesque dolusque
insidiaeque et vis et amor sceleratus habendi (I, w. 128-131). 
The age of iron, as described by Ovid, is corrupted by the lack of 
pudency and the love of gain. To a Christian, such as Ausias March, 
this description corresponds to the reign of fornicatio and cupidity 
which he described in Poem LXXV. Hence, in Poem LXXIX, the 
progression in the succession of ages, represented by the allegory 
of the arrows, is a movement away from truth and purity that 
constitute Charity.
A problem in this comparison arises in that Ausias March
describes the decadence of man in three stages: gold, silver and
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lead, whereas Ovid uses four metals to describe this evolution:
gold, silver, bronze and iron. Yet, in the Metamorphoses, Ovid
does not describe the age of bronze elaborately. It is dispatched
in a mere two verses, and only serves as a transfer from the age
of silver to that of iron. The ages of bronze and iron are,
187therefore, dealt as one. As such, only three ages are actually 
described in Ovid, and it is not surprising that Ausias March 
should have chosen to describe only three ages.
In the allegory of the arrows was it is manipulated by 
Ausias March, the ages of bronze and iron are represented by 
that of lead. The use of lead takes on a new aspect when the 
allegory of the three arrows, which is originally used objectively, 
becomes the subjective problem of the poet. Thus, the implications 
of this succession comes to become subordinated to an opposition 
which is not present in Calanson’s allegory. Ausias March is 
wounded by a leaden arrow, and aspires to emulate Golden Age 
virtue, which we_have seen above, can be considered Augustinian 
Charity. His lady is hit (only) by a leaden arrow, and is not 
interested in the poet’s intellectual love. She, therefore, shuns 
him. Significantly, the leaden arrow causes the lady to flee her 
lover, who is hit by a golden arrow. The quality of the arrows 
to have opposite properties and cause the lover to feel true love 
for the lady who rejects his love, returns to the traditional 
opposition of wills caused by an arrow of gold and one of lead, 
found in Ovid’s metamorphosis of Daphne, and particularly as it 
is interpreted in the Ovide Moralise.
In his subjective interpretation of the allegory Ausias 
March minimizes the importance of silver arrows. As we have seen
369
in Poem LXXV, mixed love, or the active life, is in fact very closely 
associated with the voluptuous life, or as he indicates, Venus 
understood to be fornicatio ?in the broad sense?rules this world. 
Hence, the silver arrows which are an intermediary between bestial
and divine love are a variation on the leaden arrows. The crux of
his problem in Poem LXXIX is the opposition between carnal and 
chaste love. Already in verses 13-14 the poet preludes this 
conflict, before explaining the symbolic value of the metals as 
representing the quality of love imparted by the arrows:
D’or e de plom 
e d’un metall 
cascu d’aquests
aquestes flexes sdn, 
que»s anomen* argent;
dona son sentiment,
segons que d’ells different«a»n lo mdn (LXXIX, w. 13-16)
As in Poem LXXV Ausias March’s tripartite division of love in Poem
LXXIX corresponds to the scale of values inferred in the allegory.
According to Ausias March, love has at least three forms, carnal,
188human or mixed, and honest or angelical. The angelical love of
Ausias March, like Castiglione’s, is not divine love excluding
secular beauty, but the love of the intellect or soul perceived in
the corporeal beauty of a person of the other sex, which reflects 
189divine Goodness. Thus, from verses 33 to 40 Ausias March creates
an opposition between his ideal conception of love and the baseness
of the one with which he is confronted on earth.
This conflict is attributed to Love’s treachery, as one
notes in verses 27 to 32. From verses 34 and 35 one also finds
that this opposition is not only between the poet and his beloved,
but also between the poet and Love. In the Ovide Moralise the war
between Apollo and Cupid, from which the image of the two arrows
which cause the metamorphosis of Daphne originates, is understood 
190to be a confrontation between ’’bone amours ou sapience”. The
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solution given to this conflict by the author of the Ovide Moralise 
191is, "en Dieu ces deux qualites se trouvent unies". The problem
faced by Ausias March is essentially the same, as is his solution.
Although he does not immediately turn his love strictly to God in 
192an act of asceticism, he does seek to find love in the divine
part of man, the soul. 193 As a divine object the soul is immaterial
and acts as an intermediary between the intelligible and material 
194worlds. It can, therefore, be a source of felicity. The
tornada of Poem LXXIX makes this the object of Ausias March’s love, 
in which the intellect opposes carnal love:
0 foil Amor, 
sobre loch fals 
per po repbs 
car si no »1 ver
qui vostre delit vol, 
ha son contentament;
no te«n 1’enteniment,
1’enteniment no col (LXXIX, w. 41-44).
"Poll Amor" is essentially the carnal love induced by the leaden
arrow, which has no virtuous quality. It is inconstant, unlike
Ausias March’s virtuous love which places its affection in the 
195source of particular beauty, divine Goodness. However, as
Hughes de Saint Victor and M. Ficino have indicated, all love that
is based on beauty perceived in imagination will eventually waver
between the flesh and the soul, and can only be a source of torment 
196since the object of this love is corporeal. This is an ineluctable 
consequence of the "descensus ad inferos". "Foil Amor" is the 
earthly love that has wounded the poet, and caused his torment.
It is this love that has caused his laetus horror by revealing the 
beauty of divine Goodness which is the real end, but it is also 
his demise, since love originates in the sense of sight and can 
either rise to the contemplative delights found in Charity, or fall 
to the lust of the senses in cupidity. It is, therefore, not the
delight of corporeal beauty which is associated with "Foil Amor"
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that Ausias March seeks, but the delight of the intellect (verse 44)
In Poem LXXIX Ausias March returns to the sapiential
context of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, as it was understood by the 
197Chartrians. The Ovidian image of Cupid’s arrows and the topos
of the ages of man are used in the light of the integumenta of the 
Ovide Moralise, in order to represent a conflict between worldly
love and intellectual love, that is, between the manifestations
of cupidity and Charity. Certain aspects of the Latin original 
are, therefore, lost, such as Apollo’s lust for Daphne. The 
modifications are conditioned by the authorial intention, which
is primarily moral. As in Poem XXIII, this intention is a
rejection of ’’courtly love” as it is depicted by writers such as
Andreas Capellanus. It is in this framework that the possible
influence of Guiraut de Calanson’s allegory on Ausias March must
be understood. Although Ausias March may have had Calanson’s
allegory in mind, the use he makes of the image is so vastly 
198different that the predominant influence returns to Ovid.
Ausias March raises the allegory of the arrows to a 
metaphysical level. It does not serve to describe the court and 
power of Love, but the inner problems that beset the Christian 
man seeking to recover from the "descensus ad inferos". The poem 
consists of five parts: an invocation to the virtuous ancients,
the presentation of a tripartite theory of love, the explanation 
of the significance of the arrows as a temporal succession, an 
exposition of the poet’s problem caused by Love’s treachery, and 
finally, a tornada which sums up the poet’s moral and metaphysical 
anguish. Poem LXXIX, like LXXV, is concerned with the opposition 
between Charity and cupidity. The allegory of Love’s feats is,
372
therefore, relegated to the background, and the central protagonist 
is the poet. His anguish is the subject of this poem. Love has 
ceased to inspire virtue in all but the poet. The suffering that 
arises out of this unrequited love, which is based on the 
contemplation of a corporeal object, keeps the poet frcm attaining 
the state of bliss that is found only in the direct contemplation
of God’s Goodness.
Ovid’s images of the decline of man and the unrequited 
love of Apollo, who incarnates Sapientia, are subordinated to the 
human dimension of Ausias March’s problems. The invocation to 
the ancient ’’heroic” lovers, with whom the poet identifies, refers 
to the ideal world of Ovid’s lovers, understood in the integumenta
of their roles in the Ovide Moralise. In his use of these sources
Ausias March expresses an interior need, and reinterprets these 
images within the limits of his circumstance. The details of
these images cease to interest him. What concerns Ausias March
is their moral significance in the contrast of cupidity and Charity.
Hence, his suffering is engendered by the desire to love in the
light of Sapientia, or right reason, within a world which is fraught
with cupidity. As we have seen in Chapter III and in the analysis
of Poem XXIII, Ausias March’s love is animated by a profound
consciousness of the implantations of grace in nature. It is
moved by an evangelical sensibility that is radically different
from that of an Andreas Capellanus. Therein lies the justification
for his frequent claim to exceptionality in love. His ’’heroic"
199love, based on Christian values, is unrequited in this world.
This inevitably leads him to seek to renounce the world which he
loves, knowing that the source of the beauty he contemplates lies
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beyond and that it can only be attained by a recovery from the 
"descensus ad inferos’’.^^
As I have pointed out above, and in particular in Chapter
III, the tension that pervades Ausias March’s poetry is the product
of the movement of imagination, which can deceive reason into
becoming excessively enamoured of a corporeal object. Hence, the
bitter-sweetness of Ausias March’s erotic experience is closely
associated with his consciousness of the composite nature of the
beauty that he contemplates. This is accentuated by the limitations
of his own duality which he attempts to transcend. Thus, although
imagination can lead the poet to contemplate the reflection of the
face of God, it can also sink to the torments of "melancolia negra".
These extremes of love find their expression in Ausias March’s use
of Hughes de Saint Victor’s image of the shirt of Nessus in the
"De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", which is also used by Florentine
Neoplatonists. This text is quoted and analysed in notes 26 and
31 of Chapter III, but it is of such importance that I will summarize
its contents in order to stress the distance that separates Ausias
March’s "fin’ amors" as an introspective love, from Andreas 
201Capellanus’ "amour courtois". Extensive references to imagination,
and an analogous usage of Hughes de Saint Victor’s image of the
shirt of Nessus, are present in Ausias March’s poetry. I would
suggest that owing to the popularity of Hughes de Saint Victor 
202among Franciscans, such as Lull, and translations, such as,
Antoni Canals* De arra de anima,as Well as the presence of 
other images in Ausias March’s works proceeding from the Victorine 
mystic’s writings (see Appendix II), Ausias March could well have 
had a first-hand knowledge of the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus".
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Hughes de Saint Victor’s description of the fluctuation
of reason is of particular interest because it identifies the
problems inherent in the vision of Beauty in ’’heroic”, or "angelical" 
204love. He explains that imaginations are conceived when the form 
of objects enters the eye of the beholder and reaches the cell of 
phantasy. These imaginations are corporeal and common to men and 
animals. In men, however, they are spiritualized by reason and 
reach the very substance of the rational soul. If these imaginations 
are contemplated in order to inform the intellect, they are easily 
shaken off, because such a contemplation is disinterested. However, 
if reason becomes enamoured of these imaginations they cling to it 
like a second skin or garment. I translate Hughes de Saint Victor’s 
description verbatim:
... when imagination has ascended to reason, like a shadow coming 
into light, and coming upon light suddenly when it reaches it, it 
is made manifest and therefore circumscribed, and sometimes when 
it comes upon it, it veils reason, obscures it, envelopes it and 
hides it. And if, indeed, reason herself, by contemplation alone 
puts it on, as though it were a vestment, then imagination is 
outside reason and around it, so that it may be easily cast off 
and stripped. If, then, through delight imagination still clings 
to reason, the imagination herself becomes like a skin on it to 
which reason clings with love, in such a way that it cannot be 
cast off without grief or pain (underlining is mine).
As Hughes de Saint Victor indicates the origin of this "enamourment" 
is in vision, or contemplation. The binding of reason by the 
imagination that drags it down to the senses entails a loss of
will and the creation of a habit as a way of life, by which the
soul forgets its divine destiny. This is the negative effect of 
206Neo-platonic "sensualitas" acknowledged by Ficino. The relation
of the negative effects of the movement of imagination to Andreas
Capellanus’ definition of love as, "passio innata procedens ex 
207visione et immoderata cogitatione formae alterius sexus", with
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its emphasis on "excessive meditation derived from sight” is self- 
208evident. However, it must be remembered that Capellanus focuses 
only on the negative aspects of imagination, as he does in the 
case of melancholy, whereas the concept of imagination as also 
being divine illumination, an "alta fantasia", is explicit in the 
entire opuscule of Hughes de Saint Victor.
In the above quotation (205), the imagery that Hughes de 
Saint Victor uses to describe the effects of imagination harks back 
to the topos of the shirt of Nessus. Indeed, the reference to
imagination as a garment that becomes like a skin on the wearer,
and cannot be torn off without causing great pain, recalls Ovid’s 
209metamorphosis of Hercules. Ovid’s account begins when Hercules
is faced with the problem of crossing the Euenus with his weapons 
and his bride, Deianira. As a friend, the centaur Nessus offers 
to help him by carrying Deianira on his back while Hercules swims 
with his weapons. When the latter reaches the other side he sees
Nessus about to rape Deianira. He therefore kills Nessus with an
arrow dipped in the Lernean Hydra’s blood. The dying centaur 
. 210gives his blood-soaked tunic to Deianira assuring her that it
has the power to revive the waning love of whoever wears it.
Years later, Rumour makes Deianira believe that her husband is now 
211in love with Iole. In order to regain Hercules’ love, she sends
him Nessus* shirt. As he wishes to please his wife, Hercules puts 
on the garment. While he is making the necessary sacrifices to 
the gods to celebrate his victory in Oechalia, the poison of the 
Lernean Hydra is released by the heat of the sacramental pyre and 
steals into his body. Ovid then describes the agony. The Theban
hero is unable to take off the tunic which roots itself into the
flesh:
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nec mora, letiferam conatur scindere vestem: 
qua trahitur, trahit ilia cutem, foedumque relatu, 
aut haeret membris frustra temptata revelli, 
aut laceros artus et grandia detegit ossa
(IX, w. 166-169).
In his use of this image Hughes de Saint Victor creates an 
equivalence between the "habit”, as a tunic worn by the lover, and 
the "habit" as a mental constitution that becomes ingrained in 
the lover’s soul.
It is in this tradition that Ausias March uses this image
in all his poetry, and, in particular, in the tornada of Poem
LXXVII, which was to be one of his most influential images in 
213. Spanish Golden Age poetry. Here too the lover has easily put
on a garment which now tightens upon him:
Amor, Amor, 
de vostre drap, 
en lo vestir, 
e fort estret,
un abit m’e tallat
vestint-me 1*espirit;
ample molt l’e sentit, 
quant sobre mi »s posat
(LXXVII, vv. 25-28).
In the previous stanzas one learns that this has lead to great
torment and suffering, which will culminate in the lover’s death.
This plight is described in verses 10 and 15: "d’aquell qui jau
en turment i dolor", and "d’Amor n*om clam, si be*m port* a
morir". In Poem CXXI the image of the shirt of Nessus, as established 
by Ausias March In Poem LXXVII, is described a deceitful friend:
Solen pensar 
per a jaquir 
si creu no sab
de fer-hi aparell
tan singular amich; 
que li sia»nemich
(CXXI, w. 33-35).
On the basis of the contents of Poems LXXVII and CXXI one could
reasonably establish a paradigm comparing Ausias March’s use of
21Athis image with Ovid’s in the Metamorphoses and the Ovide Moralise. 
Although the image of the shirt of Nessus as it was known in the 
Middle Ages undoubtedly originates in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the use
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that Ausias March makes of this image is primarily based on the
tradition of Hughes de Saint Victor. For both the French mystic
and the Valencian poet, it serves to express primarily the difficulty
of transcending a habit which originates in contemplative delight 
and inclines towards sensuality. Thus, Ausias March can say in
Poem CXXX:
No ha temptat 
qui facilment 
puix al vestir 
al despullar,
de perdre habit veil
se pensa que*s fara; 
plaentment lo troba,
tai pensa trob aquell
(CXXI, vv. 29-32).
Yet, many critics, basing their judgement on the research of Pages,
215attribute this image strictly to an imitation of Oton de Granson.
In view of other points at which we have seen that Ausias March is
undoubtedly familiar with the work of Oton de Granson, there is no 
reason to deny that some aspects of this image in Ausias March’s 
poetry may well have been affected by the French poet. However, 
although this influence may be present, it is strongly affected 
and modified by the implications of Hughes de Saint Victor’s imagery, 
which is not present in Oton de Granson’s original image. Furthermore,
these critics overlook Ausias March’s use of the shirt of Nessus
topos, as it is found in a popular Spanish proverb, in Poem CVIII 
(see Appendix II : Proverbial Phrases). A close scrutiny of the 
tradition of Oton de Granson’s image of the melancholy lover’s 
black garment will reveal that although both may proceed from 
Hughes de Saint Victor, Ausias March retains the introspective
implications, whereas Oton de Granson and his Spanish successors
do not.
Ausias March goes beyond the strictly ludic implications 
of Oton de Granson’s image. The gulf that separates the two uses
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of this topos should illustrate the difference between Ausias
March’s "fin* amours" and "courtly love" as they are defined by
Douglas Kelly. Unlike Oton de Granson, and especially his
Castilian fifteenth-century imitators, Ausias March is conscious
of the moral implications of this image as a metaphor of the role
played by imagination as a source of tension between the body and
the soul, as are his successors, Garcilaso and the Petrarquistas.
The full significance of Ausias March’s image is clear when it is
read in the light of the "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus".
References to imagination and phantasy in other poems, as studied
in Chapter III, enable one to understand that the "hbit" in Poem
LXXVII, and elsewhere (see Appendix'll, A : 17), is the product of
imagination that first loosely clothes the rational soul in
contemplation, then overpowers the lover’s reason, and binds it 
216to the flesh. As in Hughes de Saint Victor,the image of the 
garment consistently represents the loss of will and reason: "Tot 
nuu me trob, vestit de grossa manta, / ma voluntat Amor 
la te»n penyora" (LXIV, w. 21-22). Yet, Ausias March also remarks 
that imagination is neither good nor bad: "Car lo delit e la 
dolor / que porten per los senys forans / e imaginacions grans / d’on 
mal e be s’en consegueix" (CXXVIII, vv. 242-245). Thus, the garment 
image is used to represent a point at which reason becomes excessively 
enamoured of corporeal imagination, and the poet attempts to recover
from his soul’s fallen state.
This condition, which is described in verses 29 to 32 of
Poem CXXI, quoted above, can be further illustrated in relation to 
the aesthetic principle that determines the nature of beauty 
contemplated, as well as the love which it animates, as we have
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seen above in the analysis of Poem XXIII. Poem XVIII, analysed in
Chapter III, describes at length the effects of imagination as a
mystic rapture in which the soul soars and the flesh is quietened. 
The central problem in this poem are the "descensus ad inferos" of
the soul and its ultimate return to its origin which is effected
through love. Indeed, phantasy enables the poet to perceive divine 
light, or illumination, he is: "Si com los sants sentints la
lum divina" (XVIII, v. 25). Thus, love raises his soul from the
immersion into chaos:
Si com sant Pau 
del cors perqu6 
car ds lo cors 
e tant com viu 
axi Amor 1’ 
e no*y acull 
e per yo sent 
si que ma earn
Ddu li sostrague l’arma 
vds divinals misteris, 
del esperit lo cargre 
ab el 6s en tenebres, 
esperit meu arrapa 
la maculada pensa, 
lo delit qui no»s canssa, 
la ver» amor no»m torba
(XVIII, w. 33-40).
Clearly, this is a description of the first part of the fitting of 
the shirt of Nessus on the rational soul. It is, in Hughes de 
Saint Victor1s terms, the moment at which the imagination is put on 
by reason as though it were a vestment, or as Ausias March states: 
"en lo vestir ample molt l’e sentit" (LXXVII, v. 27). In this 
phase, in which reason apprehends corporeal beauty as a reflection 
of divine Goodness, love is of a purely spiritual nature. This is 
the beginning of the problem presented by Hughes de Saint Victor’s 
description of the bipolarity of imagination.
Ausias March describes his experience in terms that echo 
the epistemology of Hughes de Saint Victor. These are based on 
the contradiction of the flesh and the spirit, in which the former 
usurps the latter, that is, the flesh attempts to be spiritual.
Poem LXXXVII presents some important examples of this state: "La
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earn volar vol e l’arma s’aterra" (verse 89). The constant 
fluctuation of reason and imagination, as intermediaries between 
the intellect and the corporeal object is caused by the soul’s 
reaction to the information that it receives from the senses,
towards which it can incline excessively. In such instances the 
soul falls to the sensual delights of the flesh and becomes less 
than the soul; it forgets its nature:
L’arma pel cors 
lexant lo seu, 
lo cors en alt 
no coneix be
a son delit s’enclina, 
e sa natura*s lunya; 
a delitar met punya,
sa natura mesquina (LXXXVII, w. 85-88).
At this point Ausias March pushes the image of the shirt of Nessus 
yet further. The soul becomes wrapped in vice. In a moment of 
extreme self-accusation in which he proclaims that the real nature
of man lies in his soul and that his past life has been unfit for
his nature, he states that his soul is wrapped in a garment woven
by vice: ”... m»arma*n tench vestidura, / tai com aquells
vicis saber li feren” (C, w. 23-24). This is an extreme use of 
217the image of the garment. What the soul perceives from the 
prison of the body is at the outset a divine reflection:
tant com lo cors sa passid gran lexa, 
del espirit, ds sa preso pus ampla,
e ses virtuts e potences exampla,
tras paret mas per rexa; 
en interbs no»s causa
es curt plaer sa causa (LXXXVII, w. 195-200)
si que no veu 
sa pur* amor 
e la del cors
beauty as the composite of harmonious parts.
That which the soul perceives is evidently spiritual, since the
love which the soul bears for the object is disinterested (verse 199).
The subsequent description that he gives of his love is particularly
noteworthy, because it runs counter to Andreas Capellanus’ description 
218of beauty, which follows the Stoic materialist definition of 
219 Ausias March
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going somewhat beyond the limits of Oton de Granson’s archetypal
description of the lady, describes the manner in which he apprehends
Beauty: 220
Mon espirit 
e dintre si 
d’ella no pens 
car tot semblant 
Solament vull 
que res de mi
contemplant se contents 
huna persona forja;
brajos, peus, mans ne gorja, 
altre semblant presents, 
d’ella tan clara penssa, 
no»l fos cosa secrets
(LXXXVII, w. 231-236).
The reference in verse 235
previous mention of ”raho
to "clara penssa" is equivalent to his 
clara" (LXXXVII, v. 214), which indicates
illumination, or, natural reason guided by the light of "right 
221reason". This is a manifestation of clear spirit. Verses 214­
215 of Poem LXXXVII which precede the above quotation leave no 
doubt as to Ausias March’s intention to love according to "right
reason":
Quant al meu cors, Amor lo desempara 
perque*1 poder d’aquell ve a son terme;
pur*amor l’esperit meu conferme •
e»n aquell punt resta ma raho clara
(LXXXV/II, w. 211-214).
Thus, what Ausias March perceives in "clara penssa" is not merely 
a physical model or archetype, but a reflection of God’s Goodness, 
as we have seen in Poem XXIII, and which is identified with the 
notion of "gest".
In spite of the tormented condition of the lover whose
reason inclines excessively to the corporeal beauty that Ausias
»March describes, this love is not exclusively the cupiditas
described by Andreas Capellanus. Indeed, if we are to believe
Amedee Pages, Ausias March was very familiar with Capellanus’
222De Amore. The statement in Poem LXXXVII, w. 233 quoted above, 
"no pens bravos, peus, mans ne gorja" is, then, a deliberate
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rebuttal of Andreas Capellanus’ description of the lover’s ’’complete
meditation”, which states that the lover thinks of fashioning a
woman and differentiates her various parts in order to pry into 
223the secrets of her body, and proceeds to action immediately.
Whereas this description describes lust, Ausias March’s yearning 
for "right reason”, for the clear sight of the eye of the soul, is 
a spiritual contemplation. The love described by Andreas Capellanus 
is based on courtly manners that accompany lust, which he ironically 
terms, "this complete meditation". Further comparison shews that 
Ausias March shies away from "active life": "mon delit es en vida 
contemplativa, / e romanch trist devallant en 1’activa" (LXXXVII, 
w. 269-270). Ausias March’s delight is "fin’ amors", understood 
as the intuition of the inner reality of the lady as a universal 
form reflecting divine Goodness. The problem remains for Ausias 
March, as it does for all Christian Neoplatonists, that the corporeal 
reflection is a means and not an end in itself, and it must, 
therefore, be transcended. The amorous experience of the Christian 
Neoplatonist is always based on the ambivalent role of imagination. 
This is perfectly summed up in the verse: "I’imaginar, amarch- 
dolj assaborea" (CXIX, v. 18). The vision is sweet because it is 
a reflection of God whose Goodness lies at the centre of all beauty, 
but it is bitter because it forces one to realize its inaccessibility 
as a result of the soul’s fall.^^
When in Poem CXIV Ausias March uses the image of the black 
melancholy garment, as it is used by Oton de Granson, the implications 
of this image are far more complex than in the French poet. It is
used to refer to the melancholy that derives from the excessive
meditation on a corporeal object, which has captured his reason
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and impedes a recovery from
Mon mal no es 
yo«l he fet gran, 
car, vent-me ser 
la terra»m fall 
Mentre no pens, 
mas l’esperit 
per l’abit pres, 
d’un negre drap
the "descensus ad inferos":
tant com en altre<n vench; 
preant molt lo que pert,
de tot» amor desert, 
e al cel no«m estench, 
yo trob algun repos,
meu tostemps esth trist
que lonch temps ds que vist
o celici molt gros
(CXIV, w. 41-48)
This poem, which seems to be written in old age since he refers to 
the loss of the saeculum (verse 48), expresses his concern at the 
fact that he is abandoned by his wordly condition and yet finds it 
impossible to reach Heaven (verse 44). The remaining verses shed 
light on the cause of this tension. The spirit, or soul, has 
taken on a habit, which is subsequently described as the black
melancholy garment. This habit is Hughes de Saint Victor’s metaphor 
of the shirt of Nessus, which the rational soul puts on and, when 
it takes excessive delight in the corporeal object, it cannot take
off.
These implications of the shirt of Nessus image would be 
hard to find in the "courtly tradition" of Oton de Granson’s Castilian
successors. Whereas Ausias March delves into the various factors
that are at the origin of his melancholy, these poets use the
garment image as a social "pose" in which melancholy becomes an 
ornament of the lover’s plight illustrating his "duelo amoroso".
I will shew this by quoting three of the many possible choices found
in the research of A. Pages. Of Oton de Granson’s use of the image,
\ 225 Pages states that it is a leit-motiv of love’s martyrdom:
Et pour mieulx semblant demonstrer 
Que trop m’est dure ma penance 
Vestu de noir par desplaisance 
Me suis sans prendre autre couleur. 226
The same attitute is found in Juan Alvarez Gato:
384
Doloridas quantas, quantos 
soys presentes y pasados, 
llorad comigo mis llantos; 
vestid, vestid negros mantos 
los queridos deseados: 
que yo tuue concertado 
remedio de mi beuir, 
y mi hado desdichado 
hizome tan acechado, 
que no me dexa sallir. 227
Finally, it is repeated in Alonso de Cardona:
pues me matd disfauor 
porque el mal se vea cierto 
traygo negro con color 
porque es la propia color 
que deue cobrir al muerto. 228
In these poems the black melancholy garment is worn as a sign of 
unreciprocated love, which results from the active pursuit of the 
desired object. There is no doubt that when Cardona tells us that 
he did not obtain his lady’s favours, the frustration which he feels 
is expressed in the symbol of the black garment. Thus, the use of 
this image, even in Oton de Granson, has a strictly ludic connotation, 
and melancholy is seen as a socially acceptable posture within the 
arts of love. It is part of a social, or "courtly” game.
Introspective wit as it is found In Ausias March, although it may 
be implied in the background of certain instances, is conspicuously 
lacking in this kind of poetry.
Ausias March knows, and describes, the extremes of love.
It would be an injustice to his work, and to the research of his 
critics, to suggest that he is only concerned with divine 
contemplation. It is, however, equally misleading to suggest that 
his poetry only depicts tortured passion. The extremes of love 
range from the "melancolia generosa" , which is evident in those 
poems that describe mystic illumination and the moments in which 
Ausias March’s love is guided by the eye of the soul, or "right
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reason" in the Augustinian sense, which is a turning of the soul
towards Sapientia Dei, to the depths of "melancolia negra", which
he seeks to escape, because it is an abyss of cupidity in which
reason loses its rightful dominion. The image of the shirt of
Nessus expresses this "melancolia negra". It symbolozes the
melancholy, or tristesse that the poet experiences when he moves
away from pure contemplation in order to pass to action: "romanch
trist devallant en 1’activa". This melancholy, which results
from immoderate cogitation, is also the concern of the Florentine
Neoplatonists who follow the doctrine of Marsilio Ficino. Indeed,
we will recall that Ficino, drawing on standard mediaeval medical
theory, describes the cause of "melancolia negra" as the movement
of the vital spirits, which are in the blood, away from the heart
where they are produced, and to the place where the soul contemplates 
. 229the image of the beloved. He.adds to this description that the 
pure clear blood, wasted in the contemplation of a corporeal image, 
turns to black bile owing to the unrenewed vital spirits, and 
causes the lover’s flesh to turn a dirty grey-green colour. This 
kind of description is also present in the work of Ausias March in 
the physiological analysis of "heroic love". Thus, in P oem LXXXVII 
the Valencian poet describes the puddling of the "clear spirits" 
that arise from contemplative love that degenerates into active 
love, and inclines the lover to "melancolia negra":
Ladonchs lo foch d’Amor bd no s’amaga, 
e los meus hulls publich lo manifesten, 
e les dolors mes sanchs al cor arresten, 
acorrent 11a on es donada plaga.
Los meus desigs de punt en punt cambie, 
e la dolor no«m trob en un loch certa; 
ma cara £s de sa color incerta; 
cerch lochs secrets e los publichs desvie; 
lan<j-m en lo Hit, dolor me’n gita fora; 
cuyt esclatar mentre mon ull no plora 230(LXXXVII, w. 271-280)
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Clearly, this too describes a state of mental alienation resulting
from contemplation. This is not the mystic rapture or divine
alienation of Poems XVIII and XXIII, but one resulting from the
vital spirits' requirement of the constant presence of the physical
image of the beloved.It is the "melancolia negra" of heroic
love. The fire of Love in verse 271 refers to the burning of the
vital spirits which are drawn away from the heart, causing sorrow
(verse 273), and move to the place where the wound is given (verse
232274), that is, the eyes, where the image of the beloved is found.
This leads to the melancholy instability of the lover (verses 
233275-280). His physiology alters from the extremes of hot to cold 
caused by the depletion of the vital spirits which are gathered at 
one place only. This causes an instability in the elements among 
which melancholy predominates. Unlike the description of poems such
as XVIII and XXIII in which the lover is said to be well tempered,
here discord reigns. Thus, Ausias March claims that the colour
of his face is altered (verse 277), and like a typical melancholic 
234he shuns company and seeks solitude.
Set in its proper context this reference to melancholy
in "heroic love" does not have the same significance as that of 
Andreas Capellanus. Rather, as in Ficino and his successors, this 
"heroic love" is the closest approximation that man can find to 
divine love. Even though this contemplation seeks the interior 
beauty of a corporeal object, and, therefore, a reflection of 
God’s Goodness, the fact that the object is physical will eventually 
cause the soul to fluctuate. "Melancolia negra" in Ausias March 
is associated with these fluctuations. In Andreas Capellanus 
"melancolia negra" is associated with unrestrained immoderate lust.
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It is bestial love, the lowest of the tripartite division of love. 
Ausias March’s description is representative of ’’heroic love” as 
a stage between the bestial and the purely contemplative loves.
It is the inclination to cupidity restrained by reason which seeks 
Charity. "Melancolia negra" in the above verses is associated with
the active life. As Ausias March notes in verses 269-270 of Poem
LXXXVII, which precede the physiological analysis of melancholy 
given above: "Mon delit es vida contemplativa, / e romanch 
trist devallant en 1’activa". This is, as we have seen in Poem 
LXXV, the inclination to cupidity, or the pursuit of the active 
life, the life of Juno, which Ausias March normally qualifies as 
"amor homenlvol" (XLV, v. 55) , because it partakes of both flesh 
and spirit. Thus, in the physiological description that follows 
verses 281-290 of Poem LXXXVII, he points out that he feels Impelled 
by desire towards bestial love, but something restrains him:
la gran cura 
e no s’esten 
1’executar 
e no ssd que
d’Amor tots fets me lonya 
sino »n cosses penssades;
lo meu desig l’esforca, 
ven£ aquesta gran forja
(LXXXVII, w. 286-290).
Thus, as he slips towards cupidity, something restrains him. It
235has been suggested that the force restraining him is his timidity.
It seems to me that this is but a peripheral answer that takes 
notice of the effects but not the cause. If this were only his 
timidity, Ausias March could certainly identify it. One must 
suppose, therefore, that something lies behind this timidity. The 
force that restrains Ausias March’s lust is melancholy. As a cold 
and dry heavy humour, melancholy causes despondency and is contrary 
to action. Even though melancholy is the complexion of the
contemplative man, and is responsible for the immoderate cogitation
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that causes lust, its extreme instability has contrary effects.236
Thus, the timidity, to which Ausias March alludes in verse 290, is
caused by an excess of cold melancholy resulting from the venting 
237referred to in verses 278-280.
This description of melancholy resulting from the 
contemplation of the beloved indicates that Ausias March closely 
associates humoral disposition with the soul’s afflictions.
Indeed, he remarks that in lovers the humours are in a continual
state of flux, and that at different moments one humour predominates:
Si com en l’om 
que no es hu 
e ve per temps 
axi Amor
un humor predomina, 
que per egual les haja,
que s cambia *1 domini, 
pratica en nosatres
(CXVII, w. 141-144).
Similarly, the flux of the humours is paralleled by the constant
alterations of the kinds of love in which either the soul or the
body predominates:
Dins lo cors d’om 
de temps en temps 
en un sols jorn 
n»aquell mateix
car en un punt 
e prestament
les humors se discorden; 
llur poder se transmuda: 
regna malenconia, 
colera, sanch e fleuma.
Tot enaxf les passions de l’arma
mudament han molt divers o contrari,
per ella*s fan los actes, 
es en lo cors la causa
(XCIV, w. 17-24).
In the description of the cause of melancholy in Poem LXXXVII, 
verses 271-280, Ausias March is, therefore, discussing the extremes
of melancholy, which he feels both physiologically and psychologically. 
It is evident from these quotations that he uses physiological 
analysis in order to account for psychological disturbances. He 
acknowledges this in Poem XCIV, verses 21-24 quoted above. The
constant alteration of the humours determines the state of elemental
equilibrium, and hence, the temper of the individual. This
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indicates Ausias March’s consciousness of the correspondences between
the macrocosm and the microcosm, as in the Graeco-Arabic medical 
238'tradition inherited by the Chartrians. '
The interpenetration of the macrocosm and the microcosm,
which has many points of affinity with the pseudo-Dionysian-Erigenian
aesthetic in writers such as Ramon Lull, is fundamental to the 
239symbolic mentality. The universe described by Ausias March is 
240rarely objective, but rather it moves and breathes with his own 
physiological and psychological fluctuations. The imagery in 
Ausias March is symbolic of the microcosm’s activity. As we have 
seen above in the interpretation of Poems LXXV and LXXIX, integumentum 
is essential to the significance of his poetry. On a macrocosmic 
level this becomes particularly true of the marine imagery in
Poem XLVI.
In the symbolic world, the alterations of humours and
elements, which are evident in Poems LXXXVII and CXVII referred to 
above, find their expression in imagery describing nature and the 
physical world. The first stanza of Poem XLVI uses the names of
various winds to this end. The description of the movement of the 
winds expresses parallels with that of the humours in the lover’s 
body. For the interpretation of this poem it is necessary to turn 
again to Bernardus Silvestris’ Commentary on the First Six Books of 
the Aeneid, and to the elemental table of Jeronimo Cortes in the
El non plus ultra de lunario y pronostico perpetuo of 1638, which
presents a complete picture of the tradition of elemental theory
as it was circulated in the West from the beginning of the Christian 
241era. This tradition was well-known to Ausias March’s contemporary, 
Alfonso Martinez de Toledo, who uses a less developed system in his 
popular work, El Arcipreste de Talavera, o Corbacho. It is,
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consequently, not out of place to suggest that when Ausias March 
lists the various winds that rage in the Mediterranean basin, he 
would have been aware of their medical significance.
Owing to the complexity of Poem XLVI, which describes a 
sea-storm, it is important that the significance of the sea and 
related symbols be first clearly Identified. Bernardus Silvestris 
provides basic clues which, as I hope to shew, are applicable to 
the poetry of Ausias March. Indeed, the sea-storms in the Aeneid 
are taken to represent the agitation of the vices in the body.
The sea symbolizes the body. Thus in two separate instances
Bernardus Silvestris writes:
Data Deiopea Eneas periculis lacessitur. Mare corpus humanum
intelligitur quia ebrietates et libidines que per aquas intelliguntur 
ab eo defluunt et in eo sunt commotiones vitiorum 243.
The storm imagery of the sea, therefore, represents ebbings and 
flowings of the body, and the ship and its crew are the soul and 
its powers which are prey to the body’s fluctuations: ’’Itaque his
commotionibus maris, id est influxionibus et effluxionibus corporis, 
244Eneas et socii eius, id est spiritus et eius potentie, vexantur .
The image of the ship is, then, principally representative of the
soul and its volitional power. Silvestris sheds more light on this
point: ’’NAVES: voluntates... LITORA: Exitus a mari et ingressus
in portum est exitus a libidine carnis et commotione temporalium 
. 2^5et incohatio studii, et hec vocat litus”. In the poetry of
Ausias March, such as in Poem II, verses 1-8, any manifestation of 
land is a symbol of the spiritual and contemplative life. Silvestris 
goes on to. explain that all references to land indicate the firmness 
of the spiritual life, which is opposed to the temporal life 
represented by the symbol of the sea.^^
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That these images function in Ausias March's poetry in the
same manner as in Silvestris' commentary can be demonstrated by 
247referring to the image of the ship in Poem LXXXII. It is
undeniable that the image of the ship in this poem symbolizes the 
soul. This provides a point of reference for the understanding of 
the sea images in his poetry. Ausias March states that when it 
pleases God even the boat in a safe harbour perishes:
Quant plau a Deu 
en segur port 
e de poch mal 
null hom es cert
que la fusta peresqua, 
romp ancores y ormeig, 
a molt hom morir veig:
d’algun fet com fenesqua
(LXXXII, w. 1-4).
In death God does not take .the body, but the soul of a man. Thus, 
in verses 3 and 4 Ausias March expresses his bewilderment at the 
ease with which death strikes where it is not expected. The soul 
in a seemingly healthy body is like a ship in a safe harbour.
In stanza I of Poem XLVI the sea-storm is a description 
of the contrary movements of the elements in the body, similar to 
that of Poem LXXXVII, verses 271-290. The images and references 
subsequent to stanza I serve to clarify its significance. The 
first two verses state that the lover will accomplish his desires 
by cutting dangerous paths through the sea, that is, against the 
raging of the sea, or the body:
Veles e vents 
ffahent camins 
Mestre y ponent 
xaloch, levant 
ab lurs amichs
ffent humils prechs 
qu*en son bufar 
e que tots cinch
han mos desigs complir, 
duptosos per la mar.
contra d'ells veig armar; 
los deuen subvenir 
lo grech e lo migjorn,
al vent tremuntanal 
los sia parcial 
complesquen mon retorn
(XLVI, w. 1-8).
Here, as elsewhere in his poetry, the desires which Ausias March
seeks to fulfil are those of the delights of the contemplative life
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which are opposed to the lust of the flesh. This is what verses 1
and 2 indicate since these desires make their way against the
torments of the sea. The wind image that follows is a storm that
must be understood within its physiological context. The winds all
come in pairs, except the tremuntanal which affects the power the
first two, the mestre and the ponent. These winds, according to
the chart of Jeronimo Cortes, represent the various humours and
elements. As in standard mediaeval physiology, Ausias March respects
the fact that the elements in the body are not found in their pure
state but in a combined form in which one predominates. As he states
in Poem CXVII, verse 177: "Tot element elementat no»s simple".
The "elemented" form prevails over the simple element in the natural
world. Hence, the "elemented" form in Ausias March’s image is
represented by the four predominant winds: migjorn, ponent, levant
and tremuntanal, which are the winds of the south, west, east, and 
248 •north. The mestre is a north-west wind, the xaloch a south-east 
wind and the grech a north-east wind. The pattern of humours and 
elements depicted in Ausias March’s image of the winds is represented 
in the following diagram:
mestre + ponent vs. xaloch + levant + grech + migjorn
cold warm & dry warm cold & moist moist warm & moist
fire water air
choler phlegm blood
lust L constancy... love
tremuntanal A
cold & dry ( s
earth \
melancholy \
pure contemplation)
Verse 3 states that mestre and ponent, the north-west and western 
winds rise against his desires. Since his desire is to find pure
love in contemplation, as we have seen in Poems XVIII and XXIII
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it is evident that if we acknowledge the significance of the symbol 
of the sea and follow the standard humoral interpretation of these
winds, as given by Jeronimo Cortes, Ausias March is referring to 
the rise of the impetuous choleric humour which moves him to lust,
but which he wishes to resist. The mention of the sails in verse 1
is reference to a part of the ship that propels it. This is the 
soul’s will which, as we will see below, maintains the clear spirit 
of the lover. The soul which is tossed sets its course by tacking 
with the remaining winds. The xaloch and levant have the stability 
of phlegm that grants the constancy of the love which is found in 
the warmth of the blood. The grech and migjorn represent the blood 
that carries the vital spirits which catch the image of the beloved, 
and can cause love to incline towards lust. Hence, these four 
winds do not suffice to counter the effects of the mestre and ponent. 
Love and constancy on their own are insufficient to restrain the 
attraction to lust. Melancholy is needed to offset the power of
choler. Thus, in verses 5 and 6 these winds ask that the tremuntanal 
be partial to them, and assist them in fulfilling the soul’s desires.
In this instance melancholy takes on a virtuous aspect. It is the 
source of pure contemplative, or honest, love. This is a development 
of its function as a source of restraint in Poem LXXXVII, verse 290.
The opposition in these verses is, then, mainly between the tremuntanal 
and the mestre and ponent. It represents a conflict between choler, 
as lust, and melancholy, as constancy or honest love, around the 
stable humours of phlegm and blood. As Guido Bonatti, following 
Johannes Hispalensis’ translation of Alcabitius, states, honesty 
in love is an attribute of Saturn - Melancholy: ”Et si inciperet
Saturninus diligere aliquem, quod raro contingit, diliget eum
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249dilectione vera”. The combination of the tremuntanal with the
other four winds consequently represents a form of "melancholia 
adusta". The gathering of the xaloch and levant with the grech 
and migjorn is tantamount to the mixing of phlegm and blood. This 
leads to a predominance of warm and moist qualities (see diagram 
above). The mixture of warm and moist is traditionally considered 
to be the best disposition for intellectual ability. The warmth 
of the blood causes melancholy to heat up, though not violently 
because it is restrained by both phlegm and blood. This is not 
Albert the Great’s "melancholia adusta", understood strictly as 
the firing of yellow bile, but a development of this notion in 
mediaeval medicine, following Avicenna’s "squaring" of melancholy, 
which in his view can arise from the scorching of any of the four 
humours. The conflict of the four humours in Poem XLVI, which 
results in a "boiling", is a form of adustio. Hence, one can turn
to Avicenna’s Liber cannonis in order to understand what this
favourable combination is, as a form of "melancholia adusta",
leading towards the concept of "melancolia generosa", according
to which Ausias March will claim that he is an exceptional man:
If the black bile which causes melancholy be mixed with blood it 
will appear coupled with joy and laughter and not accompanied by 
deep sadness; but if it be mixed with phlegm, it is coupled with 
inertia, lack of movement, and quiet; if it be mixed with yellow 
bile its symptoms will be unrest and violence, and obsessions, 
and it is like a frenzy. And if it be pure black bile, then there 
is very great thoughtfulness and less agitation and frenzy except 
when the patient is provoked.250
In the context of Ausias March’s sea-storm a combination of choler
and melancholy would be indicative of violence and physical frenzy. 
For this reason, xaloch, levant, grech and migj orn request the
assistance of the tremuntanal. This results in the combination of
black bile with blood and phlegm, which should lead to the joy of
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peaceful contemplative love which Ausias March desires.
The concept of the ensuing stanzas casts more light on
this use of the concept of "melancholia adusta". The second stanza 
uses the image of the boiling sea, which is generally attributed 
to Job XLI, 22 (see Appendix IX). Its significance in this context, 
however, is consistent with the description of melancholy, as we 
have found it in the analysis of Poem LXXXVII, w. 271-290. This
image is, then, a description of the physiological disturbances
which is used to enlighten the significance of stanza I:
Bullir&'l mar 
mudant color 
e mostrara 
que sobre si 
grans e pochs 
e cerquaran 
ffugint al mar 
per gran remey
com la canola n forn, 
e l’estat natural, 
voler tota res mal
atur hun punt al jorn; 
peix a recors correran 
amaguatalls secrets:
, hon son nudrits e fets, 
en terra exiran
(XLVI, vv. 9-16).
The boiling of the sea refers to the agitation of the soul and the
humours in the body. As Bernardus Silvestris remarks, "the spirit
and its powers are assailed by these agitations of the sea" (see
above). The boiling is caused by the scorching of the spirits in 
251the constant contemplation of the image through imagination.
Hence, this contemplation results in the alteration of the flesh’s 
colour (XLVI, v. 10), as it does in Poem LXXXVII, verse 277, and 
to the characteristic misanthropy of the melancholic (XLVI, v. 11), 
as in Poem LXXXVII, verse 278, as well as the constant physical
252torment (XLVI, v. 11-12), as in Poem LXXXVII, verse 276 and 279.
The result of this melancholy adust, which originates in the 
movement of imagination that causes Ausias March to seek a reflection
of the divine telos, is that the fish, or senses, which are born
and bred in the flesh, are stilled as they hide or rise to the land
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or the firmness of spiritual life (verses 13-16).
This interpretation of the second half of stanza II in
Poem XLVI is confirmed by the implications of the imagery in stanza 
III. Verses 17-20 contain images of light and truth contrasting 
falsehood. They imply that the false gifts and promises made by 
"the pilgrims" will be recognized as such, and like the greatest 
secrets held in the seal of confession they will come to light:
Los pelegrins 
e prometran 
la gran paor
tots ensemps votaran 
molts dons de cera fetS
traura *1 lum los secrets
que al conf£s descuberts no seran (XLVI, w. 17-20).
The pilgrims1 false gifts represent the transitory delights of the 
senses. The transient nature of the gifts of the flesh is revealed 
by the light of truth. This light is the inner light of the soul 
which is found in pure contemplation. Hence, in all this turmoil 
the image of the beloved, which as we have seen above in Poems 
XVIII and XXIII is a reflection of Sapientia Dei, remains constantly 
present to the poet’s eye:
En lo perill 
ans votare 
de no minvar
no»m caureu del esment, 
hal Deu qui«ns ha ligats,
mes fermes voluntats
e que tots temps me sereu de present (XLVI, w. 21-24). 
This is accomplished by a proper direction of the will to the 
polishing of the Clear Spirit. The use of the plural of will in 
verse 23 corresponds to the image of the sails in verse 1. The
will is the sail that helps Ausias March fulfil his desire of pure
- 253love.
The remainder of this poem deals specifically with Ausias 
March’s awareness of the distance that separates his desire from its 
reality in the sublunar world. It reveals his consciousness of
"laetus horror" Thus, in verse 24 Ausias March refers to the
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metaphysical problem that lies at the heart of contemplation in 
"heroic love". This is the need that the heroic lover feels, if his 
soul becomes excessively enamoured of a corporeal image, for the
constant presence of the person. As we will recall, Ficino, like
Hughes de Saint Victor in his description of imagination, stated
in his expose of this problem that the eyes and the spirit felt
the continuous need for the presence of the image and that if this 
254contemplation were excessive the soul would follow the senses.
The problem of the "heroic" lover is that he must use the beauty which 
he finds in corporeal objects to lead him to divine contemplation, 
but since his love fixes its attention on a corporeal image the 
soul will waver with the imagination. Hence, in the first part of 
stanza IV, Ausias March claims that although he wishes this presence, 
he believes that his love will endure even if death should take away 
the beloved. This confirms his prior claims in poems such as XVIII 
and XXIII that what he contemplates transcends corporeality:
Yo tern la mort 
per que Amor 
mas yo no creu 
pusqua esser
per no sser-vos absent, 
per mort es anullats
que mon voler sobrats 
per tai departiment (XLVI, w. 25-28).
In verse 26 Ausias March recognizes that sensual love can be ended 
by death, but since his love attempts to be spiritual it will last 
beyond any separation caused by death. Yet, in spite of this these
verses reveal Ausias March’s consciousness of the limitations of his
love. As I have pointed out before, he is acutely aware, like the 
Florentine Neoplatonists, that all human love that is not turned 
exclusively to God, is prey to the ebbings and flowings of the 
body. As he states: "James ami que no fos desijos / d’aquell 
desig que per fretur* avem" (LXXXV, w. 33-34), yet his will
has sought a chaste spiritual love, and a man can do no more.
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Hence, his poetry describes the efforts of the will to live according 
to Charity in the secular world, and a rejection of cupidity. The 
rest of Poem XLVI discusses this problem on the basis of the 
contradiction predicated in verses 26-28. Ausias March rightly 
concludes of the uncertainties caused by love which sets its 
affection on the movement of imagination^that it is a game of 
hazard and wordly Ibrtune: "A joch de daus vos acomparare"
(XLVI, v. 60).
From the analysis of his manipulation of the theory of
imagination in Chapter III and of his poetic imagery in this chapter,
it seems obvious that the beauty that moves Ausias March is not 
255merely harmonious beauty, as some critics have thought. He 
himself notes that the beauty which he finds in the lady is not in 
the lines or colours, but interior (XXIII, vv. 5-16). As a result 
the love which he describes seeks Charity in the Augustinian sense;
it is the love that turns his soul towards the light of right
reason in the embodiment of Sapientia Dei, as we have seen in Poems
XVIII and XXIII. The aesthetic principle underlying his poetry 
is that of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite and John Scotus 
Erigena, the thought of whom weighs heavily on the philosophy of 
Ramon Lull, which is emulated by Ausias March. This Valencian 
poet’s sensibility is, then, that of the evangelical current 
which is: ”la lumiere intdrieure qui suscite... une conscience
256nouvelle des implantations de la grSce dans le sol de la nature."
This has many points of affinity with Douglas Kelly’s definition of 
"fin’ amors" which is the intuition of the inner reality of the 
experience of love. It is this very preoccupation with interior 
spiritual reality, which reaches the limits of an individual approach
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257to God in the ’’Cant Espiritual”, that differentiates the theory
of love in Ausias March from the "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus 
258and the cancionero poets of the "troubadour revival" in Spain.
The obvious preoccupation of Ausias March for melancholy
naturally indicates that his love is "amor hereos". This term
cannot be dealt with adequately if it is understood as a monolithic
concept. It is intimately associated with melancholy and Imagination,
and since both of these terms have nefarious and beneficial qualities, 
259"amor hereos" cannot be reduced to mere "melancolia negra".
Like melancholy and imagination, it spans the extremes of mental
alienation. It can take the lover from worldly madness, which
reduces him to the level of beasts, to the heights of divine
illumination which raises him to angelical bliss. The heart of
the problem of "amor hereos" is that, since it is based on the
movement of imagination, it is subject to physiological and
psychological fluctuations. The "courtly love" of Andreas Capellanus
emphatically denies the redeeming value of imagination and melancholy,
because it does not acknowledge the presence of grace in the secular
world, which is the basis of "amor hereos". Logically, since
Ausias March recognizes the value of imagination, melancholy is
also recognized as a potentially virtuous quality, because it leads
to introspection. This is contrary to the sensibility of an Andreas
Capellanus. There is no doubt that Ausias March received the notion
of the cult of tristesse from his French predecessors, but he is 
260not a slavish imitator and goes somewhat beyond them. His
imitation of classical "heroes", which is normally confused with
"hereos" and leads to the popular acceptance of the term "heroes 
261love", is evident in Poem LXXIX. Ausias March’s practice of the
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"love of heroes" is an effort to retrieve the virtuous love of the
Golden Age as it is depicted in the Ovide Moralise, that is, as
"sapience". Hence, much like Alain de Lille’s Complaint of Nature 
it is an attempt to return to cosmic order. This order lies in the 
aspiration to Charity, that is, in the love of any object, not for
its sake but for that of God. This is what Ausias March describes
in Poem LXXV. In the words of Ficino, it makes him another of the 
262"alii Diane et Palladi consecrati." Yet, Ausias March facing
his ideal of Charity from a very realistic point of view, like
Philip Sidney, acknowledges the problem of his "descensus ad inferos",
and does not confuse his theoretical ideal with his experience.
He remains profoundly conscious of the limitations of imagination
and its corporeal origins. Thus, like Castiglione, imagination
is for him a beauty far greater than It is in worldly reality:
"per virtu della immaginazione formers dentro in se stesso quella bellezza 
> 263molto piu bella, che in effetto non sara". This focal problem, 
present in all Christian Neoplatonic theory, forces Ausias March to 
experience the deceit of imagination, which he recognizes as corporeal.
Out of this arises his endeavour to rid himself of the shirt of
Nessus, in order to transcend corporeal beauty, and enjoy divine
Goodness which is imperfectly perceived in this secular world but
yearned for by his soul.
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(Cooper, p. 68). If,as I believe, Andreas refers to this pastoral 
figure the thrust of his irony is indeed "two sided". The pastoral 
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qui solament
ab angel, /
amor ab cors e arma senten, / amant lo cors 
I1arma, / grau de amor homenxvol atenyen: / 
lo jou d’Amor aporten".
e mes la part de 
sobre dos colls
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See Chapter IV, note 216.
160 Servii Grammatici, Vergilii Carmina Commentarii, vol. II, p. 482: 
"cum nasci coeperimus, sortimur a Sole spiritum, a Luna corpus, a Marte 
sanguinem, a Mercurio ingenium, a love honorum desiderium, a Venere 
cupiditates, a Saturno humorem...".
161
Jones’, Commentary, p. 25;.. Meerson, p. 124.
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C. de Boer, Ovide Moralist en Prose, p. 106. The Metamorphoses 
were extremely popular in Catalonia during the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, whether in Berjuire’s Ovidiu& Moralizatus or Chretien le 
Gouays’ Ovide Moralise (see J. Ruiz Calonja, Historia de la literatura 
catalana, Barcelona: Teide, 1954, p. 282; and Martin de Riquer, 
L’Humanisme catala, Barcelona: Barcino, 1934, p. 86). Although many 
critics have spoken of the possible influence of Ovid in the poetry of 
Ausias March, comparisons have only been made with the Ars Amatoria, 
the Remedia, and the apocryphal Facetus (see A. Pag*es, Auzias March 
et ses predecesseurs, p. 228; Commentaire des poesies, pp. 10, 11,
89, 96, 352; P. Bohigas, Poesies I, p. 84, Poesies III, p. 162). No 
critic seems to have paid sufficient attention to the influence of the 
mediaeval tradition of the Metamorphoses on the significance of the 
poetry of Ausias March. Only M. de Riquer indicates in passing that 
the allegorical image in Poem LXXIX is somewhat Ovidian ("Ausias 
March", Historia de la literatura catalana II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, 
p. 516).
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Thus, Mercury is also considered to be Christ, (Ovide Moralise^ 
en Prose, p. 107).
Ovide Moralise en Prose,p. 68.
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See, Bohigas, Poesies III, p. 111.
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See Appendix II, N:7.
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See Chapter III, notes 26 and 31.
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The Complaint of Nature, p. 68.
169
See Chapter IV, notes 201-209 In text.
170
Chapter IV, note 329.
171
See, Chapter III, analysis of Poem IX, and in this Chapter, 
note 15.
172
Although both the texts of Ber^uire and Le Gouays may have 
been available to Ausias March (see note 162) , one cannot be certain 
of his exact source. I have, therefore, chosen to use the standard 
Latin text for quotation (P. Ovid, Metamorphoses vols. I-II, ed. G.
P. Goold, London: William Heineman, 1976), with occasional references 
to , Chretien Le Gouays, Ovide Moralise, vols. I and II, ed. C. de 
Boer, Amsterdam: Verh. de Konh. Akad. van Vetenschapen, 1915, 1920).
173
See, Martfn de Riquer, Los trovadores II, Barcelona: Planeta, 
1975, pp. 1081-1084. .......
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M. de Riquer, Historia de la literatura catalana II, p. 516.
175
See, A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 247-248; 
Commentaire des poesies d'Auzias March, p. 89; P. Bohigas, Poesies III, 
p. 123; Rafael Ferreres (ed.) Ausias March, Qbra poetica completa I, 
pp. 60-62.
176
On this subject see, Marc-Rene Jung, Etudes sur le poeme 
allegorique en France au moyen age, Berne: Ftancke, p.139.
zpoeme allegorique, pp. 133-146.
poeme allegorique, p. 139. 
poeme allegorique, p. 139.
Etudes sur le
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Etudes sur le
Etudes sur le
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See above the
181
Etudes sur le
182
Etudes sur le
discussion around footnote 16 in the text.
, zpoeme allegorique, p. 144.
__________ poeme allegorique, footnote 63, p. 144; Auzias
March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 316-320; and see in this thesis 
Chapter IV, note 170.
183
I am here following Guiraut Riquier’s explanation of the 
allegory. M. - R. Jung’s study of this subject has clearly denied the 
validity of A. Pages’ extremely subjective interpretation.
184
Etudes sur le poeme allegorique, p. 139.
185 Critics agree that the arrows refer to three types of love 
of varying quality, but have utterly failed to understand the importance 
of the temporal succession in this image. Poesies II, pp. 155-156; 
Poesies III, pp. 123-124; Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 247­
248; and Riquer, Los trovadores II, p. 1082.
186
Etudes sur le poeme allegorique, p. 138.
187
In the Ovide Moralise the third age is also rapidly glossed 
over (Book I, w. 937-948) and serves a purely transitional purpose.
188
See above, note 182. For Ausias March’s own expos£ of this 
problem see inter alia Poem CXXIII and Chapter IV, note 170.
189 See Bohigas’ discussion of Ausias March’s use of the tripartite 
division of love in Poesies II, pp. 155-156 contrasted to that of 
Guiraut Riquier. It concerns Ausias March’s discussion of the three 
loves in Poem XLV (above note 158); see also Chapter IV, note 318.
190
Ovide Moralise,!, v. 3670.
191
Ovide Moralise I, w. 3272-3274.
192
See Poems CV and CXXVIII. This ultimate ascesis is also 
sought by the Florentine Neoplatonists (see Chapter IV, note 158), 
and is not like that of Andreas Capellanus which is an ascesis 
a priori.
193 See Poem CVI, verse 123, and Appendix I, in text between notes 
9 and 18.
194
See Chapter IV, note 121.
195■ This interpretation is not opposed to that of P. Bohigas, who
considers that the poet has placed his affection on the wrong object 
(Poesies III, p. 124). Simultaneously, Ausias March admits the 
impossibility of finding the lasting quality of divine love in a 
corporeal object, as do Castiglione and the other Florentine 
Neoplatonists. This is a frequent theme in Ausias March’s poetry, 
as in the first verse of Poem CXVII.
196
See Chapter IV, and notes 143, 149, 155 and 162.
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197
’’Arnulf of Orleans... says Ovid has attempted ’so to describe 
the mutability that one may understand by it not simply those changes 
which take place around us., altering material things for good or ill, 
but those also which take place inwardly, in the soul’. By these 
means, Arnulf tells us, Ovid seeks ’to recall us from error to a 
recognition of the true creator” (Platonism and''Poetry, p. 11).
198
In a footnote to his edition of Calanson’s Poem M. de Riquer 
expresses a certain reserve as to the way Ausias March used the Gascon 
poet’s image: "la aplicacitfn de estas tres flechas simbolicas hecha 
por Ausias March... tai vez glosando y aclarando esta alegor£a” ( Los 
trovadores II, p. 1082). The general fallacy of this interpretation has 
been repeated by many critics who follow A. Pages* erroneous judgement 
on the direct Imitation of Calanson’s verses.
199
This clearly flies in the face of 0. H. Green’s statement 
based on his third-hand analysis of Ausias March, "En la epoca en 
que Boscan empez6 a escribir, este amor-gentileza coincidia en lfneas 
generales con la concepci6n trovadoresca del fin’ amors - concepcion 
muy particular y del todo extraha a la naturaleza humana y las 
ensenanzas morales del cristianismo. Su estfmulo era la belleza y 
la virtud de la amada, pero no era platonico, sino carnal y sensual 
..." (El amor cortes en Quevedo, Zaragoza: Librerfa General, 1955, 
p. 135). This is a blatant case of academic myopia aggravated by the 
poor lenses of "courtly love".
200
This attachment to the world, and the eventual renunciation 
which we find in Poem CXXVIII, is best explained in Poem CVII, especially 
in verses 49-56: "Cascuna part de nos tira d’on ve: / lo cors 
terreny deja vol romanir; / l’arma d’aquell no*s volrria 
partir, / e lo seu be per la mort li perve. / Mas tant abdos 
han estret*amistat, / que*1 hu dolor pel companyo soffer, /
hoc fins en tant que»1 mal torna»n plaer, / y ell mal aquell
ha per grau estimat". As man is made of body and spirit, he longs
for earthly joys, because the spirit is drawn to the body through the
"descensus ad inferos", hence, the soul finds its true end in death.
201
See note 17 above.
202
See R. Pring-Mill, El microcosme lullia, Palma de Mallorca:
Moll, 1962, p. 122 inter alia.
203
x Antoni Canals, Scipio e Anibal, De Providencia, De Arra de
Anima, ed. M. de Riquer, Barcelona: Barcino, 1935, pp. 121-171.
204
I deliberately introduce "heroic" as "angelical" love for 
their contemplative affinity, which is evidently an aspect of the 
former. Thus Ausias March can say "a temps volent com horn, com 
brut, com angel" (CXVII, v. 168). See Chapter IV, discussion on
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Castiglione’s Cortegiano, and note 318; the discussion on Bembo in 
the text; on Hebreo, between footnotes 256-260; and the discussion 
on ELcino between footnotes 170 and 180. See also, Chapter III, 
notes 86, 87, 95, 100.
205
Translation from Chapter III, note 31.
206
See Chapter IV, note 136, and Chapter III, page 52.
207
Andreas Capellanus, De Amore, ed. E. Trojel, p. 3.
208
See Chapter III, notes 7 and 31.
209
Metamorphoses, Book IX, w. 1-272 (vol. II, pp. 2-22).
210
The Latin word used is velamina, which has the meaning of: 
garment, tunic, shirt or robe, all of which are also implied in 
"habit”. The Ovide Moralise is somewhat inconsistent in the 
translation of velamina, and uses both "chemise" (IX, v. 431) and 
"robe" (IX, v. 763).
211
In the Ovide Moralise Hercules does fall in love with Iole 
(IX, w. 488-599). This is an ornamental addition of Le Gouays which 
does not affect the basic plot of the myth.
212
Ovide Moralise, (IX, w. 679-682).
213
Bohigas, Poesies I, p. 154; A. Comas, "Cuatro influencias 
de la literatura catalana medieval sobre la castellana de la edad 
media y del renacimiento," Ensayos sobre literatura catalana,
Barcelona: Taber, 1968, p. 38.
214
live years ago I wrote a paper which I read at the Asociacion 
de Hispanistas Canadienses in Fredericton, New Brunswick. May 1977.
This paper was subsequently re-written and accepted for publication.
It is forthcoming in Hispanofila as "The Hercules Theme in the Poetry 
of Ausias March". This paper does not take into account the tradition 
of Hughes de Saint Victor, and is limited to a paradigmatic analysis 
of Ausias March’s use of the image of the shirt of Nessus.
z - See, A. Pages, "Le theme de la tristesse amoureuse," Romania
LVII, 1932, pp. 29-43j P. Bchigas, Poesies V, p. 52; R. Ferreres (ed.), 
Ausias March, Obra poetica completa II, pp. 234-235.
216
Like Ficino, Ausias March actually refers to the clothing of 
the spirit ("esperit", Poem LXXVII, v. 26), which implies "vital spirit"
421
as the mirror of the soul (see Chapter III, notes 21, 26, 104 and 
105, as well as, Chapter IV, note 192). For the sake of brevity I 
am referring to the composite soul-spirit as ’’rational soul", since 
in medical theory, as exposed by Ficino in Chapter IV, the soul is 
always present where the vital spirits are. Their function is 
directly related to the generation of melancholy as "negra" or 
"generosa".
217
Similarly, in a mcment of disillusion, Ausias March points 
out that because worldly love originates in sensual perception, it 
remains fundamentally sensual. The problem is like that of Sidney’s 
Astrophel and Stella, in which the poet recognizes the limitations 
of natural reason (see Chapter IV, conclusion). Thus, just as Ausias 
March can say: "James ami que no fos desijos / d’aquell desig 
que per fretur*avem" (LXXXV, vv. 33-34), so can he say in Poem LV:
"Lir entre carts, molts trobadors an dit / que »1 be d’Amor 
&s al comen^ament; / yo dich qu*esta prop del contentament. /
D’aquell ho dich qui mor, desig finit" (LV, w. 41-44). This
reflects disillusion at the possibility of finding spiritual love 
on earth, as in Poem CV, w. 23-24. One must note, however, that 
this is absolutely consistent with the theory of love present in 
Ficino and his successors, who stress the limitations of natural 
reason and the need for an ascesis from this world, because the beauty 
of this world should only spur man to turn his attention to his 
origin, that is, to God’s Goodness (see Chapter IV).
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See note 40 above.
219 •
See inter alia Chapter IV, notes 69, 123, 130, and Marsile 
Ficin, Commentaire sur le Banquet, ed. Raymond Marcel, Paris:
Society Les Belles Lettres, 1956, p. 147.
220
This is reminiscent of Bembo’s Lavinello, as seen in Chapter 
IV, in text between notes 298-300.
221 On this problem see Chapter III, note 104. Furthermore,
Ausias March’s rejection of the Stoic definition of beauty is also 
evident in Poem CXIX, verses 81-90. See Chapter III, notes 40-49, 
as well as, the discussion of "gest" in Chapter III, pages 55-60.
222
A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 183, 230,
317, 318, etc. I am inclined to believe, with Peter Dronke (Medieval 
Latin and the Rise of European Love-Lyric, vol. I, p. 85), that 
Capellanus’ De Amore is only one of many such love treatises written 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and that excessive attention 
has been paid to it in isolation. This naturally invalidates Pages’ 
claims of an influence; I believe that many of references he uses 
are actually coincidental.
See note 40 above
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224
Ausias March can rightly say of the ’’gest”, which is the 
spiritual reflection of the soul’s beauty and the immediate source 
of his delight (see note 221 above): "quin delit es lo que d’amor 
yo taste. / No es en earn, e la earn mi enclina: / entra. per 
l’ull e-n lo tot d’ella fina" (CXIX, w. 78-80).
225 .
A. Pages, "Le Theme de la tristesse amoureuse," Romania LVII, 
1932, p. 30.
226
"Le Theme de la tristesse amoureuse," p. 30.
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"Le Theme de la tristesse amoureuse," p. 37.
228
"Le Theme de la tristesse amoureuse," p. 36.
229
See Chapter IV, note 192. Although I refer to Ficino for the 
sake of the comparison which is the object of this thesis, I am not 
attempting to explicate Ausias March by a reading of Ficino. The 
latter’s knowledge of medicine is scholastic and. Salernitan. His 
descriptions are standard mediaeval ones that belong to a previous 
heritage. I have not sought out these sources in this case because 
it was not my intention to suggest that Ausias March "precedes"
Ficino, but that the two are not incompatible, as some critics have 
pretended (see Chapter I). In this instance it is more important to 
turn to Ficino’s text. For a description of the medical tradition 
used by Ficino see, Saturn and Melancholy,in particular, pp. 82-97.
230
A similar physiological description of melancholy is evident 
in Poem XI, w. 33-40, which Ausias March uses to claim exceptionality.
231
See Chapter IV, note 137.
232
Rafael Ferreres, (Ausias March, Obra poetica completa I, p. 431), 
translates verses 273-274 by, "y mis dolores detienen mis sangres al 
corazSn acudiendo alia donde esta hecha la llaga". Although it has 
the merit of being one of the rare attempts to interpret this verse,
I disagree with Ferreres. The actual sense is: "My spirits cause 
sorrow to gather in my heart by fleeing to where the wound is given". 
Since the wound is given in the eyes (v. 271), where the image of the 
beloved is seen, the vital spirits move there. The depletion of 
vital spirits which the heart cannot renew, because they are scorched 
by the constant effort to maintain the presence of the image and their 
vapours cloud the cell of phantasy, results in an accumulation of 
black bile, which causes sorrow. The poet’s love is then, "morbosus 
melancholicusque". If the spirits, contained in the blood and therefore 
referred to as "sangres" by Ausias March, were to rush to the heart, 
as Ferreres believes, then joy would ensue. Clearly this is not the 
case. (see Chapter IV, page 233, notes 200 and 327). This is hence,
423
a medical description of the source of melancholy, and its predominance 
in the lover’s distempered condition, caused by an immoderate cogitation 
on a corporeal object.
233
See Saturn and Melancholy, p. 34. Problem XXX, i decribes 
instability as a characteristic of the melancholic. Also the 
Tractatus de complexionibus, quoted in a footnote of Saturn and 
Melancholy (p.115),states that he is of "inconstans animo”. This 
proceeds from Problem XXX,i in which Aristotle states that melancholy 
is like wine, "making men ill-tempered, kindly, merciful or reckless" 
(Aristotle, Problems vol. II, trans. W. S. Hett and H. Rackham,
London: William Heineman, 1965, p. 157, and see also p. 169).
234
Saturn and Melancholy, p. 14. Thus, in the Tractatus de 
complexionibus by Johan von Neuhaus, quoted in Saturn and Melancholy, 
p. 115, the melancholic "semper diligit esse solus". This trait has 
its origin in Problem XXX, and the medical tradition preceding it, 
thus Aristotle states: "The same is true of Ajax and Bellerophontes; 
the former went completely insane, and the latter craved for desert 
places" (Aristotle, Problems vol. II, p. 155).
235
See P. Bohigas, Poesies III, p. 290. See also note 233. This 
aspect of this description is subordinated to the verse 286: "e lo 
meu cors me vist sola vergonya" (LXXXVII, v. 285). Thus, the 
explanation that this force which Ausias March cannot readily identify 
cannot be said to be the effect, timidity, which he has already 
identified. One is reminded here of the sense of "vergcnya" in 
Poem LXXV: Vergonya = Diana, and Raho = Pallas.
236
This aspect of the melancholy individual goes back to Aristotle’s 
Problem XXX, i (see op. cit., p. 155 ff.: "Why is it that all men 
who have become outstanding in philosophy, statesmanship, poetry 
or the arts, are melancholic?"). This is repeated by mediaeval 
natural philosophers such as Alexander Neckham, William of Auvergne, 
Avicenna and Hughes de Fouilloi (Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 70-71,
73, 89 and 108). Constantine the African, referred to in Saturn and 
Melancholy, provides a standard mediaeval medical description of the 
melancholy unbalance and the over-exertion of the soul: "We say that 
their moods constantly fluctuate between irascible excitement and a 
peaceable frame of mind, recklessness and timidity, between sadness 
and frivolity, and so on... There are vei^many holy and pious men 
who become melancholy owing to their great piety and from fear of 
God’s anger or owing to their great longing for God until this 
longing masters and overpowers the soul; their whole feeling and 
thoughts . are- only, of" God, the contemplation of God.... They fall 
into melancholy as do lovers and voluptuates.... And all will fall 
into melancholy who overexert themselves in reading philosophical 
books etc." (op. cit. pp. 84-85). Thus, more popular writers such as 
Guido Bonatti, following Johannes Hispalensis’ translation of Alcabitius, 
note the beneficial aspects of Saturn-melancholy: "significat 
profunditatem scientiae et consilium bonum et profundum" (Op.cit., 
p. 190).
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“black bile, which is naturally cold... produces apoplexy, 
or torpor, or despondency or fear" (Aristotle, Problems IX, p. 161).
238
See Saturn and Melancholy, pp. 67-111 (inter alia), and D. C. 
Meerson, The Ground and Nature of Literary Theory in Bernardus 
Silvaster* s Twelfth-Century1 ^Commentary on the "Aeneid',* Chicago:
Ph.D. thesis, 1967.
239 V K
See M. D. Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siecle, Paris: Vrin, 
1957, pp. 159-209.
240
For a particularly insensitive interpretation of this point 
in the poetry of Ausias March, see W. Rolf, “Conflict and Choice:
The Sea Storm in the Poems of Ausias March," H.R. (39), 1971, pp. 
69-75. A very intelligent analysis of the sources of Ausias March’s 
imagery can be found in Rosa Leveroni, "Les imatges marines en la 
poesia d’Ausias March," B.H.S. XXVIII, 1951, pp. 152-166. A contrast 
between these sources in Leveroni’s article and my analysis should 
shew how the poet uses a topical image and modifies it to meet his 
authorial intention.
241
See, F. Rico, El pequeno mundo del hombre, Madrid: Castalia, 
197 , p. 165. “
242 A. Martinez de Toledo, El Arcipreste de Talavera o Corbacho, 
ed. G. Muela, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, pp. 180-207.
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245
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Jones (ed.), Commentary, p.
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p
Jones (ed.), Commentary, p
10; Meerson, p.
11; Meerson, p.
33; Meerson, p.
50; Meerson, p.
108.
108-109.
132.
151.
See Appendix I, note 60.
248
See Jeronimo Cortes in El pequeno mundo, p. 165. The direction 
of the winds determines the predominant quality. Thus, the Mestre 
is a north-west wind which combines with the westerly Ponent, the 
direction is then west by north-west. The direction is then 
predominantly west and the Ponent predominates. This pattern is 
repeated in all other wind references.
249
Saturn and Melancholy, p. 190. This is also attributed to 
melancholics by Ficino, see Chapter IV, notes 192-198.
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Saturn and Melancholy, p. 89.
251 '
Thus, Juan Huarte de San Juan (Examen de Ingenios para las 
ciencias, ed. Esteban Torre, Madrid: Nacional, 1976, p. 191) uses a 
very similar metaphor to describe melancholy adust: "la imaginative 
.... esta calidad levanta figuras y las hace bullir".
252
This is a commonly repeated variation of Aristotle’s description 
of hot bile, or melancholy adust: "but if it becomes overheated, it 
produces cheerfulness with song and madness, and the breaking of 
sores and so forth" (Problems II, p. 163).
253
It seems to me that the reference to the "Deu qui »ns ha 
ligats" may indicate that Ausias March is adressing this poem to his 
wife. This would support the thesis of M. de Riquer (Historia de la 
literatura II, Barcelona: Ariel, 1964, pp.Ml'50$.
254
See Chapter IV, note 137, as well as 136, 149-150.
255
See Chapter III, note 41.
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M. D. Chenu, La theologie, p. 226.
257
See Appendix II.
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Roger Boase, The Troubadour Revival, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1976.
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See Chapter III, note 87.
I should like to add to this note by pointing out that when 
Chaucer refers to "Hereos", which moralists and medical writers after 
him frequently equate with the demented passion of Arcite, he does 
not specifically equate "Hereos" with manic depression: "Not only like 
the loverfts maladye / Of Hereos, but rather lyke manye" (w. 1374­
1375), and only then does he describe Arcite’s plight as "melancolia 
negra".
260
See Saturn and Melancholy, p. 225.
261
See John Livingston Lowes, "The Loveres Maladye of Hereos," 
Modern Philology XI, 1913-1914, pp. 491-546.
Commentaire sur le Banquet, p. 199; see Chapter IV, note 216.
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B. Castiglione, op. cit., Opere Volgare e Latine, ed. 
Bentivoglio, Padova: Giuseppe Comino, 1733, p. 238
Cornelio
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
The heritage of Chartrian-Victorine Platonism, common to
all Renaissance Neoplatonists, creates many points of deep affinity 
between Ausias March and the Florentine Neoplatonists. His 
manipulation of the extremes of the theory of imagination, as well 
as the opposite qualities of melancholy, demonstrates that his 
sensibility was not that of a ’’troubadour attarde*’, and that his 
love was not exclusively a lascivious passion. To the contrary, 
for him and the Florentine Neoplatonists, this love is a struggle 
to transcend the limits of an unreliable natural reason, in order 
to find the light of right reason, perceived imperfectly in the 
beauty of this world. There is jin this, none of the divorce from
2Christian morality, so frequently associated with ’’courtly love”.
To the contrary, it is a passionate expression of interior devotion, 
for both Ausias March and the Ficinian Neoplatonists. In both, 
their sensibility remains anchored in the evangelicalism which 
originates among the Chartrians and Victorines. For these mystic 
thinkers the world is primarily a reflection of the thought of God. 
Ausias March assimilates this theory from Ramon Lull, who remains 
important for Christian humanists of the Renaissance.
The variations between the work of Ausias March and that
of the Florentines is largely a matter of personal emphasis and
literary fashion. Hence, whereas, according to Raymond Marcel, the
primary intention in Ficino’s Commentarium in Convivium is to provide 
3
a demonstration of the soul’s immortality, and only subsequently 
is it a theory of love, Ausias March acknowledges the soul’s 
immortality a priori, and his real concern is to illustrate the
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difficulty of recovering from the soul's "descensus ad inferos".^
The followers of Marsilio Ficino, with the exception of Leone Hebreo 
whose approach goes beyond Ficino, still continue to place the
emphasis on the subject of the immortality of the soul, and the 
question of the soul’s recovery becomes secondary, although it is 
nonetheless constantly present. Further distinctions can be drawn 
on the basis of Ficino’s literary background and his far more 
extensive use of Platonic and Classical texts. Hence, there is an 
unmistakable difference in style and elegance. Even with this in 
mind, one must never forget that for the Christian Platonists, such 
as Ficino, these classics are subordinate to his religious intention, 
and the text is read for its integumenta. Moreover, at this point 
one must note that the comparison is unequal, being between a 
professional philosopher and a poet. What matters is that the 
essential content remains the same, and as Thomas Gould states:
In the history of the idea of love, at least, the Renaissance does 
not appear to have been a crucial turning point. After all, there 
is not really much more Plato in Spenser or Ficino than there is in 
Dante.5
The introduction of the Italianate sensibility in Spain, which 
infused a renewed serious content into Petrarchan topoi, was well 
prepared by the work of Ausias March. The admiration professed for 
him by the first generation of Petrarquistas attests this. This 
shift that occurs apparently around the time of Boscdn’s translation 
of the Cortegiano is, then, largely an adjustment of literary fashions 
to the wave of evangelicalism which sweeps through Europe between
152.0 and 1550.
As Mila y Fontanals remarked, and as I hope to have
demonstrated, Ausias March has an uncommon knowledge of medical
429
g *
theory. This is sufficient at least to enable him to articulate
the same concepts that Ficinian Platonism will disseminate in the
sixteenth century. His imagery reflects a symbolic mentality
inherent in the Dionysian-Erigenian aesthetic theory of Christian 
Platonists. These factors contribute to the compatibility of Ausias 
March’s poetry to the Italianate Neoplatonic love theory introduced 
in Spain by his admirers, Garcilaso de la Vega and Juan Boscdn. It 
would be pointless to reiterate the conclusions which I drew in the 
last section of Chapter IV, since I consider that the proposition 
of this thesis, that the poetry of Ausias March is not radically 
incompatible with Florentine Neoplatonism and that as a consequence 
the introduction of the latter in Golden Age Spain does not constitute 
a "miraculous” shift in sensibility, has been demonstrated on a ' 
conceptual level in Chapters III and IV, and through the practical 
dynamics of his imagery in Chapter V.
A point which is raised, beyond the demonstration of my 
basic proposition, is the inadequacy of the broad concept of courtly
love used as a vertical barrier between what is mediaeval and
Renaissance.7 This very point has plagued the proper interpretation 
of Ausias March’s poetry. It creates the most violent and 
distorting anachronisms. What must be sought is a distinction 
between the various types of sensibility. The question of poetic 
sensitivity does not move in linear blocks. There are only 
individuals who reflect different degrees of sensibility, particular 
to their condition and experience, literary or otherwise. Whether 
it be Andreas Capellanus, Ausias March or Marsilio Ficino, all three 
are Christians whose writings express their concern for Charity 
and their rejection of cupidity. For these writers the considerations
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of Classical, Arabic and Jewish writers undoubtedly contribute to 
their cultural formation, but these ’’influences” are external factors 
in their thought, they are part of the tools used to answer a question,
g
and they should not be confused with that question. The fulcrum of
the problem is one of particular importance for Western Christianism;
9it is the question of evil and whence it came.
This is the object of an extensive discussion by St.
Augustine in the City of God Book XII, 6-8. I believe that the 
implications of this discussion come to bear directly on the works 
of the writers mentioned above. For St. Augustine, evil cannot be 
an opposite autonomous force. It must originate in the will, 
because by the act of Creation God made all things good. Out of 
nothing He infused goodness into all things, and gave them a nature 
and existence which proceeds from Him. Hence, this nature and the 
will can only be good:
But any existing thing which is inferior, even to the lowest depth 
of earth, is a nature and an existence, and therefore it is 
undoubtedly good, having its own mode and form in its own kind 
and order.10
From the outset St. Augustine posits the question of the efficient 
source of evil in the "mutable nature" of man. Thus, he formulates 
the problem of the source of evil as it is related to the problem 
of perception, which is directly affected by this mutability, 
although he takes care never to say that this nature is the efficient 
cause. His illustration of this problem is the kind of consideration 
that serves as a point of departure for Andreas Capellanus, and is 
subjacent in Ausias March and Ficino:
Suppose that two men, of precisely similar disposition in mind and 
body, see the beauty of the same woman’s body, and the sight stirs 
one of them to enjoy her unlawfully, while the other continues
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unmoved in his decision of chastity. What do we suppose to be the 
cause of an evil choice in one and not in the other?... It was not 
the beauty of the woman; for it did not have that effect in both of 
them, although both had precisely the same view of her. 13-
St. Augustine then denies that evil has an efficient cause. Evil
is a deficiency that consists in the failure of the will to turn to
the light of ’’right reason”, that is, it is a movement away from
12the Good. Hence, it is a voluntary matter:
the failure is voluntary, not necessary... it is not a falling away 
to evil natures; the defection is evil in itself, as a defection 
from him who supremely exists to something of a lower degree of 
reality; and this is contrary to the order of nature.13
The problem of evil for Christian writers is, then, based on a 
contradiction which Augustine points out, but avoids by specifying 
that one should not attempt to find an efficient cause for evil.
This consideration is that our nature is essentially good, but yet,
14by its very mutability it is the source of our demise or deficiency. 
This aspect of the question of evil is present in any discussion of 
Charity and cupidity. It is closely associated with the degree to 
which man is capable of apprehending the Good in particular beauty.
St. Augustine’s proposition, quoted above (note 11) is, thus, 
fundamental to Andreas Capellanus, Ausias March, and the Florentine 
Neoplatonists, all of which approach the question from the point of 
view of an aesthetic consideration directly affected by their 
conception of melancholy and imagination.
For Andreas Capellanus, who maintains a monastic perspective 
on the question of evil, the secular world is a source of deceit, 
and spiritual fulfilment can only be found within the structure of
the Church. His view is absolutely consistent with the elaborate
feudal system of relations that prevades the narrations of the De
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Amore. Thus, man’s will is deceived by the temptations of secular 
beauty; it needs the guidance of ecclesiastical piety to turn it 
in the right direction. At best, his lovers can see harmonious
symmetry in the beauty of the lady. This beauty is a vain artifice
by which man’s imagination lures reason away from the Good, and
this is evil for Capellanus, because ”to defect from him who is
Supreme Existence, to something of less reality, this is to begin 
15to have an evil will”. In the De Amore the interior meditation
of the lover can only lead to the madness of ’’melancolia negra”.
This is the kind of torment experienced by Bembo’s Perrotino in
Gli Asolani. The lover is unaware of the interpenetration of
Goodness and beauty and that the source of deceit is his deficient
will. Capellanus excludes the presence of grace from the secular
context, and curtails the power of the individual to perceive this
grace outside of the ecclesiastical machinery. Contrary to the
dignitas hominis of the evangelical current, he presupposes a
weakness in man’s will. This is, indeed, what R. 0. Jones considers 
16to be ’’the central medieval view", although it might be more 
correct to call it the "centralist” point of view. Like the monastic 
ideal it is representative of the Church’s difficulty in adjusting 
itself to the decay of the feudal system and its consequent
incapacity to meet the spiritual needs of a growing urban laity 
in the later Middle Ages.
There is, however, throughout the last centuries of the 
Middle Ages, a constant intellectual ferment, even from within the 
monastic centres of learning, that found it necessary, to revalue 
secular spirituality. Already in the twelfth century it became 
evident that, with the growth of urbanization and the revival of
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culture outside the monastic schools, there was a need to return to
the very sources of the faith and to the simplicity of the devotion 
of the Early Church. From St. Victor, Citeaux and Chartres, the 
evangelical awakening set astir a consciousness of the importance 
of the apostolic life with its emphasis on interior spirituality.
As such, the intrinsic value of imagination^ as a movement between 
the intelligible and sensible worlds to be controlled by the will, 
came to be recognized, as did its corollary, melancholy, which is
characteristic of interior meditation. Released from the bonds of
the monastic tradition, the individual could approach God without 
intermediaries, and apprehend the presence of grace in nature. The 
emphasis is, then, on the participation of grace in the secular 
world with the ever present consciousness of man’s limitations 
originating from his good but fluctuating will in an equally mutable 
nature, that is, a consciousness of the soul’s "descensus ad inferos".
Thus, for Ausias March and the Florentine Neoplatonists 
worldly love is never free from the potential torment caused by a 
misdirection of the will, but their reason seeks the guidance of the 
light of "right reason". It is by interior faith that they seek an 
ideal of chastity and Charity. Although their discussion of love 
focuses on a problem of beauty, the latter is exonerated of all 
responsibility for the individual’s love; as Bembo’s hermit tells 
Lavinello, his love is first and foremost a desire of the will, and 
only then, a movement towards the goodness apprehended in beauty.
There is in the love described by these authors a potential for 
"heroic virtue" attained through the beneficial aspects of imagination 
and melancholy. Their secular learning, especially the medical
theory of the "spiriti" enables them to focus their attention on
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the importance of the soul as a mirror which can perceive right 
reason darkly. Now, Ausias March, who does not have the trappings 
of the classical culture of Ficino, Bembo, Hebreo and Castiglione, 
is not a Florentine Neoplatonist. The serious content of his 
poetry, nonetheless, has many points of affinity with the Florentine 
Neoplatonists, that preclude the notion that the introduction of 
Castiglione’s Cortegiano and Bembo’s Neoplatonic Petrarchism marked 
a rejection of ’’earlier Spanish literature root and branch".
Ausias March is, then, an important link in Spain between the 
Chartrians and the Florentines. He represents "an influence not
IO
to be underestimated in sixteenth-century Castilian poetry", for, 
indeed, he stands besides those who, like Giordano Bruno, cultivated 
"gli heroic! furori".
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APPENDIX I: THE QUESTION OP AUSIAS MARCH’S ORTHODOXY
Orthodoxy is largely a matter of definition and conformity.
For this reason it is difficult to determine whether an author can
be considered religiously orthodox or not. In recent years two basic 
divergent views concerning this aspect of Ausias March’s sensibility 
have emerged, neither of which I find possible to accept entirely.
Much of the research done on the poetry of Ausias March rests
on the very legitimate presupposition that if Ausias March was a
scholastic poet following the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, as
claimed by Amedee Pages and Josep Torras i Bages, his orthodoxy could 
2not be questioned. Yet, this point of view has been seriously
challenged. Joan Fuster refuses to see in Ausias March a scholastic 
3poet. Although he does not question the idea that the Valencian 
poet had a good knowledge of St. Thomas’ Summa theologica, he 
interprets his religious poetry as the product of a rationalist 
sceptical attitude:
... ens obliga a eludir una confusi6 previsible: mencionada com a 
font de March 1’Escolastica, sabent-lo autor del Cant espiritual i 
implantat encara en el mon de l’Edat mitjana, podriem apressar-nos 
a identificar 1’actitud etica d*Ausias amb la del cristianisme.
Estic persuadit que una tai identificaci6 resultaria imposible, 
mirant-ho de prop. No negare que les linies generals del pensament 
ausiasmarquia coincideixin amb les del tomisme. Pero trobo que 
aixo nomes es fins a un cert punt, ... El refus dels sentits, en 
1’erotica sublimada d’Ausi&s, no es fa en nom ni per induccio de 
cap forqa sobrenatural, sink per mer convenciment racional...
Fuster’s point of view Is a meritorious attempt to move away from 
the interpretation of Ausias March as a belated mediaeval troubadour 
imposed by Pages’ analysis. This, however, has serious drawbacks.
It is an attempt to make of Ausias March a harbinger of the Renaissance. 
By attributing to Ausias March’s poetry rationalist and sceptical ten­
dencies, Fuster adjusts his perspective to the interpretation of the
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Renaissance made by Arnaldo della Torre and J. Burckhardt.One of 
the key arguments in favour of Fuster’s thesis is his interpretation 
of a central verse in the "Cant Espiritual”:
no sols es tracta d’una mera conviccio d’empecatament en les accions 
i en les volicions... hi ha mes profunda, una altra mancanga. "Cato- 
lic. s6, mas la fe no m’escalf a", escriu.... Ausias reconeix taxat iva­
ment el deficit fonamental de la seva religiositat....^
Taken at face value verse 185 of Poem CV, which Fuster quotes above,
is an expression of Ausias March’s acknowledgement of his weak faith
and real love for God. Nevertheless, in its proper context it is
one of the clearest statements of his profound devoutness. It is
one of the expressions of the "constant exalted piety" of Ausias 
7March, as noted by Eugene Baret. In the "Cant Espiritual", verse
185 introduces a stanza that describes the heterodox fervour of
Ausias March’s faith:
Catholic so, 
que la fredor 
car yo leix so 
e paradis 
Aquella part 
mas la dels senys 
donchs tu, Senyor, 
tant que la part
mas la Fe no-m escalfa
lenta dels senys apague
que mes sentiments senten,
crech per fe y raho jutge.
del esperit es prompts
rocegant-la’m acoste;
al foch de fe m’acorre,
que*m port fret abrase (CIV, w. 185-192)
The tension in these verses is between reason and faith, and Ausias
March expresses his anxiety and desire for a movement of personal
revelation. This is, in fact, the kind of self-accusation found in 
the writings of the devotio moderns. Thomas a Kempis, Ausias March’s 
Dutch contemporary, provides an excellent counterpart for these 
verses in his The Imitation of Christ: "Appease the hunger of this 
Your beggar; warm my coldness by the fire of Your love and lighten
8my blindness by the light of your presence" (underlining is mine).
It is not a real lack of faith, or scepticism, that Kempis and
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Ausias March express in these statements, but a need to heighten
their interior experience. Hence, Fuster is correct in noting the 
tensions that beset Ausias March’s religious experience, and the 
intensity with which he seeks a transcendent love. Contrary to
Fuster, however, I believe that the tensions and doubts inherent in
the work of Ausias March are not the product of rationalism. They
are profoundly Christian and pertain to a quasi-mystic sensibility. 
Problems of faith pervade Ausias March’s poetry. For the
Valencian poet, however, faith is not passive; it is a living
experience. As X have indicated in Chapter IV of this thesis, this 
is also a key factor in the spirituality of Petrarch and Ficino,
which leads to their avowed Christian Platonism. A similar situation
occurs in the work of Ausias March through the influence of Ramon
Lull. In his poetry Ausias March expresses his awareness of the
conflict that exists between natural reason and faith which remains
unsoundable. Much of his religious and moral poetry constitutes an
effort to summon his confidence in faith, since reason cannot 
zdemonstrate its basic tenets: ’Esser un Deu 1’enteniment ho
mostra; / en lo restant es mester la fe nostra" (CXIII, w. 129­
130). Thus, in this poem Ausias March seeks to express the sense 
of mystery by which the intellect apprehends the veracity of the
faith. Such a preoccupation naturally entails an inquiry into the 
9realist notion of causation. Ausias March, therefore, turns to the 
concept of the great chain of being: "Les fins dels fets estan 
encadenades / secretament, que no es ull les veja" (CXIII, w. 
245-246).What the eye of flesh does not see, the intellect can 
conceive imperfectly. • Ausias March’s statement also implies a 
reference to the problem of predestination, with which I will deal
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below. It can be seen in March s poetry as a source of anxiety
stemming from the conflict of faith and reason. Thus, in certain 
poems, such as the "Cants de Mort", one finds expressions of
possible scepticism:
Tu, Pietat, 
que«l cor de earn 
No tens poder 
Qual tan cruell
com dorms en aquell cas
fer esclatar no sabs?
que tai fet no acabs?
qu* en tai cas no* t loas?
(XCIII, w. 37-40)
and:
Ddu piados 
tant es en nos
e just cruel se mostra:
torbada conexenqa
(XCII, w. 175-176)
As in Ficino and Petrarch, these occasional moments of doubt in
Ausias March’s poetry, find some solution in his belief in the
primitive doctrine of the dignity of man, which is intimately related
to the concept of the great chain of being, since it allows man to 
11partake in the divine nature of his cause. Four references to 
this concept can be found in his poems. These are partially
12integrated into the general problem of the composite nature of man.
In spite of this reference to the duality of man Ausias March does
stress that man’s real nature is his soul. For Ausias March,man’s
nature inclines him to seek to transcend the delights of animals.
13These animal delights, as they are frequently called in Ausias 
March’s poetry, refer to the pleasures of the flesh. Hence for the 
Valencian poet man’s true end is to seek intellectual fulfilment,
this befits his nature:
Qui*n aquest m6n 
cerque delits 
llexant als bruts 
e sos delits 
Lo delit d’om 
quant veritat
d’esser horn se contents 
que ssa natura vulla 
los camps e llur despulla, 
no*ls acurt ne*ls d6*npenta.
, en 1’entendre s’assents 
per aquell es sabuda
(C, w. 61-66)
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The soul, then, constitutes the real seat of human nature. It is to 
the rational soul that the intellect pertains, and through the 
operations of the latter man achieves his true end. The soul is 
divine and it yearns to return to its origin; because of this man
can be said to have been made in the similitude of God:
L’animal horn 
toquant de brut 
brut per la earn;
es animal cornu
e de celestial
per l’arma divinal
(CVI, w. 121-123)
Like most Neoplatonist thinkers, Ausias March is conscious of the
dual condition of human nature after the soul’s immersion in the
body. He, nevertheless, r’ecognizes the inherently divine, and
therefore good> capacity of human nature which lies in the transcendent 
power of his soul. Thus, he can say, like St. Augustine and the 
Chartrian Platonists, that man can find in himself the real end of
his activity. In other words, man can perceive the divine cause
reflected in the mirror of his soul. This is a point which has 
escaped Pages’ interpretation of verses 43-44 in Poem CIV:
On ne voit pas comment ce principe suivant lequel l’homme peut 
trouver en lui-meme la fin de son activite, s’accorde avec la morale 
chretienne pour qui la nature est mauvaise.^
Ausias March understands man’s real nature to be good, in a manner 
foreshadowing the humanist belief in pagan virtue,which is
consistent with the evangelical tradition:
Si Deu no fos, 
per si mateix 
car en ben fer 
e l’ome reb
This statement may not be
ne lo mon donas premis,
horn deu fer bones obres,
lo bon horn se delita
de sa bon* obra paga
(CIV, w. 41-44)
in agreement with the Aristotelian scholastic
tradition, followed by Pages, but it is consistent with the evangelical
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sensibility within which Ausias March works. Nature cannot be bad 
if its beauty is a reflection of God’s goodness. Ausias March is 
conscious of the reflection of divine attributes in nature, and he 
seeks to apprehend it intellectually* Yet, he is also aware of the
innate contradiction of man’s fallen state:
Pren-me n axi 
1’esser del hom 
e puix ell ve 
tant avorreix
com aquell qui contempla
e com es de Deu obra,
a contemplar sos actes,
trobar-s« en lo m6n home
(CXVII, w. 57-60)
As these verses indicate, human nature is divine but its undoing is
the ’’descensus ad inferos”. Ausias March’s concern is with the 
soul’s recovery of its plenitude. Spiritual tension in his poetry 
consequently arises from the knowledge of the soul’s fall and his
desire to assert his divine nature.
It is the emphasis that Ausias March places on man’s divine 
nature that forces him to seek a pure love. As such, the erotic 
experience in Ausias March constitutes a basic incentive for the 
soul’s return to its origin, for love causes it to recall the real 
source of all beauty, and this necessitates a rejection of scepticism:
Qui 1’esperit 
molt li es prop 
e qui tornar 
no li es luny 
E donchs puix Deu 
complit es foil
infinit lo vol creure,
que part de Deu lo crega; 
a son principi nega, 
que toqu*en Deu descreure.
es lo principi nostre, 
qui tornar no*y desija
(CXII, w. 361-366)
The problem of scepticism is present in the poetry of Ausias March, 
as some of the above references indicate. One cannot, however,
deduce from these occasional comments that Ausias March’s own
position was consistently sceptical. In his poetry, the conflict 
between reason and faith is resolved by an ardent desire to transcend
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worldly beauty, in order to contemplate its real source. Ausias 
March, like Hughes de Saint Victor and the Florentine Neoplatonists,
finds it impossible to serve both God and the world, because his 
soul, which is a "tertium quid" between the world and God, would be 
torn between the two.I? It would constantly fluctuate between 
divine and earthly beauty, which state would lead to sorrow. He sums 
up this situation, which is in fact the subject of all his poetry, 
in a later poem: "Deu e lo mon ensemps no«s poden colre; / 
qui*u vol fer tot, aparell-se a dolre" (CXII, w. 369-370). This 
is the key spiritual problem in his poetry. He is faced with the
desire to love both the world and God, because he is conscious of 
the divine presence in particular beauty, but he must transcend the
particular.
The spirituality of Ausias March can then be said to have an
evangelical basis. Ausias March probably never had any knowledge 
of The Imitation of Christ which certain passages of his work recall, 
as I have noted above. As recent research, such as that of Pere
Ramirez i Molas, following in the steps of M. Menendez-Pelayo and
Mario Casella, has shown, Ausias March’s thought is not affected as 
18much by St. Thomas Aquinas as by Ramon Lull. This evidently 
places Ausias March in the ambience of the evangelical current. 
Naturally, a complete study of Ausias March’s religious sensibility 
would be the object of a separate thesis examining the various 
religious currents present in Catalonia between 1400 and 1460. Such 
a work would involve a complete analysis of the writing of Ramon 
Lull, Arnau de Vilanova, San Vincent Ferrer and Isabel de Villena.
I will limit myself to a brief examination-enumeration of several 
definite points of heterodoxy that are strikingly evident in Ausias
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March’s work.
The study of pre-Erasmian spiritual currents in Spain generally
distinguishes three principal figures: Arnau de Vilanova, San 
19Vincent Ferrer and Ramon Lull, all of whom are Valencian. The
prominence of these three figures indicates that the Aragonese 
20kingdom was fertile for heterodox spirituality, and undoubtedly
its mercantile economy was a contributing factor. In Castilian
literature it is common to focus attention on the contribution of
conversos in order to explain heterodoxy. Yet, in Catalonia and
Valencia the situation is considerably altered by the additional
presence of the Cathar phenomenon, which continues to play an active 
21role well into the middle of the thirteenth century. It can also 
be seen to contribute to the shaping of Ausias March’s sensibility, 
if not directly, at least through Ramon Lull. The merging of Judaic 
and Cathar elements in the general evangelical current further 
complicates any explanation of the problem of heterodoxy. Thus, 
the problem with the theory of Judaic influences, or converso 
particularities, as studied by Charles Fraker in the Cancionero de
Baena, is that points of heterodoxy which he identifies with converso
literature are also those identified with Catharism by specialists 
22in that subject. One cannot, in Catalan literature, associate 
certain traits exclusively with Judaism, and it is necessary to set
aside this common means of distinction. What must be understood is
that these currents merge, because both Catharism and the evangelical
movement represent an effort to return to the doctrines and sensibility 
23of the Early Church. As Frances Yates has demonstrated, Ramon 
Lull’s work is an attempt to convince those Cathars, who had taken 
refuge in Catalonia after the disaster of Montsegur, by using their
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books: "in the right way for the most pious purpose of Christian
24apologetic". Hence, Cathar spirituality merges into the evangelical 
tradition independently from the Judaic and Arabic elements in Spain.
Cathar spirituality came to the Catalan countries principally through
the immigration and establishment of the corporations of weavers, as 
25it had in Provence and Italy. It is to be noted that the development
of the textile industry in the Valencian kingdom, and in particular,
26in Ausias March1s native Gandia, coincides with the massive
immigration of weavers fleeing the Albigensian Inquisition at the 
27end of the thirteenth century. As Jordi Ventura Subirats explains,
in the first half of the thirteenth century, Valencia became a centre 
28of Catharism in the west. This spiritual current became
indistinguishable from certain later forms of modern devotion, such 
29as the bequinatge of Arnau de Vilanova. It is not surprising,
therefore, that in the fourteenth century the inquisitor, Nicolas
30Eymerich, could find ground to question the orthodoxy of Ramon Lull. 
Ausias March writes over a century after the decline of
Catharism in Valencia. By then the Albigensian tendencies as a
separate entity had become lost in the greater current of evangelical
spirituality that was sweeping Europe. It would be misleading if 
not erroneous, to identify Ausias March’s sensibility with Catharism, 
since the latter had ceased to exist separately. One does note,
however, that in one particular instance there is an unmistakable
reference in his work which proceeds from a fragment of Cathar 
writings. This gives one sufficient ground to question his orthodoxy.
It is a phrase that is found in a Cathar ritual, and can have been 
integrated into a manual of popular devotion. Thus, in the "Cant 
Espiritual", which Amedee Pages considers to be "le testament
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31poetique d’un disciple de saint Thomas", Ausias March makes a 
very explicit dualist statement:
Yo*m trob offes 
e si no* y bast 
ab que no«m tochs
contra Tu ab gran colpa,
Tu de ma earn te farta 
l’esperit, qu*a Tu sembla
(CV, w. 210-212)
In this instance it is obvious that Ausias March makes a sharp
distinction between the flesh and the spirit. The fact that he
condemns the flesh, but asks for the redemption of the soul indicates
that he attributes the source of sin to the former. This is a
proposition that St. Augustine expressly rejected as fundamentally 
32Manichaean. Ausias March does not normally advocate such a
strongly dualist position. One notes that he repeats St. Augustine’s 
33definition of sin in Poem CXXVIII, and that in other poems he
frequently makes statements concerning the responsibility of the 
34will that are consistent with the Augustinian definition. In the
"Cant Espiritual" we are faced with a situation of interior devotion
in which Ausias March transcends the limits of formal religion and
expresses the very tensions of his faith.
It seems to me that the source of verses 211-212 in Poem CV 
35is the Servitum of the Cathar catechism. The phrase used by Ausias
March is of exceptional importance, because it is exclusively Cathar,
and it does not seem to be attributable to any other source.
Specialists in the history of Catharism single it out as one of 
3 6the most representative statements of Cathar sensibility. As in 
the "Cant Espiritual" the phrase found in the Servitum requests the 
damnation of the flesh and the salvation of the soul: "0 Senhor,
juja e condapna los vises de la earn, no aias merce de la earn nada
z 37de corruptio, mais aias merce del esperit pausat en career."
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Steven Runciman presents this section of the Servitum by explaining
that the complete Ritual does not contain any overtly heretical 
38statements, but that this phrase is a key to the dualist implications
of the doctrine contained in the Ritual:
The Servitum was apparently recited in the vernacular. It contained 
no heretical statement. Only the stress it laid upon the sins of 
the flesh and the phrase ’’Have no mercy on the flesh born in corruption 
but have mercy on the spirit held in prison” indicate the dualist 
nature of its reciters.39
The affinity of Ausias March’s verses 211-212 with the Cathar phrase 
is self-evident, although it is not a verbatim repetition. The 
language and concepts manipulated are the same. Certain facets of 
the Cathar phrase are immediately lacking in verses 211-212 of 
Ausias March, such as the adjectival phrases "born of corruption” 
and "held in prison". These qualifications are implicit in Ausias 
March’s use of the Cathar phrase. References to the prison of the 
spirit are found in other poems of Ausias March, and in Poem CV, 
only a few verses above 211-212, the "descensus ad inferos" is given 
an extreme interpretation. Ausias March conceives of it as a kind
of eternal damnation. It is the fall of the soul into its prison 
of corruption: "Torn a no-res, yo-t suplich, lo meu esser, / 
car mes me val que tostemps l’escur career" (CV, w. 197-198).
In another poem Ausias March explicitly refers to the flesh as a 
source of corruption: "Lo cors, qui es corrupta creatura"
(LXXXVII, v. 13). There is no reason to doubt that in verses 211­
212 of Poem CV Ausias March understood the concepts implicit in the 
Cathar phrase which he echoes. In the last section of the "Cant
Espiritual", Ausias March is particularly concerned with the sins 
40of the flesh. In this context his usage of a Cathar metaphor is
a good indication of his heterodox leanings. Again it is important
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to stress that this does not mean that Ausias March was a belated
Cathar, but that without necessarily being a converso the socio­
cultural circumstance within which he lived could lead him to be
affected by currents of heterodox spirituality. This is possible 
only because Catharism is not a cryptic religion, but principally 
an evangelical reaction:
C’est dans une atmosphere de haute spirituality chretienne que le 
catharisme s’est developpe; et il s’inscrit dans un mouvement plus 
large de renovation religieuse d’esprit evangelique. Il est de fait 
que les Cathares n’ont jamais parle de Mani, ni de Sophia, ni des 
Eons: ils ne citent que les Evangiles et les paroles memes de
Jesus-Christ.
A perusal of Ausias March’s poetry reveals that he was, indeed, very 
familiar with the Psalms and the New Testament, as one can verify in 
the long list of Biblical references found in his poetry which I 
have catalogued in Appendix II (L: 2). Although these aspects of 
Ausias March’s poetry might have been attributable to Catharism had 
Ausias March written in the fourteenth century, his familiarity with
the New Testament cannot be considered a sign of Catharism in the
fifteenth century, but merely one of evangelical devotion.
A fundamental characteristic of heterodox sensibility is the 
42desire to penetrate the mysteries of divine Providence. Thus, one
of the themes frequently associated with heterodox spirituality is
the question of predestination, in which the freedom of will is
denied. The importance of this problem for many Spanish poets of
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has been evinced by Charles 
43Fraker’s studies on the Cancionero de Baena. Although his ideas 
on this subject do not present any particular exceptionality, it is 
important to note that Ausias March, like his Castilian contemporaries, 
expresses certain heterodox points of view. In his research Fraker,
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following F. Marquez Villanueva, attributes the interest manifested 
for this theme by the poets of the Cancionero de Baena, to a 
development of Wyclifism among conversos. One of the main arguments 
used by Fraker, who recognizes that there might have been other 
sources, is that the converso poets use the word "pregito" in order 
to refer to the reprobate. This word is considered by Fraker and 
Marquez-Villanueva to be particularly Wyclifite, and to have been
introduced in Castile at the time of the debate on predestination:
In other words the connexion between the word and a school of thought 
is visible even at a distance of four or five centuries, and it is 
not unbelievable that it would be more visible at closer range. In 
this connexion the early history of pregito in Castilian is revealing. 
Apparently the use of this word (with its cognates) by the Baena 
poets along with one late passage in the Rimado de palacio are the 
earliest that can be found. The date for the first of these appearances 
must therefore be about 1400... This takes on greater significance, 
if we realize that pregito appears precisely at the same time that 
predestination is first discussed in Castilian vernacular literature; 
as we know, it is in such discussions that pregito is used. It is 
true that not every such context treats predestination in Wyclifite 
style, but even when the connexion Is apparent Wyclifism is not 
obvious, it is at least believable that widespread lay discussion 
of predestination might well have been sparked from a Wyclifite flint 
and that the presence of pregito signals precisely that fact.^4
Ausias March uses the Catalan form of the Latin praescitus, which
is at the origin of the Castilian pregito, in a secular reference to
the theme of predestination. In a love poem Ausias March compares 
45himself with a reprobate, who pleads for God’s mercy although he
knows that his damnation is inevitable:
s£ co»l precis 
vehent-se prop 
ne prega Deu 
e sab que va
que no»s de mort deliure, 
d’aquell seu jorn derrer, 
li sia mercener
hon null horn se pot riure
(XXXV, w. 25-28)
The view of predestination implied in these verses is extreme. At 
no .point is it suggested that the reprobate might ever be saved; he 
is condemned by God’s judgement and can expect no mercy. That precfs
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refers to the reprobate in this context is evident from verse 28.
Now, the question that arises is that if, as Fraker suggests, the 
use of praescitus signals Wyclifism, then Ausias March might be 
considered a Wyclifite. It is in such instances, however, that one
becomes especially aware of the cultural independence of Catalan
literature from Castile. As Fraker notes, the word praescitus was
used by European theologians long before Wyclif. The remarkable
aspect of Fraker’s discussion is that the use of praescitus, instead
of the more common reprobatus, belongs to a long tradition divergent
from that of the Schoolmen such as Aquinas and Scotus, and is 
46principally found in Franciscan circles. Thus, although Ausias 
47March takes a '’hard view” of predestination, as the above quotation 
implies and other quotations will elucidate, one notes that the 
presence of the word precis in his poetry probably does not proceed 
from a Wyclifite source, but from Ramon Lull. Indeed, this word is 
found in Catalan vernacular discussions of predestination at least 
a century before it is in Castilian. In the one hundredth chapter 
of his Libre de Meravelles, which is entitled ”De predestinacio e 
de franc arbitre", Lull discusses the question of the reprobate and 
the possibility of his salvation through merits:
Molt cogita Felix en qo que l’ermita hac dit de predestinacio e de 
franc arbitre, e meravella’s fortment que horn gredestinat se pusca 
perdre, ne que hora precis se pusca salvar;...^8 (underlining is mine)
Given that Ausias March is known to have read Ramon Lull, one cannot 
assume that his use of the word precis signals a Wyclifite influence. 
Lull’s interpretation of the problem of predestination in the Libre 
de Meravelles is orthodox, but it must be remembered that this theme
is central to the evangelical sensibility, inasmuch as the question
„ 49of necessity is inevitably present in the Platonic system. Thus,
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the points of doctrine raised by Ausias March are not necessarily
Wyclifite. His sensibility may have been affected by any number of 
50evangelical currents, including the Cathar. Furthermore, the
problem of the predestination of the elect remains central to the
writings of St. Augustine, who never entirely rejected this aspect 
51of his Manichaean sensibility. The discussion of this problem,
therefore, remains bound with the derivations of Augustinianism.
Discussion of the theme of predestination involves two basic 
52aspects, one theological and the other astrological. The heterodox
approach to the first aspect is that the salvation or the damnation
of the individual is in no way related to his personal merits or the
performance of good works. This point of view is expressed by Ausias 
53March in various instances. It is, however, in the "Cant Espiritual" 
that Ausias March raises various theological points questioning 
God’s Wisdom and His Justice most explicitly. Towards the beginning 
of the "Cant Espiritual" he questions the value of works:
Mas yo*m recort 
(tant quant hom veu 
ton spirit 
com ne per que
que meritist lo Ladre 
no*y bastaven ses obres); 
la hon li plau spira: 
no sab qui en earn visca
(CV, w. 29-32).
As verse 31 indicates, the thief, whose works would not have sufficed
to save him, was redeemed by the arbitrary justice of God, which
cannot be understood rationally but by faith alone (verse 32). This 
is a case which Ausias March attributes entirely to God’s election. 
Similarly, the irreconcilable nature of predestination with reason
leads Ausias March to question the goodness of God. He
a question which Fraker would attribute specifically to
sensibility, but which can also be attributed to Cathar
formulates
the converso 
54,sources.
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Fraker refers to the question made by Alfonso Martfhez de Toledo in 
the Corbacho concerning God’s justice in having created a man 
knowing that this same man was to be damned:
0 Senor!, pues de necesario me tengo de danar, ^jpor que quesiste 
que nasciese, pues a Ty era notorio, en tu paresciencia eternalmente 
dispuesta, que yo avia nasciendo de danar? Pues, sy Td lo quesyste 
asy, a Ty serfa gloria como soberano seftor, pero, Senor, por Td ser 
verdadera justicia pienso que non me fazes justicia; ca mejor fuera 
que non nasciera para tai condepnacion aver...55
Ausias March repeats this unresolved question with its Wyclifite 
implications in the ’’Cant Espiritual":
Tu creist me 
e pot-se fer 
Si es ax£, 
puix fon en Tu 
Torn a no-res, 
car mes me val 
yo crech a Tu 
que*l fora bo
perque l’anima salve, 
de mi sabs lo contrari.
J per que, donchs, me creaves 
lo saber infallible? 
yo«t suplich, lo meu esser, 
que tostemps l’escur career; 
com volguist dir de Judes 
no fora nat al mon home
(CV, w. 193-200)
Like Martinez de Toledo, Ausias March expresses his doubts concerning 
God’s justice, much as we have seen him do in Poems XCII and XCIII
above. These verses are of interest inasmuch as they illustrate 
the tension in Ausias March’s poetry that arises from the conflict 
of faith and reason. Thus, in subsequent verses Ausias March 
transforms the question of predestination into an outright expression
of doubt:
Per mi segur, 
no fos tornat 
mas a la mort 
e de present
havent rebut batisme, 
als braqos de la vida, 
hagues retut lo deute 
yo no viuria»n dubte!
(CV, w. 201-204)
Whether one interprets the word ’’dubte” as "fear” or as "doubt”, 
the fact remains that fear of his predestination would not exist if 
Ausias March did not doubt God’s justice, like many of his
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contemporaries. Since the question of predestination cannot be
resolved by reason, Ausias March turns to a highly intense expression 
of interior faith. Were Ausias March1s orthodoxy unquestionable^ 
this kind of scrupulosity would be avoided by a greater confidence
in works and his free-will.
Without necessarily going to the extremes of heterodoxy
and scepticism Ausias March is aware of the influence of cosmic 
57determinism. Thus, the questions which he raises in the "Cant
Espiritual" can be shown to be closely associated with the problem 
58of astrological predestination. As I pointed out above, Ausias 
March has recourse to the theory of causality in order to demonstrate 
the validity of his faith. The concept of the chain is closely 
related to the problem of cosmic determinism. Although it is not 
supposed to affect the individual’s free-will, the astral machine 
is considered to determine the individual’s nature or temperament.
It is, then, interesting to note that in the "Cant Espiritual"
Ausias March introduces the problem of his own predestination in 
terms of causality:
Ajuda’m Deu, 
desig saber 
a Tu»s present
car ma forqa es flaca; 
que de mi predestines: 
y a mi causa venible
(CV, w. 150-152)
Just as in the subsequent verses Ausias March is concerned with the
fate of his soul, "causa" in verse 152 refers to the concept of the
procession and return of the soul, in the most elementary implication 
59of causality. Within the great chain of being all events are 
secretly linked together, as Ausias March states in Poem CXII1, w. 
245-246 quoted above. The poet’s predestination is known to God, 
not only in virtue of St. Augustine’s concept of God’s time, but
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because He is the efficient cause He also knows the final cause, 
which remains for Ausias March "a forthcoming cause". Thus, in a 
poem in which Ausias March speaks to his heart, he repeats his belief 
in the immutability of God’s decree:
Ans que lo m6n, 
puix fon en Deu 
e lo saber 
que sia menys 
sino aytai
fon vostra mala sort, 
lo vostre cas present, 
de Aquell no consent 
vostre cas ne pus fort, 
com per Ell es sabut
(LII, w. 9-13),
Strictly speaking this view is orthodox inasmuch as Ausias March
limits his statement to the idea that predestination is determined
before any foreseen merits. The point that draws our attention is
that Ausias March introduces into the discussion a reference to 
60Fortune, "mala sort”. Although it is of no consequence in this 
instance, it has astrological implications in other verses.
The question of the great chain of being and causality 
introduces the concept of astrological influences. This can have 
deterministic consequences if it is considered that the power of the 
stars exceeds that of the individual’s free-will in determining his 
future. It is, then, imperative to know to what extent Ausias March
considers that astral influence encroaches on the individual’s
free-will. That Ausias March believes in astral influence is evident
in his reference to the fact that all men desire good that comes from
"accident or nature":
Voler honor, 
e tot quant ve 
y aquella fi 
d’aquestes fins
gloria, bens o fama,
d’accident o natura,
qu»en la virtut atura: 
lo voler d’hom s’enflamina
(CXII, w. 335-338),
"Accident" and "nature" are technical astrological terms. "Accident"
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refers to an event in the course of a man’s life brought about by
the position of the stars at the time at which the event occurs.
’’Nature” refers to the temperament of the individual which is caused 
61by the astral configuration dominant at the moment of his birth.
Thus, in Poem LXXV, in which Venus is shown to rule the world,
Venus declares that her own power is inherent, or natural, whereas 
that of the other planets is merely accidental:
Mas Venus diu: 
ab alguns deus, 
per mi s6n bons 
los altres han
- Yo son rey natural, 
senyors jus mi sients; 
e per si no valents; 
poder accidental
(LXXV, w. 29-32),
Now, the temperament, or nature, of the individual as it is
determined by the stars at the moment of his birth is not supposed
to affect his free-will. However, certain writers do suggest that 
62the temperament affects the individual’s moral acts. In Ausias
March the constant interrelation between body and soul is a strife, 
in which the desire of the body frequently usurps that of the soul, and
the temperament of the body is said to overpower the soul’s will.
Ausias March sums up this situation:
l’arma coman 
lexant lo cors 
ja no li plau 
puys ab dolor
a Deu, lo qui l’a feta, 
desastruch per mal astre; 
de sos volers lo rastre, 
viu per ell, no discreta
(LXXVI, w. 29-32),
In these verses Ausias March suggests that the body which is
"ill-starred", causes the soul to lose its discretion, which is 
the source of its free-will, and therefore, the poet seeks to release 
the soul. The stars,then,influence the soul indirectly. This kind 
of astrological influence is passive, and Ausias March does not
develop its implications to the extreme that Villasandino does in
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the Cancionero de Baena. It should be noted, however, that he does
lean in that direction and stops short of overtly associating the
Ill-starred man with the reprobate. Thus, although his approach 
to theological predestination tends towards the ’’hard view” in certain 
instances, he does not carry this to its consequences in astrological
determinism. These instances of deviation from the orthodox position
are not exceptional; they are of a topical nature in fifteenth
century, and indicate that Ausias.March was affected by the general 
spiritual unrest. From this point of view they are insufficient to 
suggest that Ausias March deviated from the norm towards a heretical
position.
Those statements in Ausias March’s poetry that can be 
considered to have heretical implications are made in instances of
extreme emotional pressure. It must be noted, however, that although 
they blend within the overall intense personal tone of Ausias March’s 
poetry, they are neither consistent nor well developed. Thus, for
instance, in the fifth Song of Death, Poem XCVI, Ausias March declares
that his prayers for his beloved are vain, for if she is in heaven 
he could not express his bliss, and if she is in hell his prayers 
will not change anything:
Preguant a Deu 
car fet es tot 
si es e»ll cel 
si en infern,
les mans no»m cal pleguar, 
quant li pot avenir: 
no»s pot lo be spremir; 
en foil es mon preguar
(XCVI, w. 17-20)
This statement is an obvious denial of the value of prayers for the 
dead. It is worthy of note that Ausias March makes no reference in 
this passage to purgatory, which lies behind the purpose of the 
prayers for the dead. In order to have value this statement would
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have to deny the doctrine of Purgatory. Yet, in a previous poem
Ausias March addresses a prayer
before Christ if his beloved is
Mare de Deu, 
son esperit 
s£ ton Fill prech
to Mary requesting her intervention
in purgatory:
si es en purgatori
per no purgats delictes,
no guart los prechs d’on venen 
(XCIV, w. 129-131).
These two quotations tend to contradict each other. We must, then,
take into account that Ausias March’s denial of the value of prayers 
for the dead, which would involve a denial of purgatory, is made in
a moment of intense personal grief. In these instances the finer 
points of theology are overlooked in order to intensify the expression 
of the poet’s emotion. It is not, as such, heterodox belief.
One is struck, nonetheless, by the fact that Ausias March’s 
statements reflect the instability of the religious atmosphere in
fifteenth-century Valencia. The very fact that Ausias March could
allow himself to make such statements does reflect an interiorization
of religion compatible with an anti-clerical feeling which he
expresses with reserve in a moral poem:
tot estament son ofici no serva
(no»m se»ls prelats; perdon-m’o Deu com dubte).
Papes e reys fins al estat pus minve
fan lo que*Is plau, mas no pas lo que volen (deuen)
(CIV, w. 11-14).63
Ausias March expresses the religious unrest and doubt of his age.
For this reason, he cannot be considered to be truly heretical,
because his position does not seem to differ substantially from the 
64community in which he lived. His doubts are those that preoccupy 
the men of his age, and they are expressed within the desire to 
strengthen his faith. Yet, it is an unrest that is not entirely
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compatible with strict orthodoxy. The Reformation and Counter­
Reformation arose out of the religious instability that was common 
at the time of Ausias March, and which could then make his heterodox 
statements seem acceptable. After the first Erasmian period in 
Spain, it is interesting to note that the translators of Ausias
March found it necessary to alter these statements which had become 
65absolutely unacceptable in the eyes of the Inquisition.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX I
"L’heresie, qui est une rupture (par choix) dans 
l’assentissement, implique done, sociologiquement une rupture 
avec la communaute, qui, sous une forme ou sous une autre, est 
le lieu de 1’orthodoxie....
L’heretique, e’est-a-dire le croyant qui "choisit”, commet 
done: 1° une impertinence vis-a-vis du Dieu dont il pretend 
ecouter la Parole, et 2° un ecart, bientot une rupture, vis-a-vis 
de la communaute dont le consensus est, sinon une regie juridique, 
du moins la surface portante de la communication des mysteres 
divins. Le croyant n’a pas le droit a l’heresie’1 (M. D. Chenu, 
’’Orthodoxie et heresie: le point de vue du theologien," Heresies 
et societes dans 1’Europe pre-industrielle, lle-18e siecles, 
ed. Jacques Le Gof, Paris: Mouton, 1968, p. 11). This definition 
avoids confusing heresy and infidelity, which is often the case 
in the history of the Spanish Inquisition. As I. S. Revah points 
out in his comment on Chenu’s definition: ’’Dans 10% des cas 
seulement l’heretique veut demeurer a 1’interieur de la foi.
L’immense majorite des heretiques poursuivie veut etre infidele: 
juifs et morisques places de force dans la communaute catholique” 
(Ibid., p. 17). Out of this arises the confusion that causes 
some critics to associate, all too easily, the deviant forms of 
spirituality with Judaism in Spanish literature.
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Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee: A Study of the Christian 
Dualist Heresy, Cambridge: University Press, 1960, pp. 88, 116, 
118, 121 and 171; Rene Nelli, Ecritures Cathares, Paris: Denoel, 
1959, pp. 21-23 and 26-27; L'Erotique des troubadours, Toulouse: 
Edouard Privat, 1963, pp. 221-225).
23 M. D. Chenu, La theologie au douzieme siecle, p. 233; see 
in this thesis Chapter IV, note 58.
Frances Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," Journal 
of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes vol. 23, London: 
University of London, 1960, p. 38.
Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 133.
See Chapter II.
Jorge Ventura Subirats, Els heretges Catalans, Barcelona:
25
26
27
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34
35
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37
38
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40
Selecta, 1976, pp. 58-59; ”E1 catarismo en Cataluna," pp. SO-
83.
J. Ventura Subirats, Els heretges Catalans, p. 58; "El 
catarismo en Cataluna," p. 141.
See Chapter III, note 109; J. Ventura Subirats, "El catarismo 
en Cataluna," pp. 148-149. It is also important to note that the 
"Jeronimos" who were largely responsible for the propagation of 
the Bible in Spain, as well as, the introduction of the devotio 
moderna, were originally beguins, and that the latter were closely 
associated with Arnau de Vilanova (see C. F. Fraker, "Gonqalo 
Martinez de Medina, the Jertfnimos and the Devotio Moderna," 
Hispanic Review XXXIV, 1966, p. 203).
F. Yates, "Ramon Lull and John Scotus Erigena," p. 39.
A. Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, p. 388.
See Chapter IV, notes 121, and especially 145 and 224.
"Lo mal, en les coses no es: / instrument son ab que horn 
fa; / per§0 en elles mal no ha" (CXXVIII, w. 16-18).
See Amedee Pages, Auzias March et ses predecesseurs, pp. 292­
293, and Chapter III of this thesis, discussion of Poem CXV.
This text is found in Rene Nelli, Ecritures Cathares, pp. 
205-228; and L. Cledat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIIIe 
siecle en langue provenqale suivi d'un rituel cathare, Geneve: 
Slatkine, 1968 (reprint of Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1887, p. XI);
See also Chapter IV of this thesis, note 58.
See J. Ventura Subirats, "El catarismo en Cataluna," pp. 165­
166; Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 154.
L. Cledat, Le Nouveau Testament traduit au XIIIe siecle en 
langue provenqale suivi d'un rituel cathare, p. XI.
In spite of his statement that the Servitum, "contains no 
heretical statement", Steven Runciman goes on to explain the 
veiled sense of the work (The Medieval Manichee, pp. 163-170).
Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 154.
The "Cant Espiritual" takes this direction from stanzas XXI 
and XXII onwards. In these Ausias March emphasizes his conscious­
ness of the sins of the flesh which keep him from attaining 
spiritual delight: "Prech-te, Senyor, que»m fasses insensible 
/ e qu«en null temps alguns delits yo senta, / no solament
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los leigs qui*t venen contra, / mas tots aquells 
qu«indifferents se troben” (CV, w. 169-172).
Rene Nelli, Ecritures cathares, p. 14.
"L’heretique est un croyant fervent, voir passionne, 
intellectuellement, avant de 1’etre sociologiquement. La foi 
a declanche dans son esprit - et au dela de son intellect meme, 
dans son comportement mental - une curiosite de penetrer le 
mystere, d’en avoir, en l’obscurite de sa transcendance, une 
intelligence intellectus fidei (M. D. Chenu, ’’Orthodoxie et 
heresie," p. 12).
See note 19 above.
C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero 
de Baena," p. 239.
Precis in Poem XXXV, verse 25 has been the source of some 
confusion for the commentators of Ausias March. A. Pages 
(Commentaire des poesies d’Auzias March, p. 48) interprets it 
to mean "condamne a la decapitation". P. Bohigas (Ausias March, 
Poesies II, Barcelona: Barcino, 1952, p. 122) basically repeats 
Pages’ interpretation: "el condemnat a mort", and more recently 
Rafael Ferreres seems to realize that the sense is reprobate in 
his translation: "Asi como el precito que no es librado de 
muerte" (Ausias March, Obra poetica completa I, Madrid: Castalia, 
1979, p. 249). There is no doubt that in this context, with the 
explicit hopelessness of the precis’ request to God for salvation, 
Ausias March intends this word to mean "reprobate".
C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero 
de Baena," pp. 238-240.
C. F. Fraker uses this term to refer to, "the notion that 
salvation or damnation is related in no way whatever to personal 
merits or sins of the person saved or damned" ("The Theme of 
Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," p. 233).
Ramon Llull, "Libre de Meravelles," ed. M. Batllori, Obres 
Essencials vol. I, Barcelona: Selecta, 1957, p. 474.
On this point see A. 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, pp. 63-66. C. S.
Lewis gives an account of how this problem is traditionally 
avoided by Christian Platonists, The Discarded Image, Cambridge: 
University Press, 1964, pp. 87-90.
See Christine Thouzellier, Catharisme et Valdeisme en 
Languedoc, pp. 365-368.
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Steven Runciman, The Medieval Manichee, p. 16.
C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero 
de Baena," p. 233.
See Chapter III, note 35.
See C. F. Fraker, Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, p. 52; 
"The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," pp. 228­
232, and Rene Nelli, L’Erotique des troubadours, p. 223, in which 
he attributes the same question to the Catharism of Peire Cardenal, 
who might well be a possible source for Ausias March.
55 Alfonso Martinez de Toledo, Arcipreste de Talavera, o^ 
Corbacho, ed. J. Gonzalez Muela, Madrid: Castalia, 1970, p. 212.
In this instance "dubte" could be translated as either "fear" 
or "doubt". A. Terry in Ausias March: Selected Poems, Edinburgh: 
University Press, 1976, p. 127 translates this as "doubt", which 
I believe is exact.
In a metaphorical manner Ausias March refers to the influence 
of the stars in two instances: Poem XV, verses 25-28, and Poem 
XX, w. 29-32.
The question of astrological or natural predestination is 
understood as the influence of the temperament on the individual’s 
moral acts, see C. F. Fraker, Studies on the Cancionero de Baena, 
p. 42, and "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de 
Baena," p. 233.
Pere Bohigas (Ausias March, Poesies V, p. 211) believes that 
"causa" in verse 152 of Poem CV means "cosa", Arthur Terry 
translates "causa" by "cause" (Ausias March, Selected Poems, p. 
123). Rafael Ferreres (Ausias March, Obra poetica completa II, 
p. 137) also translates "causa" by the Castilian "causa”. Since 
Ausias March never uses "causa" to mean "cosa" in any other poem, 
Pere Bohigas’ interpretation seems groundless.
The role of Fortuna, which generally has astrological 
implications for fifteenth-century Spanish poets (see C. F.
Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero de Baena," 
pp. 231-233), in relation to predestination is obvious in the 
short one stanza Poem LXXXII: "Quant plau a Deu que la fusta 
peresqua, / en segur port romp ancores y ormeig, / e de
poch mal a molt hom morir veig: / null horn es cert d’algun 
fet com fenesqua. / L’ome sabent no te pus avantatge / 
sin<$ que*l pech sol menys fets avenir. / L’esperiment y 
ells juhfs veig fallir; / Fortuna y Cas los torben llur 
usatge" (LXXXII, w. 1-8). As I tried to shew in Chapter V, the 
marine metaphor of the boat and the port refers here to the soul
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and the body, and therefore to the soul leaving the body, or 
death. In verses 7 and 8 Ausias March explicitly states that 
death, which is arbitrarily willed by God (verse 1), defies 
reason and is ruled by Fortune and Chance.
See C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the 
Cancionero de Baena," p. 233. On the repercussions of this 
point specifically concerning the heterodox implications of the 
theory of melancholy-imagination see Michel Foucault, "Les 
deviations religieuses et le savoir medical," Heresies et 
societes, pp. 19-29.
62 C. F. Fraker, "The Theme of Predestination in the Cancionero 
de Baena," p. 233.
Although the Bohigas edition (Ausias March, Poesies IV, p. 
102) uses the word "volen" in verse 14 of Poem CIV, the editor 
notes that later manuscripts substitute "deuen" for "volen", 
and that "deuen" is probably the correct reading (p. 114).
64 See Chapter II, note 17, and notes 1 and 20 above.
See M. de Riquer, Traducciones castellanas de Ausias March 
en la Edad de Oro, Barcelona: Instituto Espaftol de Estudios 
Mediterraneos, 1946, p. XXIV.
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Introduction to the Index of Ausias March’s Imagery
The purpose of an index of images and proverbial phrases
present in the poetry of Ausias March is to provide the critic with
a guide to the sets of ideologically and thematically related images
used by this poet. It is designed to be used for further investigation
on the work of Ausias March, and its influence on the poetry of
successive generations of Spanish poets. While it is not intended
to replace the reading of the complete poems of Ausias March, nor the
concordance to his works,it can be used independently from the latter,
and should be used as a complementary tool for literary research.
2Although the two existing commentaries to the works of 
Ausias March, do refer to related images, they do so only in a 
sporadic manner and seem incomplete and unreliable in this matter.
For the purpose for which it was designed the basic advantages of the
index over the concordance are that, it lists all known sources of an
image, with a reference to the most accessible edition of the source
where necessary, next it enables the reader to locate all references 
3to an image rapidly, without having to conjure up a series of words 
that might be related to a theme or image, and finally, this index 
is not bound to a single edition, I have used the editions of A. Pages 
and P. Bohigas, and have listed all manuscript variants of the images, 
that is, when there was a variation o£ the metaphor or theme, referred 
to. The index can, therefore, be used with any future edition of 
Ausias March, provided that these respect the numbering of the poems 
established by Pages, which is now the acknowledged standard. This 
work should help overcome the general unfamiliarity of scholars with 
the poetry of Ausias March, by making reference to his work easier.
A number of important problems concerning imagery and
cataloguing were fundamental to the preparation of this index. The
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foremost problem was that of defining imagery in such a way as not to 
break up the logical unity of the verses, and yet not to combine sets 
of images. The main difficulty rested in the nature of the poetry in 
question. Ausias March has been called the "transmitter of the Dante 
heritage in Spain",5 a remark which may not be entirely correct, but 
which serves to remind us of the predominant role which allegory plays 
in his poetry, as a means of psychological expression. Allegory is 
image-forming since it animates, or illustrates, concepts and thought 
patterns. Owing to the nature of allegory, had I included every form 
of verbal animation in my conception of imagery, I would have been 
forced to classify each verse in Ausias March’s poetry according to 
its frame of reference. I, therefore, restricted my definition of • 
imagery to symbols, metaphors and similes, considering each image to 
be a sign in the language of the poet, illustrating and defining the
terms of verbal communication, and thereby, containing and revealing 
a notion dear to the poet’s verbal needs of communication. Poem XV 
will provide an example of the problem of defining and limiting. The
second stanza of this poem, verses 9-16, consists of two basic parts,
a sea image, and an ensuing explanation. The image is a simile
representing the emotional conflict of the poet. In this instance
it is clear that the image exists. However, in verses 14-16:
dos grans desigs han combatut ma pensa,
mas lo voler vers hu seguir dispensa;
yo*l vos publich: amar dretament vds (IV, w. 14-16).
the presence of the participle "combatut" implies battle, and therefore, 
a military reference or image, but it does not form one; it only remotely 
evokes one. It does not form an image, because it is not the "sign" in 
the language, but the communication itself. I, consequently, classified 
verses 9-13 as an image, but omitted the ensuing verses.
A corollary to this problem was that of external references 
and their classification. By its nature an image is an external sign
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conceptually brought into the poet’s language. There is a similarity 
between this and the introduction of historical, literary, biblical, or 
agricultural references into a linguistic structure: they form an 
illustration. I have, therefore, included these '’references” in the 
index, especially since their function as "images” is revealed because 
they are, at times, used as similes.?
With the selection of images to be included in the index a 
final problem arose concerning the internal classification. Images
are conceptual; they arise out of a series of associations of symbols
or motifs that have a particular significance for the poet. An image
is a composite structure. Rarely is an image in Ausias March's poetry
simple; it usually extends over several verses and draws in various
elements. The problem of classifying all these elements was primarily
solved by cross-referencing the occurence of the various constituent
elements. However, the various elements, or motifs, constituting an
image are sometimes equally important to the image, they list a series
of associations with no necessarily predominant element. In those
instances the problem could only be solved by reasoned subjective
choice, but this was compensated by the fact that each element was
cross-referenced, and, therefore, easily accessible to the researcher.
I chose what seemed to be either the key element, or the first listed,
put it under the heading of "Main" image, and then, placed the remaining
ones under the heading, "subordinate" images. An example of such a
situation can be found in Poem VI, verses 29-32:
e mes que mal administrador es:
al cavador dona loguer de metge;
en lochs plans fa durar 1'estret setge,
e fort castell en tera tost l'a mes (VI, w. 29-32).
The stanza from which these verses proceed is introduced by the image 
of "folly" caused by a "lord" or "king" figure. The "administrador" 
in verse 29 Is a form of the "lord" whose function is that of ruling
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and commanding, that is, of bearing the responsibility for the order 
of the "state” or, "place", "locus", under his administration. He is 
a variation on the basic motif of the king. In consequence, the elements 
present in this image are: a main thematic image of Folly, which 
subordinates those of the kind ("administrador"), the labourer, the 
doctor, military, and the castle. The imagery in these verses is listed
in this manner in the index.
The third major problem rested in finding a viable classification
for poetic images. I was unable to find a previous complete model for
this kind of work. Indices of poetic imagery are generally limited to 
8one theme, and are, therefore, unsatisfactory for my intent to compile
a complete classification. There remained the possibility of using
the classification of two other models, that of Stith-Thompson and his 
9followers in their work on the preparation of a folk-motif index, and 
the ideological classification of proverbs by subject or theme, as used 
by Luis Martinez Kleiser, in the Refranero General Ideologico EspaKol.
The Stith Thompson model presented the advantage of a well worked-out 
classification by groups. However, the grouping used by Stith Thompson 
is not applicable to poetic motifs. The imagery of the myth is
diametrically opposed to that of poetry. Both Claude Levi-Strauss
and C.S. Lewis have pointed out that poetry and myth are at opposite 
31poles of expression. This difference is made clear by the French 
anthropologis t:
Myth is the part of language where the formula traduttore, tradittore 
reaches its lowest value. From that point of view it should be placed 
in the gamut of linguistic expressions at the opposite end to that of 
poetry, in spite of all claims which have been made to prove the 
contrary. Poetry is a kind of speech which cannot be translated except 
at the cost of serious distortions; whereas the mythical value of the 
myth is preserved even through the worst translation. Whatever our 
ignorance of the language and the culture of the people where it 
originated, a myth is still felt as a myth by any reader anywhere in 
the world. Its substance does not lie in the style, its original 
music or its syntax, but in the story which it tells. Myth is language, 
functioning on an especially high level where meaning succeeds
M2
practically at "taking off" from the linguistic ground on which it 
keeps on rolling. 12
Since in myth the meaning is the principal medium communicated it 
follows that the "motifs" or images, belong to a fairly simple and 
common heritage. They draw on a common experience, which is given
collective expression.
This is not the case of poetic imagery. Poetry is a well
established and highly codified form of expression dependent on the
intellectual use of language in particular and limited ways. It
is, from this point of view, not a collective, but an individual 
13expression. Robert Scholes has correctly noted that:
In poetry the lexical and paradigmatic side of language dominates - 
the reverberations of a given word in its own linguistic heritage. 
Naturally, this is, as Robert Frost said, "what gets lost in translation" 
Poetry celebrates the unique in a culture, a language, a man’s way of 
using his language. In myth, however, the structural and syntagmatic 
side of language dominates, and at this level languages have much more 
in common. Linguistic structures and hence myths, have a universality 
which linguistic units, being arbitrary, do not have. 14 
The poetic image has implications dependent upon an intellectual and 
historical "tradition" alien to the myth. Especially in the case of 
Medieval and Renaissance poetry, imagery is closely related to a highly 
codified scale of social and intellectual values conditioned by theories
of love and courtship.
These basic differences made it impossible for me to classify
the imagery of Ausias March under the folkloric headings of Stith
Thompson. The ideological classification of Luis Martinez Kleiser,
seemed more compatible to my project. It lists alphabetically the
occurrence of proverbial themes. The major drawback being that, it is
very haphazard and not cross-referenced. I, consequently, produced
my own classification which is a hybrid of these two models. I listed
every item thematically and ideologically, and then grouped them under
twenty general headings. The classification of the proverbs is a 
15separate matter.
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All of Ausias March’s poetry is concerned with problems of 
Love, profane and divine; all his imagery is related to this theme.
It should be borne in mind, however, that a certain section of this 
imagery refers directly to the courtly tradition and forms a basis for 
Ausias March’s poetry. In my classification I began by setting aside 
the four great ’’metaphysical" themes that predominate in his poetry:
Love, Fortune, Folly-Wisdom-Fool, and Death. The section on Love 
includes all images that are closely related to the stock of courtly 
imagery, and I included a section on images referring to courtly love 
terminology. Throughout the index I did not arrange the classification 
alphabetically, but grouped them according to related themes within the 
major groupings. Hence, the image of the Bread of Love is followed by 
that of the Oven of Love, and the Religion of Love is followed by images 
of the beloved as a goddess, and of Love as an idol, similarly images 
concerning Death are followed by those of Time and the Worm.
After having grouped images under these four main themes,
I found it appropriate to form another three main categories based on 
man’s means of relating to the four metaphysical themes. These three 
themes are, "Religious" imagery, "Military" imagery related to the 
martial arts, and "Science", which groups all images related to medicine, 
apothecary science, alchemy and astrology. This grouping which is 
based on man’s understanding of the universe is succeeded by imagery 
based on man’s vision of the world; it includes all imagery concerned 
with marine life, the elements, nature and geography. The latter 
theme is, in fact, a "Geography of Love", it is an allegorical 
topography of the lover’s universe modelled on the topical scenery 
of the medieval world.. The next group involves four large themes
found in Ausias March which describe the manifestations of man in this
world. This includes literary imagery, references to man’s infirmities 
which are seen as a manifestation of his limitations, as well as images
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based on his emotions which are understood as his expression of his 
limitations, and the final theme in this group includes all musical 
images. Finally, the last major definite group gathers all images 
concerned with the description of man, his civil structures, his 
commodities, and his social organization. This is followed by a 
collection of miscellaneous images, a list of which can be found on 
pages 485 and 486.
In this section I have included additional short indices
to help guide the researcher. These include, a numerical index which 
lists all the poems referred to in the Index, the main images in each 
one and at which verses they are found; an alphabetical index of the 
image items, or themes, and their position in the index; an index to 
the miscellaneous images, and an index of the sources referred to. 
This is preceded by a general synopsis to the Index.
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Footnotes
1. Presently, the only existing concordance is that of Bernard 
Flam, A Concordance to the Works of Auzias March, University of 
Wisconsin: Ph.D. thesis, 1962. It seems that Constanzo di Giroloma
is preparing a new computerized concordance to the works of Ausias March 
(see, Joseph Gulsoy and Josep M. Sola-Sole, Catalan Studies in Memory 
of Josephine de Boer, Barcelona: Borras Edicions (Hispam), 1977, p. 12).
2. A. Pages, Commentaire des poesies d*Auzias March. Paris:
Honore Champion, 1925, and P. Bohigas (ed.) Ausias March Poesies I-V, 
Barcelona: Barcino, 1952-1959. I do not consider the philological 
critique of P. Ramirez i Molas, La poesia d’Ausias March: analisi 
textual, cronologia, elements filosofics, Ph.D. thesis, University
of Basle, privately printed, 1970, is actually a commentary, the
second part only comments on certain textual problems.
3. An example of the greater value of the Index over the concordance 
can be seen in the case of the image of the worm. In the concordance of 
B. Flam one finds listed under "verm" and "verme", five verses and 
locations. In the preparation of this index I found seven references
to this image, one of which is a manuscript variant innaccessible through 
the concordance.
4. Myron A. Peyton. "Auzias March as Transmitter of the Dante 
Heritage in Spain", Italica vol. XXXIV, no. 1, 1957, p. 83.
5. Poem X is an excellent example of allegory used to describe 
a psychological problem.
6. As T.S. Eliot pointed out: "We have to consider the type of 
mind which by nature and practice tended to express itself in allegory: 
and, for a competent poet, allegory means clear visual images. And 
clear visual images are given much more intensity by having a meaning- 
we do not need to know what that meaning is, but our awareness of the 
image we must be aware that the meaning is there too", in "Dante: I,
The Inferno", Selected Essays, London: Faber and Faber, 1972, p. 243.
7. Examples of such cases are clear in IX, 10, and CXXVII, 25, 
among others.
8. Two examples of such limited classification are, Helga Bauer,
Per Index Pictorius Calderons: Unterschungen zu seiner Malermetaphorik,
Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter und Co., 1969, p. 233-260, and Ana M. Komornicka, 
Metaphores, Personnifications et Comparaisons dans 1*Oeuvre dlAristophane.
Warszawa: Wyclawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1964, p. 182-195.
9. Stith Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk Literature I-VI, Bloomington: 
University Press, 1955 (1966), and John Esten Keller, Motif-Index of 
Medieval Spanish Exempla, Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1949.
10. Luis Martinez Kleiser, Refranero General Ideologico Espano1. 
Madrid: Real Academia, 1953.
11. Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology I, trans. C.
Jacobson and B. Grundfest Schoepf. New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 210. 
and C.S. Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism, Cambridge: University Press, 
1961, p. 41.
Mb
12. Structural Anthropology I, p. 20.
13. This general statement obviously raises the problem of '’epic"
poetry, which is a collective expression. I would resolve this serious
problem by pointing out that pre-Renaissance epic poetry belongs to a 
certain group of people, it has a historical and social significance
particular to an ethnic group. Moreover, in either the composition
or the recitation the poet or the joglar introduces his own particular 
style and interpretation, in which more than the ’’story" counts, hence 
the importance of language in the epic, as opposed to the myth.
14. Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature, New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1974, p. 62.
15. On the problem of the proverbs see pages 619-620.
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General Synopsis of the Index to the Imagery of Ausias March
Love 1. Arrow-Spear
2. Bond of Love (rope, chain, knot, etc.)
3. Bondage of Love (service and Vassalage)
4. Bread (food of Love)
5. Oven
6. Cloth
7. Court of Love-Fortune
8. Courtly Love
9. Feast
10. Religion of Love
11. Goddess
12. •Idol •
13. Hostal of Love
14. Nest of Love
15. Novice of Love
16. Power of Love
17. Robe-Garment
18. Wound of Love
19. Envious Man (see Man: Types, P:a:4)
Fortune 1. Fortuna
2. Game a: chess
b: dice
C. Folly-Wisdom-Fool
D. Death 1. Death
2. Time
3. Worm
4. Tetric
5. Poison
E.
F.
G.
Religious
Military
Science
(as distinct from the Religion of Love)
1. Crucifixion
2. Devil
3. Devout Man
4. Religious
5. Mystic
6. Martyr-Saint
7. Eschatological, (Paradise, Glory, Hell)
8. God
1. Military
2. Armed Man, sword
3. Equestrian
4. Hunting
1. Medicine
a. Bitter-sweet
b. Doctor
c. Heat-Cold
d. Humours
e. Sick Man
f. Opposites
2. Alchemy
3. Apothecary
4. Astrology
478
H. Marine 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Sailor
Port
Sea
Ship
Wind (see Elements, 1:5)
I. Elements 1. Fire-Ice, non-medical Hot-Cold
2. Light-Darkness (illumination)
b. Dark place
3. Sun
4. Water
b. Rivers
c. Sea (see Marine, H:3)
5. Wind
J. Nature 1. Agricultural
2. Animal
b. worm (see Death, D:3)
3. Landscape-flowers
4. Tree
K. Geography of Love
1. Path-Way-Road
2. Traveller-Travelling
3. Bridge
4. Hill
5. Wall
6. Door
7. Key
8. House
9. Castle
10. Prison-Prisoner
L. Literary 1. Literary, General
2. Biblical
3. Book
4. Classical
5. Golden Age
6. Historical
7. Mythological
8. Petrarchist
M. Infirmity 1. Blind
2. Deaf and Dumb
3. Lame
4. Short-sightedness
N. Emotions 1. Fear-Flight
2. Laughing-crying
3. Tears
4. Cruelty
5. Friendship
0. Music 1. Music
2. Dance
3. Trumpet
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Man a. Types:
1. Child
2. Coward
3. Dwarf-Giant
4. Envious Man
5. Old Man
6. Sad Man
7. Sterile Man
8. Sodomite
9. Strong Man 
10. Weak Man
b. Occupations:
1. Beggar
2. Hermit
3. Labourer
4. Penitent
5. Philosopher
6. Pilgrim
7. Armed Man (see Military, B2)
8. Traveller (see Geography , K:2)
9. Rich Man-Merchant
10. Robber
11. Prisoner (see Geography, K:10)
12. Sailor (see Marine, H:l)
13. Miser
c. Parts of the body:
1.
2.
3.
Eyes
Hair
Heart
d. States:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Hunger
Thirst
Sleep
Solitude
Civil Structures
Commodities
1. Bridge (see Geography, K:3)
2. Castle (see Geography, K:9)
3. Door (see Geography, K:6)
4. House (see Geography, K:8)
5. Pillar
6. City (see Literary, :Biblical
1. Axe
2. Bed
3. Table
4. Vessel
5. Oven (see Love, A:5)
6. Money-Gold
7. Sword (see Military, F:2)
8. Closet (see Geography, K:7)
L:2)
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S. Social Organization
1. King-Lord
2. Servant
3. Juridical
4. Vassalage (see Love: Bondage of Love, A:3)
T. Miscellany
U. Proverbial phrases.
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Alphabetical Index of Image Items in Ausias March's Poetry
Left column lists the items alphabetically, right column in letters 
and numbers refers to the location of the items in the index, as 
may be found in the Synopsis.
Agricultural reference J:1
Alchemy G:2
Animal J: 2
Apothecary G:3
Armed Man F: 2
Arrow A:1
Astrology G:4
Axe R:1
Bed R:2
Beggar P:b:l
Biblical L:2
Bitter-Sweet G:l:a
Blind Mil
Bond of Love A: 2
Bondage A: 3
Book L:3
Bread (Food of Love) A:4
Bridge K:3
Castle K:9
Chain of Love A:2
Chess B:2:a
Child P:a:1
City L:2
Classical L:4
Closet K:7
Cloth A:6
Court of Love-Fortune A: 7
Courtly love (terminology A:8
Coward
Crucif ixion E:1
Cruelty N:4
Crying-Laughing N:2
Dance 0:2
Dark Place 1:2:b
Deaf M:2
Death D:1
Devil E:2
Devout Man E: 3
Dice B:2:b
Doctor G:l:b
Door K:6
Dumb-Deaf M:2
Dwarf -Giant P: a: 3
Envious Man P: a: 4
Equestrian F:3
Eyes P:c:1
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Fear-Flight N:1
Feast A:9
Fire III
Flight-Fear N:1
Folly-Wisdom-Fool C
Food of Love A:4
Fortuna B:1
Friendship N:5
Game B:2
Garment-Rob e A: 17
Giant-Dwarf P:a:3
God E:8
Goddess . A: 11
Gold R:6
Golden Age L:5
Hair P:c:2
Heart P:c:3
Heat-Cold (Medical) G:l:c
Hell E:7
Hermit P:b:2
Hill ' K:4
Historical L:6
Hostal of Love A: 13
Hot-Cold (Non-Medical) 1:1
House K:8
Humours G:l:d
Hunger P:d:l
Hunting F:4
Idol A: 12
Illumination 1:2
Juridical S:3
Key K:7
King S:1
Knot of Love A: 2
Labourer P:b:3
Lame M:3
Landscape J:3
Laughter-Crying N:2
Light-Illumination 1:2
Literary Reference (General) L:1
Lord S:1
Martyr-Saint E:6
Merchant-Rich Man P:b:9
Military F:1
Miscellany T
Miser P:b:13
Money-Gold R:6
Music D:1
Mystic E:5
Mythological L:7
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Natural landscape J:3
Nature J
Nest of Love A: 14
Novice of Love A: 15
Old Man P:a:5
Opposites (Medical) G:l:f
Oven A:5
Paradise-Hell E:7
Path-Road-Way K:1
Penitent P:b:4
Petrarchist L:8
Philosopher P:b:5
Pilgrim P:b:6
Pillar Q:5
Poison D:5
Port H:2
Power of Love A:16
Prisoner K:10
Proverbial Phrases U
Religion of Love A: 10
Religious (General) E:4
Rich Man-Merchant P:b:9
River I:4:b
Road-Way-Path K:1
Robber P:b:10
Robe A: 17
Rope of Love A:2
Sad Man P:a:6
Sailor H:1
Saint E:6
Sea H:3
Servant S:2
Ship H:4
Short sightedness M:4
Sick Man G: 1: e
Sleep P:d:3
Sodomite P: a: 8
Solitude P:d:4
Sterile Man P:a:7
Strong Man P:a:9
Sun 1:3
Sword F:2
Table R:3
Tears N:3
Tetric D:4
Thirst P:d:2
Time D:2
Traveller K:2
Travelling K:2
Tree J:4
Trumpet D:3
Vassalage A: 3
Vessel R:4
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Wall K:5
Water • 1:4
Way-Road-Path K:1
Weak Man P:a:10
Wind 1:5
Wisdom-Folly C
Worm D:3
Wound of Love A: 18
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Alphabetical Index to Miscellaneous Images
The left-hand column lists the items alphabetically. Roman numerals 
in the right-hand column indicate in which poems these items are 
found. The arable numbers refer to the particular verses in which 
these items occur.
Bad and Good Man XLI 5-8
Bath CXXVII 280
Chain CXII 245-246
Clever Man CXXVIII 557-566
Colours LVIII 9-12
Earth and'Heaven CXIV 44
Evil CXVIII 31-35
Father and Son CVI 213-214 
CXVII 209-212
Flesh in tooth LXXV 33-40
Flesh; Seven Lives CXVIII 59
Fortune Teller CX 5-8
Glue CXXVII 148-150
Good and Bad Man XLI 5-8
Heaven and Earth CXIV 44
Hole CXXVIII 118-119
Inheritance-Purse CXIX 57-58
Janus: Two-faced person CXIII 156
Man, b ad XLI 5-8
Man, clever CXXVIII 557-566
Man, good XLI 5-8
Milk CXXVIII 382-385
Possessions CXXVIII 664-666
Price of Love CIX 11-12
Purse-Inheritance CXIX 57-58
Race LXXXVIII 15-16
Rest LVII 25-26
Sawing CII 103
Scythe CV 147
Son and Father CVI 213-214 
CXVII 209-212
Stone LXVII 33-36 
extt 11-13
Two faced person, Janus CXIII 156
Veil XCIII 29-32 
CXXVIII 557-566
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Weather
Wet Nurse
Wood
XXXIV 33-36 
XCII 121-122 
CXII 249-250 
CXX 121-124 
XLII 23-24 
XLII 25-32 
CXXVIII 230
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Numerical Index to the Poems of Ausias March
This index lists all the poems of Ausias March and the main
images found in them. Roman numerals indicate the number of the
poem. The arabic numbers refer to the verses containing an image.
The word found next to these numbers refers to the Main heading under 
which I have catalogued these images in the "Index to the Imagery of
Ausias March".
JL 1-2, Sleep; 13-16, Prisoner; 19-20, Proverb; 22-24,
Child; 31-32, Sick Man; 33-40, Hermit; 41-42, Worm; 43-44, Envious Man.
II 1-8, King; 9-10, Wind; 11-12, Key; 17-18, Animal; 24, 
Fire; 2.7-28, Sun; 37-40, Sleep; 41-44, Bread.
III 5-6, Fire; 9-12, Heat (Medical); 13-14, Sick Man,
IV 1-6, Hunger; 9-13, Sea; 27-30, Animal; 31-32, Fire; 
55-56, Pillar.
V 9-16, Biblical; 17-18, Fire; 19-20, Book; 23-24, Folly; 
29-32, Folly; 40, Door.
VI 9-12, Path; 21-22, Money; 23-24, King; 26-28, Folly; 
29-32, Folly; 34-36, Agricultural; 37-40, Friendship; 43, Bread;
44, Animal.
VII 1-2, Proberb; 4, Music; 13-16, Water; 32, Biblical;
48, Axe; 49-51, Biblical; 57-59, Paradise; 61-64, Light; 67-68, Water.
VIII 2-4, Courtly love; 5-7, Dance; 10-12, Dance; 16, Proverb 
17-20, Child; 25-28, Robber; 35-36, Sun.
IX 1-8, Prison; 9-12, Biblical; 15-16, Mythological;
19, Folly; 41-44, Door.
X 1-8, Military; 25-26, Bread; 27-28, Bondage of Love;
29-32, Military; 33-40, Military.
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XI 1-4, Tears; 9-16, Death; 17-24, Death; 35-36, Humours
39-40, Military.
XIII 1-8, Tetric; 11-12, Death; 13-16, Historical; 17-24,
Mythological; 25-30, Death; 33-38, Death.
XIV 1-8, Fortuna; 10-12, Fortuna; 25-28, Thirst; 29-31,
Astrology; 33--35, Fire.
XV 4, Proverb; 5-8, King; 17-20, Sun; 21-24, Fire; 25-28
Mythological; 29-32, Mythological; 35, Folly; 41-48, Feast; 49-53,
Military.
XVI 9-12, Sterile Man; 17-20, Wall; 20-24, Table; 25-32,
Military; 33, Proverb; 41-44, Folly.
XVII 10-11, Dumbness; 29-32, Prisoner; 37, Proverb; 41-44,
Doctor; 45-48, Novice of Love; 49-52, Military; 53-56, Biblical. 
XVIII 1-4, Light; 9-12, Fire; 17-20, Animal; 25-28, Light;
33-36, Biblical; 41-44, Philosopher; 49-52, Martyr; 57-60, Money.
XIX 5-8, Devil; 23-24, Death; 33-36, Bitter-Sweet.
SC 1-4, Classical; 17-24, Key; 25, Proverb; 29-32,
Courtly Love; 33-40, Fire.
XXI 9-12, Biblical; 23-24, Dice; 25-28, Light; 33-36,
Heart; 43-44, Juridical.
XXII 6-8, Tetric; 10-12, Hunger; 25-28, Prisoner.
XXIII 9-12, Eye; 15-16, Petrarchist; 25-28, Biblical; 31-32
Biblical; 33-36, Biblical.
XXIV 3-8, Fortuna; 9-12, Envious Man; 17-20, Sleep; 25-28, 
Animal; 37-40, Fire.
XXV 21-22, Music; 27-28, Laughing-Crying; 6-8, Deaf and 
Dumb; 41-42, Heart.
XXVI 6, Deaf and Dumb; 9-12, Historical; 13-16, Biblical; 
20, Fire; 27-28, Envious Man; 33-36, Death; 41-42, Classical; 43-44, 
Biblical; 45-48, Classical; 49-53, Tree.
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25-28, Ship; 33-36, Sea.
XXVII 9-12, Weak Man; 15-16, Petrarchist; 17-20, Servant;
XXVIII 1-8, Light; 9-11, Death; 17-20, Bond of Love.
XXIX 1-4, Animal.
XXX 1-4, Coward; 9-10, Proverb; 39-40, Animal; 49-56,
Fortune.
XXXI 13-16, Idol; 17-20, Fortuna; 25-32, Fortuna; 33-40,
Fortuna; 41-44, Mythological.
XXXII 9-12, Music; 29-30, Proverb.
XXXIII 25-32, Fire; 33-36, Deaf and Dumb; 37-40, Worm.
XXXIV 1-8, Wind; 23, Fear; variant 20-32, Music; 33-36,
Miscellaneous; 41-44, Animal.
XXXV 7-8, Sick Man; 25-28, Prisoner; 33-36, Folly.
XXXVI 1-8, Death; 17-20, Laughing-Crying; 27-32, Goddess;
37-38, Folly.
XXXVII 31-32, Hunger; 37-40, Goddess; 43-48, Crucifixion.
XXXVIII 29-32, Path; 37-40, Time; 41-44, Bread.
XXXIX 3-6, Folly; 17-20, Hermit; 27-28, Petrarchist.
XL 21-24, Dwarf and Giant; 25-28, Strong Man; 33-38,
Military.
XLI 5-8, Miscellaneous; 13, Trumpet; 31-32, Proverb;
37-40, Friendship.
XLII 1-8, Animal; 12-16, Animal; 23-24, Miscellany;
25-32, Miscellany.
XLIII 9-10, Fear; 17-24, Devil.
XLIV 1-4, Doctor; 17-20, Sun.
XLV 9-13, Fire; 31-32, Military; 37-40, Hostal; 69-72,
Power of Love; 73-76, Power of Love; 81-88, Martyr; 89-94, Literary 
97-100, Path.
XLVI 1-8, Wind; 9-16, Biblical; 17-20, Fear; 45-48, Door;
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60, Dice.
XLVII 1-4, Astrology; 19-20, Equestrian; 25-28, Fire; 33-35,
Hermit.
XLIX 1-6, Heat-Cold (Medical); 13-16, Sleep; 20-24,Biblical
25-28, Literary; 35-40, Military; 41-44, Bondage of Love.
_L 1-6, Devout Man; 10-12, Juridical; 17-18, Paradise;
23-24, Power of Love; 28, Death..
LX 1-6, Prisoner; 13-16, Sick Man; 25-28, Mythological;
30-31, Hostal; 32, Proverb; 37-39, Literary.
LII 1, Proverb; 1-4, Robe; 5-8, God; 14-16, Military;
25-28, Arrow; 30-32, Death; 33-36, Death; 43, Death.
LIII 1-4, Heat-Cold (Medical); 9-12, Religious (General);
21-24, Martyr; 25-26, Goddess; 30-32, Religion of Love; 33-37, Folly; 
43-44, Feast.
LIV 1-4, Folly; 9-12, Paradise; 13-16, Death; 25, Proverb;
29-32, Death.; 33-36, Fortune; 39-40, Bitter-Sweet; 41-44, Hostal.
LV 17-20, Ere; 35, Deaf and Dumb; 37-40, Death.
LVI 9-12, Music; 13-16, Religion of Love; 21-24, Fortuna;
25-32, Light; 33-36, Fortuna; 37-40, Death.
LVII 5-8, Literary; 11-16, Biblical; 17-20, Biblical; 25-26
Death; 39-40, Biblical.
LVIII 1-4, Rich Man; 9-12, Power of Love; 21-22, Robber.
LIX 1-4, Sick Man; 13-14, Death; 17-20, Death; 21-22, Fear
27-28, Death; 29-32, Prisoner; 43-44, Power of Love.
LX 15-16, Military; 21-24, Military; 28, Proverb; 31-32,
Military; 35-36, Travelling.
LXI 33-34, Blindness.
LXII 4-5, Juridical; 15-16, Death; 20-21, Biblical; 25-28,
Path; 33-36, Power of Love; 41-44, Eye; 49-50, Petrarchist.
LXIII 3-4, Prisoner; 5-6, King; 12, Proverb; 16, Proverb
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41- 44, Heat-Cold (Medical).
LXIV 1-8, Animal; 10-12, Power of Love; 13-15, Courtly Love;
17-20, Fortuna; 21-22, Robe; 25-27, Animal; 28, Biblical.
LXV 1“4, Petrarchist; 9-11, Blind; 25, Petrarchist;
27, Wound; 29-30, Hostal.
LXVI 1-4, Bond of Love; 9-12, Sick Man; 14-15, Religion of
Love; 21-23, Light; 25-28, Sick Man;' 33-36, Power of Love; 37-38,
Power of Love; 39-40, Blindness; 41-44, Petrarchist.
LXVII 2-4, Heat-Cold (Medical); 9, Petrarchist; 11-12, Heat-
Cold (Medical); 13-16, Hermit; 18-20, Power of Love; 33-36, Miscellaneous 
39-40, Fire; 45-48,. Robe; 49-50, Religion of Love.
LXVIII 1-8, Servant; 17-24, Solitude; 26, Landscape.
LXIX 15-16, Bond of Love; 25-28, Heat-Cold (Medical); 51-52,
Music; 53-56, Sick Man; 57-58, Power of Love; 63-64, Laughing-Crying.
LXX 33-35, Poison; 46-48, Power of Love; 55-56, Proverb.
LXXI 33-34, Castle; 49-52, Golden Age; 53-56, Water; 57-60,
Bond of Love; 73-74, Animal; 86-88, Bond of Love; 101, Folly.
LXXII 9-12, Envious Man; 13-14, Blindness; 16, Biblical;
17-22, Biblical; 25-26, Biblical; 27-30, Biblical; 37-40, Power of
Love.
LXXIII 5-8, Literary; 17-22, Wound of Love; 41-42, Servant.
LXXIV 9-12, Sick Man; 17-20, Ship; 28, King; 32, Equestrian;
47, Proverb.
LXXV 3-4, Religion of Love; 11-12, Prisoner; 21-22, Religion
of Love; 23-24, Mythological; 25-28, Mythological; 33-40, Mythological;
42- 43, Hostal; 45-48, Mythological; 49-56, Mythological; 70-72, Power 
of Love; 73-80, Mythological; 81-84, Mythological.
LXXVI 2-4, Port; 5-8, Travelling; 30, Astrological; 33-36,
25-26, Proverb; 27-28, Bread; 30-32, Bitter-Sweet; 33-40, Death;
Old Man.
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LXXVII 7, Cruelty; 25-28, Robe.
LXXVIII 41-42, Robe; 43-44, Animal; 49-50, Prisoner; 56, Death
59-60, Bond of Love.
LXXIX 1-8, Wound; 9-16, Arrow; 17-27, Golden Age; 27-32,
Military.
LXXX 1-2, Labourer.
LXXXI 1-4, Death; 7-8, Travelling.
LXXXII 1-4, Ship.
LXXXIII 1-4, Sick Man.
LXXXIV 2-4, Friendship; 13, Proverb; 19-22, Golden Age; 23-24
Heat-Cold (Medical); 33, Deaf and Dumb; 39, Military; 49-51, Power 
of Love; 57-60, Power of Love.
LXXXV 1-2, Fortuna; 18, Military; 19-20, Bond of Love;
41-44, Fire; 45-48, Bond of Love; 49-54, Fortuna; 55-56, Proverb.
LXXXVI 3-4, Death; 9-10, Death.
LXXXVII 9-10, Fire; 15-16, Miscellaneous; 48, Animal; 49-50,
Cloth; 57-58, Military; 67, Sick Man; 91-92, Sea; 95-98, Bond of Love 
113-114, Hostal; 119-120, Eyes; 131-132, Eyes; 159-160, Alchemy;
161, Mythological; 166-167, Sleep; 170, Animal; 173-174, Fire; 
175-176, Court of Love; 177-180, Power of Love; 187, Wound of Love; 
189-190, Light; 195-196, Prison; 198, Prison; 207-208, Bond of Love; 
251-254, Travelling; 271-274, Fire; 277-280, Sick Man; 282-283, Heat- 
Cold (Medical); 291-292, Money; 295-296, Fire; 299-300, Power of Love 
305-307, Death; 311-313, Military; 328-329, Power of Love; 331-332, 
Astrological; 335-337, Astrological; 339-340, Power.
LXXXVIII 13-14, Robe; 41, Military; 63-64, Door; 71-72, Power
of Love; 76, Eye.
LXXXIX 1-2, Biblical; Bridge, 3-4; 5-8, Path; 17, Hill.
xc 9-12, Landscape; 29-31, Military; variant 32, Fire;
33-34, Bond of Love; 41-42, Literary; 57-60, Fortune.
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Folly; 21-24, Blind; 25-27, Time; 30-32, Power of Love.
XCII 1-4, Mythological; 19, Religion of Love; 35-38, Blind;
39-40, Apothecary; 53-54, Bread; 55-58, Traveller; 77-78, Worm; 
109-110, Religion of Love; 121-122, Miscellaneous; 129, Paradise;
147, Fortuna; 150, Devil; 153-154, Death; 157-158, Light; 181-184, 
Alchemy; 195-196, Power of Love; 197-200, Power of Love; 204, Robe; 
214, Feast; 221-222, Agricultural; 244-246, Death; 247, Wound of 
Love; 249-250, Biblical.
XCIII 29-32, Folly; 33-34, Sick Man; 67, Bitter-Sweet;
69-70, Bitter-Sweet; 80, Time; 86, Fire.
XCIV 17-20, Humours; 25-28, Fire; 59-62, Medical Opposites;
63-64, Bitter-Sweet; 67-68, Solitude; 86, Sick Man; 103-104, Child; 
115-116, Alchemy; 118-120, Humours.
XCV 10-12, Heat-Cold (Medical); 17-20, Fortuna; 21-22,
Juridical; 43, Heart; 45-46, Death; 65-66, Death; 67-68, Death;
69-72, Death; 73-76, Tetric.
XCVI 1-4, Death; 35-36, Military.
XCVII 13-16, Path; 21-22, Sick Man; 27-28, Death; 43-44,
Envious Man; 47-48, Tears; 49-50, Tears; 57-60, Hermit.
XCVIII 1-4, Path; 5-6, Folly; 7-8, Winds; 25-28, Military;
29-32, Military; 37-39, Power of Love; 41-42, Sick Man; 57-59, Water. 
XCIX 5-6, Lameness; 7, Wound of Love; 16, Path; 23-24,
Prisoner; 25-27, Fire; 43-44, Bread; 56, Path; 65-66, Sick Man;
67-68, Musical; 79-80, Sick Man; 81-83, Death; 84-85, Biblical;
91-92, Animal.
C 1-2, Child; 5-7, Sailor; 8, Path; 23-24, Robe; 29-30,
Vessel; 31-32, Proverb; 33-36, Military; 37-40, Sick Man; 44, Servant 
53-56, Folly; 57-60, Folly; 61-64, Animal; 71-72, Proverb; 94, 
Agricultural; 95-96, Path; 101-102, Rich Man; 103-104, Death;
XCI 9-10, Proverb; 13-14, Time; 15-16, Proverb; 17-20,
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107-108, Animal; 109-111, Time; 143-144, Courtly Love; 145-148, Folly; 
157-160, Robe; 168, Robe; 175, Juridical; 177-180, Child; 197-200, 
Folly; 215-216, Folly; 219-220, Path.
CI 1-6, Sick Man; 9-12, Eyes; 13-16, Petrarchist; 17-24,
Child; 25, Eyes; 37-39, King; 41-42, Eyes; 44, Prisoner; 47-48, Heat- 
Cold (Medical); 49-52, Petrarchist.
CII 17-24, Sailor; 25-26, Biblical; 59-60, Landscape;
61-62, Prisoner; 63-64, Power of Love; 65-68, Labourer; 72, Death; 
91-96, Folly; 103, Miscellany, 105-108, Biblical; 115, Bread; 121, 
Fire; 129-132., Fire; 137-138, Fire; 139-140, Mythology; 145-146, 
Heat-Cold (Medical); 155-156, Animal; 165-168, Bread; 169-170, Folly; 
174-176, Castle; 177-180, Sick Man; 211-212, Military; 214-216, Folly; 
221-222, Travelling; 229-230, Petrarchist.
CIII 8, Proverb; 17-20, Robe; 33-34, Child; 41, King;
1variant between 48-49, B d e, Blindness; variant between 48-49,
B^ d e, Musical; 55-56, Fortuna; 59-60, Money.
CIV 37-38, Ship; 53-56, Animal; 73-77, Fortuna; 84, Hunger;
95-96, Folly; 155-156, Hermit; 157, Biblical; 167-168, Path; 170-172,
Sodomite; 189-192, Pillar; 201-202, Fire; 205, Biblical; 214-216,
King; 219-221, Folly; 225-228, Mythological; 229-231, Old Man; 240, 
Path; 247-248, Literary; 256, Animal; 261-264, Idol.
CV 1-2, Hair; 11-12, Juridical; 13, Religious; 27-28,
Path; 29-30, Biblical; 31-32, Biblical; 45-46, Biblical; 65-66,
Biblical; 80, Travel; 95-96, Eye; Biblical, 109-110; 128, Biblical; 
133-134, Biblical; 147-148, Biblical; 162-163, Mystic; 167-168, 
Biblical; 173-174, Biblical; 185-186, Fire; 189-192, Fire; 197-198, 
Prison; 199-200, Biblical; 201-203, Death; 210-212, God; 217-218, 
Biblical; 219-220, Water.
CVI 9, Folly; 33-36, Death; 39, Money; 41, Proverb; 72,
Biblical; 137-138, Wall; 144, Proverb; 159-160, Fire; 165, Proverb;
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168, King; 191-192, Weak Man; 213-214, Miscellany; 265-268, Animal; 
295-296, Folly; 297-302, Blindness; 313-314, Folly; 341-344, Miser; 
387-388, Animal; 429-432, Equestrian; 443-444, Animal; 447, Deaf and 
Dumb; 449-452, Chess; 469-472, Biblical; 476, Proverb; 485-488, Tree. 
CVII 76-78, Sick Man; 85-86, Death; 87-88, Heat-Cold (Medical)
CVIII 13-16, Folly; 17-20, Biblical; 43-44,. Idol; 46-48,
Bread; 59-60, Folly; 64, Folly; 79-80, Robe; 83-84, Folly; 88,
Proverb; 93-96, Biblical.
CIX 5-8, Prisoner; 11-12, Miscellaneous.
CX 1-2, Prisoner; 3-4, Fortune; 5-8, Miscellaneous;
13-14, Blind; 15-16, Death; 17-20, Hunt; 22-24, Fire.
CXI 1-8, Traveller; 15-16, Wound of Love; 23, Miscellaneous;
26-28, Sick Man; 37-38, Animal.
CXII 2-5, Death; 38, Death; 50, Death; 71-73, Miscellaneous;
87-88, Astrology; 107-110, Animal; 118-120, Military; 121-130, Death; 
137-140, Death; 146-147, Tears; 153, Bitter-Sweet; 175-178, Death; 
189-190, Path; 193-198, Robe; 226-227, Literary; 235-237, Death;
255-260, Door; 294, Death; 309-310, Biblical; 324, Tree; 349-350,
Fire; 369-370, Biblical; 372-373, Lameness; 377-378, Book, 391-400, 
Military; 403-405, Path; 411-412, Door.
CXIII 1-4, Literary; 8, Light; 39-40, Alchemy; 81-82, Doctor;
83-84, Military; 87-88, Key; 95-98, Light; 99-100, Bond of Love;
101-104, Path; 115-116, Sick Man; 117-118, Door; 121-124, Path;
125-128, Folly; 139-140, Ship; 145-146, Path; 149-150, Doctor; 156, 
Miscellaneous; 164 Animal; 165-166, Path; 169-170, Juridical;
171-172, God; 176, Juridical; 179-180, Ship; 181-184, Music; 189­
190, Fire; 195-198, Folly; 203-204, Path; 205-208, Traveller; 209­
210, Time; 211-214, Bitter-Sweet; 215-218, Blind; 221-223, Sick Man; 
245-246, Miscellaneous; 251-254, Religious (General).
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CXIV 35-36, Alchemy; 44, Miscellaneous; 45-48, Robe; 61-62,
Light; 85-86, Heart; variant 90-91, Worm.
CXV 15-18, Sick Man; 59-60, Bond of Love, 63-64, Worm;
71-78, Sick Man; 83-84, Table; 95-96, Power of Love; 100, Military;
107-108, Tree; 119-120, Death.
CXVI 8-10, Martyr; 27-28, Sick Man; 29-30, Military; 46-48,
Path; 53-54, Bitter-Sweet; 61-64, Death; 66-67, Military; 88, Light; 
105-106, Hermit; 130, Petrarchist; 139-140, Sea; 151-152, Bread.
CXVII 1-2, Animal; 7-8, Biblical; 25-27, Sick Man; 41-44,
Mystic; 57-60, Philosopher; 67-68, Prisoner; 73-74, Hostal; 77-80, 
Military; 81-82, Blind; 89-90, Folly; 97-98, Blind; 107-108, Tree; 
111-112, Robe; 125-126, Military; 141-144, Humours; 169-172, Fire; 
179-182, Alchemy; 185-188, Military; 193-196, Folly; 201-204, Miser; 
209-212, Miscellaneous; 219-220, Friendship; 233-236, Doctor; variant
240-244, Bitter-Sweet.
CXVIII 1-2, Blindness; 10, Wound of Love; 29-30, Path; 31-35,
Miscellaneous; 57-58, Fire; 59, Miscellaneous; 73-74, Bond of Love;
91-92, Historical.
CXIX 1, Biblical; 5-7, Opposites (Medical); 13-14, Fire;
15-18, Fire; 19-20, Sea; 26-28, Wound of Love; 57-58, Juridical; 
61-66, Doctor; 81-86, Miscellaneous.
CXX 13-14, Vessel; 17-20, Folly; 45, Bitter-Sweet; 77-78,
Hostal; 79-80, Folly; 121-124, Miscellaneous; 129-130, Religious 
(General); 131-132, Money.
CXXI 15-16, Bitter-Sweet; 27-28, Lameness; 29-32, Robe;
33-35, Friendship; 41-48, Traveller; 56, Servant; 58, Robe; 67-68,
Biblical.
CXXII a 13-16, Folly; 26-27, Folly; 29-31, Alchemy.
CXXII b 21-23, Folly; 29-32, Historical; 37-38, Animal;
59-60, Hunger; 71-72, Military.
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CXXIII 49-52, Fire; 60-61, Fire; 67, King.
CXXIV 6-7, Castle.
cxxv 1-3, Juridical.
CXXVI 17-20, Book.
CXXVII 17-18, Robe; 23, Child; 24-25, Biblical; 26, Bond of
Love; 47, Hunt; 56-58, Wind; 58-60, Death; 79-81, Pillar; 86-92,
Miser; 94-95, Hunger; 104-105, King; 115-117, Hunger; 122-123, Path; 
133-135, Game; 148-150, Miscellaneous; 151-152, King; 157-158,
Power of Love; 169-170, Juridical; 172-174, Military; 208-209,
Courtly Love; 217-219, Path; 223, Servant; 230, Tree; 231-232, Vessel;
245-246, Hunger; 280, Water; 282, Door; 285, Bread; 328-329, Path;
354-355, Path; 356-357, Death; 391-392, Tree; 394, Laughing-Crying;
415-416, Bitter-Sweet.
CXXVIII 6-7, Path; 24-25, Short-sightedness; 84-85, Hill;
106-109, Animal; 118-119, Death; 134-137, Path; 193, Servant; 197-
199, Folly; 202, Path; 210-213, Folly, 219-222, Blindness; 230, 
Miscellaneous; 234, Equestrian; 260-263, Musical; 272-275, Dice; 
288-293, Folly; 294-297, Folly; 306-307, Apothecary; 316-319, Path; 
320-325, Military; 336-339, Doctor; 340-343, Traveller; 352-353,
Path; 356-357, Path; 365, Money; 372-377, Child; 382-385, Miscellaneous 
394-399, Sailor; 400-405, Castle; 421-423, Religious; 448-451, Animal; 
482-483, Military; 484-487, Military; 488-491, Idol; 492, Idol;
502-509, Sick Man; 510, Apothecary; 514-516, Lameness; 528-531,
Thirst; 547-552, Hermit; 553-555, Path; 557-566, Miscellaneous;
599-602, Fortune; 603-604, Biblical; 605-609, Fortuna; 631, Bitter­
Sweet; 654-655, Military; 664-666, Fire; 685-686, Cloth; 687-690,
Path.
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Index to the Imagery of Ausias March
A. Love
1. Arrow
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LII, 25-28
LXXIX, 1-8
LXXIX, 9-16
LXXIX, 17-27
LXXXVII, 187
CXIII, 181-188
2. Bond of Love
Poem
X
Wound of Love
X
Golden Age
Wound of Love
Music
Main
X, 29-32
Military
X, Tetric
Wound of Love, 
Mythological
X, Mythological, 
Wound of Love
X, (spear)
X, Sick Man, 
Death
Subordinate
Military X
XXVIII, 17-20 X Path, Death, 
Prisoner
Roman de la 
Rose, w. 1689­
1690. (Pages).
Guiraut de
Calanson
"Celeis cui am 
de cor e de saber” 
(Pagfes, p.89);
Ovid, Metamorphoses, 
Book I, 89-150.
Source
variant
XXIV, 20-32 
in E
Music X
LXVI, 1-4 X
LXXI, 57-60 X.
LXXI, 86-88 X Prisoner
LXXVIII, 59-60
LXXXV, 19-20 X
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Bond of Love (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate S curce
LXXXV, 45-48 X Ramon Llull,
Arbre de filosofia
d’amor (Ramirez i 
Molas, p. 320)
LXXXVII, 95-98 X" Death Ramon Llull, Arbre 
de filosofia d’amor
(Ramirez i Molas, 
p. 320)
LXXXVII, 207-208 X
XC, 33-34 X . Blind
CXIII, 99-100 X . Prisoner
CXV, 59-60 X Proverb
CXVIII, 73-74 X Proverb
CXXVII, 26 x.:
3. Bondage of Love (Service and Vassalage)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
X, 27-28 X
XXXVII, 43-48 Crucifixion X, Death
XLIX, 41-44 X Sleep, Prisoner,
Death
LXXIX, 34-36 Military X, Wound of Love
CI, 13-16 Petrarchist Armed Man, Military
4. Bread (Food of Love)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 31-32 X Bitter-Sweet,
Beggar
II, 41-44 Sick Man X
IV, 1-6 Hunger X, Tree 
Agricultural
IV, 55-56 Pillar X
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Bread of Love (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VI, 43 X Folly, Proverb
VII, 49-51 Biblical X
X, 25-26 X
XVIII, 1-4 Light X
XXIII, 25-28 Biblical X
XXXVIII, 41-44 X Bitter-Sweet,
Oven
LXIII, 27-28 X Bitter-Sweet
XCII, 53-54 X Apothecary
XCIX, 43-44 X Bitter-Sweet
CII, 115 X
CII, 165-168 X Bitter-Sweet
CVI, 469-472 Biblical Path, X
CVIII, 46-48 X Tblly
CXVI, 151-152 X Bitter-Sweet,
Sick Man,
Apothecary,
Medical Opposites
CXXVII, 217-219 Path X
CXXVII, 285 X
5. Oven
SourcePoem Main Subordinate
IV, 31-32 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical)
XXXVIII, 41-44 Bread X, Bitter-Sweet
XLVI, 9-16 Biblical X, Animal
XCII, 181-184 Alchemy Fire, X
CII, 129-132 Fire X, Bed,
Heat-Cold
(Medical)
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6. Cloth
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXIII, 9-12 Eye X, Courtly Love
XLII, 12-16 Animal X, Short-sighted 
Man
XLII, 23-24 Miscellany 
(Wet nurse)
X
LXVII, 45-48 Robe X
LXXV, 42-43 Hostal X
LXXVII, 25-28 Robe X, Mythological, 
Classical
LXXXVII, 49-50 X
XCI, 17-20 Fool Robe, X
CXIV, 45-48 Robe X, Religion of
Love
CXXVIII, 685-686 X Labourer
7. Court of Love or Fortune
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
XXX, 49-56 Fortune X, Classical
XXXIX, 17-20 Hermit Feast, X
LXVII, 13-16 Hermit X, Folly
LXXXVII, 175-176 X Courtly Love
XCI, 21-24 Blind X
8. Courtly Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 43-44 Envious Man X
VIII, 2-4 X (Drut) Gaucelm 5'aidii
"Lo rossinholet 
salvatge" stanza 
V, 10-14, (Pages, 
p. 12)
XX, 29-32 X (cors gentil) Astrology 
Mythology
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Courtly Love (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXII, 9-12 Eye X (cos gentil),
Cloth
LXIV, 13-15 X (servent) Religion of Love,
Goddess, Servant
LXVI, 14-15 Religion of 
Love
X (guardo)
LXVIII, 17-24 Solitude X (vassall),
Feast, Juridical,
Petrarchist
LXXIV, 38 X (vassall) King, Servant
LXXX, 8 X (guardo) Time
LXXXVII, 175-176 Court of
Love
X (escolans)
XCVII, 43-44 Envious Man X
C, 143-144 X (villans) Labourer
CXXVII, 208-209 X (guardo)
9. Feast
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XIII, 1-8 Tetric X, Death
XV, 41-48 X Eschatological, 
Musical, Biblical
Verses 43-44 
S t. Luke XV: 
(Bohigas)
XXXIX, 17-20 Hermit X, Court of Love
XLIII, 17-24 Devil X, Juridical
LIII, 43-44 X Religion of Love
LXVIII, 17-24 Solitude X, Courtly Love,
Juridical,
Petrarchist
LXXV, 33-40 Mythological X, Miscellany 
(flesh)
XCII, 214 X Proverb
CII, 91-96 Folly X, Agricultural, 
Proverb, Bitter­
Sweet
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Feast (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXXI, 369-370 Biblical X
10. Religion of Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
L, 17-18 Eschatological X, Death
LIII, 30-32 X
LIII, 43-44 Feast X
LVI, 13-16 X House
LXIV, 13-15 Courtly Love X, Goddess,
Servant
LVI, 13-16 X House, Courtly
Love
LXVII, 49-50 X
LXXV, 3-4 X Bitter-Sweet
LXXV, 21-22 X Mythological
LXXV, 81-84 Mythological X
XCII, 19 X
XCII, 109-110 X Devout Man
CVIII, 43-44 Idol X
CXIV, 45-48 Robe X, Cloth
CXVI, 8-10 Martyr-Saint Eschatological, X
11. Goddess
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXVI, 27-32 X Penitent, Poison
XXXVII, 37-40 X
LIII, 25-26 X Death
LXIV, 13-15 Courtly Love X, Religion of 
Love, Servant
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12. Idol
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXI, 13-16 X Death, Folly
CIV, 261-264 X Folly
CVIII, 43-44 X Religion of Love
CXXVIII, 488-491 X Miscellany (veil)
CXXVIII, 492 X
13. Hostal of Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XLV, 37-40 X Oton de Granson, 
Balade: "Salut et
paix et bonne 
entencion" stanza 
II, and "Chastel 
d’Amors" (Pages, 
p. 142)
LI, 30-31 X
LIV, 41-44 X
LXV, 29-30 X Bed
LXXV, 42-43 X Cloth
LXXXVII, 113-114 X
CXVII, 73-74 X Door Oton de Granson, 
"Salut et paix et 
bonne entencion" 
stanza II, and 
"Chastel d’Amors" 
(Pagks, p. 142)
CXX, 77-78 X
14. Nest of Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXIII, 33-40 Deaf and Dumb X
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15. Novice of Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVII, 45-48 X Folly
16. Power of Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XLV, 69-72 X
XLV, 73-76 • X King
XLIX Biblical X, Juridical, 
Blindness,
Dumbness, Proverb
L, 23-24 X
L, 28 Death X
LVIII, 9-12 X Eyes, Miscellany, 
(Colours)
LIX, 43-44 X Castle, Agriculture
LXII, 33-36 X Heart
LXII, 41-44 Eye X
LXII, 49-50 Petrarchist X, Heart
LXIV, 10-12 X
LXVI, 33-36 X Child, Old Man
LXVI, 37-38 X Death
LXVII, 18-20 X
LXIX, 57-62 X Fortuna, Blindness
LXIX, 63-64 Laughing-
Crying
X
LXX, 46-48 X Sick Man
LXXII, 37-40 X Trumpet
LXXV, 70-72 X Light, Nature
LXXIX, 27-32 X Military, Castle
LXXXIV, 49-51 X Sick Man
LXXXIV, 57-60 X
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Power of Love (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXXVII, 177-180 X Bed
LXXXVII, 271-274 Fire X, Eyes, Wound of 
Love, Humours
LXXXVII, 295-296 Fire X
LXXXVII, 299-300 X Devil
LXXXVII, 328-329 X Biblical
LXXXVII, 339-340 X Travelling
LXXXVIII, 71-72 X
XCI, 30-32 X Poison
XCII, 195-196 X Wind, Fire 
(Hot-Cold)
XCII, 197-200 X Tree
XCVIII, 37-39 X Hair
C, 1-2 Child X, Fortune
CII, 63-64 X Fortuna,
Biblical
CXIV, 35-36 Alchemy X
CXV, 95-96 X Sick Man
CXVI, 27-28 Sick Man X
CXXVII, 148-150 Miscellany
(Glue)
X
CXXVII, 157-158 X
17. Robe
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LII, 1-4 X Heart, Wound of 
Love
LXIV, 21-22 X Anonymous ’’devinalh”,
”Sui e no suy, fuy 
e no fuy”, verse 3, 
in C. Appel,
Provenzalische 
Chrestomatie p. 82-83 
(Pages, p. 78)
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Robe (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXVII, 45-48 X Cloth
LXXVII, 25-28 X Mythological, 
Cloth, Classical
Ovid, Metamorphoses 
Book IX, Shirt of 
Nessus, 166-169; 
Hughes de Saint- 
Victor, ”De Unione 
Corporis et 
Spiritus", P.L. 
CLXXVII, p. 288; 
and see Proverbial 
phrase CVIII, 79-80.
LXXVIII, 41-42 X Death
LXXXVIII, 13-14 X Ovid, Remedia Amoris 
vv. 91-92; (Pagbs, 
p. 96)
XCI, 17-20 Fool Cloth, X
XCII, 204 X
C, 23-24 X
C, 157-160 X Military
C, 168 X
cm, 17-20 X Animal, Bed,
Fire (Hot-Cold)
Seneca, "De Vita 
Beata", XXV, 2; 
(Pag^s, p. 116)
CVIII, 13-16 Fool X
CVIII, 79-80 X Death, Proverb
CXII, 193-198 X Tree
CXIV, 45-48 X
()
\
Religion of
Love, Cloth
Oton de Granson,
A. Pages, "Le Thbme 
de la tristesse 
amoureuse en France 
et en Espagne" 
Romania LVIII, 1932, 
pp. 29-43; Bohigas, 
V, p. 52; Hughes de
Saint-Victor, "De 
Unione Corporis et 
Spiritus”, P.L. 
CLXXVII, p. 288; 
and see Proverbial 
phrase CVIII, 79-80.
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Robe (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXVII, 111-112 X Classical,
Proverb
Ovid, Metamorphoses, 
Book IX, Shirt of 
Nessus, 166-169; 
Hughes de Saint- 
Victor, "De Unione 
Corporis et Spiritus’* 
P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288; 
and see Proverbial 
phrase CVIII, 79-80.
CXXI, 29-32 X
CXXI, 58 X Ovid, Metamorphoses, 
Book IX, Shirt of 
Nessus, 166-169; 
Hughes de Saint- 
Victor, ”De Unione 
Corporis et Spiritus” 
P.L. CLXXVII, p. 288; 
and see Proverbial 
phrase CVIII, 79-80.
CXXVII, 17-18 X
18. Wound of Love
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LII, 1-4 Robe X, Heart
LIII, 21-24 Martyr-Saints X
LXV, 27 X
LXVI, 9-12 Sick Man X
LXVI, 39-40 Blind X, Death
LXVII, 33-36 Miscellany,
(stone)
X, Heart, Military 
Juridical
LXXIII, 17-22 X Bitter-Sweet,
Worm, Poison
LXXIX, 1-8 X Arrow, Tetric Guiraut de
Calanson, ’’Celeis 
cui am de cor e de 
saber" (Pages, p. 89) 
Ovid, Metamorphoses 
Book I, w. 468­
471.
LXXIX, 9-16 Arrow X, Mythological
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Wound of Love (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
LXXIX, 17-27 Golden Age Arrow, Mythological 
Wound of Love
LXXIX, 34-36 Military X, Bondage
LXXXVII, 187 X Arrow (Spear)
LXXXVII, 271-274 Fire X, Power of Love, 
Eyes, Humorous
XCII, 247 X
XCIX, 7 X
CXI, 15-16 X
CXIII, 125-128 Folly X, Religious 
(General)
CXVIII, 10 X
CXIX, 26-28 X
Source
i
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Source
B. Fortune
1. Fortuna
Poem Main Subordinate
XIV, 1-8 X Proverb
XIV, 10-12 X Mythological
XIV, 33-35 Fire X
XXIV, 3-8 X
XXX, 49-56 X Court of Love- 
Fortune , 
Classical
XXXI, 17-20 X
XXXI, 25-32 X Agricultural,
Hill
XXXI, 33-40 X Folly, Sword, 
Laughing-Crying
XXXVI, 1-8 Death X
XLVI, 45-48 Door X
XLVI, 60 Dice X
LIV, 29-32 Death X
LVI, 21-24 X Death
LVI, 33-36 X Death, Blindness
LXII, 15-16 Death X
LXIV, 17-20 X Game
LXIX, 57-62 Power of Love X, Blind
LXXVI, 30 Astrological X
LXXVI, 33-36 Old Man X
LXXXI, 1-4 Death X, Sea
LXXXII, 1-4 Ship X, Port, Death
Guiraut de Calanson, 
"Celeis cui am de 
cor e de saber"
II, 2
Vergil, Aeneid X, 
284, (Pages, p. 42); 
Alain de Lille, 
Anticlaudianus and 
Philosophiae (Pages, 
"Sur un vers 
d’Auzias March", 
Romania, LXI, p. 90)
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Fortuna (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXXV, 1-2 X
LXXXV, 49-54 X Labourer
XC, 57-60 X Dice
XCII, 1-4 Mythological X, Death
XCII, 147 X Proverb
XCV, 17-20 X Literary Reference
XCV, 65-66 Death X
C, 1-2 Child X, Power of Love
CII, 63-64 Power of Love X, Biblical
CIII, 55-56 X Rich Man, Beggar
CIV, 73-77 X Sea, Sailor
CVI, 443-444 Animal X, Folly,
Proverb
CVI, 449-452 Chess X
CX, 3-4 X Prisoner
CXII, 121-130 Death X, Sad Man, 
Bitter-Sweet
CXIII, 179-180 Ship Wind, X
CXIII, 211-214 Bitter-Sweet X, Juridical
CXXVIII, 599-602 X Chess, Sea
CXXVIII, 605-609 X Sailor, Blindness, 
Laughing-Crying
2. Game
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXIV, 17-20 Fortune X
CXXVII, 133-135 X Fortuna
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2. a. Chess
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CVI, 449-452 X Fortuna
CXXVIII, 599-602 Fortune X, Sea
2. b. Dice
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
XXI, 23-24 X
XLVI, 60 X Fortuna
XC, 57-60 Fortune X
CXXVIII, 272-275
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C. Folly-Wisdom-Fool
Poem Main
I, 1-2 Sleep
I, 22-24 Child
V, 23-24
V, 29-32 X
VI, 26-28 X
VI, 29-32 X
VI, 43 Bread
VI, 44 Animal
VII, 13-16 Water
VIII, 10-12 Dance
VIII, 16 Proverb
IX, 1-8 Prisoner
IX, 19 X
XV, 35 X
XVI, 9-12 Sterile Man
XVI, 41-44 X
XVII, 45-48 Novice of 
Love
XXVI, 13-16 Biblical
XXVI, 49-53 Tree
XXXI, 13-16 Idols
XXXI, 33-40 Fortuna
XXXV, 33-36 X
XXXVI, 37-38
Subordinate Source
X
X •
Folquet de 
Marseilles,
'’Sitot me sui 
a tart apercebutz", 
1:1. (Pages, p. 8)
Servant, King
King, Labourer,
Doctor, Military,
Castle
X, Proverb
X, Proverb
X, Petrarchist,
Proverb
X, Music
X
X
X, Sick Man
Ship
X
X
X
X, Death
X, Sword,
Laughing-Crying
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Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
XXXIX, 3-6 X Sad Man, Dark Place
LI, 37-39 Literary
Reference
X, Path, Death
LIII, 33-37 X Sick Man
Source
Seneca: "Ira furor 
brevis" (Pages,
P. 70)
LIV, 1-4 X Laughing-Crying
LXII, 4-5 Juridical X
LXII, 20-21 Biblical X
variant
LXIV, 21-22 
in B
X
LXVII, 13-16 Hermit X, Court of Love
LXXI, 101 X
LXXV, 73-80 Mythological X, Equestrian
XCI, 17-20 X Robe, Cloth
XCIII, 29-32 X Miscellany
Biblical
XCVIII, 5-6 X Eschatological, 
Path
XCIX, 91-92 Animal X, Proverb
C, 53-56 X Death
C, 57-60 X Labourer, Literary
Reference,
Apothecary
C, 145-148 X Agricultural
C, 197-200 X Sick Man, Beggar
C, 215-216 X Blind
Psalm XIV, 1, and 
Psalm LIII, 1
Aristotle, The 
Nichomachean Ethics,
Book I, IV, 1095 a 
24, (Pages, p. 110­
111); (Bohigas, IV, 
p. 78)
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Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
CII, 91-96 X Feast, Proverb, 
Agricultural, 
Bitter-Sweet
CII, 169-170 X Alchemy
CII, 214-216
CIV, 95-96
X
X
Fire (Hot-Cold)
CIV, 219-221 X Miser, Coward, 
Rich Man-Merchant
CIV, 261-264 Idol X
CVI, 9 X Money
CVI, 39 Money X
CVI, 265-268
CVI, 295-296
Animal
X
X
CVI, 297-302 Blind X
CVI, 313-314 X Prisoner
CVI, 429-432 Equestrian Path, X
CVI, 443-444 Animal X, Fortuna, 
Proverb
CVIII, 13-16 X Robe
CVIII, 17-20 Biblical X
CVIII, 46-48 Bread X
CVIII, 59-60 X Proverb
CVIII, 64 X Wind, Proverb,
Biblical,
Petrarchist
Source
Summa Theologica
II - II, 149, 4. 
(Pages, p. 115)
St. John III, 8. 
and, see under 
heading "Proverbial 
Phrases". It is 
also possible that 
this verse proceeds 
from the last stanza 
of Arnaut Daniel’s 
"En cest sonet coind’ 
e leri..." (ed. M. 
de Riquer, Los 
trovadores: Historia 
literaria ,y textos,
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Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
tomo II, Barcelona: 
Planeta, 1975, pp. 
628-631: ”Ieu sui 
Arnautz qu’amas 
l’aura, / e chatz 
la lebre ab lo bou / 
e nadi contra suberna' 
w. 43-45) Alfred 
Jeanroy gives 
another version of 
these lines: "Je 
suis Arnaut, qui 
emprisonne le vent, 
chasse le lievre 
avec le boeuf et 
nage contre le flot" 
(La poesie lyrique 
des troubadours vol. 
II, Toulouse: Edouard 
Privat, 1934, p. 50). 
This verse could also 
have been known by 
Ausias March through 
Petrarch’s imitation 
of Arnaut Daniel in 
sonnet 212, verses 
1-2: "Beato in sogno 
e di languir contento, 
/ d’abbracciar 1*ombre 
et seguir l’aura 
estiva,".
CVIII, 83-84 X
CX, 13-14 Blind X
CXII, 137-140 Death X (Wise Man)
CXIII, 125-128 X Wound of Love,
Religious
(General)
CXIII, 195-198 X Crying-Laughing, 
Death, House
CXIII, 215-218 Blind X, Death, Path
CXVII, 89-90 X Sick Man, Devil
CXVII, 193-196 X King
CXVII, 209-212 Miscellany X
(Father-Son)
X Sick ManCXX, 17-20
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Folly-Wisdom-Fool (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
CXX, 79-80 X
CXXII a, 13-16 X Animal
CXXII a, 26-27 X Path, Music
CXXII a, 29-31 Alchemy X
CXXII b, 21-23 X Animal, Proverb
CXXVII, 86-92 Miser X, Hunger
CXXVtII, 197-199 X
CXXVIII, 210-213 X Miser
CXXVIII, 219-222 Blind X, Equestrian
CXXVIII, 288-293 X Sailor, Death
CXXVIII, 294-297 X Hunter
Source
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D. Death
1. Death
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
I, 13-16 Prisoner X
I, 22-24 Child X
IX, 1-8 Prisoner X
IX, 15-16 Mythological X, Animal, 
Petrarchist
XI, 1-4 Tears X
XI, 9-16 X Tears, Music
XI, 17-24 X Music
XIII, 1-8 X Feast
XIII, 11-12 X
XIII, 25-30 X
XIII, 33-38 X Eschatological
XVI, 25-32 Military X
XVII, 29-32 Prisoner X
XIX, 23-24 X Path
XX, 17-24 Key X, Door
XXI, 43-44 Juridical X
XXII, 6-8 Tetric X
XXVI, 33-36 X
XXVIII, 9-11 X Jordi de Sant Jordi, 
”Lo setge d'amor" 
w. 33-40 (Pages, 41)
XXVIII, 17-20 Bond of Love X, Path
XXXI, 13-16 Idol X, Folly
XXXV, 25-28 Prisoner X
XXXVI, 1-8 X Fortuna Petrarch, "Remediis 
utriusque fortunae” 
(Pages, 48)
XXXVII, 43-48 Crucifixion X, Bondage of
Love
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Death (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
XLIX, 13-16 Sleep X
XLIX, 41-44 Bondage of
Love
X, Prisoner, Sleep
L, 17-18 Eschatological X, Religion of Love
L, 28 X Power of Love
LX, 1-6 Prisoner X
LX, 13-16 Sick Man X
LI, 37-39 Literary-
Reference
X, Folly, Path
LII, 5-8 God X, Juridical
LII, 30-32 X Laughing-Crying
LII, 33-36 X
LII, 43 X
LIII, 25-26 Goddess X
LIV, 13-16 X
LIV, 25 Proverb X
LIV, 29-32 X Fortuna
LIV, 33-36 X Fortuna
LV, 37-40 X Mystic
LVI, 21-24 Fortuna X
LVI, 33-36 Fortuna X, Blindness
LVI, 37-40 X
LVII, 25-26 X Miscellany (Rest)
LVIII, 1-4 Rich Man X
LIX, 13-14 X
LIX, 17-20 X Prisoner
LIX, 27-28 X
LIX, 29-32 Prisoner X
LXII, 15-16 X Fortuna
Source
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Death (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXIII, 33-40 X Fear
LXVI, 25-28 Sick Man X
LXVI, 37-38 Power of
Love
X
LXVI, 39-40 Blindness X, Wound of Love
LXXV, 45-48 Mythological X
LXXVIII, 41-42 Robe X
LXXVIII, 56 X
LXXXI, 1-4 X Sea, Fortune
LXXXII, 1-4 Ship X, Fortune, Port
LXXXVI, 3-4 X Dance
LXXXVI, 9-10 X River, Path, 
Mythology
Pages states that 
the river referred 
to in these verses 
is the Aqueron, 
Auzias March et
ses predecesseurs
p. 259; and
Commentaire, p. 92. 
Pages generally 
relates this to 
the Divina Commedia. 
Bohigas echoes 
Pages theories.
I suggest that the 
river referred to 
is the Lethe, and 
is a result of 
Ausias March’s 
reading of the 
Metamorphoses.
Pagfes theory on 
the Aqueron is 
unsubstantiated, 
but March specifically 
refers to the Lethe 
in CII, 139.
LXXXVII, 95-98 Bond of
Love
X
LXXXVII, 305-307 X
LXXXIX, 5-8 Path X
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Death (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCII, 1-4 Mythology X, H^rtuna
XCII, 153-154 X
XCII, 249-250 Biblical X
XCIII, 41-44 Hunting X, Animal
XCV, 10-12 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
XCV, 45-46 X
XCV, 65-66 X Fortuna
XCV, 67-68 X Path, Sun
XCV, 69-72 X Bitter-Sweet
XCI, 1-4 X Eschatological
XCVII, 13-16 Path X
XCVII, 21-22 Sick Man X
XCVII, 27-28 X
XCVIII, 1-4 Path X, Mythological, 
Water
XCVIII, 17-20 Religious
(General)
X, Eschatological, 
Devout Man
XCIX, 81-83 X Animal
XCIX, 84-85 Biblical X, Echatological, 
Literary Reference
C, 53-56 Folly X
C, 61-64 Animal X
C, 103-104 X King, Servant Nichomachean Ethics 
Book I, V, 1095, b, 
19; (Pag^s, p. 108) 
(Bohigas IV, p. 76)
CII, 72 X Water (River)
CII, 139-140 Mythological X, Water (River)
CIV, 53-56 Animal X, King, Proverb
CIV, 214-216 King X, Animal
Death (cont.)
Source
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Poem Main Subordinate
CV, 11-12 Juridical X
CV, 147-148 Biblical X, Miscellany 
(Scythe)
CV, 167-168 Biblical X
CV, 201-203 X
CV, 210-212 God X, Religious, 
Literary
CVI, 33-36 X Money, Old Man
CVI, 72 Biblical X
CVII, 85-86 X
CVII, 87-88 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
CVIII, 79-80 Robe X, Proverb
CX, 5-8 Miscellany
(Fortune­
teller)
X
CX, 15-16 X
CX, 17-20 Hunt X, Animal
CXII, 2-5 X Path
CXII, 38 X Religious (General)
CXII, 50 X Equestrian, Proverb
CXII, 121-130 X Fortuna, Sad Man, 
Bitter-Sweet
CXII, 137-140 X Folly-Wisdom
CXII, 153 Bitter-Sweet X
CXII, 175-178 X Animal
CXII, 235-237 X
CXII, 255-260 Door X, Key
CXII, 294 X
CXIII, 115-116 Sick Man X
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Death (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXIII, 115-116 Sick Man X
CXIII, 117-118 Door X
CXIII, 181-188 Music X, Sick Man, Arrow
CXIII, 195-198 Folly Crying-Laughing, X
CXIII, 203-204 Path X
CXIII, 215-218 Blindness X, Folly, Path
CXIII, 221-223 Sick Man X, Bitter-Sweet, 
Poison
CXV, 15-18 Sick Man X
CXV, 119-120 X Fire
CXVI, 61-64 X
CXXVII, 56-58 Wind X, Port
CXXVII, 58-60 X Path
CXXVII, 169-170 Juridical X
CXXVII, 356-357 X
CXXVIII, 118-119 X Miscellany (Hole)
CXXVIII, 288-293 Folly X, Sailor
CXXVIII, 352-353 Path X
CXXVIII, 482-483 Military X
2. Time
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXVIII, 37-40 X Sleep
XLIV, 17-20 Sun X
LXX, 55-56
LXXX, 8 Courtly Love X
XCI, 13-14 X
XCI, 25-27 X
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Time (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCIII, 80 X Proverb
C, 109-111 X Nicomachean Ethics,
Book I, VIII, 1099, 
b, 2 (Pages, 108)
CXIII, 209-210 X
3. Worm
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 41-42 X Nicomachean Ethics,
Book VIII, V, 1157, 
b, 11 (Pag^s, p. 3)
XIII, 17-24 Mythological X
XXXIII, 37-40 X
LXXXIII, 17-22 Wound of Love X, Bitter-Sweet, 
Poison
XCII, 77-78 X
variant
CXIV,990-91 
in EG a
X
CXV, 63-64 X
4. Tetric
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XIII, 1-8 X Feast, Death
XIX, 5-8 Devil X
XXII, 6-8 X Death St. Thomas Aquinas 
Summa Theologica
II-I, 21, 3. 
(Pagbs, p. 32)
LXXIX, 1-8 Wound of Love X, Arrow
XCV, 73-76 X Humours
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Source
5. Poison
Poem Main Subordinate
XXVII, 17-20 Servant X, King
XXXIV, 41-44 Animal X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical)
XXXVI, 27-33 Goddess X, Penitent
XLII, 25-32 Wet Nurse X, Hair, Animal
LIX, 1-4 Sick Man X, Doctor
LXX, 33-35 X Bitter-Sweet
LXXIII, 17-22 Wound of Love X, Worm, 
Bitter-Sweet
XCI, 30-32 Power of Love X
XCII, 39-40 Apothecary X
XCII, 55-58 Traveller X, Port, Path
C, 37-40 Sick Man X, Bitter-Sweet
CXIII, 221-223 Sick Man X, Bitter-Sweet 
Death
CXIV, 85-86 Bitter-Sweet X
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E. Religious Imagery (as distinct from that of Religion of Love)
1. Crucifixion
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXVII, 43-48 X Bondage of Love, 
Death
LVII, 17-20 Biblical X
2. Devil
Poem Main Subordinate Source
V, 9-16 Biblical X
XIX, 5-8 X Tetric
XLII, 17-24 X Peast, Juridical
LXXXVII, 299-300 Power of Love X
XCII, 150 X
CXVII, 89-90 pool X, Sick Man
3. Devout Man
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXIII, 31-32 Biblical X, Blindness
L, 1-6 X
XCII, 109-110 Religion of 
Love
X
XCVIII, 17-20 Religious X, Eschatological,
(General) Death
CXVII, 57-60 Philosopher X
4. Religious (General)
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
LIII, 9-12 God X
LXIV, 28 Biblical X
LXVI, 41-44 Petrarchist Biblical, X
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Religious (General) (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCVIII, 17-20 X Death,
Eschatological,
Devout Man
CV, 13 X X, Death, Literary
CV, 210-212 God X, Death, Literary
CXII, 38 Death X
CXII, 391-400 Military X
CXIII, 125-128 Folly X, Wound of Love
CXIII, 251-254 X
CXX, 129-130 X
CXXVIII, 421-423 X Juridical
5. Mystic
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 24 Fire X
III, 5-6 Fire X, Alchemy, Heat- 
Cold (Medical)
VII, 61-64 Light X
XVIII, 25-28 Light X, Eschatological
XX, 33-40 Fire X, Astrology, Ship,
Wind, Port, Sea
XLV, 9-13 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical), Light
LV, 37-40 Death X
LVI, 25-32 Light X, Biblical, Sun
LXXXVII, 89-90 X
CV, 95-96 Eye X, Literary
Reference, Light
CV, 162-163 X Fire
CXVII, 41-44 X
CXVII, 45-46 Fire X
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6. Martyr-Saint
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVIII, 49-52 X
XLV, 81-88 X Sun, Light
LIII, 21-24 X Wound of Love Stigmatization of
St. Francis of 
Assisi. Divina 
Commedia, ’’Paradiso” 
Canto XI, (Pages,
P. 70)
LXIII, 41-44 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X, Fire
CXVI, 8-10 X Religion of Love, Dante, Divina 
Commedia, "Inferno”, 
Canto V, (Bohigas,
V, p. 67)
7. Eschatological Images (Paradise, Glory, Hell)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VII, 57-59 X Guillem de Cabestany 
"Lo dous cossire”, 
Stanza IV, w. 5-8 
(Pag&s, p. 12, 
Bohigas, II, p. 30)
XIII, 33-38 Death X
XV, 41-48 Feast X
XVIII, 25-28 Light X, Mystic
L, 17-18 X Religion of Love, 
Death
LIV, 9-12 X
LXXIV, 38 Courtly Love X, King
XCII, 129 X
XCVI, 1-4 Death X
XCVIII, 5-6 Fool X, Path
XCVIII, 17-20 Religious
(General)
X, Devout Man, 
Death
XCIX, 25-27 Fire X
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Eschatological (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCIX, 84-85 BibLieal X, Literary 
Reference, Death
C, 8 Path X, Proverb
CII, 137-138 Fire X
CV, 27-28 Path X, Fear
CXIII, 101-104 Path X
CXVI, 8-10 Martyr-
Saint
X, Religion of
Love
8. God
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LII, 5-8 X Juridical, Death
LIII, 9-12 X Religious (General)
CV, 210-212 X Death, Religious, 
Literary
"Le rituel occitan", 
Ecritures Cathares,
ed. et trad. Rene 
Nelli, Paris: Denoel, 
1959, p. 213; as 
well as L. Cledat,
Le Nouveau Testament 
traduit en langue
provencale, suivi 
d*un rituel cathare,
Paris: Lumifere,
1887 (reprint Geneve: 
Slatkine, 1968., 
p. Xl): "0 Senhor 
juja e condapna los 
vises de la earn, 
no aias merce de 
la earn nada de 
corrupcio, mais 
aias merce del 
esperit pausat en 
career". Of 
particular importance 
is that specialists 
in Catharism refer 
to this very phrase 
as being extremely 
representative of 
the Cathar sensibility 
(see Jordi Ventura 
Subirats, "El •
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God (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
catarismo en •
Cataluha", B.R.A.B.L.E 
t. 28, 1960, p. 166, 
and Steven Runciman, 
The Medieval
Manichee: A Study
of the Christian 
Dualist Heresy, 
Cambridge: University 
Press, 1960, p. 154).
CXIII, 171-172 X Laughing-Crying, Psalm II, 4, and
Proverb, Biblical Psalm XXXVII, 13
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Subordinate Source
F. Military
1. Military
Poem  Main
VI, 29-32 Folly X
X, 1-8 X King Peire Espanhol, 
"Cum selh que 
fon ricx per 
encantamen”.
(M. Mila y 
Fontanals, De
los trovadores 
de Espana, p.
457). Developed 
by (Pages, p. 
14-15)
X, 29-32 X Bond of Love
X, 33-40 X
XI, 39-40 X Armed Man
XV, 49-53 X
XVI, 20-24 Table X
XVI, 25-32 X Port, Classical, 
Death
Seneca, ’’Epistula 
70", 13-15, 
(Bohigas I, 
p. 61 and p. 76)
XVII, 10-11 Deaf and
Dumb
X
XVII, 49-52 X
XXVII, 9-12 Weak Man X, Strong Man
XL, 25-28 Strong Man X
XL, 33-38 X
XLV, 31-32 X
XLIX, 35-40 X
LII, 14-16 X
LII, 25-28 Arrow X
LVII, 11-16 Biblical X
LX, 15-16 X Armed Man-Sword
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Military (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
LX, 21-24 X
LX, 31-32 X
LXVII, 33-36 Miscellany X, Juridical,
Heart, Wound of
Love
LXXI, 33-34 Castle X
LXXIX, 27-32 Power of Love X, Castle
LXXIX, 35-36 X Wound of Love, 
Bondage of Love
LXXXIV, 39 X
LXXXV, 18 X
LXXXVII, 57-58 X
LXXXVII, 311-313 X
LXXXVIII, 41 X
XC, 29-31 X Ship
XCVI, 35-36 X
XCVIII, 25-28 X Coward
XCVIII, 29-32 X
C, 33-36 X
C, 157-160 Robe X
CI, 13-16 Petrarchist X, Bondage of
Love, Armed Man- 
Sword
CI, 41-42 Eyes X
CII, 174-176 Castle X, Petrarchist
CII, 211-212 X
CXII, 118-120 X
CXII, 391-400 X Religious (General)
CXIII, 83-84 X Sick Man
CXV, 100 X
Source
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Military (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
CXVI, 29-30 X
Source
St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica
I - II, 48, 2. 
(Auzias March et 
ses predecesseurs",
p. 307, note 1). 
Bohigas indicates 
that the opposite 
of Aquinas, and 
that Pages has 
misinterpreted 
the passage. 
(Bohigas V, p. 68)
CXVI, 66-67 X
CXVII, 77-80 X Coward
CXVII, 125-126 X
CXVII, 185-188 X Castle
CXXIIb, 71-72 X
CXXIV, 6-7 Castle X
CXXVII, 172-174 X Trumpet
CXXVIII, 320-325 X Equestrian
CXXVIII, 326-329 X
CXXVIII, 482-483 X Death
CXXVIII, 484-487 X Bitter-Sweet
CXXVIII, 654-655 X
2. Armed Man, Sword
Poem Main Subordinate
XI, 39-40 Military X
XXXI, 33-40 Fortuna X, Laughing- 
Crying, Folly
LX, 15-16 Military
CI, 13-16 Petrarchist X, Bondage of
Military
Source
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3. Equestrian
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XLVII, 19-20 X
LXXIV, 32 X Proverb
LXXIV, 73-80 Mythological X, Folly
CVI, 429-432 X Path, Folly
CXII, 50 Death X, Proverb
CXXVIII, 219-222 Blindness Folly, X
CXXVIII, 234 X
CXXVIII, 320-325 Military X
4. Hunting
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCIII, 41-44 X Animal, Death
CX, 17-20 X Animal, Death
CXXVII, 47 X Eye
CXXVIII, 294-297 Folly X
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G. Science
1. Medicine
a. Bitter-Sweet
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 41-44 Bread X
XIX, 33-36 X
XXXVIII, 41-44 Bread X, Oven
LIV, 39-40 X
LVIII, 17-20 Path X, Laughing-Crying
LXIII, 27-28 Bread X
LXIII, 30-32 X Path
LXX, 33-35 Poison X
LXXIII, 17-22 Wound of Love X, Worm, Poison
LXXV, 3-4 Religion of 
Love
X
LXXXVII, 67 Sick Man X
XCIII, 33-34 Sick Man X
XCIII, 67 X
XCIII, 69-70 X Laughing-Crying,
Eye
XCIV, 63-64 X
XCV, 69-72 Death X
XCVIII, 41-42 Sick Man X, Humours
XCVIII, 57-59 Water X, Tears
XCIX, 43-44 Bread X
C, 37-40 Sick Man X, Poison
CII, 91-96 Folly X, Agricultural,
Feast, Proverb
CII, 165-168 Bread X
CXII, 121-130 Death X, Fortuna, Sad
Man
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Bitter-Sweet (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXII, 153
CXIII, 149-150 
CXIII, 211-214
CXIII, 221-223
CXIV, 85-86
CXVI, 53-54
CXVI, 151-152
X
Doctor
X
Sick Man
X
X
Bread
variant
CXVII, 240-244 X 
in de
CXIX, 15-18 Fire
CXIX, 19-20 Sea
CXX, 45 X
CXXI, 15-16 X
CXXVII, 415-416 X
CXXVIII, 484-487 Military
CXXVIII, 631 X
Death
X, Sick Man
Juridical, Fortuna
X, Poison, Death
Poison
X, Apothecary,
Sick Man, Opposites
X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical)
X, Water (River), 
Biblical
Bed
X
b. Doctor
Poem Main Subordinate
III, 9-12 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
IV, 29-32 Folly X
XIII, 13-16 Historical X
XVII, 41-44 X Sick Man
XLIV, 1-4 X Sick Man
LIX, 1-4 Sick Man X, Poison
Source
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Doctor (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CI, 1-6 Sick Man X
CXIII, 81-82 X Sick Man
CXIII, 149-150 X Bitter-Sweet, 
Sick Man
CXVII, 233-236 X
CXIX, 61-66 X Sick Man Hippocrates, 
Aphorism! Ill, 
(Pag'fes, p. 145) 
Bohigas suggests 
as the specific 
source, Vincent 
de Beauvais, 
Speculum Naturale
XXXI, cap 101, 
referring to ed. 
Cologne, 1494, 
f. 405 r., "De 
signis mortalibus” 
(Bohigas V, p. 96­
97)
CXXVIII, 336-339 X Sick Man
CXXVIII, 502-509 Sick Man X, Apothecary
c. Heat-Cold
Poem Main Subordinate Source
Ill, 5-6 Fire X, Alchemy, 
Mystic
Doctor, Sick Man
X
III, 9-12 X
IV, 31-32 Fire
variant 
XXVII, 17-24 
in E
Sick Man X
XXXIV, 41-44 Animal
XLV, 9-13 Fire
XLVII, 25-28 Fire
XLIX, 1-6 X
X, Poison
X, Light, Mystic
X
Macrobius, 
Commentary of
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Heat-Cold (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
Dream of Scipio, 
ed. William Harris 
Stahl, New York: 
Columbia University 
Press, 1952, p. 96. 
Book I, V, 5-7.
The reference 
concerning 
especially verses 
5-6 is to the 
concept of 
imagination and 
its relation to 
what Macrobius 
calls the "termini”, 
which like 
imagination 
represent "the 
first incorporeality 
after corporeality".
LIII, 1-4
LXIII, 41-44
LXVII, 2-4
LXVII, 11-12
LXVII, 39-40
LXIX, 25-28
LXXXIV, 23-24
X
X
X
X
Fire
X
X
LXXXVII, 282-283
XCV, 10-12
CI, 47-48
CII, 129-132
X
X
X
Fire
Path
Saint-Martyr,
Fire
Sick Man
Fire
X, Eyes
Eyes, Sea
Bernat de Ventadorn, 
"Tant ai mon cor 
plen de joja"
Stanza I, v. 11-12. 
(Pages, Auzias 
March et ses 
predecesseurs, 
p. 240) Bohigas 
remarks that the 
parallel is very 
tenuous. (Bohigas 
III, p. 130)
Sick Man
Death
Fire
X, Oven, Bed
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Heat-Cold (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CII, 145-146 X
CVI, 159-160 Fire X, Water
CVII, 87-88 X Death
CXIX, 13-14 Fire X
CXIX, 15-18 Fire X, Bitter-Sweet
d. Humours
Poem Main Subordinate Source
IV, 27-30 Animal X
XI, 35-36 X
XLIV, 1-4 Doctor X
LXXXVII, 271-274 Fire X, Power of Love, 
Eyes, Wound of
Love
XCIV, 17-20 X
XCIV, 118-120 X Musical
XCV, 73-76 Tetric X
XCVIII, 41-42 Sick Man X
CXVII, 141-144 X
e. Sick Man
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 31-32 X Bread
II, 37-40 Sleep X, Hill
III, 9-12 Heat-Cold Doctor, X
III, 13-14 X
XVI, 9-12 Sterile Man X, Folly
XVII, 41-44 Doctor X
XXVI, 27-28 Envious Man X
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e. Sick Man (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
variant
XXVII, 17-24, 
in E
X Heat-Cold (Medical)
XXVIII, 1-8 Light X, Robber, Animal
XXXV, 7-8 X
XLIV, 1-4 Doctor X
LI, 13-16 X Death
LIII, 33-37 Folly X
LIX, 1-4 X Doctor, Poison
LXVI, 9-12 * X Wound of Love
LXVI, 25-28 X Death
LXVII, 2-4 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
LXIX, 51-52 Music X
LXIX, 53-56 X
LXX, 46-48 Power of Love X
LXXXVII, 67 X Sick Man
LXXXVII, 189-190 Light X
LXXXVII, 277-280 X Bed, Eye
LXXXVII, 282-283 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
XCIII, 33-34 X Bitter-Sweet
XCIV, 86 X
XCVII, 21-22 X Death
XCVIII, 41-42 X Bitter-Sweet,
Humours
XCIX, 65-66 X Humours
XCIX, 67-68 Music X
XCIX, 79-80 X
Source
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Sick Man (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
C, 37-40 X Bitter-Sweet,
Poison
C, 197-200 Folly X, Beggar
CI, 1-6 X Doctor
CII, 177-180 X
CVII, 76-78 X
CXI, 26-28 X
CXIII, 81-82 Doctor X
CXIII, 83-84 Military X
CXIII, 115-116 X Death
CXIII, 149-150 Doctor X, Bitter-Sweet
CXIII, 181-188 Music X, Arrow, Death
CXIII, 221-223 X Bitter-Sweet, Death 
Poison
CXV, 15-18 X Death
CXV, 71-78 X
CXV, 95-96 Power of Love X
CXVI, 27-28 X Power of Love
CXVI, 151-152 Bread X, Bitter-Sweet, 
Apothecary, 
Opposites 
(Medical)
CXVII, 25-27 X
CXVII, 89-90 Fool X, Devil
CXIX, 61-66 Doctor X
CXX, 17-20 Folly X
CXXIIb, 59-60 Hunger X
CXXVII, 24-25 Biblical X
CXXVIII, 336-339 Doctor X
CXXVIII, 502-509 X Apothecary,
Doctor
Source
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book VI, I, 1138 b,
18 sqq. (Pages, p.154)
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f. Opposites
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCIV, 59-62 X Apothecary, Alchemy
CXVI, 151-152 Bread X, Apothecary, Sick
Man, Bitter-Sweet
CXVII, 177-182 Alchemy X
CXIX, 5-7 X
2. Alchemy
Poem Main Subordinate Source
III, 5-6 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical),
Mystic
V, 17-18 Fire X
LXXXVII, 159-160 X Philosopher
XCII, 181-184 X Fire, Oven
XCIV, 25-28 Fire X, Money
XCIV, 59-62 Opposites
(Medical)
X, Apothecary
XCIV, 115-116 X
XCVIII, 33-34 X
CII, 169-170 Folly X
CXIII, 39-40 X
CXIV, 35-36 X Power of Love
CXVII, 169-172 Fire X
CXVII, 177-180 X Opposites
(Medical)
CXXIIa, 29-31 X Folly
3. Apothecary
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCII, 35-38 Blindness X, Light
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Apothecary (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XCII, 39-40 X Poison
XCII, 53-54 Bread X
XCIV, 59-62 Opposites
(Medical)
X, Alchemy
C, 57-60 Folly X, Literary
Reference,
Labourer
CXVI, 151-152 Bread X, Opposites 
(Medical), 
Bitter-Sweet 
Sick Man
CXXVIII, 306-307 X
CXXVIII, 502-509 Sick Man X, Doctor
CXXVIII, 510 X
4. Astrology
Poem Main Subordinate
XIV, 29-31 X Mythological
Classical
Source
St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica I, 68, 4 (Pages7 p. 21) 
Dante, Convito, 
"Canzone” I, verse 
1 (Pages, p. 22). 
Dante, Divina 
Commedia, "Paradiso" 
Canto VIII, 3, 
w. 34-39. (Pages, 
p. 22) and (Bohigas 
II, p. 53). R.
Lull, Doctina 
pueril Chapter 98. 
(Ramirez i Molas, 
p. 319)
XX, 29-32 Courtly Love X, Mythological
XX, 33-40 Fire X, Wind, Ship, 
Port, Mystic, Sea
XLVII, 1-4 X Fire
LXXVI, 30 X Fortuna
LXXVII, 331-332 X Biblical
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As trology (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXXVII, 335-337 X
CXII, 87-88 X
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H. Marine
I. Sailor
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXVII, 25-28 Ship X
variant
XLVI, 17 
in H
Fear X
LXXIV, 17-20 Ship X, Wind
C, 5-7 X Wind
CII, 17-24 X House, Sea
CIV, 37-38 Ship X
CIV, 73-77 Fortuna X, Sea
CXIII, 205-208 Traveller X
CXXVIII, 288-293 Folly X, Death
CXXVIII, 394-399 X (Merchant) Robber, Ship,
Rich Man
CXXVIII, 605-609 Fortuna X, Blindness, 
Laughing-Crying
2. Port
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVI, 25-32 Military X, Classical,
Death
XX, 1-4 Classical X, Door
XX, 33-40 Fire X, Wind, Ship, Sea 
Mystic, Astrology
LX, 35-36 Travelling X
LXXVI, 2-4 X See XVI, 25-3:
Military, possibly 
Seneca, "Epistula 
70”
LXXXII, 1-4 Ship X, Fortuna, Death
XCII, 55-58 Traveller X, Poison, Path
CXXVII, 56-58 Wind X, Death
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Source
3. Sea
Poem Main Subordinate
II, 1-8 King X, Ship, Castle, 
Wind
II, 9-10 Winds X
IV, 9-13 X Wind, Literary 
Reference
XVIII, 41-44 Philosopher X
XX, 33-40 Fire X, Astrology, Wind 
Ship, Port, Mystic
XXVI, 45-48 Classical X
XXVII, 25-28 Ship X, Sailor, Wind
XXVII, 33-36 X
XLVI, 1-8 Wind X, Path
LXIX, 25-28 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X, Eye
LXXXI, 1-4 Death X, Fortune
LXXXVII, 91-92 X
CII, 17-24 Sailor X, House
CII, 65-68 Labourer X, Water (River)
CIV, 73-77 Fortuna X, Sailor
CV, 65-66 Biblical X
CV, 133-134 Biblical X, Water (River)
CXVI, 139-140 X
CXIX, 19-20 X Biblical, Water 
(River), Bitter­
Sweet
CXXVIII, 599-602 Fortuna X, Chess
Dante, Divina 
Commedia, ’’Inferno” 
V, 29. (Pages, 
p. 6) and (Bohigas 
II, p. 17); also, 
"Purgatorio” XXXII, 
115-116. (Pages, 6) 
and El Marques de 
Santillana, 
Cancionero de
Stuniga, 98.
(Pagbs, 6-7)
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4. Ship
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 1-8 King X, Sea, Castle,
Wind
XVI, 41-44 Folly X
XX, 33-40 Fire X, Astrology, Wind, 
Mystic, Port, Sea
XXVII, 25-28 X Sailor, Sea, Wind Dante, Divina
Commedia, ’’Inferno” 
V, 29. (Bohigas 
II, p. 17)
Bohigas suggests 
that the sources 
should be the 
same as IV,
9-13, (Sea)
LXXIV, 17-20 X Wind, Sailor
LXXXII, 1-4 X Death, Fortuna, 
Port
XC, 29-31
CIV, 37-38
CXIII, 139-140
CXIII, 179-180
Military
X
X
X
X
Sailor
Prisoner
CXXVIII, 394-399 Sailor
Fortuna, Wind
Rich Man (Merchant) 
Robber, X
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I. Elements
1. Fire-Ice, non-medical Hot-Cold
Poem  Main Subordinate Source
II, 24 Mystic Hugues de Saint- 
Victor, Commentary 
on Ecclesiastes,
Migne, P,L, 175, 
p. 117. On the 
perception of 
God as Love. 
"Primum ergo 
visus est ignis 
cum flamma, et 
fumo deinde ignis 
cum flamma sive 
(sic) fumo, 
postremo ignis 
purus sine flamma 
et fumo."
II, 27-28
III, 5-6
IV, 31-32
V, 17-18
VIII., 35-36
XIV, 33-35
XV, 17-20
XV, 21-24
XV, 25-28
XVIII, 9-12
XVIII, 17-20
XX, 33-40
Sun
X
X
X
Sun
X
Sun
X
Mythology
X
Animal
X (Hot-Cold)
X
Alchemy, Mystic,
Heat-Cold
(Medical)
Heat-Cold
(Medical)
Alchemy
Hugues de Saint- 
Victor, Commentary 
on Ecclesiastes,
Migne, P.L. 175, 
p. 177. Same 
as II, 24
Hugues de Saint 
Victor, Commentary 
on Ecclesiastes,
Migne, P.L. 175, 
p. 177. Same 
as II, 24
X
Fortuna, Light
X, Petrarchist
Hermit, Door
X, King, 
Petrarchist
Light
X, Mythology 
Astrology, Wind, St. Thomas Aquinas,
.t
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Fire (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
Ship, Port, Sea, 
Mystic
Summa Theologica,
I, 66, I. Dante, 
Divina Commedia,
"Purgatorio" 
canto XVIII, w. 
27-32. (Pages, 
p. 30)
XXII, 10-12 Hunger X (Hot-Cold)
XXIV, 37-40 X (Hot-Gold) Proverb
XXVI, 20 X (Hot-Cold) Proverb St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica I 
63, 2. (Pages, 
pp. 35 and 39)
XXXIII, 25-32 X Hunger
XLV, 9-13 X Heat-Cold 
(Medical),
Light, Mystic
Hugues de Saint 
Victor, Commentary 
on Ecclesiastes,
Migne, P.L. 175, 
p. 177. Same 
as II, 24
XLVII, 1-4 Astrology X
XLVII, 25-28 X Heat-Cold (Medical)
variant
LIII, 21-24 
in B d e
X
LV, 17-20 X
LXIII, 41-44 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X, Saint-Martyr
LXVII, 11-12 Heat-Cold
Medical)
LXVII, 39-40 X Eyes, Heat-Cold 
(Medical)
LXXXV, 41-44 X
LXXXVII, 9-10 X
LXXXVII, 131-132 Eyes X
LXXXVII, 173-174 X
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Fire (cont.)
SourcePoem Main Subordinate
LXXXVII, 271-274 X Power of Love,
Eyes, Wound of
Love, Humours
LXXXVII, 295-296 X Power of Love
variant
XC, 32 
in a
X
XCII, 181-184 Alchemy X, Oven
XCII, 227-228 X
XCIII, 86 X
XCIV, 25-28 X Alchemy, Money
XCIX, 25-27 X Eschatological
CI, 47-48 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
CII, 121 X Water
CII, 129-132 X Oven, Heat-Cold 
(Medical) , Bed
CII, 137-138 X Eschatological
CII, 214-216 Folly X (Hot-Cold)
CIII, 17-20 Robe X (Hot-Cold), Bed, 
Animal
CIV, 201-202 X Sodomite, Biblical 
(Apocalypsis)
CV, 45-46 Biblical X
CV, 162-163 Mystic X
CV, 185-186 X (Hot-Cold)
CV, 189-192 X
CVI, 159-160 X Heat-Cold 
(Medical), Water
Seneca, 
XCII 21, 
p. 356. 
p. 124) 
(Bohigas 
p. 156)
"Epistula 
tome II, 
(Pages,
and
IV,
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Fire (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CX, 22-24 X
CXII, 349-350 X
CXIII, 189-190 X House
CXV, 119-120 Death X
CXVI, 130 Petrarchist X
CXVII, 45-46 X Mystic
CXVII, 169-172 X Alchemy
CXVIII, 57-58 X
CXIX, 13-14 X Heat-Cold
(Medical)
CXIX, 15-18 X Heat-Cold 
(Medical), 
Bitter-Sweet
CXXIII, 49-52 X
CXXIII, 60-61 X
CXXVIII, 557-566 Miscellany 
(Clever Man)
X
CXXVIII, 664-666 X Miscellany 
(Possessions), 
Proverb
2. Light-Darkness (Illumination)
SourcePoem Main Subordinate
VII, 61-64 X Mystic
XIV, 33-35 Fire X
XVIII, 1-4 X Bread
XVIII, 9-12 Fire X
XVIII, 25-28 X Eschatological, 
Mystic
XVEII, 33-36 Biblical X, Prison, Dark
Place
XXI, 25-28 X
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Light (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXVIII, 1-8 X Animal, Robb er, 
Sick Man
XLV, 9-13 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical) , Mystic
XLV, 81-88 Martyr-Saint X, Sun
LVI, 25-32 X Sun, Biblical, 
Mystic
Song of Songs, 
VI, 9
LXVI, 21-23 X
LXXV, 70-72 Power of Love X, Landscape
LXXXVII, 189-190 X Sick Man
XCII, 35-38 Blindness X, Water
XCII, 157-158 X
CV, 95-96 Eye X, Literary 
Reference,
Mystic
CXIII, 8 X (Darkness)
CXIII, 95-96 X (Darkness)
CXIV, 61-62 X Music
CXVI, 88 X
CXVII, 97-98 Blindness X
2. b. Dark Place
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVIII, 33-36 Biblical X, Light (Darkness),
Prison
XXXIX, 3-6 Folly X, Sad Man
3. Sun
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 27-28 X Fire
VIII, 35-36 X Fire
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Sun (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XV, 17-20 X Fire, Petrarchist Petrarch, Amador 
de los Rios, 
Historia critica 
de la literatura
espanola. VI 
p. 502. De los 
Rios states that 
this is a 
petrarchist 
reminiscence, 
but does not 
specify.
XLV, 81-88 Martyr
LVI, 25-32 Light
XCV, 67-68 Death
4. Water, b River
Poem Main
VII, 13-16 X
X, Light
X, Biblical,
Mystic
Path, X
Subordinate Source
Folly, Petrarchist, Catullus, Poem 70, 
Proverb "Nulli se dicit
mulier mea nubere 
malle”, verse 4.
Guido Guinizelli, 
Canzone X, "Donna, 
l’amor me sforza", 
stanza IV, verse 
48. Petrarch,
Sonnet 212, stanza 
X, verse 4 (Pages,
10). Apparently 
using the Mestica 
edition, Paghs 
indicates sonnet 
177. For a study 
of the origins 
and uses of this 
myth see J. Frappier, 
"Variations sur le 
theme du mirroir 
de Bernard de 
Ventadour a Maurice 
de Sceve", Histoire, 
Mythes et Symboles,
Geneve: Droz,
1976, pp. 149-167, 
in particular, 
p. 153.
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Water-River (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VII, 67-68 X (River)
XIV, 25-28 Thirst X
LXXI, 53-56 X Landscape
LXXXVI, 9-10 Death X (River), Path,
Mythology
XCII, 35-38 Blindness Light, X
XCVII, 49-50 Tears X, Laughing- 
Crying
XCVIII, 1-4 Path X (River), Death,
Mythology
XCVIII, 57-59 X Tears, Bitter­
Sweet
CII, 65-68 Labourer
(Fisherman)
X (River), Sea
CII, 72 Death X (River)
CII, 121 Fire X
CII, 139-140 Mythology X (River), Death
CV, 133-134 Biblical X (River), Sea
CV, 217-218 Biblical X
CV, 219-220 X Key
CVI, 159-160 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical)
CXIX, 19-20 Sea X (River), Biblical,
Bitter-Sweet
CXXVII, 280 X Miscellany (Bath)
5. Wind
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 1-8 King X, Castle, Ship,
Sea
II, 9-10 X Sea
IV, 9-13 Sea X, Literary Reference
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Wind (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XX, 33-40 Fire X, Astrology, Port, 
Sea, Mystic, Ship
XXVII, 25-28 Ship X, Sea, Sailor
XXXIV, 1-8 X Lameness, Hill
XLVI, 1-8 X Sea, Path "Breviari d’amor
verse 6086 (Pages, 
p. 63). Cerveri 
de Girona, Poem 
76, v. 1-2, "Greu 
pot (nuyl) hom 
coneixer en la 
mar" (Bohigas 
III, p. 8)
LXXIV, 17-20 Ship X, Sailor
LXXVI, 5-8 Erring X, Landscape
XC, 9-12 Landscape X
XCII, 195-196 Power of Love X
XCVII, 7-8 X
C, 5-7 Sailor X
CVIII, 64 Folly X, Proverb,
Biblical,
Petrarchist
CXIII, 179-180 Ship X, Fortuna
CXXII, 56-58 X Port, Death
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J. Nature
1. Agricultural Reference
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XV, 1-6 Hunger . X, Bread, Tree, 
Proverb
VI, 34-36 Labourer X
XXVIII, 1-8 Light X
XXXI, 25-32 Fortuna X, Hill
LIX, 43-44 Power of Love X, Castle
XCII, 221-222 X
C, 94 X
C, 145-148 Folly X
CII, 91-96 Folly X, Feast,
Proverb, 
Bitter-Sweet
CVI, 485-488 Tree X
CXXVII, 115-117 Hunger X (Thistle), 
Proverb
CXXVII, 230 Tree X
2. Animal
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 17-18 X Classical Vergil, Eglogue I 
59-60. (Pag&s, 
p. 4), and 
(Bohigas, II, 
p. H)
IV, 27-30 X Humours (Medical)
VI, 44 X Folly, Proverb
IX, 15-16 Mythological X, Petrarchist, 
Death
XVIII, 17-20 X Mythological,
Fire
Cino da Pistoia 
or Dante, Sonnet
"Molti volendo 
dir che fosse 
Amore”, (Numb er
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Poem
Animal (cont.)
Main Subordinate Source
XXIV, 25-28 X
XXVIII, 1-8
XXIX, 1-4
Light
X
79 in: Dante 
Alighieri, Rime 
ed. G. Contini,
Torino: Giulio 
Einaudi, 1965), 
stanza 9. Pa£es 
attributes this 
verse to Pistoia, 
after misquoting 
and misinterpreting 
his source, M. 
Scherillo, ’’Alcune 
fonti provenzali 
della ’Vita Nuova’ 
di Dante”, p. 246 
(Pag£s, p. 25)
Classical Juvenal, Satire
XII, 34-36; Richard 
de Fournival, Li 
Bestiare d’Amour,
ed. C. Hippeau,
Geneve: Slatkine 
Reprints, 1969, 
p. 31; ”Las 
Naturas d’alcus 
auzels e d’alcunas 
bestias", in K. 
Bartsch, Chrestomathie 
Provengale, Berlin: 
Wiegandt und 
Schotte, 1892, 
p. 336. (Pages, 
p. 37). Bestiaris 
vol. I, ed. S. 
Panunzio,
Barcelona:
Barcino, 1963, 
p. 110. Faules 
isopiques, ed.
Miquel i Planas, 
Barcelona: 1908, 
p. 170. (Bohigas 
II, p. 90)
X, Sick Man,
Robber
According to 
Bohigas, the 
image of the 
bull would 
proceed from an 
unspecified 
bestiairy. As
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Animal (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
his source on 
this matter he 
refers to, R.
Albs Moner, "Els 
bestiaris a 
Catalunya",
Discursos llegits
a la ’Real Academia 
de Buenas Letras * a
Barcelona, Barcelona 
1924. p. 32. 
(Bohigas II, p. 102) 
Owing to the nature 
of the image I 
would also suggest 
that it may also 
be inspired by: 
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book III, VII, 3, 
1116 b 29 - 1117 a.
XXX, 39-40 X
XXXIV, 41-44 X Heat-Cold 
(Medical), 
Poison
XLII, 1-8 X Tree San Vicente Ferrer
quoted in D. Roque 
Chabas, "Estudios 
sobre los sermones 
de San Vicente 
Ferrer" Revista 
de Archivos t. II, 
1903. p. 89.
Richard de Fournival 
Le Bestiare d*Amour,
ed. C. Hippeau, 
Geneve: Slatkine 
Reprints, 1969, 
p. 31. (Paghs, 
p. 57). For 
unclear reasons 
P. Bohigas considers 
improbable the 
influence of 
Hugues de St.
Victor, "De bestiis 
et aliis rebus" I, 
XXV, Migne, P.L.
177, p. 26, as 
well as, "De 
propietatibus 
rerum" de Bartomeu 
Glanville. (Bohigas
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Poem
Animal (cont.)
Main Subordinate Source
II, p. 144)
The image of the 
dove being of 
popular tradition 
it is also 
interesting to 
note that it is 
found in the 
romance, "Fontefrida, 
Fontefrida", and 
in Anselm Turmeda, 
Disputa del Ase,
Barcelona:
Barcino (E.N.C.), 
161-162.
XLII, 12-16
XLII, 25-32
XLVI, 9-16
LXIV, 1-8
Short-sightedness, 
Cloth
Wet Nurse X, Poison, Hair
Biblical X, Oven
Music Peire Rogier,
”Belh Monruelh, 
aisselh que-s 
part de vos” 
stanza II, verses 
7-8. To be found 
in C. Appel, Das 
Leben und die
Lieder des
Trobadors Peire
Rogier, Berlin: 
Reimer, 1882, 
p. 92. Pages 
wrongly indicates 
Appel’s Chrestomathie 
Provencale as the 
textual source. 
(Pages, p. 77)
X
X
LXIV, 25-27 X Petrarchist Arnaut Daniel, 
’’Canzone X”, "En 
cest sonet coind’e 
leri", stanza VII, 
verses 43-45. 
Arnaut Daniel, 
Canzoni, ed.
G. Toja. Firenze: 
Sansoni, 1960, 
p. 274. Petrarch 
"Sonnet 212" 
stanza II, verses 
7-8, and Rime
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Animal (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CCXXXIX, Sestina 
8, "La ver 1’aurora 
che si dolce l'aura" 
stanza VI, verse 
35-36. (Paghs, 
p. 78) (Bohigas 
III, p. 67)
LXXI, 73-74 X
LXXII, 25-26 Biblical X
LXXV, 49-56 Mythology X
LXXVIII, 43-44 X Coward
LXXXVII, 48 X
LXXXVII, 170 X Proverb
LXXXIX, 1-2 Biblical X
XCIII, 41-44 Hunting X, Death
XCIX, 81-83 Death X
XCIX, 91-92 X Fool, Proverb
C, 61-64 X Death
C, 107-108 X Music
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book 1, IX, 1099 
b 32. (Pag'es, 
p. 106)
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book I, V, 1094 
b 19. (Pagks,
108)
C, 177-180 Child X
CII, 155-156 X
CIII, 17-20 Robe X, Hot-Cold (Fire) 
Bed
CIV, 53-56 X King, Death, 
Proverb
CIV, 214-216 King X, Death
CIV, 256 X Proverb Nicomachean Ethics,
Book I, VII, 1098 
a 18. (Pagbs, 
p. 119) (Bohigas 
IV, p. 119)
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Animal (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CVI, 265-268 X Folly
CVI, 387-388 X
CVI, 443-444 X Folly, Fortuna, 
Proverb
variant
CVII, 86 
in N
X
CX, 17-20 Hunt X, Death
CXI, 37-38 X
CXII, 107-110 X Proverb
CXII, 129-130 Tree X, Animal
CXII, 175-178 Death X
CXIII, 164 X
CXVII, 1-2 X Proverb
CXXII a, 13-16 Folly X
CXXII b, 21-23 Folly X, Proverb
CXXII b, 37-38 X
CXXVIII, 106-109 X
CXXVIII, 260-263 Music Tree, X
CXXVIII, 448-451 X
3. Landscape - flowers
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXVIII, 26 X Proverb, Biblical Psalm I, 3
LXXI, 53-56 Water (River) X
LXXV, 70-72 Power of Love X, Light
LXXVI, 5-8 Travelling X, Wind
XC, 9-12 X Wind
CII, 59-60 X
CXXI, 41-48 Travelling X
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Main Subordinate Source
4. Tree
Poem
IV, 1-6
XXVI, 49-53
XLII, 1-8
XCII, 197-200
CVI, 485-488
CXII, 193-198
CXII, 324
CXV, 107-108
CXVII, 107-108
CXXVII, 230
CXXVII, 391-392
CXXVIII, 260-263
Hunger X, Agricultural,
Bread
X Folly
Animal X
Power of Love X
X Agricultural
Robe X
X
X
X .
X Agricultural,
Proverb
X
Music X, Animal
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K. Geography of Love
1. Path-Way-Road
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VI, 9-12 X
VII, 49-51 Biblical X
IX, 41-44 Door X
XIX, 23-24 Death X
XXVIII, 1—20 Bond of Love X, Prisoner,
Death
XXXVIII, 29-32 X Hill
XLV, 97-100 X
XLVI, 1-8 Wind X, Sea
LI, 37-39 Literary
Reference
X, Folly,
Death
LIII, 1-4 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X
LVIII, 17-20 X Bitter-Sweet,
Laughing-Crying
LVIII, 21-22 Robber X
LXII, 25-28 X Traveller
LXIII, 30-32 Bitter-Sweet X
LXX, 55-56 Proverb X, Time
LXXXVI, 9-10 Death X, Mythology,
Water (River), 
Mythology
LXXXIX, 5-8 X Death
XCII, 55-58 Traveller X, Port, Poison
XCV, 67-68 Death X, Sun
XCVII, 13-16 X Death
XCVIII, 1-4 X Water, Mythology, 
Death
The water image 
in these verses
subtly refers to 
the Lethe, as in 
LXXXVI, 9-10, and 
CII, 139. The
563
Path-Way-Road (cont.)
Poem  Main Subordinate Source
source is, 
therefore, 
probably 
references to 
the Lethe found 
in Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses.
XCVIII, 5-6 Fool
XCIX, 16 X
XCIX, 56 X
C, 8 X
C, 95-96 X
C, 219-220 X
X, Paradise
Proverb, 
Blindness
Hill
Nicomachean Ethics
Book VI, II, 1139 
a 16 - 1139 b 15. 
St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica
I - II, 27, 2. 
(Pages, p. Ill)
CI, 17-24 Child X, Travelling
variant
CIII, between
48-49
In '
manuscripts
B d e Blind
CIV, 167-168 X
CIV, 240 X
CV, 27-28 X
Proverb
Eschatological
(Fear)
CV, 173-174 
CVI, 429-432
CVI, 469-472
CVIII, 93-96
CVIII, 100
Biblical
Equestrian
Biblical
Biblical
X
X, Folly
X, Bread
X, Blind
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P ath-W ay-Ro ad (c ont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXIX, 2-5 •
CXII, 189-190
CXII, 403-405 
CXIII, 101-104 
CXIII, 121-124 
CXIII, 145-146
CXIII, 165-166 
CXIII, 203-204
CXIII, 215-218
CXVI, 46-48
CXVIII, 29-30
CXXII a, 26-27 
CXXVII, 58-60
CXXVII, 122-123
CXXVII, 217-219
CXXVII, 328-329
CXXVII, 354-355
CXXVIII, 6-7
CXXVIII, 134-137
CXXVIII, 202
CXXVIII, 316-319 
CXXVIII, 352-353 
CXXVIII, 356-357 
CXXVIII, 553-555
CXXVIII, 687-690
Death
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Blindness
X
X
Folly
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Eschatological
Death
X, Folly, Death
X, Music
Traveller
Bread
Death.
2. Traveller-Travelling
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LX, 35-36 X Port
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Traveller-Travelling (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXII, 25-28 Path X
LXXVI, 5-8 X Wind, Nature
LXXXI, 7-8 X
LXXXVII, 251-254 X
LXXXVII, 339-340 Power of Love X
XCII, 55-58 X Path, Port, 
Poison
CI, 17-24 Child X, Path
CII, 221-222 X
CV, 80 X
CVI, 137 Wall X
CXI, 1-8 X
CXIII, 205-208 X Sailor
CXXI, 41-48 X Landscape
CXXVII, 127-129 Path . X
CXXVIII, 340-343 X Hill
3. Bridge
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXXIX, 3-4 X
4. Hill
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 37-40 Sick Man X, Sleep
XXXI, 25-32 Fortuna X, Agricultural
XXXIV, 1-8 Wind X, Lameness
XXXVIII, 29-32 Path X
LXXXIX, 17 X
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Hill (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
C, 95-96 Path X
CXXVIII, 84-85 X
CXXVIII, 340-343 Traveller X
5. Wall
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVI, 17-20 X
CVI, 137 X Travelling
6. Door
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 11-12 Key X
V, 40 X
IX, 41-44 X Dumbness, Path
XV, 21-24 Fire-Ice X
XX, 1-4 Classical X, Port
XX, 17-24 Key X, Death
XLVI, 45-48 X Fortuna
LXXXVIII, 63-64 X
CXII, 255-260 X Death, Key
CXII, 411-412 X
CXIII, 117-118 X Death
CXVII, 73-74 Hostal of Love X
CXXVII, 282 X
7. Key
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 11-12 X Door
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Key (cont.)
Poem
XX, 17-24
CV, 219-220
CXII, 255-260 
CXIII, 87-88
8. House
Poem
LVI, 13-16
CII, 17-24
CXIII, 189-190
CXIII, 195-198
9. Castle
Poem
II, 1-8
VI, 29-32
LIX, 43-44
LXXI, 33-34
Main
X
Water
Door
Subordinate
Door, Death
X
X, Death
Source
LXXIX, 27-32
CI, 9-12
Main
Religion of 
Love
Sailor
Fire
Folly
Main
King
Folly
Power of Love
X
Subordinate
X
X, Sea
X
X, Laughing- 
Crying, Death
Subordinate
X, Sea, Ship, 
Wind
X
X, Agricultural 
Reference
Military
Source
Source
Jordi de Sant 
Jordi, Poem III,
"Lo Setge d’Amor", 
"Ajustat vey d’amor 
tot lo poder", 
stanza II, verses 
13-16. Jordi de 
Sant Jordi, ed.
M. de Riquer, 
Granada:
Universidad, 1955, 
p. 119. (Bohigas 
I, p. 83; II, p. 94)
Power of Love
Eyes
X, Military
X, Servant, King
5 68'
Castle (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CII, 174-176 X Military,
Petrarchist
Petrarch, Sonnet 
LXVII, "Del mar 
tirreno a la 
sinistra riva", 
verse 10.
(Amador de los 
Rios, Historia 
de la literatura
espanola VI, 
p. 519) (Pages, 
p. 115)
CVI, 168 King X
CXVII, 6-7 X Military
CXXVIII, 400-405 X ■
10. Prisoner
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 13-16 X Death Guillamue de
Lorris et Jean 
de Meun, Roman 
de la Rosa, tome 
II, ed. E. 
Langlois, Paris: 
Firmin-Didot, 
p. 135: "Mout 
est Espernace 
courtoise: /
El ne laira ja 
une toise /
Nul vaillant 
ome jusqu’au 
chief, / Ne por 
perill ne por 
meschief. /
Nes au larron 
que l’en viaut 
pendre / Fait 
ele ades merci 
at/endre (vv. 
2631-2636).
IX, 1-8 X Tears, Death, 
Folly
XIII, 13-16 Historical X
XVII, 29-32 X Death
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Prisoner (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVIII, 33-36 Biblical X, Light-Darkness, 
Dark Place
XXII, 25-28
XXVIII, 17-20
XXXV, 25-28
XLI, 37-40
XLIX, 41-44
X
Bond of Love
X
Friendship
Bondage of 
Love
X, Path, Death
Death
X
X, Sleep, Death
L, 10-12 Juridical X
LI, 1-6 X Death Guillamue de 
Lorris et Jean 
de Meun, Roman 
de la Rose tome 
II, ed. E. 
Langlois, Paris: 
Firmin-Didot, 
p. 135: "Mout 
est Espernace 
courtoise: /
El ne laira ja 
une toise /
Nul vaillant 
ome jusqu’au 
chief, / Ne 
por perill ne 
por meschief. / 
Nes au larron 
que 1’en viaut 
pendre / Fait 
ele ades merci 
atendre (w. 
2631-2636).
LIX, 17-20 Death X
LIX, 29-32 X Death
LXIII, 3-4 X
LXXI, 86-88 Bond of Love X
LXXV, 11-12 X Mythological
LXXVIII, 49-50 X
LXXXVII, 166-167 Sleep X
LXXXVII, 195-196 X .
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Prisoner (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXXVII, 198 X
XCIX, 23-24 X King
CI, 44 X
CII, 61-62 X King
CV, 197-198 X
CVI, 313-314 Folly X •
CIX, 5-8 X King
CX, 1-2 X
CX, 3-4 Fortuna X
CXIII, 99-100 Bond of Love Prisoner
CXIII, 139-140 Ship X
CXVII, 67-68 X
CXXII b 29-32 Historical X
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L. Literary
1. Literary References (General)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
IV, 9-13 Sea
XLV, 89-94 X
X, Wind
XLIX, 25-28 X
Dante, Divina
Commedia, ’’Inferno’’ 
Canto V, verses 
73-142 (Francesca 
da Rimini). (Paghs, 
p. 62) (B. Sanvisenti, 
I primi influssi de
Dante del Petrarca 
e del Bocaccio 
sulla Letteratura
Spagnuola, Milano: 
Ulrico Hoepli,
1902, p. 387, 
note 40); A.
Farinelli, Dante 
in Spagna, Francia, 
Inqhilterra, Germania,
Torino: Fratelli 
Bocca, 1922, p. 86. 
Bohigas and Torras 
i Batges, (La 
tradicio catalana, 
Barcelona: Selecta, 
1966, p. 323), as 
well as Pages 
(Auzias March et 
ses predecesseurs,
p. 258) consider 
that this reference 
is simply an 
exultation of 
Dante’s Beatrice. 
Furthering this 
argument I would 
suggest that it 
is equally possible 
that this is a 
reference to the 
Vita Nova, which 
is also a ’’story”.
It is an "hystorial", 
or record of 
Dante’s love.
Dante, Divina
Commedia,
"Purgatorio"
Canto XXVI,
verses 120-128.
(Milh y Fontanals,
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Literary References (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
De los trovadores 
en Espana, ed.
G. Martinez y 
F.R. Manrique, 
Barcelona: Consejo 
Superior de 
Investigaciones 
Cientificas, 1966, 
p. 457. Pag^s 
and Bohigas both 
reject this theory. 
(Pages, Auzias 
March et ses 
predecesseurs, 
p. 232; Commentaire, 
p. 64) (Bohigas 
III, p. 17)
LI, 37-39
LVII, 5-8
X Folly, Path,
Death
X St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica
II - II, 125, 2. 
Dante, Divina 
Commedia, 
"Purgatorio”
Canto I, verses 
71-75. (Pages, 
p. 73) Seneca, 
"Epistula LXX" 
13-16.
LXXI, 49-52
LXXIII, 5-8
Golden Age X
X
XC, 41-42
Pages sees in 
this image an 
allusion to the 
novels of chivalry, 
especially to 
the Lancelot, 
and also to 
some ancient 
sources. (Pages, 
p. 86) For 
Bohigas this Is 
a reference to 
Roman antiquity 
in general.
(Bohigas III, 
p. 101)
Dante, Divina 
Commedia, "Inferno" 
Canto V, verses
X
5 7 3.
Literary References (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
121-123. (Pages, 
p. 97) Boethius,
De consolatione,
II : iv, ed.
S.J. Tester, 
London: Heineman, 
1973, p. 191. 
(Bohigas II, 
p. 7; III, 
p. 171)
XCV, 17-20 Fortuna X
XCIX, 84-85 Biblical X, Echatological, 
Death
C, 57-60 Fool X, Apothecary, 
Labourer
CIV, 247-248 X Historical, Table
CV, 95-96 Eye X, Mystic, Light
CV, 210-212 God X, Death, Religious
CXII, 226-227 X Pages suggests 
that this might 
be a reference 
to Seneca’s 
"Consolatio ad 
Helviam, ...ad 
Marciam, ...ad 
Polybium". 
(Pagbs, p. 135)
CXIII, 1-4 X Proverb Hippocrates, 
Aphorismi III, 
49. (Pages, 
137) (Bohigas
V, p. 43)
CXVIII, 91-92 Historical X, Proverb
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2. Biblical
Poem Main. Subordinate Source
V, 9-16 X Devil Refers to the 
Incarnation
VII, 32 X Friendship,
Proverb
Psalm I, 1
VII, 49-51 X Path, Bread Fall of Man
IX, 9-12 X King Solomon
XV, 41-48 Feast X
XVII, 53-56 X David
VIII, 33-36 X Light, Dark Place, 
Prison
Conversion of 
Saul, Acts IX, 
1-9
XXI, 9-12 X Job
XXIII, 25-28 X Bread Song of Songs 
VI, 1 and 4
XXIII, 31-32 X Devout Man, 
Blindness
Song of Songs 
VI, 4-5
XXIII, 33-36 X City
XXVI, 13-16 X Folly Solomon
XXVI, 43-44 X Samson, Absalon 
"Rhythmus de 
contemptu mundi 
(Paghs, p. 40)
XLI, 31-32 Proverb X
XLVI, 9-16 X Oven, Animal Job XLI, 22, 
(Bohigas III, 
p. 8)
XLIX, 20-24 X Juridical,
Blindness,
Dumbness, Power 
of Love, Proverb
Miracles of 
Jesus
LII, 1 X Biblical
LVI, 25-32 Light X, Mystic, Sun
LVII, 11-16 X Military Reference to
Jesus as the 
Redemptor (Pages, 
p. 73)
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Poem Main
Biblical (cont.)
Subordinate Source
LVII, 17-20 X Crucifixion
LVII, 39-40 X Redemption. 
Pages sees in 
this image a 
reference to 
Genesis II,
5 and the 
creation of
Eve (Pag'fes, 
p. 73).
Bohigas puts 
this in doubt 
(Bohigas III, 
p. 44).
LVIII, 29-30 X Job III, 2. 
(Bohigas III, 
p. 47)
LXII, 20-21 X Fool Psalms XIV, 1; 
LII, 1.
LXIV, 28 X Religious
(General)
Passion of Palm 
Sunday (Pagbs, 
p. 78)
LXVIII, 26 Landscape X, Proverb
LXVI, 41-44 Petrarchan X, Religious
LXXII, 16 X Life of Jesus 
Christ. (Pages 
p. 85) (Bohigas 
III, p. 97)
LXXII, 17-22 X Life of Jesus 
Christ. (Pages 
p. 85) (Bohigas 
III, p. 97)
LXXII, 17-22 X Life of Jesus 
Christ
LXXII, 25-26 X Animal Annunciation to 
the shepherds. 
St. Luke II, 
8-20. (Pagbs, 
p. 85) (Bohigas 
III, p. 98)
LXXII, 27-30 X St. Luke II, 
(Pagbs, p. 85) 
(Bohigas III, 
p. 98)
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Main Subordinate SourcePoem
LXXXVII, 328-329
LXXXVII, 331-332
LXXXIX, 1-2
Biblical (cont.)
Power of Love X
Astrology X
X Animal Psalm LXII, 1 
(Biblia Sacra 
Vulgatae Sditionis,
London: Bagster, 
1970). Paghs 
(pp. 96-97) and 
Bohigas (III, 
p. 167), attribute 
it to Psalm XLI, 2. 
Rafael Ferreres 
(Ausias March,
Obra Poetica
Completa vol. II,
Madrid: Castalia, 
1979, pp. 8-9; and 
’’Ausias March en 
algunos poetas del 
siglo de oro’’, 
Estudios sobre
literatura v arte
dedicados al
Profesor Emilio
Orozco Diaz, tomo
I_, Granada: 
Universidad de 
Granada, 1979, 
pp. 470-472) 
pointedly remarks 
that the tradition 
of this imagery, 
as studied by 
Maria Rosa Lida 
de Malkiel (La 
tradicion clas ic a
en Espana, Barcelona 
Planeta, 1975, pp. 
55-60; 76-79;
95-98) indicates 
that Ausias March 
may have borrowed 
this from Galician 
and Portuguese 
troubadours in 
whose work this 
theme is frequently 
found.
XCII, 249-250 X Death Judgement Day
XCIII, 29-32 Folly X, Miscellany
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Poem Main
Biblical (cont.)
Subordinate Source
XCIX, 84-85 X Death, Literary
Reference,
Eschatological
Judas (Bohigas 
IV, p. 64)
CII, 25-26
CII, 63-64 
CII, 105-108
X
Power of Love X, Fortuna
X
Lazarus
CIV, 157 X Robber, Proverb
CIV, 201-202 Fire X, Sodomite
CIV, 205 X
CV, 29-30 X Robber
CV, 31-32 X
CV, 45-46 X Fire
CV, 65-66 X Sea
CV, 109-110 X
Pages sees this 
passage as an 
imitation of 
”Lo Fasset” 
verses 1629-1634, 
Romania t. XV., 
1885, p. 219. 
(Pag&s, p. 115) 
St. Matthew 
XXVII, 69-75. 
(Bohigas IV,
P. 95)
Psalm I, 1
cv, 128 X
cv, 133-134 X Water (River), 
Sea
Apocalypsis
St. Luke XXIII, 
39-43
St. John III,
8. (Pag'es, 
p. 120) (Bohigas 
IV, p. 130)
Psalm I
Book of Job
St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica I, 
13, 9. (Pagbs, 
p. 120-121) Psalm 
LXXXVI, 6.
(Bohigas IV, 
p. 130)
St. John the 
Baptist (Pag'es, 
p. 121)
Ecclesiastes I, 7.
CV, 147-148 X Miscellany (Scythe),St. John I, 23 
Death
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Biblical (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CV, 167-168 X Death St. Paul, I 
Corinthians
XV, 55-56
CV, 173-174 X Path St. John I, 23
CV, 199-200 X St. Matthew XXVI,
24. (Pages, 
p. 121) (Bohigas
IV, p. 131)
CV, 217-218 X Tears Psalm CXIX, 134; 
Jeremiah XIX, 18
CVI, 72 X Death St. Matthew XXIII,
27 (Pag^s, p. 122)
(Bohigas, p. 154)
CVI, 469-472 X Path, Bread St. John VI, 48
CVIII, 17-20 X Tolly Psalms XIV, 
and LII, 1
1
CVIII, 64 Folly X, Proverb,
Wind, Petrarchist
CVIII, 93-96 X Path, Blind St. Matthew XV, 14
CXII, 303-310 X St. Matthew 
(Bohigas V,
XIX, 29 
p. 31)
CXII, 369-370 X Feast St. Matthew 
(Bohigas V,
VI, 24 
p. 32)
CXIII, 171-172 God X, Laughing- 
Crying, Proverb
CXVII, 7-8 X Solomon
CXIX, 1 X Job III, 3.
(Pages, p. 144)
(Bohigas V, p. 94)
CXIX, 19-20 Sea Water (River), 
Bitter-Sweet, X
CXXI, 27-28 Lameness X (Rod), Tree
CXXI, 67-68 X (Rod) St. John I, 23; 
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book II, ix, 
between 1109 a
25 and b 15
CXXVII, 24-25 X Sick Man Book of Job
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Poem Main
CXXVIII, 603-604 X
Biblical (cont.)
Subordinate Source
St. Matthew XIX, 
30; XX, 16;
Luke XIII: 30
3. Book
Poem Main Subordinate Source
V, 19-20 X
XXV, 41-42 Heart X
CXII, 377-378 X Proverb
CXXVI, 17 X
Medieval aphorism: 
“Non dari vacuum 
in natura”
(Pages, p. 136) 
(Bohigas V, 
p. 32)
St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica
I - II, 40, 5. 
(Pages, p. 151) 
(Bohigas V, 
p. 136)
4. Classical
Poem
II, 17-18
XIV, 29-31
XVI, 25-32
XVIII, 41-44
XX, 1-4
XXIV, 25-28
XXVI, 41-42
Main
Animal
Astrological
Military-
Philosopher
X
Animal
X
Subordinate
X
X
X, Death, Port
X, Sea
Port, Door
X
Source
Seneca, ’’Epistula 
70", 13-15. 
(Pages, p. 29) 
(Bohigas II, 
p. 76)
"Shythmus de 
contemptus 
mundi” (Pages, 
p. 40) (Bohigas 
II, p. 97)
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Classical (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXVI, 45-48 X Sea
XXX, 49-56 Fortuna X, Court of Love
LXXVII, 25-29 Robe X, Mythology, 
Cloth
CXVII, 111-112 Robe X, Proverb
5. Golden Age
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXI, 49-52 X Literary Reference
LXXIX, 17-27 X Arrow, Mythology, 
Wound of Love
Ovid, Metamorphoses 
Book I, v. 89-150 
(The Ages of Man); 
Book I, v. 469-552 
(Apollo and Daphne)
LXXXIV, 19-22 X Old Man
6. Historical
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XIII, 13-16
XXVI, 9-12
CIV, 247-248
X Prisoner, King, Reference to
Doctor Janus de Lusignan,
King of Cyprus, 
taken prisoner 
July 27, 1426 
at the battle of 
Chierochitia, 
who remained so 
until May 20,
1427. (Pages, 
p. 18-19)
(Bohigas II, 
p. 48)
X Refers to the
opposing religious 
beliefs in Africa 
and Europe.
Literary X, Table
Reference
CXVIII, 91-92 X Literary Reference, Refers to the rape 
Proverb of La Cava by King
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Historical (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXXII b 29-32
7. Mythological
Poem
IX, 15-16
Rodrigo, and 
consequently 
to the treason 
of Count Julian. 
Pages sees the 
tradition of 
the "romances 
del rey Rodrigo" 
and the Cronica 
del rey Roderico,
cap. CLXV as the 
source. (Pages, 
p. 144) Bohigas 
only notes that 
Ausias March 
draws on a 
popular legend. 
(Bohigas V, 
p. 89)
X Prisoner Refers to the
loves of Lucrezia 
d’Alagno and 
Alfons el Magnanim, 
and to their 
desired marriage 
which would have 
been made possible 
through the 
intervention of 
Lucrezia’s uncle 
Pope Calixt III. 
(Pages, p. 147-148) 
and (Bohigas V, 
p. 121-122)
Main Subordinate Source
X Animal, Death, Petrarch,
Petrarchist "Triumphus
Cupidinis" III, 
verse 20. (Pages, 
p. 14). Bohigas 
retells the 
legend but does 
not attribute a 
particular source. 
(Bohigas I, p. 83; 
II, p. 36) I 
would suggest 
that one of the
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Mythological (cont.)
Poem Main  Subordinate Source
XIII, 17-24 X Worm
XIV, 10-12 Fortuna X
XIV, 29-31 Astrological X
XV, 25-28 X lire, King, 
Petrarchist
most probable 
sources could 
be Ovid’s 
Metamorphoses, 
Book IV, verses 
55-166.
Vergil, Aeneid 
VI, verses 
529-600. Dante 
Divina Commedia 
”Inferno”, canto 
XXXI, 124. 
(Pag'hs, p. 14); 
(Bohigas II, 
p. 48).
Metamorphoses, 
Book IV, v. 457
XV, 29-32 X Heart, Eyes
XVIII, 17-20 Animal X
XX, 29-32 Courtly Love X, Astrology
XXXI, 41-44 X
LI, 25-28 X
LXXV, 11-12 Prisoner • X
In this two part 
image, Pag'es 
suggests Seneca’s 
Phedra, translated 
by A. de Vilaragut, 
1396. (Pag'bs, 
p. 23) Bohigas 
also suggests 
Ovid’s Heroidas 
in general, which 
was translated 
into Catalan by 
G. Nicolau in 
1390. (Bohigas
II, p. 57) Petrarch, 
’’Triumphus Cupidinis’’,
III, verse 79.
(Page's, p. 23)
Reference to
the Pates.
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Mythological
Poem
LXXV, 21-22
LXXV, 23-24
LXXV, 25-28
LXXV, 33-40
LXXV, 45-48 
LXXV, 49-56
LXXV, 73-80
LXXV, 81-84
(cont-)
Main Subordinate Source
Religion of X
Love
X Pages suggest as
a source, Ovid 
or Vergil, in 
general. (Pages, 
p. 87)
X
X Miscellany (Flesh), Verses 39-40
Feast seem to draw
on the work of 
Bertran de Born 
”Greu m’es..” 
(Antoine Thomas, 
ed. Poesies 
completes de 
Bertran de Born,
Toulouse: 
"Bibliotheque 
Meridionale",
1888, p. 63; 
unavailable to 
me but quoted 
in A. Jeanroy,
La poesie lyrique
des troubadours 
tome XI, Toulouse: 
Edouard Privat, 
1934, pp. 112-113: 
"Je dois porter 
la langue ou la 
dent me fait mal, 
Je dois inculper 
ma dame de felonie 
et de trahison, 
car son humeur 
volage souffre 
les prikres de 
ces perfides, 
qui vont brigant 
son amour").
X Death
X Animal
X Folly,
Equestrian
X Religion of
Love
5 84
Mythological (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXVII, 25-28 Robe X, Classical,
Cloth
CXXIX, 9-16 Arrow X, Wound of
Love
LXXIX, 17-27 Golden Age X, Arrow, Wound 
of Love
LXXXVI, 9-10 Death X, Water (River) , 
Path
LXXXVII, 161 X
XCII, 1-4 X Death, Fortuna Indirect reference 
to the Fates
XCVIII, 1-4 Path X (Lethe), Water 
(River), Death
CII, 139-140 X (Lethe) Water, Death
CIV, 225-228 X Miser
8. Petrarchist
SourcePoem Main Subordinate
VII, 13-16 Water X, Folly
IX, 15-16 Mythological X, Animal, Death
XV, 17-20 Sun X, Fire
XV, 25-28 Mythological X, Fire, King
XXIII, 17-20 X Amador de los
Rios saw in 
these verses an 
imitation of 
Petrarch’s Sonnet 
262: "Cara la 
vita e dopo lei 
mi pare".
Historia de la 
literatura espanola
VI, p. 500. Pagbs 
disagrees with 
him. (Pagks, 
p. 35)
XXVII, 15-16 X Petrarch, Sonnet 
134, "Pace non
585
Petrarchist (cont.)
Poem  Main Subordinate Source
XXXIX, 27-28 X
LXII, 49-50 X Heart, Power of 
Love
trovo, e non ho 
da far guerra", 
verse 13. Also, 
possibly, Jordi 
de San Jordi,
Poem XV (Can^o 
d’Opposits):
’’Tots jorns
aprench e
desaprench
ensemps",
verse 2. Jordi
de San Jordi,
ed. M. de Riquer,
Granada: Universidad,
1955. p. 173.
(Pagbs, p. 41)
Petrarch, Sonnet 
174, "Fera stella 
(se’l cielo ha 
forza in noi 
quant’alcun crede)’’; 
Sonnet 231, ’’I’ mi 
vivea di mia sorte 
contento,"; Sonnet 
296, ”1’ mi soglio 
accusare, et or 
mi scuso". Amador 
de los Rios sees 
the general 
influence of 
Sonnet 296 on 
these particular 
verses of Ausias 
March. Historia 
de la literatura
espanola VI,
p. 497. Pages 
records parallel 
drawn by Tassoni 
(Rime di Fr.
Petrarca, Modena,
1711. 4th ed. 
p. 358, 451) 
between these 
verses and sonnet 
174, verses 12-14, 
and 231, verses 
2-4. (Pages, 
p. 52).
Petrarch, Sonnet 
5, "Quando io movo 
i sospiri a chiamar
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Petrarchist (cont.)
Main Subordinate SourcePoem
voi,” verse 2; 
Jordi de San 
Jordi, Poem IX 
(Stramps), "Jus 
sus lo front port 
vostra bella 
semblan^a", Stanza 
I, verse 5-8. 
Arthur Terry has 
pointed out the 
relation between 
these verses and 
those of Petrarch, 
but overlooked the 
equally possible 
influence of Jordi 
de San Jordi. 
(Arthur Terry, 
Anthology of 
Spanish Poetry
1500-1580.
Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1965. 
p. 149, note to 
page 43).
LXIV, 25-27 Animal
LXV, 1-4 X
X
LXV, 25 X
LXVI, 41-44 X Religious 
(General), 
Biblical
According to 
Amador de los 
Rios, Historia 
de la literatura
espanola VI, 
p. 519, this is 
a general 
petrarchist 
imitation.
(Pag'es, p. 78)
Petrarch, 
"Triumphus '• 
Cupidinis" III, 
verses 64-66. 
(Amador de los 
Rios, Historia 
de la literatura
espanola VI, 
p. 519). (Pag'fes, 
p. 78).
Petrarch, Sonnet 
3, "Era il giorno 
ch’al sol si 
scoloraro" (Pag^s, 
p. 79) (Bohigas 
III, p. 73)
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Petrarchist (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXVII, 9
LXVIII, 17-24
CI, 9-12
CI, 13-16
CI, 49-52
CII, 174-176
CII, 229-230
X Petrarch, Sonnet
160, ’’Amor et io 
si pien di 
meraviglia", 
verse 8. (Pag^s, 
p. 80)
Solitude X, Feast, Courtly 
Love, Juridical
Eyes X, King, Servant, 
Castle
X Sword, Military, 
Bondage of Love
Petrarch,
"Triumphus 
Cupidinis" III, 
verse 91.
(Amador de los
Rios, Historia 
de la literatura
espanola VI, 
p. 498), (Pag^s, 
p. 112) (Bohigas
IV, p. 81)
X
•
Amador de los
Rfos sees in 
verses an
imitation of 
Petrarch’s Poem
71, "Perche la 
vita e breve," 
(Canzone 8), 
verses 97-98. 
Historia de la 
literatura espanola
VI, p. 498. Pages 
rejects this idea. 
(Pages, p. 114) 
(Bohigas IV, 
p. 82)
Castle X, Military
X Amador de los
Rios sees yet 
another imitation 
of Petrarch,
Sonnet 101,
"Lasso!, ben so 
che dolorose 
prede", verse 12. 
Historia de la 
literatura espanola
VI, p. 519.
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Poem
Petrarchist (cont.)
Main Subordinate Source
Paghs denies this 
theory (Paghs 
p. 116)
CVIII, 64
CXVI, 130
Folly X, Wind, Proverb,
Biblical
X Fire Petrarch, Poem
30, "Giovene 
donna sotto un 
verde lauro” 
(Sestina II), 
stanza II, 
verse 10.
(Pag&s, p. 140); 
(Bohigas V, 
p. 69)
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M. Infirmity
1. Blind
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXIII, 31-32 Biblical X, Devout Man
XLIX, 20-24 Biblical X, Juridical, 
Dumbness, Power 
of Love, Proverb
LVI, 33-36 Fortune X, Death
LXI, 33-34 X
LXV, 9-11 X
LXVI, 39-40 X Wound of Love, 
Death
LXIX, 57-62 Power of
Love
X, Fortuna
LXXII, 13-14 X
variant
LXXXVII, 173-174 
in E, d
X
XC, 33-34 Bond of Love X
XCI, 21-24 X Court of Love
XCII, 35-38 X Light, Water
C, 8 Path X, Proverb
C, 215-216 Fool X
variant
CIII, between
48 and 49,
In
B d e
X Path
CVI, 297-302 X Folly
CVIII, 93-96 Biblical X, Path
CX, 13-14 X Folly
CXIII, 215-218 X Folly, Path,
Death
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Blind (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXVII, 81-82 X
CXVII, 97-98 X Light
CXXVIII, 219-222 X Equestrian, Folly
CXXVIII, 605-609 Fortuna X, Laughing-Crying, 
Sailor
2. Deaf and Dumb
Poem Main Subordinate Source
IX, 41-44 Door X
XVII, 10-11 X Military
XXVI, 6 X
XXXIII, 33-36 X Nest of Love
XLIX, 20-24 Biblical X, Juridical,
Blind, Power of 
Love, Proverb
LV, 35 X
LXXXIV, 33 X
CVI, 447 X
3. Lame
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXIV, 1-8 Wind X
XCIX, 5-6 X
CXII, 372-373 X Proverb
CXXI, 27-28 X Biblical St. John 1, 23
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book II, ix, 
1109a25-b 15
CXXVIII, 514-516 X
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4. Short-sightedness
Poem Main Subordinate
XLII, 12-16 Animal
CXXVII, 24-25 X
Source
X, Cloth
592
N. Emotions
1. Fear
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXIV, 23 X
XLIII, 9-10 X
XLVI, 17-20 X Pilgrim Horace, Ode I, 15-18,R. Leveroni, B.H.S. XXVIII
LIX, 21-22 X 1951, p. 154
LXIII, 33-40 Death X
CV, 27-28 Path X, Hell
2. Laughing-Crying
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXV, 27-28 X Proverb
XXXI, 33-40 Fortuna X, Folly, Sword
XXXVI, 17-20 X Solitude
LII, 30-32 Death X
LIV, 1-4 Folly X
LVIII, 17-20 Path X, Bitter-Sweet
LXIX, 63-64 X Power of Love
XCIII, 69-70 Bitter-Sweet X, Eye
XCVII, 47-48 Tears X, Eye
XCVII, 49-50 Tears X, Water
CXIII, 171-172 God X, Proverb, 
Biblical
CXIII, 195-198 Folly X, Death, House
CXXVII, 394 X
CXXVIII, 6Q5-609 Fortuna X, Sailor, Blind
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3. Tears
Poem Main Subordinate Source
IX, 1-8 Prisoner X
XI, 1-4 X Death
X, 9-16 Death X
XCVII, 47-48 X Eye, Laughing- 
Crying
XCVII, 49-50 X Water, Laughing- 
Crying
XCVIII, 57-59 Water X, Bitter-Sweet
CI, 25 Eyes X
CV, 217-218 Biblical X
CXII, 146-147 X
4. Cruelty
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXXVII, 7 X
5. Friendship
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 33-40 Hermit X
VI, 37-40 X
Vtl, 32 Biblical X
XLI, 37-40 X Prisoner
LXXIV, 2-4 X
XCV, 65-66 Death X
CXVII, 219-220 X
CXX, 33-35 X
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0. Music
1. Music
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VII, 4 X Proverb
VIII, 10-12 Dance X
XI, 9-16 Death X
XI, 17-24 Death X
XV, 41-48 Feast X
XVIII, 57-60 Money X
XXV, 21-22 X
XXXII, 9-12 X Proverb Nicomachean Ethics,
Book II, i, 1103 a 
34; Book I, vi,
1098 a 11; (Pages, 
p. 45) and (Bohigas 
II, p. 112)
variant
XXXIV, 20-32 
in E
X Bond of Love
LVI, 9-12 X
LXIV, 1-8 Animal X
LXIX, 51-52 X Sick Man
XCIV, 118-120 Humours
(Medical)
X
XCIX, 67-68 X Sick Man
C, 107-108 Animal X
variant
CIII, between
48-49,
in
B d e only
X
CIV, 155-156 Hermit X (Noise)
CXIII, 181-188 X Sick Man, Arrow 
Death
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Music (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXIV, 61-62 Light X
CXXII a 26-27 Folly Path, X
CXXVIII, 260-263 X Tree, Animal
2. Dance
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VIII, 5-7 X
VIII, 10-12 X Folly, Music
LXXXVI, 3-4 Death X
3. Trumpet
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XLI, 13 X
LXXII, 37-40 Power of Love X
CXXVII, 172-174 Military X
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P. Man
a. Types
1. Child
Poem Main Subordinate Source
L, 22-24 X Folly, Death
VIII, 17-20 X
XCIV, 103-104 X
LXVI, 33-36 Power of Love X, Old Man
LXVIII, 1-8 Servant X, King
C, 1-2 X Power of Love, 
Fortuna
C, 177-180 X Animal Nicomachean Ethics,
Book IX, iv, and 
Book IX, viii,
1169 a 11. (Pages 
page 110)
CI, 17-24 X Path, Travelling
CIII, 33-34 X
CXXVII, 23 X
CXXVIII, 372-377 X
2. Coward
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXI, 1-4 X
LXXVIII, 43-44 Animal X
XCVIII, 25-28 Military X
CIV, 219-221 Folly X, Miser,
Rich Man
CXVII, 77-80 Military X
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3. Dwarf and Giant
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XL, 21-24 X Nicomachean Ethics 
Book VIII, xii,
1168 a 30, and
Book IX, viii,
1169 a 13 (Pagbs, 
p. 53), as well 
as, Book VIII,
XII, 1161 b 16. 
(Pag&s p. 53) 
(Bohigas II,
p. 138)
4. Envious Man
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 33-44 X Courtly Love
XXIV, 9-12 X
XXVI, 27-28 X Sick Man
LXXII, 9-12 X
XCVII, 43-44 X Courtly Love
5. Old Man
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXVI, 33-36 Power of Love X
LXXVI, 33-36 X Portuna
LXXXIV, 19-22 Golden Age X
CIV, 229-231 X
CVI, 33-36 Death X, Money
6. Sad Man
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
XXXIX, 3-6 Folly X, Dark Place
CXII, 121-130 Death X, Fortuna, 
Bitter-Sweet
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7. Sterile Man
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVI, 9-12 X Sick Man, Folly
8. Sodomite
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CIV, 170-172 X
CIV, 201-202 Fire X, Biblical
9. Strong Man
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXVII, 9-12 Weak Man X, Military
XL, 25-28 X Military
10.
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
XXVII, 9-12 X Strong Man, 
Military
CVI, 191-192 X
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b. Occupations 
1. Beggar
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 41-44 Bread X
C, 197-200 Folly X, Sick Man
CIII, 55-56 Fortuna X, Rich Man
2. Hermit •
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 33-40 X Friendship
XV, 21-24 Fire (Hot- 
Cold)
X
XXXIX, 17-20 X Court of Love, 
Feast
XLVII, 33-35 X
LXVII, 13-16 X Court of Love, 
Folly
XCVII, 57-60 X
CIV, 155-156 X Music (Noise)
CXVI, 105-106 X
CXXVIII, 547-552 X Philosopher
3. Labourer
SourcePoem Main Subordinate
VI, 29-32 Folly X
VI, 34-36 X Agricultural
LXXX, 1-2 X Juridical
LXXXV, 49-54 Fortuna X
C, 57-60 Folly X, Literary 
Reference
C, 143-144 Courtly Love X
CII, 65-68 X Water, Sea
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Labourer (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXXVIII, 685-686 Cloth X
4. Penitent
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXVI, 27-33 Goddess X, Poison
5. Philosopher-Magician
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XVIII, 1-4 X Sea, Classical Pelay Briz
identifies this 
reference with 
Diogenes the 
Cynic. But, 
neither Diogenes, 
nor Seneca, in 
"Epistula XC" 
say that Diogenes 
actually threw 
his cup, or 
material 
possessions into 
the sea. Pages 
suggests that this 
is inspired by 
Juvenal "Satire 
XII", verses 30-61. 
He also relates 
this to a passage 
of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica II - II, 
186, 3, and through 
this reference 
identifies the 
philosopher as 
Crates the Cynic. 
(Pages, p. 26-27) 
Bohigas follows 
Paghs’ theory. 
(Bohigas II, p. 69) 
I would suggest 
that this is, in 
fact, a reference 
to Simon the 
magician of St. 
Clement’s 
Recognitions ,
60.1
Philosopher-Magician (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
translated into 
latin by Rufinus 
of Aquilea. My 
interpretation 
depends on the 
notion that in 
the Renaissance 
a magician was 
considered to be 
a philosopher.
On this subject 
see, A. Heiserman,
The Novel Before 
the Novel. Chicago: 
University Press,
1977, p. 208-212, 
and G. Worth O’Brien, 
Renaissance Poetics 
and the Problem of
Power, Chicago: 
Institute of 
Elizabethan Studies, 
1956, p. 62; Lynn 
Thorndike, The 
History of Magic
and Experimental
Science vol. I,
New York: Columbia 
University Press,
1934, p. 400-427.
The Recognitions 
is accessible in 
translation in,
St. Clement, Ante 
Nicene Fathers 
vol. VIII,
(American reprint 
of the Edinburgh 
edition) Buffalo: 
Christian Literature 
Company, 1867-1872.
It is also of interest 
to note that Antonio 
de Guevara confuses 
the Magus figure 
with Socrates in, 
Menosprecio de 
corte y alabanza
de aldea, ed.
Martinez de
Burgos Madrid: 
Espasa-Calpe,
1952, p. 26.
LXXXVII, 159-160 Alchemy
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Philosopher-Magician (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CXVII, 57-60 X Devout Man
CXXVIII, 547-552 Hermit X
6. Pilgrim
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XLVI, 17-20 Pear X
7. Armed Man (see Military, F:2)
8. Traveller (see Geography, K:2)
9. Rich Man-Merchant
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LVIII, 1-4 X Death
C, 101-102 X Robber, Proverb Nicomachean Ethics,
CIII, 55-56 Fortuna X, Beggar
Book I, v, 1095 b 
25, Book I, v, 1096 
a 5; Pagbs wrongly 
indicated I, 3,
1095 b 5, (Pagbs, 
p. 107)
CIV, 219-221 Folly X, Coward, Miser
CXXVIII, 394-399 Sailor X, Robber, Ship
10. Robber
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VIII, 25-28 X Servant
XXVIII, 1-8 Light X, Sick Man 
Animal
LVIII, 21-22 X Path
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Robber (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
C, 101-102 Rich Man X, Proverb
CIV, 157 Biblical X, Proverb
CV, 29-30 Biblical X
CVI, 341-344 Miser X
CXXVIII, 394-399 Sailor X, Rich Man
Ship
Source
11. Prisoner (see Geography, K:10)
12. Sailor (see Marine, H:l)
13. Miser
Poem  Main Subordinate Source
variant
CIII. 54-56 in B1
X
CIV, 219-221 Folly X, Rich Man- 
Mer ch an t, Coward
CIV, 225-228 Mythological X
CVI, 341-344 X Robber
CXVII, 201-204 X
CXXVII, 86-92 X Fool, Hunger
CXXVIII, 210-213 Folly X
Nicomachean Ethics,
Book I, v, 1096 a 
5 (Paghs, p. 127)
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c. Parts of the Body
1. Eyes
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XV, 29-32 Mythological X, Heart
XXIII, 9-12 X Courtly Love,
Cloth
These verses seem 
to parody and 
contradict those 
of Bernart de 
Ventadorn in 
"Non es meravella 
s’eu chan", verses 
41-44, especially 
the passage: "Quan 
ieu la vey, be m’es 
parven / als huelhs, 
al vis, a la color"
LVIII, 9-12 Power of Love Miscellany
(Colours)
LXII, 41-44 X
LXVII, 39-40 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical)
LXIX, 25-28 Heat-Cold
(Medical)
X, Sea
LXXXVII, 119-120 X
LXXXVII, 131-132 X Fire
LXXXVII, 271-274 Fire X, Power of Love, 
Wound of Love, 
Humours
LXXXVII, 277-280 Sick Man X, Bed
LXXXVIII, 76 Eye
XCIII, 69-70 Bitter-Sweet X, Laughing- 
Crying
XCVII, 47-48 Tears X, Laughing- 
Crying
CI, 9-12 X King, Servant, 
Castle, Petrarchist
Petrarch, "Triumphus 
Cupidinis" III, 
verse 91-3) (Amador 
de los Rios,
Historia de la 
literatura espanola
VI, p. 498) Pag^s
and Bohigas record 
this influence but
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Eyes (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
CI, 25
CI, 41-42
CV, 95-96
• only for verses
13-16. (Pagks, 
p. 112) (Bohigas
. IV, p. 81). M. de
Riquer has pointed 
out that these 
verses seem to 
be modelled on 
the first two 
of Alain Chartier’s 
"Se onques deux 
yeulx orent telle 
puissance". (M. de 
Riquer, "Alain 
Chartier et Ausias 
March", Revista de 
Filologia Espanola,
t. XXXIX, 1955, 
p. 336-338.
X Tears This metaphor is
an illustration 
of Epicure’s theory 
of idea-images as 
used by Scholastic 
philosophers. It 
is quite commonly 
used by the 
troubadours, such 
as Hughes Brunet, 
"Corteza-men mov 
en mon cor mesclansa", 
stanza I, verses 
7-8; Sordel, "Bel 
m’es ab motz 
leugiers de far", 
stanza II, verses, 
13-14. Pagks also 
refers to other 
verses such as, 
Aimeric, quoted 
by Matfre Ermengau I, 
490, and those of 
other troubadours 
and Italian poets 
listed in N.
Scarano, "Fonti 
Provenzali e 
italiane della 
lirica Petrarchesca", 
pp. 294, 295, 309.
X Military
Light, Mystic, St. AugustineX
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Eyes (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
Literary Reference Confessions vol.
I, London: William 
Heinemann, 1968, 
p. 32. Book VI, . 
chapter XVI, ’’quam 
non videt oculus 
carnis, et videtur 
ex intimo”.
CXXVII, 47
2. Hair
Poem
XLII, 25-32
XCVIII, 37-39
CV, 1-2
3. Heart
Poem
XV, 29-32
XXI, 33-36 
XXV, 41-42
LII, 1-4
LXII, 33-36
LXII, 49-50
LXVII, 33-36
XCV, 43
Hunt X
Main Subordinate Source
Wet Nurse
Power of Love
X
X, Poison, Animal
X
Main Subordinate Source
CXIV, 87-88
Mythological
X
X
Robe
Power of Love
Petrarchist
Miscellany
(Stone)
X
X, Eyes
Juridical
Book
X, Wound of Love
X
X, Power of Love
X, Military, 
Wound of Love, 
Juridical
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d. States
1. Hunger
Poem Main Subordinate Source
IV, 1-6 X Bread,
Agricultural
XXII, 10-12 X Thirst, Fire 
(Hot-Cold)
Dante, Divina 
Commedia, "Paradiso” 
Canto IV, verses 
1-6. Aristotle,
De coelo, II, 13. 
(Paghs, p. 6)
(Bohigas II, 
p. 17)
P. March, "Al punt 
com naix", verse 50. 
(M. Mila y Fontanals, 
"Resenya Historica 
y Critica dels 
Antichs Poetas 
Catalans" Obras 
Completas, tomo 3, 
Barcelona: Libreria 
de Xlvaro Verdaguer, 
1890, page 159.) 
(Pages, p. 32)
XXXIII, 25-32 Fire X
XXXVII, 31-32 X Thirst
CIV, 84 X Proverb
CXXII b, 59-60 X Sick Man
CXXVII, 86-92 Miser X, ally
CXXVII, 94-95 X ■
CXXVII, 115-117 X Agricultural,
Proverb
CXXVII, 245-246 X
2. Thirst
Poem Main Subordinate
XIV, 25-28 X Water
XXII, 10-12 Hunger X, Fire (Hot-Cold)
XXXVII, 31-32 Hunger X
CXXVIII, 528-531 X
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3. Sleep
Poem Main Subordinate Source
I, 1-2 X Folly .
II, 37-40 X Hill, Sick Man St. Thomas Aquinas 
Summa Theologica,
II - II, 147, I. 
(Pag'bs, p. 5) Bohigas 
sees this as a fairly 
common topos of 
Provencal poetry, 
and indicates 
similar images, 
in N. Scarano,
"Fonti Provenzali 
e italiane della 
lirica Petrarchesca", 
p. 305-307
XXIV, 17-20 X
XXXVIII, 37-40 Time X
XLIX, 13-16 X Death
XLIX, 41-44 Bondage of 
Love
X, Prisoner,
Death
LXXXVII, 166-167 X Prisoner
4. Solitude
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXXVI, 17-20 Laughing-
Crying
X
LXVIII, 17-24 X Feast, Courtly 
Love, Juridical, 
Petrarchist
Amador de los Rios, 
sees in this an 
imitation of
Petrarch’s Sonnet 
320, "Sento I1aura 
mia antica, e i 
dolci colli", 
w. 12-14.
(Historia de la 
literatura espanola
VI, p. 499) (Paghs, 
P. 81)
XCIV, 67-68 X
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Q. Civil Structures
1. Bridge (see Geography, K:3)
2. Castle (see Geography, K:9)
3. Door (see Geography, K:6)
4. House (see Geography, K:8)
5. Pillar
Poem Main Subordinate Source
IV, 55-56 X Bread of Love
CIV, 189-192 X St. Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica 
III, 85, 3. (Pages 
p. 119)
CXXVII, 79-81 X
6. City
Poem Main Subordinate Source
XXIII, 33-36 Biblical X
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R. Commodities
1. Axe
Poem Main Subordinate Source
VII, 48 X
2. Bed
SourcePoem Main Subordinate
LXV, 29-30 Hostal of Love X
LXXXVII, 177-180 Power of Love X
LXXXVII, 177-280 Sick Man X, Eye
CII, 129-132 Fire X, Heat-Cold 
(Medical), Oven
CIII, 17-20 Robe X, Kre (Hot- 
Cold) , Animal
CXXI, 15-16 Bitter-Sweet X
3. 1
Poem
rable
Main Subordinate Source
XVI, 20-24 X Military
CIV, 247-248 Literary
Reference
X, Historical
CXV, 83-84 X
4. Vessel
Subordinate SourcePoem Main
C, 29-30 X Proverb
CXX, 13-14 X Proverb
CXXVII, 231-232 X •
5. Oven (see Love, A:5)
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Subordinate Source
6. Money-Gold
Poem Main
VI, 21-22 X
XV, 5-8 King
XVIII, 57-60 X
LXXXVII, 291-291 X
XCIV, 25-28 Fire
CIII, 59-60 X
CVI, 9 Folly
CVI, 33-36 Death
CVI, 39 X
CXX, 131-132 X
CXXVIII, 365 X
X, Proverb 
Music (Temprare)
X, Alchemy
Proverb
X
X, Old Man
Folly
7. Sword (see Military, F:2)
8. Closet (see Geography, K:7)
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S. Social Organization
1. King-Lord
Poem Main Subordinate Source
II, 1-8 X Sea, Ship, Castle, Folquet de Lunel,
Wind "Quant beutatz me
fetz de premier"
The editions referred 
to by Pages are 
inaccessible.
I am giving the 
indications found 
in his commentary.
The whole stanza 
beginning "E pren 
m’en cum al
marinier", in the 
edition of Eichelkraut, 
Berlin 1872. Also a 
verse of Cadenet,
"Plus que la naus 
ques en la mar 
prionda", in the 
edition of G.
Bertoni, "Rime 
Provenzali inedite", 
Studj di Filologia 
Romanza VIII, p. 440; 
and verses of Bertran 
Carbonel, "Ar suy 
en aital balansa / 
co* 11 nauchiers..." 
in C. Appel,
Provenzal Inedita,
p. 72. (Pages, 
p. 4). Bohigas 
only acknowledges 
the influence of 
Folquet de Lunel. 
(Bohigas II, p. 10)
VI, 23-24 X
VI, 26-28 Folly
VI, 29-32 Folly
X, 1-8 Military
XIII, 13-16 Historical
XV, 5-8 X
XV, 25-28 Mythological
X
X
X
X
Money, Proverb
X, Petrarchist, 
Fire
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King-Lord, (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
XXVII, 17-20 Servant X, Poison
XLV, 73-76 Power of Love X
LXIII, 5-6 X Servant
LXVIII, 1-8 Servant X, Child
LXXIV, 28 X Servant
LXXIV, 38 Courtly Love X, Servant
variant
XCII, 214 
in a
X
XCIX, 23-24 Prisoner X
C, 44 Servant X
C, 103-104 Death X, Servant
CI, 9-12 Eyes X, Servant, 
Castle
CI, 37-39 X
CII, 61-62 Prisoner X
Source
Gaucelm Faidit,
’’Sitot ai tarzat 
mon chen”, stanza 
IV, verses 35-36. 
(Raynouard, Choix 
III, p. 291);
Ramon J orda Breviari 
d ’Amor II, stanza 
449, vv. 28288­
28289 (I was unable 
to find an accessible 
edition of this work, 
and have therefore 
only repeated and 
clarified Pages1 
indications.); Oton 
de Granson "Complainte 
de Saint Valentin”, 
stanza VIII, verses 
57-60. (Arthur 
Piaget, Oton de 
Granson: Sa Vie
et ses Poesies,
Geneve: Payot,
1941, p. 185).(Pagis, p. 113-114)
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King-Lord (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate S ource
CIII, 41 X Servant
CIV, 53-56 Animal X, Proverb, 
Death
CIV, 214-216 X Death, Animal
CVI, 168 X Castle Seneca, ’’Epistula 
LXXIV” 19-20. 
(Pages, p. 125) 
(Bohigas IV, 
p. 157)
CIX, 5-8 Prisoner X
CXVII, 193-196 Fool X
CXXIII, 67 X Servant
CXXVII, 104-105 X Servant
CXXVII, 151-152 X Servant
2. Servant
Poem Main Subordinate
VI, 26-28 Jblly X
VIII, 25-28 Robber X
XXVII, 17-20 X King, Poison
LXIII, 5-6 King X
LXIV, 13-15 Courtly Love X, Rdligion of 
Love, Goddess
LXVIII, 1-8 X King, Child
Source
Guillaume le 
Clerc de Normandie, 
"Le Besant de Dieu" 
(L. Petit de 
Julleville,
Historie de la 
langue et
litterature 
francaise II,
Paris: A. Colin, 
1908, p. 196)
Peire Ramon de 
Tolosa, "Si com 
l’enfas qu’es 
alevatz petit"
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King-Lord (cont.)
P oem Main Sub ordinate Source
stanzas I-II. 
(Raynouard, Choix 
V, p. 326) (Paghs, 
p. 81) (Bohigas III, 
p. 78)
LXXIII, 41-42 X
LXXIV, 28 King X
LXXIV, 38 Courtly Love X, King
C, 44 X King
C, 103-104 Death X, King
CI, 9-12 Eyes X, Castle, King
CIII, 41 King X
CXVIII, 31-35 Miscellany X
CXXI, 56 X
CXXIII, 67 King X
CXXVII, 104-105 King X
CXXVII, 151-152 King X
CXXVII, 223 X
CXXVIII, 193 X
3. Juridical
Poem Main Sub ordinate
XXI, 33-36 Heart X
XXI, 43-44 X Death
XLIII, 17-24 Devil X, Feast
XLIX, 20-24 Biblical X, Blind, Dumbness, 
Power of Love, 
Proverb
L, 10-12 X Prisoner
LII, 5-8 God X, Death
LXII, 4-5 X Folly
Source
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Juridical (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate Source
LXVII, 33-36 Miscellany
(Stone)
X, Military,
Wound of Love,
Heart
LXVIII, 17-24 Solitude X, Feast, Courtly
Love, Petrarchist
LXXX, 1-2 Labourer Juridical
XCV, 21-22 X
C, 175 X
CV, 11-12 X Death
CXIII, 169-170 X
CXIII, 176 X
CXIII, 211-214 Bitter-Sweet X, Fortune
CXIX, 57-58 X Miscellany, Proverb
CXXV, 1-3 X
CXXVII, 169-170 X Death
CXXVIII, 421-423 Religious
(General)
X
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T. Miscellany
Poem Main Subordinate
XXXIV, 33-36 X (Weather)
XLI, 5-8 X (Good-Bad
Man)
XLII, 23-24 X (Wet Nurse) Cloth of Love
XLII, 25-32 X (Wet Nurse) Animal, Poison, 
Hair
LVII, 25-26 Death X (Rest), Proverb
LVIII, 9-12 Power of Love X (Colours), Eyes
LXVII, 33-36 X (Stone) Heart, Wound of 
Love, Military, 
Juridical
LXXV, 33-40 Mythological X (Flesh), Feast
LXXXVII, 15-16 X (Race)
XCII, 121-122 X (Weather)
XCIII, 29-32 Folly X (Veil), Biblical
CII, 103 X (Sawing)
CV, 147-148 Biblical X (Scythe), Death
CVI, 213-214 X (Father- 
Son)
CIX, 11-12 X (Price of 
Love)
CX, 5-8 X (Fortune­
Teller)
Death
CXI, 23 X (Colours)
CXII, 71-73 X (Stone)
CXIII, 156 X (Two Faces: 
Janus)
CXIII, 245-246 X (Chain)
CXIII, 249-250 • X (Weather)
CXIV, 44 X (Earth and 
Heaven)
CXVII, 209-212 X (Father-Son) Folly
Source
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Miscellany (cont.)
Poem Main Subordinate
CXVIII, 31-35 X (Evil) Servant
CXVIII, 59 X (Flesh,
Seven Lives)
CXIX, 57-58 Juridical X (Purse- 
Inheritance) , 
Proverb
CXX, 121-124 X (Weather)
CXXVII, 148 X (Glue) Power of Love
CXXVII, 280 Water X (Bath)
CXXVIII, 118-119 Death X (Hole)
CXXVIII, 230 X (Wood) Proverb
CXXVIII, 382-385 X (Milk)
CXXVIII, 488-491 Idol X (Veil)
CXXVIII, 557-566 X (Clever
Man)
Fire
CXXVIII, 664-666 Fire X (Possession 
Proverb
Source
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U. Proverbial Phrases
Owing to the philosophical nature of the proverbs, it is 
difficult to list them in the same way as normal poetic images, or
illustrations. I have, therefore, chosen to list them by quoting 
them and indicating similar proverbial phrases found in the Iberian 
repertoire. Hence, I have proceeded by first listing the poem and 
verses at which a proverbial phrase was found, then, if it was 
related to one of the image groupings from the "Index of Images"
I indicated this by listing the various headings under which it 
could be found and underlining the main one. If it was not listed 
previously under any heading I have indicated so with: "No
Classification".
I have quoted each proverb as it is found in Bohigas1 
edition of Ausias March’s poems. I found no substantial variations 
in the manuscripts and earlier editions. Therefore, I did not see 
fit to indicate slight variations which do not affect the meaning, 
or sense, of the text. Where applicable, I have listed, after each
quotation, Spanish proverbs which I consider to be ideologically and
thematically related to those used by Ausias March. Certain of the 
proverbs I have included convey a similar concept as that of Ausias 
March by using diametrically opposite elements. Such a case is 
Proverb VI, 43, in which the elements can be said to form a converse
structure to that used by Ausias March.
Although I have used various sources in this research, I 
found that all proverbs could be referred to by using as a standard 
source; Luis Martinez Kleiser, Refranero General Idedlogico Espanol. 
Madrid: Real Academia, 1953. Consequently, all proverbs referred 
to. in this index are listed according to their number in the 
Refranero General, which I have abbreviated to R.G,
Part of the choice for the "proverbs" was conditioned by a
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list of proverbial phrases found at page 113 of the first volume of 
Bohigas’ edition of the poems of Ausias March. Some of these items 
were previously in my own list. However, after much hesitation, I 
have included the examples chosen by Bohigas, although some did not 
seem proverbial to me; my dissatisfaction was partially confirmed 
by the fact that I was unable to find counterparts for any of these
in the ’’refraneros” X consulted.
I319-20 No Classification
Malament viu 
per enemich
qui te lo pensament 
fent-li d’enuyts report
R.G. 12.118; No hay carga mas pesada que tener la conciencia cargada
VI, 43 Bread; X, Polly
negre forment no dona blanca pasta
R.G. 61.436; Trigo centenoso, pan provechoso
VI, 44
ne 1’ase ranch
Animal; X, Polly
es animal corrent
VII, 1-2 No Classification
Si com rictat 
mas val aytant
no porta bens ab si 
com cell qui n’es senyor
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book I, V, 1095 b 14 - 1096 a 3
VII, 4 Musical; X
manxa bufant orgue fals no ret fi
VII, 13-16 Water; X, Folly
Mal pendrh pint en l’aygua sa figura: 
molt menys Amor pendr^ lo no dispost; 
ne pot estar l’aygua dins un loch rost: 
axi Amor en cap d’om foil atura!
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VII, 32 Biblical; X, Friendship
car viur* ab mals es d’om perdicio
Psalm I
VIII, 16 X; Folly
foil es perfet qui»s veu menys de follia
R.G. 37.089 Todo el mundo es casa de locos, y el que se cree
cuerdo es el mayor de todos.
R.G. 37.112 Entonces eres loco de veras cuando piensas que 
eres cuerdo.
VIII, 35-36
e si lo sol es 
si no es fret,
Sun; X
calt naturalment, 
no deu ser corregit.
XIV, _1- (8)
Malventuros
R.G. 59.253
R.G. 59.254
R.G. 59.256
Fortuna; X
no deu cerquar Ventura
No puede hombre huir su ventura.
No puede hombre huir su ventura, blanda ni dura. 
Contra fortuna no vale arte ninguna.
XV, 4
e be no val
No Classification
mas tant com es preat
XV, 5-8 King; X, Money
Rey pot ser dit 
per un petit 
e lo rich hom, 
gran suma d’or
lo pobre dins sa pensa 
do que*1 sia offert,
de larguesa desert, 
pobretat no»l defensa.
R.G. 55.646 Un rey es mas esclavo que un pxcaro descalzo.
XVI, 33 No Classification
Pejor que mort es vida sens plaer
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XVII, 37 No Classification
"Sens causa gran null acte gran se fa;"
XX, 25 No Classification
Cascun semblant ab son semblant se guarda.
Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, I, 1155 a 32, and 1155 b 7 (Pages, p. 29)
XXX, 9-10 No Classification
Ans del perill 
emprenent risch,
se deu fer lo cor fort; 
hom ha dels bons paria,
XXXII, 29-30 No Classification
Aytant es larch l’om menys de fer larguesa 
com es eschs si no fall en despendre
Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, vii, 1107 b 9 and v, 1106 a 6 (Pages, p. 
45-46).
XLI, 31-32 X; Biblical
Beneyt aquell 
e diu lo mal
qui»l be sa boca brama 
com be n’es conexent!
A general attempt to define the "good man" in biblical terms, this 
proverb seems to echo various- psalmic formulations of this concept, 
such as Psalm 26, with particular attention to verse 7.
XLIX, 20-24 Biblical; X, Blindness, Dumbness, Juridical, Power
of Love
per mi Amor son poder torna »n sella
Bohigas sees a proverb in this phrase (I, p. 112-113); I fail to do so.
LI, 32 No Classification
"sembren los bons cullen los mais e molen"
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LII, 1 X; Biblical
Clamar no-s deu qui mal cerqua e troba
Pages sees in this allusion to the biblical adagio "Quaerite et 
invenietis'' (Pages, p. 68), (St. Matthew VII, 7)
LIV, 25 X; Death
Viur* en delit port* ab si por de mort
R.G. 50.501 
el diablo.
Placer bueno baja del cielo; placer malo, subelo
R.G. 50.543 Huye del placer presente que te ha de pesar en lo 
siguiente.
R.G. 50.552 El fin del placer es principio del pesar.
R.G. 50.565 El contento en este mundo es fuego de canas; que 
es ceniza cuando apenas fue llama.
LVII, 25-26 No Classification
Del viure lonch ja sent lo gran repos
qui d’aquest curt lo viure avorreix;
LX, 28 No Classification
que tot perill se te»n molt gran bonanza
Bohigas considers this to be a proverb (I, p. 112-113).
LXIII, 12. No Classification
no ha lloguer qui no ha treballat.
R.G. 61.226 De Dios abajo, cada cual vive de su trabajo.
R.G. 61.267 Tras el trabajo viene el pago.
R.G. 61.274 Bien cena quien bien trabaja.
R.G. 61.280 Aunque entres en la vitta y sueltes el gaban, si no 
cavas, no te daran jornal.
R.G. 61.283 En casa del pobre, el que no trabaja, no come.
R.G. 61.284 En esta vida caduca, el que no trabaja, no coma.
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LXIII, 16 No Classification
sens tristor no* s pot alegrar
R.G. 50.554 No hay placer do no haya dolor.
LXIII, 25-26 No Classification
Apres lo mal, qui sent de be sabor 
no pot ser dit del tot malahuyrat;
LXVIII, 26
erbes no*s fan
Psalm I, 3
Landscape; X, Biblical
males en mon ribatge;
LXX, 55-56
ho’it e dir que 
si lonch espay
X; Path, Time
tot mal fa sa via, 
de temps es atenyent.
R.G. 60.529 Ganando tiempo, se gana todo.
LXXIV, 32
Malament viu
R.G. 25.268
Equestrian; X
qui n mal fer no te frens.
El buen freno, el mal caballo hace bueno
LXXIV, 47 No Classification
... (qui s penit grat no val)
LXXXIV, 13 No Classification
Sol per amor se desij* altr amor
LXXXV, 55-56 No Classification
de Deu es ja qui viu ab null despit, 
car lo pus rich del mon es pobrejant.
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LXXXVII, 170 Animal; X
De ardiment no pot sentir la labre!
R.G. 10.958 El cobarde es ledn en casa y lebre en la plaza.
R.G. 10.970 Quien no tiene corazon, huye como lebron.
XCI, 9-10 No Classification
Lobe d’Amor 
a l’amador,
clar demostr*ab lo dit, 
lo mal qui *1 es vinent;
R.G. 50.553 El placer es vispera del pesar.
XCI, 15-16 No Classification
grat, sobregrat e cambi»s favorx
e ranc es dret no »1 plau bregues partir.
XCII, 147 No Classification
qui»n terra jau, no tem pus aval caja:
R.G. 8.397 Quien no cae, no ha menester levantarse.
XCII, 214 Feast; X
fallint lo sant, defall la sua festa.
R.G. 24.681 Pasada la fiesta, el loco resta.
XCIII, 80 Time; X
temps minva •! mal, e lo be tots jorns creix.
R.G. 60.622 No hay mal que tanto dure que el tiempo no lo cure
XCIX, 92 Animal; X, Fool
a quatre peus deu anar qui no<u creu.
Bohigas considers this phrase to be proverbial (I, p. 112)
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C, 8 Path; X, Blindness
caure deu l’om, guiat per via cegua;
Bohigas sees a close association between C, 8 and XCIX, 56. (Bohig 
IV, p. 75)
C, 29-30 Vessel; X
Qui *n poch vexell molt gran cantitat penssa, 
no»s pot aver, car la natura passa;
C, 31-32 No Classification
qui vol rich 
lo seu desig
ser per una ma esquasa, 
de aver se deffenssa.
C, 71-72 No Classification
Tot quant es d’om 
situ fa per Ddu,
fa sa propia obra; 
sa vida ^s perfeta.
C, 101-102 Rich Man; X, Robber
A les honors 
a riques gens
grans penssamens sequexen; 
servex la roberia
R.G. 36.024 Ladrones roban millones, y son ;
R.G. 12.149 Para vivir a tus anchas, ten la 
ensanchas.
R.G. 5.688 Llegan a ser ricos los osados y 
en llegando, ya son nobles.
CII, 91-96 Folly; X, Feast, Agricultural 
Sweet
Di* abciach per solemnial col,
mas no del tot d’ignoranca*s conquest,
ans sab que may farta la sua fam,
desvergonyit a dar e pendre larch;
no*y ha boci que li pareg*amarch
Jqu& «s deu penssar de les pomes del ram?
R.G. 38.707 La manzana, por de fuera colorada, por de dentro 
no sana.
Bohigas remarks that this phrase in Ausias March’s work must be of 
popular origin. (Bohigas IV, p. 95)
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CIII, 8 No Classification
dins hom estb. lo seu be tot complit.
Seneca, "Epistula LXXIV": "Summum bonum in animo contineamus" 
(Bohigas IV, p. 100). (Pages, p. 116)
CIII, 59-60 Money; X
fugen del tot 
e pells diners
cobejan^a e por, 
a llur ostal venrran.
CIV, 56 Animal; X, King, Death
e no aquells havents en les mans ungles.
CIV, 84 Hunger; X
si que james fam se part de lur ventre,
R.G. 11.162 A la codicia no hay cosa que la hincha.
R.G. 11.178 De paja o de heno, mi vientre lleno.
Bohigas sees a proverb in this phrase, (I, p. 112); I fail to do so.
CIV, 157 Biblical; X, Robber
Ladre es vist qui ab ladres pratica;
Psalm I, 1-2
CIV, 240 Path; X
al atrevit lo mon cami ly obre
R.G. 5.674 A los osados ayuda la fortuna.
R.G. 5.675 Al hombre osado, la fortuna le da la mano.
CIV, 256 Animal.; X
un oronell l’estiu no denuncia
Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, VII, 1098 a 18. (Pages, p. 119) and 
(Bohigas IV, p. 119).
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CV, 80 Travelling; X
no te repos lo qui te fer viatge
R.G. 63.307 El camino no ha plazo.
CVI, 41 No Classification
Si be»a»n l’om, per lo mon l’a trobat.
CVI, 144 No Classification
dient d’aquest no stendre tant ses mans.
CVI, 165 No Classification
Ell vol tant l’om estrbnyer dins sa pell,
CVI, 443 Animal; X, Folly, Fortuna
ja no es bo, e mes pech es que ruch
R.G. 5.341 Asno mohino, malo de carga y peor de camino.
CVI, 476 No Classification
No es d’alt cor qui tras tai favor va.
R.G. 1.013 El que ha de besar al perro en el culo, no ha 
menester limpiarse mucho.
CVIII, 60 Folly; X
puys dins breu temps de blanch en negre*s
R.G. 59.471 La rueda de la fortuna, nunca es una.
CVIII, 64 Folly; X, Wind, Biblical, Petrarchist
Foil es aquell qui*l vent fermar volia
R.G. 59.477 La fortuna es un montoncillo de arena:., un viento 
la trae y otro se la lleva.
R.G. 59.485 A la Fortuna mas presto la hallaras que la detenras
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Bohigas thinks that this is a proverbial phrase. (Bohigas I, p. 112­
113, and IV, p. 173). It may also refer to St. John III, 8. I am 
also inclined to think that it is a literary reference, either to one 
of the many medieval Simal Magus legends, possibly one based on Book
II of the Recognitions in which Simon Magus claims to have made a 
spirit out of air, or a direct reference to Sopater, a disciple of 
Iamblichus “executed under - Constantine on a charge of putting a spell 
on the winds" (E.S. Bouchier, Syria as a Roman Province, Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1916, p. 231). See, also under Folly, C.
CVIII, 79-80 Robe; X, Death
Del hom vestit mal pendre fa despulla;
menys es de fer, toire’l ans que la prenga.
R.G. 13.894 Mudar costumbre el viejo cuestale el pellejo.
CVIII, 88 No Classification
mes prop li es lo plorar que lo riure.
Bohigas considers this to be a proverb. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113).
CXII, 50 Death; X, Equestrian
tu est al hom com al cavall mordaces
R.G. 42.275 Adonde quiera que corrieres, alii te 
la muerte.
encontrara
R.G. 42.276 Andes por aquf, andes por alii, el paradero es 
morir.
R.G. 42.285 La muerte todo lo ataja.
CXII, 110 Animal; X
En semblant cas lo led torna lebre.
R.G. 10.958 El cobarde es leon en casa y liebre en la plaza.
CXII, 373 Lameness; X
lo mon sequeix e no ab coxa cama.
Bohigas sees a proverb in this phrase. (I, p. 112-113)
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CXII, 377-378 Book; X
a<;b es test auctentieh, menys de gloses,
que no-s da buyt en la msLchina plena.
"Non dari vacuum in natura". (Pages, p. 136) (Bohigas V, p. 32)
CXIII, 1-4 Literary Reference; X
La vida»s breu
l’esperiment 
1'enteniment, 
al juhi d’hom
e l’art se mostra longa;
defall en tota cosa; 
en lo mon no reposa; 
la veritat s’allonga.
Hipocrates. Aphorismi III, 49. (Pages, p. 137) (Bohigas V, p. 43)
CXIII, 171 God; X, Laughing-Crying, Biblical
Ja veig estar a Deu pie de rialles.
Bohigas considers this to be a proverb. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113). 
As I pointed out in the index this proceeds from Psalms II, 4 and 
XXXVII, 13.
CXV, 59-60 Bond of Love; X
Quant nos pensam qu»ens leixa, ell nos toca;
ab un fil prim se tira una roca.
Bohigas remarks that this is a proverb (Bohigas V, p. 59).
CXVII, 1-2 Animal; X
la cinquen peu 
yo he cercat
del molto ab gran cura 
e no«n te sino quatrel-
Pages remarks that this is a common French proverb, "chercher cinq 
pieds a un mouton". (Pages, p. 141). Bohigas also claims that this 
is a proverbial- phrase. I remember hearing a Peruvian gentleman 
exclaim that literary critics, "buscan la quinta pata al gato".
CXVII, 112 Robe; X, Classical
per l’abit pres, que si pel rau no squin^a
R.G. 13.894 Mudar costumbre el viejo cuestale el pellejo. 
(Closely related to CVIII, 79)
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CXVIII, 74 Bond of Love; X
pensant que fuig, lo lla<£ al coll s’enlla^a
CXVIII, 91-92 Historical; X, Literary Reference
Per lo garro que lo rey veu de Caba 
se mostr»Amor, que tot quant vol acaba.
R.G. 3.737 El amor lo vence todo.
R.G. 3.738 . El amor todo lo puede; o todo lo vence.
R.G. 3.743 Todo lo vence amor.
CXIX, 58 Juridical; X, Miscellany
tai heretat, de la bossa tan pobra.
Bohigas considers this to be a proverb. (Bohigas I, p. 112-113)
CXX, 13-14 Vessel; X
Si com vexell no pot mes recollir
despuix qu»ds pie -tot l’hls per&re’s covd-,
CXX, 124 Miscellany; X
no*y fa empaig any cech o si molt plou.
CXII b, 23 Folly; X, Animal
mes am anar en part hon rompa*1 coll.
CXXVII, 115-117 Hunger; X, Agricultural Reference
mas qui menja carts no deju
e qui no pren conduyt algu 
mor-se de fam.
CXXVII, 230 Tree; X
D’un arbre bort volguf bon fruyt,
R.G. 5.152 Arbol que no frutea, bueno es para lefta.
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R.G. 5.153
R.G. 5.156
Arbol que no frutes nadie lo tenga en su huerta. 
£rbol sin fruto, digote lena.
CXXVIII, 230 Miscellany; X
L’om es de earn e no de fust)
Bohigas sees a relation between the above verse, and CXIV, 87. 
(Bohigas V, p. 182)
CXXVIII, 664-666 lire; X, Miscellany
Los altres bens, de altre son,
car son de natura o del mon,
e lo saber es casi fum;
Bohigas sees a relation between these verses and, CVI, 177-184, 
321-456. (Bohigas V, p. 185)
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Onomastic Index of Sources
Aimeric, 605
Alagno, Lucrezia d*, 581
Alfons el Magnanim, 581
Anonymous,"Sui e no suy, fuy e no fuy", 506
Aristotle, "De coelo", 607; Nicomachean Ethics, 514, 521b, 523, 540, 
557, 559, 563, 578, 590, 594, 596, 597, 602, 603, 620, 622, 627
St. Augustine, Confessions, 606
Beauvais, Voncent de, Speculum Naturale, 536
Bertran de Born, 583, 604
Bestiaris Catalans, 557
Bible, "Acts", 574; "Corinthians", 578; "Ecclesiastes", 577; "Jeremiah", 
578; "Genesis", 575; "Job", 574, 575, 577, 578; "Psalms", 514, 529, 
560, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 621, 622, 624, 630; "Song of Songs", 
551, 574; "St. John", 515, 577, 578, 590; "St. Luke", 502, 575, 577; 
"St. Matthew", 577, 578, 579, 623
Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, 573
Breviari d'Amor, see Jorda, Ramon
Brunet, Hughes, 605
Cabestany, Guillem de, 527
Cadenet, 612
Calanson, Guiraut de, 498, 508, 510 
Calixt III, Pope, 581 
Cancionero de Stuniga, 545
Carbonel, Bertran, 612
Catullus, 552
Chartier, Alain, 605
Cino da Pistoia, 555
St. Clement, see Recognitions.
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Crates the Cynic, 600
Daniel, Arnaut, 515, 558
Dante Alighieri, Divina Commedia, 520, 527, 542, 545, 546, 548, 571, 
572, 582, 607; Vita Nuova, 556, 571
Diogenes the Cynic, 600
Epicure, 605
Ermengau, Matfre, 605
Espanhol, Peire, 530
Faidit, Gaucelm, 501, 613
Faules isopiques, 556
Faustinus, see Recognitions.
"Fontefrida, Fontefrida”, 558
Fournival, Richard de, Le Bestiare d1Amour, 556, 557
St. Francis Assisi, 527
Girona, Cerveri de, 554
Glanville, Bartomeu, De propretatibus rerum, 557
Granson, Oton de, 504, 507, 613
Guido Guinizelli, 552
Guillaume le Clerc de NormanbLe, 614
Jorda, Ramon, Breviari d*Amor, 554, 613
Julidn, Conde don, 581
Juvenal, "Satire XII", 556, 600
Hippocrates, Aphorismi, 536, 573, 630
Horace, 592
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La Cava, 580
Lille, Alain de, Anticlaudianus, 510
Lo Fasset, 577
Lull, Ramon, "Arbre de filosofia d’Amor”, 499; "Doctrina Pueril", 542 
Lunel, Folquet de, 612 
Lusignan, Janus de, 580
March, Pere, 607
Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, 536
Marseilles, Folquet de, 513
Nicolau, Guillem, 582
Ovid, general, 583; Heroides, 582; Metamorphoses, 498, 507, 508, 520, 
562, 580, 582; Remedia Amoris, 507
Petrarch, 516, 518, 552; Remedii utriusque Fortunae; Rime, 552, 557, 
558, 568, 584, 585-8, 608; "Triumphus Cupidinis", 581, 582, 586, 
587, 604
Peire Ramon de Tolosa,
Rhythmus de Contemptu Mundi, 574, 579
Recognitions of St. Clement, 600
Rodrigo, 581
Rogier, Peire, 558
Le Roman de Lancelot, 572
Roman de la Rose, 498, 568
Rufinus of Aquilea, see Recognitions.
Saint Victor, Hughes de, "De bestiis et aliis rebus", 557; Commentary 
on Ecclesiastes, 547, 548; "De Unione Corporis et Spiritus", 507, 
508
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Sant Jordi, Jordi de, 518, 567, 585, 586
Santillana Marquds de, 543
Seneca, 514; "Consolatio ad Helviam... ad Marciam... ad Polybium”, 
573; "De vita beata", 507; ’’Epistula LXX”, 530, 544, 571, 572, 
579; “Epistula LXXIV", 614, 627; "Epistula XC", 600; "Epistula 
XCIX", 549; ’’Phedra'^ 582.
Simon Magus, see Recognitions.
Sordel, 605
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 515, 523, 532, 542, 548, 563, 
572, 577, 579, 600, 608, 609
Turmeda, Anselm, Disputa del Ase, 558
Ventadorn, Bernat de, 537, 552
Vergil (general), 582; Aeneid, 510, 582; Eglogues, 555 
Vilaragut, 582
St. Vincent Ferrer, 557
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Select Bibliography
Owing to the scope of this thesis a complete bibliography would fill 
another one hundred pages, needlessly. I have, therefore, chosen to 
limit it to works specifically quoted in the thesis. This bibliography 
is divided into two parts. The first concerns Ausias March, primary 
and secondary sources. The second part refers to other works referred 
to in the course of this thesis, and is again divided into primary 
and secondary sources. For Ausias March, except for key works, I 
have limited references to works not listed in the bibliography of 
the first volume of Pere Bohigas’ critical edition, which stops at 
1952. I have also only listed certain recent editions in the primary 
sources. Manuscripts and early editions, seme of which I consulted 
out of curiosity in Barcelona and Edinburgh, are described in Pages’ 
excellent study of the manuscript tradition in the first volume of 
his edition.
Ausias March : Primary Sources
Poesies I-V. (ed.) Pere Bohigas. Barcelona: Barcino 
(Els Nostres Classics), 1952-1958.
Obra poetica completa I-II. (ed. and trans.) Rafael 
Ferreres. Madrid: Castalia, 1979.
Poesia. (ed.) Joan-Ferrater. Barcelona: Edicions 62 
(La Caixa), 1979.
Les Poesies d’Ausias March, (ed.) Joan Ferrater. Barcelona: 
Edicions Quaderns Crema, 1979.
Antologia poetica. (ed. and trans.) J oanj • Fus ter. B ar celona: 
Selecta, 1959.
Obra poetica. (ed. and trans.) Pere Gimferrer,(intro.)
J. Molas. Madrid: Alfagara, 1978.
Les Obres d’Auzias March I-II, (ed.) Amedeu Pag'es. 
Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1912.
Selected Poems, (trans.)A. Terry. Edinburgh: University 
Press, 1976.
Secondary Sources
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